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Part I. 
Introduction 
Importance of the issue and aims of the study 
The idea of the topic of this thesis arose for several interconnected 
reasons. The first reason was the accession of Latvia to the European 
Union, which brought about changes in the Latvian legal system by 
introducing EU law. The second reason was the introduction of explicit 
sex equality norms into Latvian legislation because of obligations under 
the EC Treaty. The third was lack of awareness of society in Latvia about 
the presence of discrimination on grounds of sex, and the 
disadvantageous position of women in the labour market and as regards 
financial resources and about the urgency and significance of this topic 
not only in the context of human rights, but also of economic interests.  
Although formally women and men have the same rights, 
nevertheless frequently men and women are in different positions and 
possesses different resources for exercising those formally equal rights1, 
which leads to inequality, largely defined by stereotypes governing in 
society and creating hidden social obstacles. Several statistical data testify 
to the presence of discrimination based on sex in the labour market and 
demonstrate the disadvantages which the average Latvian woman faces. 
Although on average women in Latvia have a better education2, 
nevertheless they are paid on average 16% less than men3. The 
employment rate of men is 7% higher4. On average, women occupy 
lower posts5 and perform work in occupations which are lower paid6. 
Women in Latvia spend twice as long as men every week on unpaid 
home, family, and child-rearing duties7. Summing up, work and family 
duties show that women on average work longer hours, but earn less. 
Data on other EU Member States varies8, but none of them has attained 
equality of the sexes in the employment market.  
The principle of equal treatment as regards human rights is 
important to Latvia in as much as it testifies to the level of democracy of 
                                                 
1 Lynn M.Rosebery, The Limits of Employment Discrimination Law in the United States and European 
Community, DJOF Publishing 1999, at page 354. 
2 Results of the 2000 population and housing census in Latvia, Central Statistical Bureau in Latvia, 
Riga, 2002. 
3 Equality between women and men in the European Union, European Commission, Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publication of the European Communities, 2005. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Profesiju apsekojuma rezultāti Latvijā 2004.gada oktobrī, Republikas Centrālā statistikas pārvalde, 
Rīga, Jūlijs 2005. 
6 Darbaspēka apsekojuma galvenie rādītāji 2004.gadā, Latvijas Republikas Centrālā statistikas 
pārvalde, Rīga, Maijs 2005. 
7 Latvijas iedzīvotāju laika izlietojums 2005, Republikas Centrālā statistikas pārvalde, Rīga, 2005. 
8 Equality between women and men in the European Union, European Commission, Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publication of the European Communities, 2005. 
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the country and consequently raises the authority of Latvia as a country 
which respects common values of humanity. This is because it allows any 
person residing in or visiting there to feel respected and protected from 
unjust treatment.  Just treatment makes people feel safe and comfortable. 
People who feel comfortable act more productively and enjoy a better 
state of health. 
However, human rights are not the only dimension of the principle 
of equal treatment. A more significant dimension is the economic one. 
Since the whole of Europe suffers from ageing, the need exists for a 
workforce. Increasing women’s employment rate is one way to overcome 
this problem. This is one of the major goals of the Lisbon strategy9. But 
there is also a need for an increase of the birth-rate, in order to provide a 
workforce in the future. Factors that impede birth-giving are many. But 
the most important concerns the division of roles between the sexes. The 
traditional patriarchal division of roles where man is the bread-winner but 
woman is the home and child-carer does not fit within today’s reality. It 
contradicts the goal of the Lisbon strategy and the needs of today’s 
woman. Since women are more educated, they see that they are able to 
contribute to society through work outside the home. This is also 
important from the perspective of financial independence, taking into 
account the proportion of single mothers10 and serial monogamy as 
dominating family structure, when women themselves to a great extent 
must provide their children with financial means11. So women want a 
career and financial stability in order to give birth.  
                                                 
9 See homepage of European Commission, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/employment_strategy/index_en.htm  
10 Results of the population census in Latvia in 2000, 1/3 of children in Latvia were growing up in 
single-parent families the absolute majority of which are mothers. Results of the 2000 population and 
housing census in Latvia, Central Statistical Bureau in Latvia, Riga, 2002. 
11 For example, the State Fund of Alimony provides more than 16 500 children with alimony, because 
one of their parents is not able or most frequently is not willing to provide the child with financial 
means. The majority of claimants are mothers who are raising children alone. Only 256 are fathers. See 
in this regard Bargāk vērsīsies pret aliment nemaksātājiem, portāls www.delifi.lv , 04.08.2006, 
available at http://www.delfi.lv/archive/print.php?id=15160713&categoryID=193. 
Recent research on the possibility to obtain sufficient alimony via the court process is problematic, 
since national courts fail to estimate the real financial situation of defendant parents, which are usually 
fathers. This leads to the situation that women after divorce frequently have to maintain children by 
themselves. See research “Sieviešu un bērnu tiesību īstenošana laulības šķiršanas gadījumos Latvijas 
tiesu praksē”, portal www.politika.lv, at http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=9912  
Common social inclusion memorandum, portal of Ministry of Welfare www.lm.gov.lv , at 
http://www.lm.gov.lv/doc_upl/LMMemorandsLV_230104.doc , provides that in Latvia a group which 
is especially endangered by the risk of poverty is families where women alone raise children. 
Rūta Kesnere, „Visiem jābūt vienādām iespējām” (All have to have equal opportunities), newspaper  
„Latvijas Vēstnesis”, 19.05.2004., p.B4, state official Sanita Zaksa of Ministry of Welfare recognizes 
that  
“In society, there is strong concept that man has to earn more because he has to maintain 
his family. Statistics show that in Latvia there is a large number of divorced families 
where exactly the women maintain children. Besides frequently they do not receive any 
financial support from the man – “breadwinner of the family””. 
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Besides, more and more young fathers are starting to reconsider 
their bread-winner role and instead they want to participate in equally 
shared child-rearing. Those needs of society may be accommodated only 
via respective social protection during special protection periods, a stable 
employment relationship and the possibility to effectively reconcile work 
and family life. In order to provide this, stereotypes and discrimination in 
labour market must be eliminated.  
Notwithstanding that, an important role here is played by the aspect 
of fair competition within the common market, which forms the basis for 
the whole idea of the EC and subsequent EU. This was actually the main 
reason why equality provisions appeared in the EC Treaty in 1958. That 
was due to the French fear that since they have an obligation to pay to 
their employees equal pay for the same work irrespective of the sex of the 
worker, they could suffer a competitive disadvantage, because other 
signatory states may legitimately pay women less than men for the same 
work12. Since that time, the principle of equal treatment between men and 
women has been recognized as a fundamental principle of the EC13 and 
provided as an aim and horizontal priority by the EC Treaty14.   
Taking into account all the reasons mentioned, the first aim of this 
thesis is to research whether EC sex equality law and related law as 
regards labour and social rights are implemented into the Latvian legal 
system properly. In order to do so, the thesis describes and analyses the 
main EC sex equality law concepts such as direct and indirect 
discrimination, concepts of equal pay, equal treatment and social security 
as well as the concept of self-employed person under EC sex equality 
law.  One section is dedicated to the most important issue of any law 
system, which is enforcement and remedies under EC law. Research and 
analysis on EC sex equality law and related law as provided by EC 
legislative acts and case-law of the ECJ serves as the basis for analysis of 
Latvian labour and social security law in order to verify whether Latvia 
has fully, properly and precisely fulfilled obligations arising out of the EC 
Treaty as regards implementation of EC sex equality law and related EC 
law as regards employment and social rights. The section on concepts of 
equality and non-discrimination analyses the construction of equality law 
from the perspective of legal theory in international, EC and Latvian legal 
systems. This is of great importance as regards the second aim of this 
study, since the legal theory of each legal system forms a basis for further 
construction of concepts of equality and non-discrimination and in 
                                                 
12 Paul Craig/Grainne De Burca, EU Law, (2003), 3rd edition,Oxford University Press, at page 846. 
13 Case 149/77, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena, European 
Court Reports 1978 Page 01365, para. 27. See also Principles of European Constitutional Law, edited 
by Armin von Bogdandy and Jurgen Bast, Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2006 at pages 130-132.
14 Articles 2 and 3(2) EC Treaty. 
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particular provides for a legal basis, under what conditions and norms a 
legal system accommodates biological differences between both sexes 
and to what extent it is able to catch socially-construed differences and 
thus exhaust inequality. Since EC sex equality law provides for minimum 
requirements, the aim of this study is not only to analyse the aptitude of 
Latvian law to EC sex equality law, but also to find ways to improve the 
Latvian legal system in order to promote sex equality.  
Birth of a child and the consequences arising is considered a key 
aspect of sex inequality15. This is recognized by a number of EC policy16 
and legislative documents17. Those documents show that the problem of 
low birth-rate is also seen in the light of sex equality. In particular, 
today’s labour market necessitates an equal parenting approach, by 
involving fathers in child-care and allowing workers of either sex to 
effectively combine work and family life.   
Rights connected with child-birth in Latvia is a hot topic presently 
but only because of the low birth rate and consequent negative effect on 
the economics of Latvia, taking into account the fact that Latvia has the 
fastest growing economy in the EU18 and that a considerable part of the 
workforce flows to work in old Member States, while at home there is a 
shortage of workers.  The first step taken towards increase of the birth-
rate was a considerable increase of child-birth and child-care allowances. 
Reform of allowances did not result in a considerable birth rate, because 
child-birth allowance is extraordinary, but child-care allowance provides 
                                                 
15 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 2, paragraph 2, 
argues: 
“The primary causes for a woman’s career-interruption and reduced professional 
availability include: childbirth, breastfeeding and childrearing. Childbirth and 
breastfeeding are biologically imposed on the mother and temporarily prevent her from 
contributing to the world of paid labour. On top of that, female workers still tend to take 
leaves of absence (or quit jobs) more often than men do to raise children. As a 
consequence, the expected return to the company from the average woman seems lower 
than that of the average man. Even women who do not actually plan to have a family 
may suffer from employers’ stereotypic belief that women interrupt their careers to have 
and raise children. This is called statistical discrimination.” 
16 See for example Resolution of the Council and of the Ministers for employment and social policy, 
meeting within the Council of 29 June 2000 on the balanced participation of women and men in family 
and working life (2000/C 218/02), OJ C 218/5, 31.07.2000. or A Road Map for Equality between 
Women and Men 2006-2010, European Commission, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities, 2006.  
17 See for example, Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the 
principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocation training 
and promotion, and working conditions, OJ L 269, 05.10.2002. p. 15-20 and Directive 2006/54/EC of 
the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the implementation of the principle of 
equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation 
(recast), OJ L 204, 26.07.2006. p. 23 – 36. 
18 LETA ziņu dienests, PB prognozes par Latvijas ekonomikas attīstību eksperti vērtē kā pārāk 
optimistiskas, 26.07.2006., portālā www.delfi.lv,  
http://www.delfi.lv/archive/print.php?id=11803199&categoryID=159  
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financial means at the proper level only until the child-reaches one year. 
This reform did not provide any long-term family policy. So it has 
resulted in several cases before the Constitutional Court of Latvia, in one 
of which prohibition of combining paid child-care leave and part-time 
work was successfully contested, and recognition by the Government19 of 
the fact of a total shortage of kindergartens resulting in compelled 
unemployment of parents which would otherwise help to resolve the 
problem of shortage of workforce. 
The author argues that the current problem of policy on raising the 
birth-rate is lack of respect to the present needs of today’s women and the 
economic situation of the majority of families in Latvia. In particular, it 
fails to take into account the different effect of child-birth on men’s and 
women’s life, to provide measures offsetting that difference and the 
possibility of effective reconciliation of work and family life. In other 
words, it fails to see the low birth-rate problem from the perspective of 
sex equality. While this remains so, no policy on increase of birth-rate 
will be successful. It will remain low, the majority of children will be 
born in families with low income,20 and the unemployment rate among 
women after child-care leave will be as high as it stands now21. Besides, 
discrimination against women within the labour market in general will 
remain present. 
Thus the second aim of this thesis is to research how the birth of a 
child affects employment and social rights of their parents, because the 
birth of a child is the key aspect of sex inequality in the labour market 
and as regards social security rights. Almost all inequalities between the 
sexes arise due to birth of a child, because of the distinct ways it affects 
the mother’s and father’s life due to biological and socially construed 
differences between the sexes. This thesis will analyse to what extent the 
present law is able to accommodate biological differences between the 
sexes and at the same time guarantee equality of outcome as regards 
economic and social rights.  
In this regard, it is also important to recognize the provisions of 
law reflecting mere socially construed differences between the sexes 
having a distinct effect on lives of men and women. Recognition of 
problems in this field will serve as a basis for respective proposals on 
how to improve the law in order to eliminate social stereotypes from the 
law as such and in order to help overcome stereotypes prevailing in 
                                                 
19 Ministru prezidenta 2006.gada 3.augusta rīkojums Nr.391 „Par darba grupu pasākuma plāna izstrādei 
jaunu bērnudārzu būvniecībai”//Latvijas Vēstnesis 125, 08.08.2006. Since in Latvia more than 15 000 
children are waiting in line for a kindergarten, the President of Ministers ordered a common action plan 
to be elaborated for building new kindergartens. 
20 Sanita Jemberga, Brīvpusdienas – lūdzu, dzīvokli – nē//Diena, Nr.186(4626), 12.08.2006. 
21 On May 2006 12.3% of unemployed persons comprise women after child-care leave. Komersanta 
Vēstnesis, 2006/52(31), Latvijas Vēstnesis, 16.lpp. 
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society. Elimination of stereotypes in the field of rights connected with 
birth of a child would help to offset the difference of treatment between 
the sexes in the labour market and the consequent effect on social rights. 
It would allow men to participate in child-rearing and thus strengthen the 
family, while women will be more confident about their position in the 
labour market and financial stability, which will logically result in an 
increase of birth-rate.  
Finally, taking into account the first and second reasons for 
choosing this topic, the sub-aim of this thesis is - after translation into 
Latvian - to provide lawyers in Latvia with information on EC sex 
equality law, the interpretation given by the ECJ and correct application 
of Latvian law.  
  
Scope of the study 
Ratione personae of the thesis cover rights to equal treatment of workers, 
self-employed and unemployed persons as regards employment and 
social rights. Ratione materiae include analysis of EC sex equality law in 
the field of labour and social law as provided by Article 141 of the EC 
Treaty, Directives 75/11722, 76/20723, 79/724, 86/37825, 86/61326 and 
97/8027 and respective case-law of the ECJ giving interpretation of those 
legislative provisions as well as defining general principles of EC law, 
such as in the field of enforcement and remedies of EC law state liability 
or indirect effect.  
                                                 
22 Council Directive 75/117/EEC of 10 February 1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member 
States relating to the application of the principle of equal pay for men and women, OJ L 045, 
19.02.1975, p.0019-0020. 
23 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion,  
and working conditions, OJ L 39, 14.02.1976 P.0040-0042 and Directive 2002/73/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 
February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as 
regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion,  and working conditions, OJ L 269, 
05.10.2002. p. 15-20. 
24 Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the 
principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security, OJ L 006, 10.01.1979 
P.0024-0025. 
25 Council Directive 86/378/EEC of 24 July 1986 on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women in occupation social security schemes, OJ L 225, 12.08.1986. P.0040-
0042 and Council Directive 96/97/EC of 20 December 1996 amending Directive 86/378/EEC on the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in occupational social security 
schemes, OJ L 046, 17.02.1997. P.0020-0024. 
26 Council Directive 86/613/EEC of 11 December 1986 on the application of the principle of equal 
treatment between men and women engaged in an activity, including agriculture, in a self-employed 
capacity, and on protection of self-employed women during pregnancy and motherhood, OJ L 359, 
19.12.1986 P.0056-0058. 
27 Council Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination 
based on sex, OJ L 014, 20.01.01998. P.0006-0008. 
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However, EC sex equality law formally does not comprise 
Directives 92/8528 and 96/34,29 which nevertheless directly affect sex 
equality. This thesis will put special stress on analysis of those documents 
and their place and effect on EC sex equality law and sex equality in real 
life. Recently, Recast Directive 2006/54/EC30 has had the effect of 
unifying Directives 75/117, 76/207, 86/378 and 97/80 and codifying case-
law of the ECJ as well as having several new features in the field of sex 
equality. Changes in the field of EC sex equality law provided by Recast 
Directive 2006/54/EC will be briefly analysed in a separate section. 
Directive 2004/11331 will be analysed only as far as it reinforces and 
supplements Directive 86/613.  
  Latvian law will be analysed as far as it is covered by EC sex 
equality law already mentioned from the perspective of proper 
implementation and Latvian national law regulates special protection 
during pregnancy, maternity, paternity and child-care leave and after it 
going beyond the scope of EC law from the perspective of sex equality. 
Rights of unemployed persons under Latvian law will be discussed as far 
as they are covered under Directive 79/7. Although Directive 86/378 also 
covers unemployed persons and persons seeking employment, 
nevertheless there are no such occupational social security schemes in 
Latvia which would be applicable to them. Latvian law analysed 
comprises not only legislative documents, but also cases decided by 
Latvian national courts and writings of Latvian layers and scholars. As 
regards EC law, not only legislative documents and case-law of the ECJ 
but also a variety of writings of scholars will be used. 
In order to give a full picture on existing sex equality law and 
existing obligations of the Member States of the EU, according to their 
international obligations, which falls outside the scope of EC law, the 
thesis will recall respective international law documents providing for 
equality. However, the thesis will not give a thorough analysis of 
international sex equality law because of limited space. The aim of 
recalling international sex equality law is to compare in general its 
provisions with EC sex equality and demonstrate the far-reaching effect 
of EC sex equality law in comparison to international sex equality law.  
                                                 
28 Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently 
given birth or are breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of 
Directive 89/391/EEC), OJ L 348, 28.11.1992 P.0001-0008. 
29 Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded 
by UNICE, CEEP and the EUTC, OJ L 145, 19.06.1996 P.0004-0009. 
30 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in 
matters of employment and occupation (recast), OJ L 204, 26.07.2006. p. 23 – 36. 
31 Council Directive 2004/113 of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services, OJ L 373/37, 21.12.2004. 
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As regards analysis of the key aspect of EC sex equality law  - 
rights of the sexes affected by birth of a child - this will comprise the 
period of the whole pregnancy, maternity, paternity and child-care leave, 
the period of breastfeeding and a short period after child-care leave, in 
which a person may suffer disadvantages as regards non-acquired social 
security rights during that leave. Because of limited space, the thesis will 
not specially analyse such important aspect of sex equality as the effect 
on rights of both sexes of the socially-construed stereotype of the child-
raising obligation put on women throughout their lives.  
Materials used for this study comprise law documents and 
publications in Latvian and English. Law documents cover international, 
EC and Latvian legal instruments – legislative acts, case-law of the ECJ 
and Latvian national courts, one case on sex equality matters delivered by 
the European Court of Human Rights, explanatory or soft law documents, 
such as recommendations under international and EC law. Since some 
part of policy documents sooner or later becomes law, EC and Latvian 
policy documents are used to illustrate EC and Latvian policy in the field 
of sex equality.  
There is a significant amount of writing on EC sex equality policy 
and sex equality and related law, especially on case-law of the ECJ.  The 
author of this thesis will use a selection of those writings, mainly 
concerning analysis of the case-law of the ECJ published in the form of 
articles by the biggest European law journals, and books published by the 
biggest European publishers. As regards Latvian legal writings, there is 
not a significant amount of these as regards labour law and no writings on 
Latvian sex equality law, except those published by the author of this 
thesis. In order to acquaint the reader with the state of sex equality issues 
in everyday life, sources providing for statistics and different kinds of 
research are used. Analysis reflects the state of normative acts and 
literature published up to August 2006, when the main research was 
completed.   
 
Method 
Since one of the aims of this thesis is to research proper implementation 
of EC sex equality law and related law within the Latvian legal system, 
an appropriate method must be used. The comparative method in its 
traditional sense compares two independent legal systems32. Although the 
EC and Latvian legal systems are subordinated, nevertheless in order to 
recognize whether EC law is properly implemented into the Latvian legal 
system no other method than the comparative may be used.  
                                                 
32 Konrad Zweigert, Hein Kotz, Introduction to Comparative Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 3rd 
edition, 1998. 
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However, for this special purpose some elements of methodology 
depart from the traditional notion of the comparative method, but it still 
contains common elements. There is almost no problem to find two 
objects33 each coming from superior and subordinated legal systems 
sharing common features, because of references in national law on what 
EC law document is intended to introduce by that national provision. This 
work is also reduced by the fact that the EC Treaty and EC directives 
presently give quite exhaustive definitions of main sex equality law 
concepts and the fact that Latvian law presents a continental law system 
which provides legislative norms by statutes.  
So in general, in order to implement EC law within the Latvian 
legal system, definitions given by EC law must be transformed almost 
unchanged into national law. Problems arise where the ECJ has 
elaborated in course of interpretation of concepts provided by EC 
legislative acts and regarding enforcement and remedy measures which is 
left for the competence of each Member State. However, it is true that 
mere grammatical comparison does not give an answer on the subject of 
proper implementation. In order to ensure proper implementation, the 
practical effect and application of implemented provisions must be 
detected. Only such analysis may guarantee thoroughness of research on 
implementation. Further analysis on gaps in the Latvian legal system as 
regards failure to implement EC law properly will be analysed from a 
critical point of view. 
The second aim of the thesis is to recognize deficiencies of EC and 
Latvian national sex equality law and related law as regards their ability 
to exhaust de facto discrimination. For this purpose, the critical method 
will be used. Critical methods represent several movements. Critical legal 
studies emerged at the end of the 1980’s in the United States and 
represent the view that existing legal doctrine and practices of legal 
institutions represents application of law which is “biased in favour of 
economically and socially privileged elites, but ignore relations in the 
reality of life. Feminist critiques deal with understanding the concept of 
equality and whether it provides adequate means for elimination of 
inequality. In order to catch discriminatory practices existing in real life 
its task is to elaborate equality law concepts which would allow claiming 
equal treatment of the sexes not only where they are in similar situations, 
but also in different situations such as pregnancy34. The author of the 
thesis will mainly criticize law from the feminist perspective. Besides, the 
author uses analytical, inductive and deductive methods.  
                                                 
33 Lynn M.Rosebery, The Limits of Employment Discrimination Law in the United States and 
European Community, DJOF Publishing 1999, at page 7. 
34 Lynn M.Rosebery, The Limits of Employment Discrimination Law in the United States and 
European Community, DJOF Publishing 1999, at pages 352-364. 
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Structure 
The structure of the thesis is built in order to provide reader friendly 
material taking into account that not all lawyers are familiar with issues 
of sex equality and especially with EC sex equality law consisting also of 
a considerable number of judgments delivered by the ECJ. The present 
Chapter or Chapter I introduces the reader to the importance of the topic 
analysed, defines the aim and scope of the study, as well as providing the 
methodology and terminology used in the course of the thesis.    
Chapter II first defines, describes and analyses EC law including 
case-law of the ECJ as regards main sex equality law concepts. Second, it 
describes and analyses their implementation into the Latvian legal 
system. In order to give a complete picture of sex equality concepts, 
fragmentary reference to international law is provided. 
Chapter III deals with a key aspect of sex equality law – rights of 
persons with regard to child-birth. Here both EC and Latvian law on this 
matter are described and analysed from the perspective of proper 
implementation and sex equality. 
Chapter IV provides final conclusions discovering deficiencies of 
EC sex equality and related law itself, problematic areas of Latvian law 
as regards implementation of EC law and the impact of Latvian national 
law falling outside the scope of EC law on sex equality. The author also 
gives proposals for elimination of deficiencies, adverse impact of 
legislative provisions on sex equality and its promotion towards 
substantive equality.   
 
Terminology 
For more precision, the author uses the term ‘EC law’ not ‘EU law’ since 
sex equality law falls within the First Pillar governed by the EC Treaty.  
‘EC Treaty’ of course means consolidated versions of the Treaty 
Establishing the European Community. The thesis provides for new 
numbering of the EC Treaty, e.g., after amendments by the Amsterdam 
Treaty. Directives will not be named otherwise but used according to 
their numbering.  
Speaking about Directive 76/207 both numberings before and after 
amendments by Directive 2002/73 will be used. When referring to old 
numbering of articles directives will be called ‘Directive 76/207’, but 
new numbering when the directive will be called ‘amended Directive 
76/207’.  
All EU Member States will be called ‘the Member State’. ‘Old 
Member States’ means the EU-15 or the Member States which acceded 
before 1 May 2004, while ‘new Member States’ means those that acceded 
after that date.  
 10
The European Court of Justice will have two designations: the 
abbreviations ‘the ECJ’ and ‘the Court’ used alternately. 
 
 11
Part II.  
Main concepts of EC equality law and their 
implementation into the Latvian legal system 
 
Chapter 1.  
Equality and non-discrimination 
Content of equality and non-discrimination law 
The law on equality and non-discrimination is built upon the notion that it 
is just to treat similar situations similarly, but different ones differently. It 
is built upon Aristotle’s paradigm that like cases should be treated alike 
and unlike cases unalike, in proportion to their unlikeness1. This 
paradigm “per se is indeterminate as a legal prescription”2 or it lacks any 
content. In other words: 
The weakness of Aristotle’s concept is that it neither specifies the 
circumstances which make individuals different nor gives an indication as 
to how one might find an adequate comparator3. 
So it must be filled with the traits providing for who are equals and who 
are not, and then which cases that the trait regards.  
Each society alone according to its state of development defines 
which cases are equal and which unequal4, particular circumstances and 
the trait according to which cases must be judged as equal or unequal. 
Consequently, which situations are similar differs from society to 
society5. One trait could be relevant in one case and absolutely irrelevant 
in another.  
                                                 
1 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 16, paragraph 30; 
Eugenia Caracciolo di Torella and Annick Masselot, Pregnancy, maternity and the organisation of 
family life: an attempt to clarify the case law of the Court of Justice, European Law  Review (2001) 26, 
Sweet & Maxwell and Contributors, at page 251 describes the Aristotelian paradigm in different words: 
“things that are alike must be treated alike, while things that are unlike should be treated in proportion 
to their unlikeness”. 
See also Oddny Mjoll Arnardottir, “Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention 
on Human Rights”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/London/New York, 2003, at page 8. 
2 Oddny Mjoll Arnardottir, “Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/London/New York, 2003, at page 9. 
3 Eugenia Caracciolo di Torella and Annick Masselot, Pregnancy, maternity and the organisation of 
family life: an attempt to clarify the case law of the Court of Justice, European Law  Review (2001) 26, 
Sweet & Maxwell and Contributors, at page 241. 
4 See in this regard, Egils Levits, Par tiesiskās vienlīdzības principu//Latvijas Vēstnesis, 08.05.2003., 
Nr.68(2833), Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European 
Community” “Sex Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the 
United States of America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 
19, paragraph 39. 
5 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 21, paragraph 44. 
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However, most important for the purposes of equality and non-
discrimination is the manner in which circumstances and traits of equal 
and unequal situations are defined. The manner in which circumstances 
and traits characterising equal and unequal situations are defined and 
settled distinguishes between different doctrines or approaches to 
equality. Two general doctrines present formal and substantive equality 
approaches, of which each has many more sub and mixed approaches 
elaborated by scholars or developed by legal systems of different states6.   
The author of this thesis will describe three – formal, substantial and a 
hybrid of both – the differential approach, because it is the closest to the 
present legal systems of the EU Member States and the legal system of 
the EU itself.  
 
Formal equality approach 
The formal equality approach usually reflects the first Aristotelian 
paradigm, that likes should be treated alike7. A strictly formal approach 
presumes that all are alike, but circumstances and traits defining equal 
situations usually represent norms governing in society or norms 
represented by a privileged group8.  
The formal approach has its roots in the liberal market economy, 
and is based on “market freedom, individualism, and formal justice”9 
where the norm is male, who is white and healthy10. It does not provide 
for different treatment according to difference. No issues of equality can 
be addressed without a comparator11, thus formal equality leaves out 
those who do not fit the norm. For example, this concerns pregnancy. 
Since a male cannot be pregnant, formal equality does not accommodate 
needs of pregnant workers, because there is no comparator which could 
                                                 
6 Oddny Mjoll Arnardottir, “Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/London/New York, 2003, at pages 29-30. 
7 Ibid, at pages 21-22. 
Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 21, paragraph 42. 
8 So far no legal system has managed to escape the norm of the privileged group. See in this regard, 
Oddny Mjoll Arnardottir, “Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/London/New York, 2003 and Petra Foubert, 
“The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex Equality, Thoughts 
of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of America”, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at pages 19-20, paragraphs 39-40. 
9 Helen Fenwick, “From Formal to Substantive Equality: the Place of Affirmative Action in European 
Union Sex Equality Law, European Public Law, Volume 4, Issue 4, 1998, Kluwer Law International. 
10 Sandra Friedman, Discrimination Law, Oxford University Press, 2002, at page 9. 
11 Oddny Mjoll Arnardottir, “Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/London/New York, 2003, at page 23, Petra 
Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex Equality, 
Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of America”, 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 19, paragraph 39. 
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be only male12. Under the doctrine of formal equality, the disadvantage of 
a pregnant worker would be seen not as a disadvantage of women as a 
group but a result of individual choice. 
Thus equal treatment leads to unequal results. In other words, the 
formal equality approach has been criticised for guaranteeing consistency 
of treatment but making no demand on the content of that treatment13. It 
accommodates the needs of the prevailing group. 
 
The substantive equality approach  
Substantive equality is aimed at equal results14 or fairer redistribution of 
benefits15. Some scholars argue that the substantive equality approach “is 
the translation of the second part of the Aristotelian equality paradigm, 
according to which unalike cases should be treated unalike in proportion 
to their unlikeness”16. Fredman argues that the substantive equality 
approach could also be oriented to equal opportunities17. Since it focuses 
on accommodating disadvantaged groups in society, the substantive 
equality model is more group-oriented18. The substantive equality 
approach requires eradication of practices that lead to increase of 
disadvantage19. According to Fredman, one stage of equality of 
opportunity is achieved when structural barriers are eliminated or 
individuals are treated on the basis of their individual qualities without 
regard to sex or race. The second stage of equality of opportunity or 
substantive equality of opportunity requires that such measures be taken 
as ensure that persons from all sections of society have a genuinely equal 
chance of satisfying the criteria for access to a particular social good20. 
                                                 
12 Oddny Mjoll Arnardottir, “Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/London/New York, 2003, at page 23. 
13 Ibid, at page 22. 
14 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 23, paragraph 47, 
Oddny Mjoll Arnardottir, “Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/London/New York, 2003, at page 27. 
15 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law, Oxford University Press, 2002, at page 11. 
16 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 23, paragraph 49. 
17 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law, Oxford University Press, 2002, at pages 11-15. 
18 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 23, paragraph 47. 
19 Oddny Mjoll Arnardottir, “Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/London/New York, 2003, at page 27. 
20 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law, Oxford University Press, 2002, at pages 11-15. 
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Substantive equality allows moving beyond comparison21 or to 
move away from the focus on sameness but rather to concentrate on the 
structural consequences of a disadvantaged group22. One need not prove 
discrimination. The simple fact that an individual or group is at a 
disadvantage is enough to take action aimed at achieving an equal 
outcome. Under this concept can be placed preferential treatment, or 
positive discrimination.23
The concept of preferential treatment of a disadvantaged group, or 
positive discrimination, fits perfectly within the substantive equality 
approach24. Nevertheless, Mjoll points out weaknesses to this approach. 
First of all it is normative indeterminacy that does not identify 
disadvantaged groups which would be entitled to preferential treatment. 
On the other hand, dividing groups by disadvantages leads to their being 
categorised as different groups, deviating from the prevailing norm.  
Second, this concept is almost unrecognisable as equality, because it 
lacks its doctrinal basis25. 
Foubert, however, tries to establish a doctrinal basis for the 
substantive equality approach. She argues that the second part of the 
Aristotelian paradigm, upon which is based the notion of substantive 
equality, concerns two situations. The first is where persons are in the 
same legal but different factual situations. This inequality could be 
corrected by use of affirmative action. The second situation occurs when 
persons are in unequal legal and factual situations. According to the 
Aristotelian paradigm, the different treatment which they deserve must be 
proportionate according to their difference26.  However, the author of this 
thesis would argue - like Mjoll - that proportionality of difference in 
treatment according to difference of situation suffers from normative 
indeterminacy.  
 
The differential equality approach 
The differential equality approach presents a mix of both the formal and 
substantive equality concepts. This model is built upon both parts of the 
                                                 
21 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 23, paragraph 47. 
22 Oddny Mjoll Arnardottir, “Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/London/New York, 2003, at page 27. 
23 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law, Oxford University Press, 2002, at pages 11-15. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Oddny Mjoll Arnardottir, “Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/London/New York, 2003, at page 29. 
26 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at pages 23-30, paragraphs 
49-61. 
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Aristotelian paradigm and although based on the formal equality 
approach is oriented to accommodation of differences. Differences which 
this model tries to accommodate are those that are “immutable and 
unchangeable”27. These include, for example, social protection measures, 
such as special protection during pregnancy or social protection of 
disabled people, protection of indigenous people28 as well as minority 
languages29, and finally, it accommodates or prohibits discrimination 
based on certain traits, such as sex, nationality, race, or age30.  
However, it is arguable on which part of the Aristotelian paradigm 
the last example is based - the first or  the second. As far as concerns 
biological abilities of the traits mentioned as prohibited for categorisation, 
there is no necessity to consider them as unfit for the first part of the 
Aristotelian paradigm. However, since socially construed preconceptions 
affect the factual situation of persons possessing traits prohibited for 
categorisation, only the second part of the Aristotelian paradigm may 
accommodate them as fitting within the first part of the paradigm.    
The differential equality approach also accepts affirmative action 
or positive discrimination, since the purpose of anti-discrimination law is 
emancipation and social integration of groups defined as disadvantaged31. 
Mjoll identifies as the strength of the approach the fact that this model 
does not require a comparator32. However, lack of a comparator does not 
guarantee substantive equal treatment where a different situation is 
accommodated, such as special treatment during maternity. Mjoll agrees 
that the weakness of this approach again entails normative indeterminacy 
as to “which differences should justify or require special treatment” and 
lack of content of treatment of different situations. Besides, under the 
differential equality approach the privileged group of society remains as 
the standard or measure of things33.   
 
Meaning of the concepts of equality and non-discrimination 
Normative acts frequently use two concepts - equality and non-
discrimination - to describe prohibition of disadvantageous treatment34. 
                                                 
27 Oddny Mjoll Arnardottir, “Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/London/New York, 2003, at page 24. 
28 Levits E., Par tiesiskās vienlīdzības principu. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 08.05.2003., Nr.68(2833). 
29 Oddny Mjoll Arnardottir, “Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/London/New York, 2003, at page 24. 
30 Levits E., Par tiesiskās vienlīdzības principu. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 08.05.2003 . 
31 Levits E., Par tiesiskās vienlīdzības principu. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 08.05.2003., Nr.68(2833), Oddny 
Mjoll Arnardottir, “Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on Human 
Rights”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/London/New York, 2003, at page 25. 
32 Oddny Mjoll Arnardottir, “Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/London/New York, 2003, at page 25. 
33 Ibid, at page 26. 
34 Article 1 CEDAW provides: 
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Consequently the question arises whether the meaning and content of 
“equality” and “non-discrimination” is similar or different. 
 “Discrimination” in English has two linguistic meanings: to make a 
distinction and to discriminate against or to make unfair distinction. In 
other languages and with regard to law35 the second meaning alone is 
used36. It follows that non-discrimination in law prohibits making unfair 
distinctions. It is important to note that discrimination is not implicit in all 
differential treatment but only treatment that is unfair or that lacks 
reasonable justification37.  
What constitutes reasonable justification depends on the legal 
system38. However, this is not the only criterion for discrimination. 
Discrimination occurs where similar cases are treated differently or two 
different cases are treated similarly.  Under the differential equality 
approach, a person in the latter case can claim similar treatment, while in 
the former case one can claim different treatment only if similar treatment 
is arbitrary39. 
“Equality” means the quality or state of being equal40. In law, 
“equality” means equality before the law and guarantees fair treatment 
                                                                                                                                            
“For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘discrimination against women’ shall mean any 
distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of 
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field…” 
Article 14 ECHR provides: 
“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status”.  
Article 26 ICCPR provides: 
“All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection. In 
this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective 
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” 
Articles 2 and 3(2) of the EC Treaty provide for equality between men and women, while Article 13 
provides for combating discrimination based on sex. 
35 Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edition, Bryan A. Garner Editor in Chief, Thomas West, 2004, at page 
500, explains that “discrimination” means: 
“The effect of law or established practice that confers privileges on a certain class or that denies 
privileges to a certain class because of race, age, sex, nationality, religion, or handicap”. 
See also L.B.Curzon, Dictionary of Law, Financial times, Pitman Publishing, 1998, William C.Burton, 
Burton’s Legal Thesaurus, 3rd edition, Macmillan Library Reference USA, New York. 
36 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 30, paragraph 62. 
37 In this regard, Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edition, Bryan A.Garner Editor in Chief, Thomas West, 
2004, at page 500, gives a second explanation of the word “discrimination” in law. It also means: 
“differential treatment – failure to treat all reasonably equally when no reasonable distinction can be 
found between those favoured and those not favoured”. 
38 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 31, paragraph 63. 
39 Levits E., Par tiesiskās vienlīdzības principu. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 08.05.2003., Nr.68 (2833). 
40 Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th edition, Bryan A.Garner Editor in Chief, Thomas West, 2004, at 
page576. 
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according to regularly established norms of justice41. Equality before the 
law is undoubtedly narrower than the concept of equality, because law 
does not always reflect a full understanding of equality governing in 
society. Besides, the formal equality approach recognizes only legal 
equality, not factual equality. Levits argues that today’s legal systems 
within Europe42 require assessment not only of the legal situation but also 
of the factual situation in order to establish whether persons are in a 
similar situation43. 
Some authors argue that equality comprises prohibition of 
discrimination or non-discrimination44. They present different arguments 
for such assertion. Levits contends that the principle of general equality 
consists of two sub-principles – prohibition of unfair differentiation and 
prohibition of discrimination. The first sub-principle allows an 
assessment of whether differentiation based on any trait in any 
circumstances is unfair or justifiable. The second sub-principle – the 
principle of non-discrimination - is strictly defined by traits and 
circumstances which do not allow for differentiation and leaves very 
small space for justification. Since non-discrimination constitutes only 
one part of the principle of equality, it follows that equality and non-
discrimination are not synonyms, but the latter comprises the former. 
Another assertion presents itself, namely that eradication of 
discrimination does not necessarily guarantee equality because of the 
existence of socially-construed obstacles which non-discrimination law is 
not able to catch. This possibly follows from the linguistic meaning of 
discrimination which means that non-discrimination is able to catch only 
unfair distinctions and nothing more. 
However, Mjoll argues that “equality and non-discrimination are 
generally taken to be the positive and negative statements of the same 
principle”45. She says so with regard to the content of Article 14 and 
Protocol 12 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. Although both norms refer only to non-
                                                 
41 Ibid, at page577. 
42 The differential equality approach. 
43 Levits E., Par tiesiskās vienlīdzības principu. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 08.05.2003., Nr.68 (2833). 
44 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 30, paragraph 63, 
Levits E., Par tiesiskās vienlīdzības principu. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 08.05.2003., Nr.68 (2833). Sacha 
Prechal, Equality of treatment, non-discrimination and social policy: achievements in three themes, 
Common Market Law Review 41, pages 533-551, 2004, Kluwer Law International, at page 543. See 
also Elisa Holmes, Anti-Discrimination Rights without Equality, The Modern Law Review, March 
2005, Vol 68, No. 2. She contends that anti-discrimination rights are not equal treatment norms, they 
do not require that all people (perhaps in a certain category) are treated the same. 
45 Oddny Mjoll Arnardottir, “Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/London/New York, 2003, at page 7, see also 
in this regard Gerald Stourzh, “...égaux en droits”: The Place of Non-discrimination in the History of 
Human Rights, Human Rights Law Journal, 29th Ocotber 2004, Vol. 25, No.1-4. 
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discrimination, nevertheless the Explanatory report to Protocol 12 of the 
Convention provides for the principle of equality and for positive 
measures; thus the content of the norms in question is filled with content 
of what equality requires. In such circumstances, one could indeed argue 
that equality and non-discrimination form opposite sides of the same 
coin46.  
 
Sex equality and non-discrimination under EC law 
The EC treaty and EC secondary legislation refer to both concepts. For 
example, Articles 2 and 3(2) of the EC Treaty provide for equality 
between men and women, while Article 13 provides for combating 
discrimination based on sex. Article 141(4) allows Member States to 
adopt measures providing for special advantages for the disadvantaged 
sex.  Titles of equality law directives refer to equality; only content 
provides for prohibition of discrimination as well as for positive 
measures.   
However, the provisions of EC legislation form only one part of 
EC sex equality. In order to assess the equality approach presented by the 
EC it is of great importance to examine the interpretation and application 
of that law. Here, the ECJ is the main actor47.   
The ECJ has held that:  
 
discrimination can arise only through the application of different rules to 
comparable situations or the application of the same rule to different 
situations48. 
 
This non-discrimination formula has been criticised by scholars as having 
been limited to situations having a comparator only49, because it sifts out 
different cases that require different treatment but that lack a comparator. 
However, this argument cannot be accepted. The case-law of the ECJ is 
not limited to this formula. The ECJ has accepted discrimination without 
an appropriate comparator in pregnancy cases50.  This testifies to the 
                                                 
46 Oddny Mjoll Arnardottir, “Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/London/New York, 2003, at pages 8-9. 
47 Article 220 EC Treaty. 
48 Case C-279/93, Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v Roland Schumacker, European Court Reports 1995 Page 
I-00225, paragraph 30.
49 Sacha Prechal, Equality of treatment, non-discrimination and social policy: achievements in three 
themes, Common Market Law Review 41, pages 533-551, 2004, Kluwer Law International, at page 
543. 
50 See for example cases C-177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichtig Vormingscentrum 
voor Jong Volwassen (VJV-Centrum) Plus, (1990) ECR page I-03941, C-421/92, Gabriele 
Habermann-Beltermann v Arbeiterwohlfahrt, Bezirksverband Ndb./Opf.e.V., European Court Reports 
1994 Page I-01657, C-32/93, Carole Louise Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd., European Court 
Reports 1994 Page I-03567, C-109/00, Tele Danmark A/S and Handels – og Kontorfunktionaerernes 
Forbund I Danmark (HK), European Court Reports 2001 Page I-6993. 
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accommodation of persons who are in a different situation and does not 
present a privileged group. Besides, the Court has accepted positive 
measures in a line of judgments51, thus allowing advantageous treatment 
for disadvantaged groups. 
Although many rulings of the ECJ in the field of sex equality and 
non-discrimination deserve considerable criticism52, nevertheless the 
approach taken by the Court regarding enforcement of EC sex equality 
and non-discrimination law demonstrates the so-called differential 
equality approach which, although based on formal equality, presents 
certain elements of the substantive equality approach.  
 
 
 
                                                 
51 See in this regard cases C-409/95, Hellmut Marschall v Land Nordhein-Westfalen, European Court 
Reports 1997 Page I-06363, Case C-158/97, Georg Badeck and Others, interveners: Hessische 
Ministerprasident and Landesanwalt beim Staatsgerichtshof des Landes Hessen, European Court 
Reports 2000 Page I-01875 and section on direct discrimination. 
52 To be analysed further in this thesis. 
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Chapter 2. 
Direct discrimination 
EC law 
Establishing direct discrimination 
A definition of direct discrimination in EC legislation was given only in 
2002 by Directive 2002/73 amending Directive 76/207. Article 2(2) 
provides: 
direct discrimination: where one person is treated less favourably on 
grounds of sex than another is, has been or would be treated in a 
comparable situation. 
This means that direct discrimination occurs where a person is treated 
less favourably on grounds of sex. This formulation seems simple, but 
sometimes it is not easy to distinguish between direct and indirect 
discrimination.  
Indirect discrimination occurs where a person is treated less 
favourably on another ground than sex, but the effect is such that it puts 
the person at a particular disadvantage compared with a person of the 
other sex. However, there could be situations where a provision or 
criterion formulated neutrally is applied to one sex only. For example, the 
case of Nikoloudi1 formed a quite complicated situation. Under the Staff 
Regulations of the employer, part-time workers under indefinite time 
contracts did not have the right to become established members of the 
staff. Thus, periods worked part-time were not taken into account when 
calculating length of service and consequently it negatively affected pay 
increase. Those provisions were formulated sex neutrally. However, the 
possibility to work under indefinite term contract part-time work was 
provided to women only. That provision was introduced as a positive 
measure allowing women to reconcile work and family life by reserving 
part-time posts exclusively to them. The ECJ recognized this situation as 
directly discriminating against women. It held that the Staff Regulation 
under which only women can be employed under a contract of indefinite 
period for part-time work does not constitute direct discrimination. 
However: 
 
the subsequent exclusion of a possibility of appointment as an established 
member of staff by reference, ostensibly neutral as to the worker’s sex, to 
a category of workers which, under national rules having the force of law, 
is composed exclusively of women constitutes direct discrimination on 
grounds of sex within the meaning of Directive 76/2072. 
                                                 
1 Case C-196/02, Vasiliki Nikoloudi v Organismos Tilepikinonion Ellados AE, OJ C 106, 30.04.2005., 
p.1 
2 Ibid., para. 40. 
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It follows that a sex-neutral provision, criterion or practice could be 
directly discriminating if it concerns persons of one sex only by putting 
them into a less favourable situation. 
 
Comparator 
The definition of direct discrimination provides that direct discrimination 
occurs where a person is, has been or would be treated less favourably in 
a comparable situation on the grounds of sex. It follows that since 2002 
the legislator allows hypothetical comparison. However, comparison to a 
hypothetical comparator is still limited to a certain category of cases.  
In the equal pay case Defrenne II,3 the ECJ set clear criteria for 
comparison – it must be a colleague of the opposite sex working or 
having worked4 in the same establishment or service. The Court still 
strongly follows this formula5. Even recently, it refused to extend the 
comparison holding that: 
So far, a hypothetical comparison is accepted by the ECJ in pregnancy 
cases only Article 141(1) EC must be interpreted as meaning that a 
woman whose contract of employment with an undertaking has not been 
renewed and who is immediately made available to her previous employer 
through another undertaking to provide the same services is not entitled to 
rely, vis-à-vis the intermediary undertaking, on the principle of equal pay, 
using as a basis for comparison the remuneration received for equal work 
or work of the same value by a man employed by the woman's previous 
employer6. 
In Dekker7 the Court held that refusal to hire on the grounds of 
pregnancy, first, is direct discrimination based on the sex of the 
candidate, and, second, the absence of a male candidate does not make 
this situation different. The Court had the same opinion regarding 
dismissal8.  
However the question arises as to what are comparable situations 
and what are not. If we follow the reasoning given by the ECJ in Dekker, 
then direct discrimination against women arises in every situation in 
                                                 
3 Case 43/75, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena, European 
Court Reports 1976 Page 00455. 
4 Case 129/79, Macarthys Ltd v Wendy Smith, European Court Reports 1980 Page 01275. 
5 Case C-320/00, A. G. Lawrence and Others v Regent Office Care Ltd, Commercial Catering Group 
and Mitie Secure Services Ltd. , European Court Reports 2002 Page I-07325.
6 Case C-256/01, Debra Allonby v Accrington & Rossendale College, Education Lecturing Services, 
trading as Protocol Professional and Secretary of State for Education and Employment, European 
Court Reports 2004 Page I-00873.
7 Case 177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichtig Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassen 
(VJV-Centrum) Plus, (1990) ECR page I-03941. 
8 Case C-179/88, Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, European Court Reports 1990 Page I-03979, case C-421/92, Gabriele 
Habermann-Beltermann v Arbeiterwohlfahrt, Bezirksverband Ndb./Opf.e.V., European Court Reports 
1994 Page I-01657, case 109/00, Tele Danmark A/S and Handels – og Kontorfunktionaerernes 
Forbund I Danmark (HK), European Court Reports 2001 Page I-6993. 
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which men never could find themselves. The ECJ took this approach in 
Hertz9 and the outcome was not favourable to pregnant workers. Here, 
the ECJ compared situations of sick men with that of sick women and 
found that Directive 76/207 does not preclude dismissal of a female 
worker on account of repeated periods of sick leave which are attributable 
to pregnancy or confinement, because men would be dismissed in that 
situation too. However, the ECJ did not take into account an important 
aspect of that situation. Namely, that the illness arose due to pregnancy, 
so that the situation of sick men is not comparable to the situation of 
women who are sick due to pregnancy disorders.  
The ECJ took this fact into account later in Brown10. The Court 
held that disorders and complications which may arise during pregnancy 
and cause incapacity for work, “form part of the risks inherent in the 
condition of pregnancy and are thus a specific feature of that 
condition”11. However, the Hertz judgment and its simple comparisons of 
situations is still enforceable with regard to complications and disorders 
manifesting after maternity leave, because “there is no reason to 
distinguish an illness attributable to pregnancy or confinement from any 
other illness”12. 
The ECJ followed the Brown approach with regard to comparable 
and non-comparable situations in Gillespie13. It held that the situation of 
women during maternity leave is not comparable with that of a man or 
woman actually working. The consequence of this reasoning is such that 
EC law does not require a woman to be provided with full pay during 
maternity leave even if a maternity allowance is paid by the employer14. 
 “Although pregnancy is not in any way comparable to a pathological 
condition”15, nevertheless with regard to the amount of maternity 
                                                 
9 Case C-179/88, Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, European Court Reports 1990 Page I-03979. 
10 C-394/96, Mary Brown and Rentokil Limited, European Court Reports 1998 Page I-04185. 
11 Ibid., paragraph 22. 
12 Case C-179/88, Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, European Court Reports 1990 Page I-03979, paragraph 16, see also case C-
400/95, Handels – og Kontorfunktionerernes Forbund I Danmark, acting on behalf of Helle Elisabeth 
Larsson v Dansk Handel & Service, acting on behalf of Futex Supermarked A/S, European Court 
Reports 1997 page I-02757.
13 C-342/93 Joan Gillespie and others v Northern Health and Social Services Boards, Department of 
Health and Social Services, Eastern Health and Social Services Board and Southern Health and Social 
Services Board, European Court Reports 1996 Page I-00475.
14 C-342/93 Joan Gillespie and others v Northern Health and Social Services Boards, Department of 
Health and Social Services, Eastern Health and Social Services Board and Southern Health and Social 
Services Board, European Court Reports 1996 Page I-00475, C-333/97, Susanne Lewen v Lothar 
Denda, European Court Reports 1999 Page I-07243. This was recently reaffirmed in case C-147/02, 
Michelle K. Alabaster v Woolwich plc and Secretary of State for Social Security, ECR 2004 Page 0000, 
paragraph 46. 
15 C-394/96, Mary Brown and Rentokil Limited, European Court Reports 1998 Page I-04185, paragraph 
22, see also case C-32/93, Carole Louise Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd., European Court Reports 
1994 Page I-03567, paragraph 25. 
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allowance which Member States are obliged to provide under Directive 
92/8516 women on maternity leave are still compared to sick workers, 
because they are entitled to receive maternity allowance which is not 
lower than sickness allowance. Thus with regard to protection of pregnant 
workers, workers on maternity leave and after it (illness attributable to 
pregnancy continuing after maternity leave) there is no clear and 
consequent approach on which situations are comparable and which are 
not17.  
However, some writers suggest that the Court has strongly 
followed the construction of the concept of discrimination. They say that 
the Hertz/Larsson18  “comparative approach” - women absent on account 
of illness attributable to pregnancy continuing after maternity leave must 
be treated in the same way as men absent from work for any reason not 
only by reason of sickness – “is the preferable one since it is consistent 
with the structural requirements of discrimination law”19. The same could 
be suggested about allowance or pay during maternity leave. Namely, the 
Court followed the structural requirements of discrimination law by 
saying that discrimination is “the application of different rules to 
comparable situations or the application of the same rule to different 
situations”. Women on maternity leave are in a special position which 
requires special protection. That special position and protection is not 
comparable with that of a man or woman actually at work20. 
Here, the question remains open – whether the situation of women in 
three periods – pregnancy at work, maternity leave, and after maternity 
leave - is comparable to that of her colleagues or not.  
 
Possibility to justify direct discrimination 
So far, the ECJ has strongly followed the position that direct 
discrimination cannot be justified.  In Dekker the Court rejected the 
argument of financial loss of the employer which he would suffer by 
                                                 
16 Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently 
given birth or are breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of 
Directive 89/391/EEC), OJ L 348, 28/11/1992 P.0001-0008. 
17 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law, Oxford University Press, 2002, at page 101, see also Evelyn 
Ellis, Recent Developments in European Community Sex Equality Law, Common Market law Review, 
35, 1998, pages 379-408, at page 393. 
18 Case C-179/88, Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, European Court Reports 1990 Page I-03979, case C-400/95, Handels – og 
Kontorfunktionerernes Forbund I Danmark, acting on behalf of Helle Elisabeth Larsson v Dansk 
Handel & Service, acting on behalf of Futex Supermarked A/S, European Court Reports 1997 Page I-
02757.
19 Evelyn Ellis, Recent Developments in European Community Sex Equality Law, Common Market 
law Review, 35, 1998, pages 379-408, at page 395. 
20 C-342/93 Joan Gillespie and others v Northern Health and Social Services Boards, Department of 
Health and Social Services, Eastern Health and Social Services Board and Southern Health and Social 
Services Board, European Court Reports 1996 Page I-00475, C-333/97.
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employing a pregnant worker for the maternity leave period21. Likewise, 
in Webb the Court did not accept the argument of improper functioning of 
the enterprise due to the maternity leave of a worker22. 
The possibility to justify direct discrimination is not provided in the 
definition of Directive 2002/73 either. In contrast, the definition of 
indirect discrimination expressly provides the possibility for justification. 
However, a different opinion in that regard is shared by scholars, the 
Commission and Advocate General Van Gerven. The question whether 
direct discrimination can be justified particularly arose in the case of 
Birds Eye Walls23. Advocate General Van Gerven was of the opinion that 
since sometimes it is difficult to distinguish between direct and indirect 
discrimination, the possibility of justifying direct discrimination cannot 
be ruled out.  
The facts of the case of Birds Eye Walls are as follows. The 
legislation of the United Kingdom provides for different statutory 
retirement ages, 60 for women and 65 for men. Under an occupational 
pension scheme, workers had rights to early retirement. Until age 60 both 
sexes received a full bridging pension under the occupational pension 
scheme, but after reaching the age of 60 women’s bridging pensions 
reduced, because they started to receive their statutory pension. That 
means that between the age of 60 and 65 men received a higher bridging 
pension than women, although the total amount of pension received by 
men and women between ages 60 and 65 was equal, because women’s 
bridging pensions during that time were reduced proportionately to the 
statutory pension they received from the state.  
According to the facts, the Commission contended that there was 
direct discrimination, because women received a reduced bridging 
pension from the age of 60 while men from 65 only; however, this direct 
discrimination must be justified taking into account the substantive 
equality which such regulation achieved.  The Advocate General argued 
that there was indirect discrimination, because calculation of the bridging 
pensions was the same. It could merely be temporarily reduced on the 
grounds that a person receives a pension from the state. However, the 
Advocate General’s view appears to be incorrect, because indirect 
discrimination occurs where persons belonging to one sex are treated less 
favourably on another ground than sex. Here “less” favourable treatment 
is based exclusively on sex, so that one cannot say that this situation is 
indirectly discriminatory. 
                                                 
21 Case 177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichtig Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassen 
(VJV-Centrum) Plus, (1990) ECR page I-03941, paragraph 12. 
22 Case C-32/93, Carole Louise Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd., European Court Reports 1994 Page 
I-03567, paragraph 26. 
23 Case C-132/92 Birds Eye Walls Ltd. v Friedel M.Roberts, European Court Reports 1993 Page I-
05579. 
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Also doubtful is the argumentation of the Commission on direct 
discrimination. When defining whether there is discrimination, one must 
assess whether situations are similar or comparable. The difficulty in a 
particular situation is such that, unlike usual equal treatment and pay 
cases, it consists of more than one element. Namely, it consists of an 
element of equal pay and statutory provision of retirement ages which 
falls outside the competence of EC law. However, in deciding whether 
situations are comparable both elements must be taken into account. 
Thus, the Court was right in holding that the situations of men and 
women between age 60 and 65 are not similar and therefore not 
comparable. The Court reaffirmed this approach in Hlozek24. 
Regarding the following case-law, legal writers indicate that in 
Smith v. Advel Systems25 the ECJ entertained the possibility to justify 
direct discrimination26. This case was about an occupational pension 
scheme which tried to comply with the Barber judgment27 by setting an 
equal retirement age for both sexes. The owner of Advel Systems 
occupational pension scheme claimed that setting less favourable and 
even discriminatory treatment for women could be justified by the 
financial difficulties faced by that occupational pension scheme. But the 
Court ruled that the financial difficulties of the occupational pension 
scheme in this case were not comparable to those in the Barber judgment, 
because the period of discrimination which must be eliminated was 
comparably very short, so that Advel Systems could not justify 
discrimination against women. The assumption that the Court gave an 
inclination for justification of direct discrimination comes from the 
phrase: “even assuming that it would, in this context, be possible to take 
account of objectively justifiable consideration relating to the needs of the 
undertaking or of the occupational scheme concerned…”28  
Likewise, scholars suggest that the inclination to accept objective 
justification for direct discrimination was given by the Court in the case 
of Webb29; however, later case-law overthrew that suggestion30.     
                                                 
24 Case C-19/02, Viktor Hlozek v Roche Austria Gesellschaft mbH., European Court Reports 2004 Page 
I-11491.
25 Case C-408/92, Constance Christina Ellen Smith and others v Avdel Systems Ltd. European Court 
Reports 1994 Page I-04435.
26 Lynn M. Roseberry, The limits of Employment Discrimination Law in the United States and 
European Community, (1999), Copenhagen, DJOF Publishing, at page 78. 
27 C-262/88, Douglas Harvey Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group, European Court 
Reports 1990 Page I-018899. 
28 Case C-408/92, Constance Christina Ellen Smith and others v Avdel Systems Ltd. European Court 
Reports 1994 Page I-04435, paragraph 30.
29 Lynn M.Roseberry, The limits of Employment Discrimination Law in the United States and 
European Community, (1999), Copenhagen, DJOF Publishing, at page 78. 
30 In case C-32/93 Carole Louise Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd., European Court Reports 1994 
Page I-03567. The court ruled that employment contract concluded for indefinite cannot be terminated 
on grounds of a worker’s pregnancy.  Indeed, formulation of the Court’s opinion tends to the 
conclusion that if it would have been the case on employment contract concluded for a definite period, 
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Scholars31 also stress that a direct discriminatory scheme which 
does not allow justifications may turn out to be too rigid. In particular, “a 
number of cases in the field of pregnancy discrimination are on the very 
edge of what is acceptable, and involve a risk of “effet pervers””32. 
Writers point out that clearly in many cases the ECJ did accept or at least 
was willing to accept unwritten justification or tried to resolve the 
problem in terms of non-comparability. The best example for this is the 
pregnancy cases33 discussed above, where “the ECJ did not follow the 
view that pregnancy discrimination is direct sex discrimination, as it has 
done in other cases, by escaping through a “non-comparability 
argument””34.  
 
Exemptions 
Though direct discrimination can not be justified, there are three 
instances where different treatment is allowed and can not be considered 
as discriminatory against either sex. These three exemptions are provided 
by Directive 76/207 and amended by Directive 2002/73. 
 
Sex of the worker as determining factor 
The first instance where different treatment can not be considered as 
discrimination is where by reason of the nature of occupational activity or 
training or the context in which they are carried out the sex of the worker 
constitutes a determining factor35. 
The ECJ has held that this particular derogation from the principle 
of equal treatment must be interpreted strictly36 and any derogation must 
be proportionate. The principle of proportionality requires assessment of 
whether derogation is an appropriate and necessary measure to achieve a 
legitimate aim37. As regards legitimate aim, this could be, for example, 
                                                                                                                                            
terminating it on the grounds of a worker’s pregnancy would have been justified. However, in case C-
109/00, Tele Danmark A/S and Handels – og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark (HK), 
European Court Reports 2001 Page I-6993, the ECJ held that dismissal on grounds of pregnancy 
cannot be justified even if a contract of employment is concluded for a definite term and because of 
pregnancy the worker will not be able to work during a substantial part of the term of that contract.  
31 Sacha Prechal, Equality of treatment, non-discrimination and social policy: achievements in three 
themes, Common Market Law Review 41, pages 533-551, 2004, Kluwer Law International. 
32 Ibid. 
33 See in this regard Cases C-342/93 Joan Gillespie and others v Northern Health and Social Services 
Boards, Department of Health and Social Services, Eastern Health and Social Services Board and 
Southern Health and Social Services Board, European Court Reports 1996 Page I-00475, C-320/01 
Wiebke Busch and Klinikum Neustadt GmbH & Co. Betriebs-KG, European Court Reports 2003 Page 
I-02041. 
34 Sacha Prechal, Equality of treatment, non-discrimination and social policy: achievements in three 
themes, Common Market Law Review 41, pages 533-551, 2004, Kluwer Law International, see 
footnote at page 545. 
35 Article 2(2) of Directive 76/207.  
36 Case 222/84, Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, European 
Court Reports 1986 Page 01651, paragraph 36.
37 Ibid., para. 38.
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public security38 internal and external39. However, considerations of 
public security as such can not be accepted as justification for derogation 
from the principle of equal treatment40. Women can not be excluded from 
a certain type of employment on the grounds that public opinion demands 
that women be given greater protection than men, because almost all risks 
affect men and women in the same way41. 
The Court has rejected too broad an exclusion of one sex from an 
entire occupational activity42.  Derogation must be justified in relation to 
specific duties and not in relation to an employment consideration in its 
entirety43. Besides, derogation must be sufficiently transparent44. So far, 
general guidelines given by the Court are more or less clear. However, 
answers lack two questions of general importance. 
The first question is how Member States can guarantee derogation 
to be applied as derogation from an individual right if derogation is 
provided by national legislation? The phrase “derogation from an 
individual right”45 can be understood as an obligation to assess each 
candidate irrespective of sex. However, if derogation is provided by 
national legislation46, then derogation is applied to an abstract circle of 
persons – one or other sex - and thus making it impossible for a person 
belonging to the exempted sex to be assessed as a candidate for vacancy 
on individual grounds. 
                                                 
38 Ibid., para. 36.
39 Case C-273/97 Angela Maria Sirdar v The Army Board and Secretary of State for Defence, ECR 
1999 Page I-07403, paragraph 17. 
40 Case 222/84, Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, European 
Court Reports 1986 Page 01651, paragraph 26, case C-273/97 Angela Maria Sirdar v The Army Board 
and Secretary of State for Defence, ECR 1999 Page I-07403, paragraph 19. 
41 Ibid., para. 44.
42 Case 165/82, Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom and Northern Ireland 
ECR 1983 Page 03431, paragraph 18, Case C-273/97 Angela Maria Sirdar v The Army Board and 
Secretary of State for Defence, ECR 1999 Page I-07403, paragraph 24, case C-203/03, Commission of 
the European Communities v Republic of Austria, European Court Reports 2005 Page 00000, 
paragraph 71, case 318/86, Commission of the European Communities v French Republic, European 
Court Reports 1988 Page 03559, paragraph 25. 
43 Case 222/84, Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, European 
Court Reports 1986 Page 01651, paragraph 32.
44 Case 318/86, Commission of the European Communities v French Republic, European Court Reports 
1988 Page 03559, paragraph 25. 
45 Case 222/84, Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, European 
Court Reports 1986 Page 01651, paragraph 36, case C-273/97 Angela Maria Sirdar v The Army Board 
and Secretary of State for Defence, ECR 1999 Page I-07403, paragraph 23. 
46 According to the ECJ, derogations may be made by national legislation. See Case 165/82, 
Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom and Northern Ireland ECR 1983 page 
03431, Case 248/83, Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, 
European Court Reports 1985 Page 01459, Case 222/84, Marguerite Johnston v Chief Constable of the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary, European Court Reports 1986 Page 01651. However, according to Article 
9(2) of Directive 76/207 the Member States have a duty to assess periodically the activities concerned 
in order to decide whether, in the light of social developments, the derogation from the general scheme 
of the directive may still be maintained. 
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The facts show that approximately 1% of women can perform 
muscle strength and aerobic fitness equal to average men47. The Court 
admits the fact that some women could be of higher physical strength 
than some men, so that a situation cannot be accepted where “women 
[can] be excluded from a certain type of employment solely because they 
are on average smaller and less strong than average men, while men with 
similar physical features are accepted for that employment”48. On the 
other hand, the Court in Sirdar allowed exclusion of women from service 
in special combat units in the Royal Marines on the grounds that women 
would not be able to fight in the first line of attack as commandos and it 
could affect interoperability49 and in Johnston accepted that possibly 
policewomen might create additional risks of being assassinated and thus 
endanger public safety50.  
This approach taken by the Court, which demonstrates total 
exemption of women from certain kinds of activities, contradicts the right 
to be assessed individually and has been sharply criticised. Scholars have 
rightly pointed out that the Court failed to show how the presence of 
women could affect interoperability and failed to take into account that 
there are women who have the necessary level of physical fitness to be 
Royal Marines51. The same concerns the Johnston case, where the ECJ 
accepted the exemption of policewomen instead of providing a test of 
physical strength which a police officer must pass in order to carry a fire-
arm. 
The second question concerns the assessment situation where the 
sex of the worker constitutes a determining factor. What should be the 
criteria? And can criteria be based on biological differences only or can 
socially defined differences be used, too? The ECJ has decided no cases 
on situations where one or other sex is exempted from certain 
occupational activities due to the nature of that activity, but this is exactly 
the base for derogations on grounds of biological differences. The Court 
merely pointed out activities where the sex of the worker obviously 
constitutes the determining factor because of the nature of the activity. 
                                                 
47 Martin Trybus, Sisters in Arms, European Community Law and Sex Equality in the Armed Forces, 
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Reports 2005 Page 00000, paragraphs 46 and 73.
49 Case C-273/97 Angela Maria Sirdar v The Army Board and Secretary of State for Defence, ECR 
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51 Martin Trybus, Sisters in Arms, European Community Law and Sex Equality in the Armed Forces, 
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This concerns singing, acting, dancing, and artistic or fashion 
modelling52. 
The rest deals with activities where persons of one sex are 
exempted on grounds of the context in which activities are carried out and 
this is the base for derogations on grounds of socially defined differences. 
This fact testifies itself - the ECJ accepts socially defined differences of 
sexes, although EC sex equality law is facilitated to fight socially defined 
differences between the sexes. Every case gives evidence of this. Starting 
with the midwives case, where the Court accepted that limitation of 
access to the occupation of midwife to men could be justified by patient 
sensitivities53 and ending with Sirdar, where the strange criterion of 
interoperability was accepted without any real assessment. 
Regarding the base for derogations the Court has merely 
recognized that:  
 
The Member States maintain a wide variety of other 
exceptions based on social, moral or in certain cases, 
religious considerations, that a substantial number of 
those exceptions are based on considerations relating to 
the physical and moral protection of women and finally, 
that certain important exemptions are bound up with the 
question of military service and the organization of the 
police and similar bodies. The basis for the exemptions is 
also variable, inasmuch as some owe their existence to 
voluntary and unwritten customs, others to provisions 
laid down by law or regulation, and others still to 
international conventions54. 
 
This means that the ECJ allows the Member States to maintain 
derogations from the equal treatment principle based on socially defined 
differences. It is restricted by the principles of proportionality and Article 
9(2) of the Directive, which requires periodical assessment of 
occupational activities referred to in Article 2(2) in order to decide, in the 
light of social developments, whether there is justification for maintaining 
the permitted exclusions.   
Article 2(6) of Directive 2002/73 amends the definition provided 
by Article 2(2) of the Directive with the phrase that difference of 
treatment shall not constitute discrimination where a characteristic related 
to sex “constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement”. 
However, interpretation of what characteristic “constitutes a genuine and 
                                                 
52 Case 248/83, Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, European 
Court Reports 1985 Page 01459, paragraph 34. 
53 Case 165/82, Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom and Northern Ireland 
ECR 1983 Page 03431, paragraph 18. 
54 Case 248/83, Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, European 
Court Reports 1985 Page 01459, paragraph 34. 
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determining occupational requirement” still remains within the 
competence of the Court and leaves space for justifications based on 
socially defined differences between sexes. 
 
Special protection during pregnancy and maternity 
Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207 provides that: “This Directive shall be 
without prejudice to provisions concerning the protection of women, 
particularly as regards pregnancy and maternity”. Historically, the 
interpretation and application of this exemption has posed considerable 
uncertainty. Article 2(3) “was designed to prevent any challenge on 
grounds of equal treatment in EC law to national employment provisions 
granting leave or other special conditions to women who are pregnant or 
have given birth, rather than to impose any obligation to adopt such 
provisions”55. Irrespective of the intent of the legislator, the ECJ 
interpreted Article 2(3) conversely. 
In Hoffman the Court ruled that Article 2(3) protects woman’s 
needs in two respects: 
 
First, it is legitimate to ensure the protection of a woman’s biological 
condition during pregnancy and thereafter until such time as her 
physiological and mental functions have returned to normal after 
childbirth; secondly, it is legitimate to protect the special relationship 
between a woman and her child over the period which follows 
pregnancy and childbirth, by preventing that relationship form being 
disturbed by the multiple burdens which would result form the 
simultaneous pursuit of employment56. 
 
In Dekker57, the Court ruled that refusal to employ a pregnant candidate 
constituted direct discrimination prohibited by Article 2(3). In the 
subsequent Hertz58 judgment, the ECJ held that logically dismissal on 
account of pregnancy also constituted direct discrimination. Further, the 
Court ruled that an employer is precluded from dismissing a pregnant 
worker on account of absences due to incapacity for work caused by 
illness resulting from that pregnancy59 and the employer could not refuse 
to appoint a pregnant worker for a post on the grounds that a statutory 
prohibition on employment attaching to the condition of pregnancy 
prevented her from being employed in that post from the outset and for 
the duration of the pregnancy60. The Court based its approach on the non-
comparability argument – namely, that men could never suffer from the 
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disadvantage which women face during pregnancy and maternity and 
thus pregnant women and women after maternity leave must enjoy the 
same but in some cases preferential treatment. 
Interestingly, the Member States tried to use Article 2(3) as 
justification in many incorrect ways. For example, in  case 312/8661 the 
French government argued that Article 2(3) allows leave for women only 
when a child is sick, in Stoeckel62 -   that it allows to put an absolute ban 
on women’s night work. In Johnston63 and Kreil64 the Member States 
wanted to justify a ban on women being employed for work where 
carrying and use of fire arms are possible.  
Recognizing the sensitivity, importance, and frequency of cases 
where employer and employees are faced by the dilemma of special 
pregnancy or maternity protection versus inconvenience for the employer, 
in 1992 the Council adopted Directive 92/85, which set a minimum 
requirement for the Member States concerning protection of women 
during pregnancy and after giving birth. Although formally Article 2(3) 
of Directive 76/207 simply allowed the Member States to adopt measures 
protecting women during this period, in reality the ECJ through its case 
law interpreted Article 2(3) as obliging the  Member States to provide 
pregnant women and women during the maternity period with special 
protection even before adoption of Directive 92/85. Therefore, part of 
Directive 92/85 is only a codification of the case-law of the ECJ rather 
than new requirements. Moreover, some situations affecting pregnant 
workers and workers after maternity leave are still covered by Directive 
76/207. For example, regarding access to work and the obligation of the 
employer to provide a worker after maternity leave with such terms and 
conditions of employment as if she had not been on maternity leave.  
A new approach to “pregnancy and maternity exemption” was 
introduced by amendments to Directive 76/207 by extending it. 
According to Directive 2002/73 amending Directive 76/207 Article 2(7) 
(ex Article 2(3) also protects persons on parental, paternity, and adoption 
leave. Thus the EC has recognized special protection of parents 
irrespective of sex.   
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Positive measures 
The third instance when Community law allows for an exception with 
regard to equal treatment is the case of positive measures. Positive 
measures are allowed according to Article 141(4) of the EC Treaty, which 
provides: 
With a view to ensuring full equality in practice between 
men and women in working life, the principle of equal 
treatment shall not prevent any Member State from 
maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific 
advantages in order to make it easier for the under-
represented sex to pursue a vocational activity or to prevent 
or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers.  
 
Positive measures are allowed by Article 2(8) of Directive 76/207 after 
amendments by Directive 2002/73. Article 2(8) does not specify what 
“positive measures” means. It simply refers to the provisions of Article 
141(4) of the EC Treaty. 
The ECJ has so far not given an interpretation on Article 141(4) of 
the EC Treaty and Article 2(8) of amended Directive 76/207, because 
Article 141(4) was inserted by the Treaty of Amsterdam and came into 
force from 1st of May 1999, while the Member State had to implement 
amendments to Directive 76/207 (Directive 2002/73) only by October 
2005. Nevertheless, the ECJ has given an interpretation on Article 2(4) of 
Directive 76/207 before amendments. From adoption of Directive 76/207 
in 1976, Article 2(4) provides: “This Directive shall be without prejudice 
to measures to promote equal opportunity for men and women, in 
particular by removing existing inequalities which affect women’s 
opportunities in the areas referred to in Article 1(1)”65.  All together there 
are seven cases66 - case 312/8667, Kalanke68, Marschall69, Badeck70, 
Abrahamsson71, Lommers72 and Briheche73. 
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In case 312/86 the ECJ held: 
 
The exception provided for in Article 2(4) is specifically and 
exclusively designed to allow measures which, although 
discriminatory in appearance, are in fact intended to eliminate or 
reduce actual instances of inequality which may exist in the 
reality of social life. 
 
Although it is clear that frequently women lose in competition for 
vacancies with equally qualified men, thus women do not always have 
equal chances to obtain a job or position, nevertheless the ECJ in Kalanke 
ruled that national rules which give priority to women in sectors where 
they are under-represented automatically, if candidates for promotion are 
equally qualified, are contrary to Article 2(4) of Directive 76/207 because 
they involve discrimination on grounds of sex74. The Court substantiated 
this decision by saying that Article 2(4) is simply a derogation from an 
individual right, therefore must be interpreted strictly75. Namely, that an 
individual right must be given priority over a group right76. 
The Kalanke judgment was sharply criticized. And indeed, various 
soft-law documents of the Community before this judgment called on the 
Member State for positive action, which they saw as the only tool to 
attain de facto equality77. The Commission immediately issued a 
Communication78 “accompanied by a draft Directive79 aiming to modify 
Article 2(4) of the Directive authorising quota rules provided that the 
promotion of men would not be a priori excluded”80. It is argued that the 
proposal to amend Article 141 with reference to positive measures to the 
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Treaty of Amsterdam was the “Commission’s reaction to the judgment of 
the ECJ in Kalanke”81. 
In the next judgment, Marschall, the Court softened its approach to 
positive action by admitting that a national rule which does not give 
automatic priority of an equally qualified female candidate but requires 
objective assessment of specific criteria of each candidate comply with 
Article 2(4). Moreover, specific criteria can not be such as to discriminate 
against female candidates. The Court pointed out that: 
 
because of prejudices and stereotypes concerning the role and capacities 
of women in working life and the gear, for example, that women will 
interrupt their careers more frequently, that owing to household and 
family duties they will be less flexible in their working hours, or that 
they will be absent from work more frequently because of pregnancy, 
childbirth and breastfeeding82.  
 
However, the Court left “uncertain what criteria can be taken into account 
at each stage as also what will be deemed sufficient to override the 
priority”83. It is argued that the Court changed its attitude because of 
pressure from Community institutions and the Member States which 
submitted observations supporting the need for quotas84. 
Scholars gave different assessments on the Marschall judgment. 
Cabral emphasized that the Court in this judgment admitted “measures 
that go beyond the mere promotion of equality of opportunities and are 
specially addressed to achieve the result of equal representation”85 while 
Ellis considered that “although the rule appeared to favour women, it only 
in reality cancelled out for them the discrimination which they would 
otherwise have experienced”86. 
In Badeck87 the Court clarified criteria which could and which could 
not be taken into account in assessing equally qualified candidates. The 
ECJ held: 
 
For the purposes of that assessment, certain positive and negative criteria 
are taken into account. Thus capabilities and experience which have 
been acquired by carrying out family work are to be taken into account 
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in so far as they are of importance for the suitability, performance and 
capability of candidates, whereas seniority, age and the date of last 
promotion are to be taken into account only in so far as they are of 
importance in that respect. Similarly, the family status or income of the 
partner is immaterial, and part-time work, leave and delays in 
completing training as a result of looking after children or dependants in 
need of care must not have a negative effect88. 
 
Some argued that “the court seems to allow some (indirect) 
discrimination against men in the application of the selection criteria”89 
while the Court substantiated its ruling saying: 
 
Such criteria, although formulated in terms which are neutral as regards 
sex and thus capable of benefiting men too, in general favour women. 
They are manifestly intended to lead to an equality which is substantive 
rather than formal, by reducing the inequalities which may occur in 
practice in social life90. 
 
The Court in Badeck supported several provisions of national law 
providing for different kinds of positive action. It accepted that temporary 
posts in academic service and for academic assistants must be provided 
for a minimum percentage of women which is at least equal to the 
percentage of women among graduates, that in trained occupations in 
which women are under-represented at least half  the training places 
should be allocated to women and that in sectors in which women are 
under-represented where male and female candidates have equal 
qualifications all women who satisfy required conditions are called to 
interview. The Court substantiated this decision by holding that those 
provisions concern only access to work, namely, it merely promotes equal 
opportunities for women, but does not give them unconditional priority 
and does not provide for a rigid quota. However, regarding the provision 
on temporary academic posts the substantiation is quite weak, because 
although temporary those posts are actually employment not pure 
training. Besides, the rule provides for a strict quota although the Court 
said that it does not91. 
In Abrahamsson the Court clarified that Article 2(4) of Directive 
76/207 does not preclude measures to promote equal opportunity to 
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women in sectors where they are under-represented if a measure does not 
give to equally qualified women priority automatically and 
unconditionally and where the candidatures are subject to objective 
assessment. Besides, criteria applied for individual assessment are 
transparent and amenable to review in order to obviate any arbitrary 
assessment of the qualifications of candidates92. The Court rejected a 
national rule providing that for each post a candidate must be chosen 
which belongs to the under-represented sex and possesses sufficient 
qualifications in preference to candidates of the opposite sex which would 
otherwise have been chosen. It added that such a provision would be in 
breach of EC law even if it concerns selection of candidates for posts of 
lower level positions93. 
Importantly, in Abrahamsson the Court for the first time referred to 
the principle of proportionality. Namely, that a measure of positive action 
must be proportionate to the aim pursued94. This is exactly the point 
proposed by Advocate General Tesauro95 in Kalanke. 
In Lommers the Court continued to analyse positive action measures 
from the perspective of the principle of proportionality. It stressed that: 
 
…in determining the scope of any derogation from an individual right 
such as the equal treatment of men and women laid down by the 
Directive, due regard must be had to the principle of proportionality, 
which requires that derogations must remain within the limits of what is 
appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the aim in view and that 
the principle of equal treatment be reconciled as far as possible with the 
requirements of the aim thus pursued96  
 
In this case the ECJ accepted an employer’s right to provide a nursery 
service for female employees only. Although such provision obviously 
has a tendency to perpetuate and legitimise the traditional division of 
roles between men and women and possibly it makes the wives of male 
employees suffer, nevertheless the particular circumstances justified it. 
First, in the particular establishment women were significantly under-
represented. Second, nursery places were of limited number and not 
accessible to all female employees. Third, fathers were not totally 
excluded from the possibility to use the nursery. The nursery was 
available for male employees in emergency situations and for those 
fathers bringing up their children by themselves. Accordingly, a provision 
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not guaranteeing equal rights to the nursery for employees of both sexes 
was proportionate and thus in conformity with Article 2(4) of Directive 
76/207. 
In Briche the Court ruled that Article 2(4) of Directive 76/207 
precludes national provisions allowing exemption from age limit for 
obtaining public-sector employment to widows who have not remarried 
and who are obliged to work, but excluding widowers who are in the 
same situation. 
All these cases illustrate that the Court gives preference to 
individual rights rather than group rights. And this is no big surprise, 
because the Community is based on a liberal market approach which 
recognizes market freedom and individualism, namely, “that individuals 
in the employment market act autonomously” and lower low-status 
employment of women is seen as result of individual choices.97
The second problem is that the liberal market approach is based on 
formal equality and does not allow positive measures as well as group 
justice98, so that the Court has faced difficulties in finding substantiation 
for positive measures from the point of view of legal theory. Writers 
characterise this situation as tension between substantive and formal 
equality. And indeed, on the one hand the Court stresses that it moves 
towards substantial equality99 but on the other hand it insists that positive 
measures are simply a derogation from equal treatment like the 
derogations provided in Article 2(2) and 2(3) of Directive 76/207 and 
thus it must be interpreted strictly and must remain within the limits of 
the principle of proportionality100. 
Scholars do not support the Court’s approach and point out that:  
 
if substantive equality is the aim of the Directive, and if affirmative 
action is likely to achieve that aim, it comes to seem more anomalous 
that such action must be viewed as a derogation form the principle 
encapsulated under the Directive101  
 
and that  
 
positive action should not be equated as a derogation form equal 
treatment, but rather as a necessary tool for the concretisation of 
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substantive equality, a coherent part of the framework and purpose of 
the Directive102. 
 
Advocate General Saggio proposed103 reconciling the tension 
between substantive equality and individual rights by the possible 
development of a proportionality criterion:  
 
Equal treatment, or formal equality, comes into conflict with substantive 
equality only if the remedial measure, in this case positive action in 
favour of women, is disproportionate, either it demands excessive 
sacrifices from those who do not belong to the group, or when the social 
reality does not justify it104. 
 
The Court did not accept it in that case, but seems to have started to 
develop proportionality criteria in Badeck and Lommers.  
It seems that the future will not bring radical changes regarding the 
Court’s approach to positive measures. Writers set hope on Article 141(4) 
when it comes into force. National courts have several times asked the 
Court to answer whether Article 141(4) would allowed for more radical 
positive measures, because formally Article 2(4) allowed equal 
opportunity measures only while Article 141(4) provides for “full 
equality in practice”. Responses on possible interpretation of Article 
141(4) are not very encouraging. In Abrahamsson the Court ruled that 
Article 141(4) is subject to the principle of proportionality105, thus 
showing that the provisions of Article 141(4) must be interpreted as 
derogating from the principle of equality and thus interpreted strictly.  
 
Positive measures and equal pay 
Although positive measures usually have been discussed regarding equal 
treatment matters, nevertheless the Court has given several rulings on 
positive measures regarding equal pay. 
In Commission v French Republic106 the Court did not accept a 
provision of a collective agreement providing for payment of an 
allowance to mothers who have to meet the cost of nurseries or 
childminders. It ruled that this particular provision and several others 
cannot be considered as positive measures, because those measures are 
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applied only to women while both sexes belong to the category of 
workers who are parents.   
Similarly, in Griesmar107 the ECJ held that a provision entitling 
only female civil servants to a higher pension on account of each child 
she has brought up cannot be considered as a measure eliminating 
disadvantages which women face in their professional life. This is 
because, first, exceptional pay for female workers only can be accepted 
with regard to special protection during the maternity period in 
accordance with Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207, and second, the 
responsibility for bringing up children concerns both parents and thus 
female employees are in a comparable situation with that of male 
employees. 
By contrast, in Abdoulaye108 the Court accepted a lump-sum 
payment exclusively for female employees who take maternity leave. The 
Court found this situation incomparable with the situation of male 
workers, because male workers do not face occupational disadvantages 
due to maternity leave. Interestingly, it accepted a presumed list of 
disadvantages which women could face during maternity leave, which 
include such activities recognized as directly discriminatory against 
women109  
It is plain why the Court in Commission v French Republic110 did 
not analyse equal pay provisions favouring females only from the point of 
view of positive measures in equal pay matters. Indeed, at that time 
positive measures were not allowed in equal pay matters. Since adoption 
of Article 141(4) it has been argued that it does allow positive measures 
with regard to equal pay111. 
However from the Griesmar ruling it follows that the Court does 
not accept positive measures regarding equal pay to compensate 
disadvantages faced by women workers. This is acceptable only in 
situations envisaged by Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207. It makes 
doubtful the argument whether Article 141(4) allows positive measures 
with regard to pay. Although Article 141/(4) allows measures which 
compensate for disadvantages in professional careers, nevertheless the 
Court  in Commission v French Republic and Griesmar has rejected 
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de la Fonction publique, de la Reforme de l’Etat et de la Decentralisation, ECR 2001 Page I-09383. 
108 Case C-218/98, Oumar Dabo Abdoulaye and Others v Regie nationale des usines Renault SA, ECR 
1999 Page I-05723. 
109 Clare McGlynn, Pregnancy, parenthood and the Court of Justice in Abdoulaye, E.L.Rev. (2000) 25 
Dec, Sweet & Maxwell and Contributors, at page 654. 
110 Case 312/86, Commission of the European Communities v French Republic, European Court 
Reports 1988 Page 06315.
111 Noreen Burrows and Muriel Robison, Positive Action for Women in Employment: Time to Align 
with Europe?, Journal of Law and Society, March 2006, Vol.33, no.1, Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 
Oxford, Malden, at page 32. 
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advantages for female workers in respect to pay precisely because the 
measures were compensatory rather than helping to eliminate existing 
inequalities structurally. Namely, the Court did not accept compensatory 
measures which do not solve the problem, but instead pose a risk of 
discriminating against male workers.  
 
Latvian law 
Article 29(5) of the Latvian labour law112 and Article 21(3) of the Law on 
social security113 precludes direct discrimination in fields of labour and 
social rights. However, so far in cases decided by national courts, there is 
no reference as regards what kind of discrimination a claimant has 
suffered from114. This demonstrates that the national courts do not 
recognize the existence of direct and indirect discrimination.  
Latvian law does not provide for positive measures, but special 
protection during pregnancy and maternity will be discussed in Chapter 
II. 
 
Sex of worker as determining factor in Latvian law 
Latvian law does not provide exclusions of one or other sex from certain 
occupational activities. However, the labour market is still strongly 
segregated in so called “male” and “female” professions. For many 
employers, it is still not clear whether a situation where the sex of the 
worker constitutes a determining factor115 can be based on objective 
factors or could be justified by social stereotypes. Considerable testimony 
on this theme is available in the shape of advertisements for vacancies 
calling for workers of a particular sex.  
The second problem concerns physically heavy and unhealthy 
work. Until 1st June 2002, when new the Labour law came into force, 
Decision No.292 of the Council of Ministers “On heavy and unhealthy 
work where employing women and persons younger than the age of 18 
are prohibited” adopted on 24th of July 1992 was effective. This Decision 
was inherited from Soviet labour law traditions, where women were 
excluded from quite a wide range of occupations, mainly in basic and 
chemical industries. It is needles to add that those exclusions were based 
                                                 
112 Darba likums: LR likums.Latvijas Vēstnesis 105, 2001. 6.jūlijs (Labour Law). 
113 Par sociālo drošību: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis 144, 1995. 21.sepbemris (Law on Social 
Security). 
114 See for example judgments Cēsu rajona tiesas 2005.gada 3.janvāra spriedums lietā Nr.C11019405, 
Rīgas pilsētas Ziemeļu rajona tiesas 2005.gada 29.aprīļa spriedums lietā Nr.C32242904047505, C-
475/3. 
115 Article 2(2) of Directive 76/207 is implemented in Article 29(2) of the Latvian Labour law. It 
provides: “Differential treatment based on the gender of employees is permitted only in cases where a 
particular gender is an objective and substantiated precondition for performance of the relevant work or 
for the relevant employment”. 
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exclusively on the stereotype that women are the only reproductive 
elements of society. Although the decision lost force together with the old 
Labour code116, nevertheless some writers in Latvia think that it is still 
enforceable117.  
Another Council of Ministers Decision inherited from Soviet 
labour law traditions was No.289 “On maximum weight that women and 
young persons are allowed to carry and move” adopted on 24th of July 
1992. The decision provided that women are allowed to carry no more 
than 15 kilograms and was obviously based on the general assumption 
that women are of lesser physical strength. This Decision is no longer in 
force. Instead, on 6th of August 2002 the Cabinet of Ministers adopted 
regulation No.344 “On labour protection requirements for carrying of 
heavy objects”. The regulations implement Directive 90/269118, which 
requires assessment of the fitness of workers individually in order to 
avoid back injury. 
However, on 28th of May 2002 the Cabinet of Ministers adopted 
Regulation No.205 “On the order in which licences are issued allowing 
employment of children in culture, art, sport and advertisement events 
and on restrictions which must be included in licences”. The regulations 
set different norms for girls and boys. Boys from 13-15 are allowed to 
carry objects not heavier than 4 kilograms, while girls only 2 kilograms. 
Such restrictions obviously diminish equal work opportunities of girls 
and are contrary to requirements of Directive 76/207, because based on 
general assumptions not taking into account the fact that the fitness of 
children of age 13 to 15 differs considerably individually.   
 
                                                 
116 The Council of Ministers adopted the Decision on the basis of delegation provided by the legislator 
in the old Labour Code; thus when the Labour Law became invalid, so did all secondary legislative 
acts, such as the Decision, which was adopted on the basis of the old Labour Code.  
117 Ingus Gailums, Darba likums. Komentāri. Tiesu prakse., 2.grāmata C daļa (28.- 99.pants), Gailuma 
juridiskā biroja izdevniecība, Rīga, 2003. 
118  Council Directive 90/269/EEC of 29 May 1990 on the minimum health and safety requirements for 
the manual handling of loads where there is a risk particularly of back injury to workers (fourth 
individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC), Official Journal L 
156 , 21/06/1990 P. 0009 - 0013 (ES, DA, DE, EL, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT.)
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Chapter 3. 
Indirect discrimination 
The concept of indirect discrimination has its origins in case law under 
Title VII of the US Civil Rights Act 1964 and was subsequently 
introduced into UK law and into Community law through judicial 
interpretation of Article 1411. This was the case of Jenkins2, referred by 
the British Employment Appeal Tribunal, in which the ECJ held that a 
difference in pay between full-time and part-time workers does amount to 
indirect discrimination if it is a way to reduce the pay of part-time 
workers which predominantly consist of women. Thereby indirect 
discrimination was recognized by EC law.  
However, application of the concept of indirect discrimination was 
problematic partially because Community law itself did not provide a 
definition3. A definition of indirect discrimination first appeared in 
Directive 97/80. That definition was criticized by scholars4, especially 
regarding the obligation to provide statistical data to prove disparate 
effect. This requirement made it impossible to prove indirect 
discrimination in many cases. On the other hand, the definition of indirect 
discrimination provided by Directive 97/80 made clear the proportionality 
test for justifications. Before this, the ECJ frequently departed from the 
three stage proportionality test firstly established in the case of Bilka-
Kaufhaus5. 
Currently, the definition of indirect discrimination is provided by 
Article 2(2) of Directive 76/207 amended by Directive 2002/73. This 
states: 
Indirect discrimination: where an apparently neutral 
provision, criterion or practice would put persons of one 
sex at a particular disadvantage compared with persons of 
the other sex, unless that provision, criterion or practice is 
objectively justified by a legitimate aim, and the means of 
achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. 
 
                                                 
1 Catherine Barnard, Bob Hepple, Substantive equality, Cambridge Law Journal, November 2000, 
59(3), pages 562-585. 
2 Case 96/80, J.P. Jenkins v Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd., European Court Reports 1981 Page 
00911. 
3 Sacha Prechal, Combating Indirect discrimination in Community law context, 1993, Legal Issues of 
Europe Integration, Vol.19, No.1. 
4 See Catherine Barnard, Bob Hepple, Indirect Discrimination: Interpreting Seymour-Smith, Cambridge 
Law Journal, July 1999, 58(2), pages 399-412, Catherine Barnard, Bob Hepple, Substantive equality, 
Cambridge Law Journal, November 2000, 59(3), pages 562-585, Sacha Prechal, Equality of treatment, 
non-discrimination and social policy: achievements in three themes, Common Market Law Review 41, 
pages 533-551, 2004, Kluwer Law International, at page 542. 
5 Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz, European Court Reports 1986 Page 
01607. For example departure from proportionality test see cases C-189/91 Petra Kirsammer-Hack v 
Nurhan Sidal, ECR 1993 Page I-06185, C-167/97 Regina v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte 
Nicole Seymour-Smith and Laura Perez, ECR 1998 Page I-05199. 
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This definition requires the following elements: 
1) provision, criterion, or practice; 
2) persons; 
3) persons would be put at a particular disadvantage; 
4)  compared to persons of the other sex; 
5) provision, criterion or practice can be objectively justified; 
6) objectively justified by a legitimate aim, and the means of 
achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. 
 
“provision, criterion, or practice” 
Indirect discrimination can arise not only from a provision or criterion, 
which are usually fixed in written form. It can arise also from practice. 
Thus the definition covers official written requirements as well as 
practice, which is usually unwritten. A provision, criterion, or practice is 
discriminatory if it has a discriminatory effect irrespective of the 
employer’s intent6.   
 
“persons” 
Such wording indicates that a negative impact must fall on a group of 
persons rather than on an individual and that if only one individual suffers 
indirect discrimination, then he/she has no right to claim. However, the 
word “persons” must be read together with “would be put at a particular 
disadvantage”. 
 
“would be put at a particular disadvantage” 
This formulation indicates that there is no demand for a group of persons 
who have already suffered from indirect discrimination. It rather provides 
that the provision, criterion, or practice is indirectly discriminatory if it 
could affect persons of one sex and has already affected one person of 
that group. The ECJ took this approach in the case of O’Flynn7 regarding 
indirect discrimination against migrant workers.  
Thus the new definition of indirect discrimination differs from the 
definition provided by Directive 97/90. Under the definition of Directive 
97/90, indirect discrimination could be proven only if statistical data can 
show that a substantially higher proportion of the members of one sex 
suffer from the disadvantage. The ECJ has given quite unclear guidelines 
on how this provision must be applied. The European Commission 
                                                 
6  Catherine Barnard, Bob Hepple, Substantive equality, Cambridge Law Journal, November 2000, 
59(3), pages 562-585. It also follows from the case-law of the ECJ see for example, case 96/80, J.P. 
Jenkins v Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd., European Court Reports 1981 Page 00911. 
or case 177/88 Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichtig Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassen 
(VJV-Centrum) Plus, (1990) ECR page I-03941. 
7 John O'Flynn v Adjudication Officer, European Court Reports 1996 Page I-02617.
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proposed a “statistically significant” test, which could show that a 
difference in impact is not mere chance8. However, the ECJ had not 
defined how much it should be. It is for the national court to determine 
whether statistics appear to be significant9. The Court also permitted use 
of statistical evidence which reveals lesser but persistent and relatively 
constant disparity over a long period between men and women10. In 
Danfoss11 the Court held that the burden of proof must shift to the 
employer if a pay system lacks transparency and if an employee can 
establish that among a relatively large number of workers, women 
workers receive less pay than male colleagues.  
The second issue is about groups which must be compared. The 
ECJ agrees that the best approach to the comparison of statistics is to 
consider, on the one hand, the respective proportions of men and women 
in the workforce able to satisfy the requirements and those unable to do 
so. “It is not sufficient to consider the number of persons affected, since 
that depends on the number of working people in the Member State as a 
whole as well as the percentages of men and women employed in that 
State”12.  
The definition in Directive 97/80 was recognized as not effective to 
catch indirect discrimination: 
 
 …use of statistical data in indirect sex discrimination cases gave rise to 
some rather technical case law and a lot of practical problems13.  
 
The requirement to establish statistics on a “substantially higher 
proportion” or a “statistically significant” or “relatively large number” 
could be the problem, first, in a small country, where only several 
employers employ more than 100 employees14, second, if such statistics 
are not available or accessible. Besides, “there were also sex 
discrimination cases in which statistics did not play a role. The very fact 
that a neutral criterion, such as seniority, could work against women 
                                                 
8 Catherine Barnard, Bob Hepple, Indirect Discrimination: Interpreting Seymour-Smith, Cambridge 
Law Journal, July 1999, 58(2), pages 399-412, Ruth Nielsen, European Labour Law, DJOF Publishing, 
Copenhagen, 2000, at page 218. 
9 Case C-167/97 Regina v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Nicole Seymour-Smith and 
Laura Perez, ECR 1998 Page I-05199, paragraph 62. 
10 Ibid., para. 61. 
11 Case C-109/88, Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behaf of Danfoss, European Court Reports 1989 Page 03199. 
12 Case C-167/97 Regina v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Nicole Seymour-Smith and 
Laura Perez, ECR 1998 Page I-05199, paragraph 59. 
13  Sacha Prechal, Equality of treatment, non-discrimination and social policy: achievements in three 
themes, Common Market Law Review 41, pages 533-551, 2004, Kluwer Law International, at page 
542. 
14 Such a situation is in Denmark: Ruth Nielsen, European Labour Law, DJOF Publishing, 
Copenhagen, 2000, at page 219, and it is quite the same in Latvia, too. 
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seemed sufficient15”. The new definition of indirect discrimination seems 
to allow proof of indirect discrimination by statistical evidence as well as 
“any other means that demonstrate that a provision would be intrinsically 
disadvantageous for the person or persons concerned”16, thus “the 
standard of proof is considerably lower”17. 
  
“compared to persons of the other sex” 
Unlike migrant workers or workers of different racial or ethnic origin, 
who must prove disadvantage in comparison to all other workers, persons 
who suffer from indirect discrimination based on sex must prove 
disadvantage in comparison to workers of the opposite sex. 
In the case of Defrenne II18 it was held that regarding 
discrimination in equal pay matters, a comparator of the opposite sex 
must be found in the “same establishment or service, whether private or 
public” and - once again approved recently in the case of Lawrence19 - 
that pay conditions must be attributed to the same source. Therefore, the 
principle of single source is applied in respect of working conditions, 
too20. However, if indirect discrimination arises due to discriminatory 
national legislation, a comparator of the opposite sex working in the same 
establishment or service is not necessary21.    
A debate arises whether a male colleague who works full-time 
could be considered as a comparator to a female worker who works part-
time. According to the case-law of the ECJ, it depends on the 
circumstances of each case22. For example part-time and full-time 
workers are comparable if the issue is about the right to receive wages in 
                                                 
15 Sacha Prechal, Equality of treatment, non-discrimination and social policy: achievements in three 
themes, Common Market Law Review 41, pages 533-551, 2004, Kluwer Law International, at page 
542, see case 184/89 Helga Nimz v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, European Court Reports 1991 
Page I-00297.
16 Ruth Nielsen, European Labour Law, DJOF Publishing, Copenhagen, 2000, at page 293. 
17 Sacha Prechal, Equality of treatment, non-discrimination and social policy: achievements in three 
themes, Common Market Law Review 41, pages 533-551, 2004, Kluwer Law International, at page 
542. 
18 Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena, European Court 
Reports 1976 Page 00455, paragraph 22. 
19 Case C-320/00, A. G. Lawrence and Others v Regent Office Care Ltd, Commercial Catering Group 
and Mitie Secure Services Ltd. , European Court Reports 2002 Page I-07325.
20 Sacha Prechal, Equality of treatment, non-discrimination and social policy: achievements in three 
themes, Common Market Law Review 41, pages 533-551, 2004, Kluwer Law International, at pages 
546-547. 
21 Case C-256/01, Debra Allonby v Accrington & Rossendale College, Education Lecturing Services, 
trading as Protocol Professional and Secretary of State for Education and Employment, European 
Court Reports 2004 Page I-00873.
22 Linds A.J.Senden, Article 119, the equal treatment principle and the concepts of direct and indirect 
discrimination in Community sex equality law, The Finnish Yearbook of international law advisory 
board, 1997, Kluwer Law International, the Hague, Boston, London, at page 397. 
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case of illness23. However, part-time and full-time workers are not 
comparable if the issue is about the right to receive overtime 
supplements24. 
 
“provision, criterion, or practice can be objectively 
justified” 
According to the definition and the case-law25 of the ECJ, indirect 
discrimination can be allowed if it can be objectively justified.  As 
Friedman points out, such a possibility is necessary to find a balance 
“between equality and other social priorities, particularly the business 
interests of the employer or state policy”26. However, one should not 
forget that the “principle of equal treatment is today recognized as an 
important value or as a fundamental right” and “the courts should not be 
easily satisfied that the interest of the author of alleged discrimination 
should have precedence over the principle of equal treatment”27. 
Regarding particular justifications, the ECJ has accepted as 
objective justifications social and employment policy of the state28 and 
real need of the undertaking29. There are particular justifications 
regarding criteria of the pay-system which could be accepted if the 
employer can prove their importance. For example, pay could vary 
according to an employee’s mobility, training, seniority30, or physical 
strength31. The Court does not accept budgetary considerations of the 
Member State32, mere generalisations33, and the fact that indirectly 
discriminatory provisions were introduced due to collective bargaining34. 
                                                 
23 Case 171/88 Ingrid Rinner-Kühn v FWW Spezial-Gebäudereinigung GmbH & Co., European Court 
Reports 1989 Page 02743.
24 Case C-399/92, Stadt Lengerich v Angelika Helmig and Waltraud Schmidt v Deutsche Angestellten-
Krankenkasse and Elke Herzog v Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund Landverband Hamburg eV and Dagmar 
Lange v Bundesknappschaft Bochum and Angelika Kussfeld v Firma Detlef Bogdol GmbH and Ursula 
Ludewig v Kreis Segeberg.  
25 Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz, European Court Reports 1986 Page 
01607.
26 Sandra Friedman, Discrimination Law, Oxford University press, 2002, at page112. 
24 Sascha Prechal, Combating Indirect discrimination in Community law context, 1993, Legal Issues 
of Europe Integration, L 19, #1. 
28 Case C-77/02 Erika Steinicke v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, European Court Reports 2003 Page I-
09027.
29 Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz, European Court Reports 1986 Page 
01607.
30 Case 109/88 Handels-og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behaf of Danfoss, European Court Reports 1989 Page 03199. 
31 Case 237/85 Gisela Rummler v Dato-Druck GmbH. , European Court Reports 1986 Page 02101.
32 Joined cases C-4/02 and C-5/02 Hilde Schönheit v Stadt Frankfurt am Main (C-4/02) and Silvia 
Becker v Land Hessen (C-5/02), ECR 2003 Page 00000. 
33 Case C-77/02 Erika Steinicke v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, European Court Reports 2003 Page I-
09027 paragraph 64. 
34 Case C-127/92 Dr. Pamela Mary Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority and Secretary of State for 
Health, European Court Reports 1993 Page I-05535. 
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“objectively justified by a legitimate aim, and the means of 
achieving that aim is appropriate and necessary” 
The definition provides for a three-stage proportionality test: 
1) there must be a legitimate aim; 
2) the means must be appropriate to achieve the legitimate aim; 
3) the means must be necessary to achieve the legitimate aim. 
“Legitimate aim” means that the aim is generally acceptable and 
deserving of protection and is sufficiently important to “take priority over 
the principle of equal treatment”35. In other words: 
 
This test implies in fact that a balancing of interests must be made, namely 
between the interest of the author of the alleged discrimination on the one 
hand and the application of the principle of non-discrimination on the 
other36. 
 
It is also important to recognize that the chosen means are necessary to 
achieve a legitimate aim or that it is impossible to achieve the legitimate 
aim in another less discriminatory or non-discriminatory way37. 
Before criteria for objective justification of indirect discrimination 
were introduced in Directive 76/207, the case-law of the ECJ on 
application of the principle of proportionality was inconsistent. The so-
called “three stage” test was firstly applied in Bilka-Kaufhaus38. The ECJ 
held that indirect discrimination can be justified: 
 
…if the national court finds that the measures chosen ... correspond to a 
real need on the part of the undertaking, are appropriate with a view to 
achieving the objective pursued and are necessary to that end39. 
 
The same test was affirmed in Seymour-Smith40. Provisions of national 
legislation which have an indirectly discriminatory effect are not in 
breach of the principle of equal treatment: 
 
...if a Member State is able to show that the measures chosen reflect a 
necessary aim of its social policy and are suitable and necessary for 
achieving that aim”.  
 
                                                 
35 Sascha Prechal, Combating Indirect discrimination in Community law context, 1993, Legal Issues of 
Europe Integration,  Vol,19, No.1. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz, European Court Reports 1986 Page 
01607.
39 Ibid., para.  36. 
40 Case C-167/97 Regina v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Nicole Seymour-Smith and 
Laura Perez, ECR 1998 Page I-05199. 
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At first sight, the proportionality tests given in Bilka-Kaufhaus and 
Seymour-Smith seem almost identical, but scholars indicate that the 
proportionality test given in Seymour-Smith is weaker than that of Bilka-
Kaufhaus41. And indeed, if an employer under the Bilka-Kaufhaus test 
must prove that indirect discrimination is due to real need of the 
undertaking, then the legislator under the Seymour-Smith test does not 
have to prove that it is necessary to attain a particular social policy aim. It 
follows that the ECJ distinguished between the proportionality test 
applied to conduct of the employer and to national legislation42.  
Indeed, in several following cases the ECJ approved that the national 
legislator is entitled to a broader discretion when deciding national social 
policy. In Kruger43 the ECJ held: 
 
…social policy is a matter for the Member States. Consequently, it is for 
the Member States to choose the measures capable of achieving the aims 
of their social and employment policy. In exercising that competence, the 
Member States have a broad margin of discretion. 
 
However, in the recently decided case of Steinicke44 on the national 
legislation of Germany, the Court referred again to the Seymour-Smith 
test and did not mention that Member States have a broad margin of 
discretion to define and implement their social and employment policy. In 
the case of Schonheit45 the ECJ did not mention the proportionality test at 
all. It elaborated only on permissible justifications.  
Some scholars have analyzed whether a difference exists between 
the proportionality tests applied in equal–pay and equal-treatment cases46. 
For a long period, there was only one case decided by the ECJ on 
possibly indirectly discriminatory treatment. That was the case of Sidal47 
concerning German legislation exempting small businesses from liability 
in case of unfair dismissal of employees. Although the ECJ did not find 
indirect discrimination here, nevertheless it admitted that such legislation 
would be justified by objective reasons because the legislation:  
                                                 
41 Catherine Barnard, Bob Hepple, Indirect Discrimination: Interpreting Seymour-Smith, Cambridge 
Law Journal, July 1999, 58(2), pages 399-412. 
42 See Catherine Barnard, Bob Hepple, Indirect Discrimination: Interpreting Seymour-Smith, 
Cambridge Law Journal, July 1999, 58(2), pages 399-412, also Sacha Prechal, Combating Indirect 
discrimination in Community law context, 1993, Legal Issues of Europe Integration, L 19, #1 
43 Case C-281/97 Andrea Krüger v Kreiskrankenhaus Ebersberg, European Court Reports 1999 Page I-
05127.
44 Case C-77/02, Erika Steinicke v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, European Court Reports 2003 Page I-
09027 paragraph 58, the same approach was approved in case C-285/02 Edeltraud Elsner-Lakeberg v 
Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, European Court Reports 2004 Page I-05861.
45 Joined cases C-4/02 and C-5/02 Hilde Schönheit v Stadt Frankfurt am Main (C-4/02) and Silvia 
Becker v Land Hessen (C-5/02), ECR 2003 Page 00000. 
46 Lynn M.Roseberry, The limits of Employment Discrimination Law in the United States and 
European Community, (1999), Copenhagen, DJOF Publishing, page 133. 
47 C-189/91, Petra Kirsammer-Hack v Nurhan Sidal, ECR 1993 Page I-06185. 
 49
 
…forms part of a series of measures intended to alleviate the constraints 
burdening small business, which play an essential role in economic 
development and the creation of employment in the Community48.  
 
Nevertheless, this concern does not come true, because in recently 
decided cases on indirectly discriminatory treatment the ECJ applied the 
full proportionality test49. 
 
 
“objective factors unrelated to sex” 
Interestingly, the definition of indirect discrimination given in Directive 
2002/73 - unlike the definition in Directive 97/80 - does not require that 
objective justification must be unrelated to sex. This is of great 
importance, in assessing proposed justification, whether and how it 
affects each sex. In Danfoss the ECJ held that mobility, training, and 
seniority criteria affecting a worker’s pay put women workers at a 
disadvantage, since they have household and family duties. Thus the 
criteria of mobility and training could be justified only it they are of 
“importance for performance of specific tasks”50.  The criterion of 
seniority can be justified only if there is a “relationship between the 
nature of the work performed and the experience gained”51. 
A pay system which is based upon the criterion of physical strength 
also put women at a disadvantage, because generally they are of lesser 
physical strength. Thus each undertaking has an obligation to adopt such 
job classification system which includes such criteria to which women 
workers may have a particular aptitude52. Although the wording of the 
definition of indirect discrimination in Directive 2002/73 does not require 
assessment of the relation of objective factors to sex, nevertheless it is 
explicitly required case-law of the ECJ. However, precision of definition 
provided by a legislative act in some cases could play a decisive role, 
especially in the national courts of new EC Member States which are not 
familiar with the jurisprudence of the ECJ.  
 
Indirect discrimination in equal pay matters 
                                                 
48 Ibid., paragraph 33. 
49 See cases C-187/00 Helga Kutz-Bauer v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, European Court reports 
2003 Page I-02741 and  C-77/02 Erika Steinicke v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, European Court reports 
2003 Page I-09027.
50 Case 109/88 Handels-og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Danfoss, European Court reports 1989 Page 03199. 
51 Case C-184/89, Helga Nimz v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, European Court reports 1991 Page I-
00297, paragraph 14. 
52 Case 237/85 Gisela Rummler v Dato-Druck GmbH. , European Court reports 1986 Page 02101.
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Although the definition of indirect discrimination in Directive 76/207 as 
amended by Directive 2002/73 seems to be much better for proving 
indirect discrimination, it concerns only equal treatment matters.  Equal 
pay cases are still covered by the definition of indirect discrimination in 
Directive 97/80. Therefore it is unclear whether indirect discrimination in 
pay matters could be proved by other than statistical means. Although 
regarding some aspects the ECJ in equal pay cases refers to equal 
treatment cases53 and vice versa, in the case of Kruger54 the Court strictly 
separated matters of equal treatment from matters of equal pay. 
 
Indirect discrimination in state social security matters 
The same issue concerns indirect discrimination in statutory social 
security matters as provided by Directive 79/7. Although Article 4(1) of 
Directive 79/7 prohibits indirect discrimination, it does not provide a 
definition. Moreover, Directive 97/80 is not applicable to state social 
security matters. However, from the case-law of the ECJ on state social 
security matters it follows that almost the same concept of indirect 
discrimination as in equal treatment and equal pay cases is applied55.  In 
case C-229/89 the ECJ held: 
 
It should be recalled at the outset that in accordance with settled case-law, 
Article 4(1) of Directive 79/7 precludes less favourable treatment from 
being accorded to a social group when it is shown to be made up of a 
much greater number of persons of one or the other sex, unless the 
provision in question is “based on objectively justified factors unrelated to 
any discriminations on grounds of sex”56. 
 
The concept of indirect discrimination applied in state social security 
matters differs from that applied regarding equal treatment and pay in 
respect to the proportionality test. Indirect discrimination in state social 
security matters could be justified by a looser proportionality test57. 
Although cases on state social security matters refer to the three-stage 
Bilka test58, nevertheless the Court added:   
                                                 
53 See in this regard application of the proportionality test in indirect discrimination cases.  
54 Case C-281/97 Andrea Krüger v Kreiskrankenhaus Ebersberg, European Court Reports 1999 Page I-
05127.
55 See C-33/89 Maria Kowalska v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, ECR 1990 Page I-02591. 
56 Case C-229/89, Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium, European Court 
Reports 1991 Page I-02205 paragraph 14. 
57 Catherine Barnard, Bob Hepple, Indirect Discrimination: Intepreting Seymour-Smith, Cambridge 
Law Journal, July 1999, 58(2), pages 399-412, at page 411, see also Evelyn Ellis, The Definition of 
Discrimination in European Community Sex Eqaulity Law, E.L.Rev (1994) 19 (6), p.563-580. 
58 See in that respect C-226/91, Jan Molenbroek v Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank, European 
Court Reports 1992 Page I-05943  paragraph 13, C-343/92 M.A. De Weerd, nee Roks, and others v 
Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Gezondheid, Geestelijke en Maatschappelijke Belangen and 
others, European Court Reports 1994 Page I-00571, paragraph 34, C-317/93, Inge Nolte v 
Landesversicherungsanstalt Hannover, European Court Reports 1995 Page I-04625, paragraph 28, C-
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 The Court observes that, in the current state of Community law, social policy is a matter 
for the Member States ... Consequently, it is for the Member States to choose the 
measures capable of achieving the aim of their social and employment policy. In 
exercising that competence, the Member States have a broad margin of discretion.  
It should be noted that the social and employment policy aim relied on by the German 
Government is objectively unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex and that, in 
exercising its competence, the national legislature was reasonably entitled to consider 
that the legislation in question was necessary in order to achieve that aim59.  
 
 
Concept of indirect discrimination and substantive equality 
The concept of indirect discrimination could help much to fight 
discrimination. Even more, from the first sight the concept of indirect 
discrimination seems to be intended to achieve equality of results, 
because it is able to catch almost every obstacle disadvantaging one sex. 
However, this is only partially true, because the concept of indirect 
discrimination in some cases simply flies in the face of social realities 
rather than helps to overcome structural inequalities60. For example, if 
women can not on average become physically stronger than men, they 
can be released from the dual burden of family responsibilities. But 
instead, the concept of indirect discrimination:  
 
…merely accepts social norms or the stereotype that women are the main 
child-carer, instead of providing them with respective child care facilities 
and therefore eliminating the problem in its background”61.  
 
This problem especially concerns part-time work, as well as problems 
regarding pay and mobility, training, and seniority of workers. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
444/93, Ursula Megner and Hildegard Scheffel v Innungskrankenkasse Vorderpfalz now 
Innungskrankenkasse Rheinhessen-Pfalz, paragraph 24. 
59 Cases 317/93, Inge Nolte v Landesversicherungsanstalt Hannover, European Court Reports 1995 
Page I-04625, paras. 33 and 34, C-444/93, Ursula Megner and Hildegard Scheffel v 
Innungskrankenkasse Vorderpfalz now Innungskrankenkasse Rheinhessen-Pfalz, European Court 
Reports 1995 Page I-04741, paragraphs 29 and 30. 
60 Sandra Friedman, Discrimination Law, Oxford University Press, 2002, at page 115, Sacha Prechal, 
Combating Indirect discrimination in Community law context, 1993, Legal Issues of Europe 
Integration, L 19, #1. 
The same is pointed out by Evelyn Ellis, Recent Developments in European Community Sex Equality 
Law, Common Market law Review, 35, 1998, pages 379-408, at page383. She states: 
“Helmig (Joined Cases C-399, 409 and 425/92 and C-34, 50 and 78/93 (1994) ECR I-
5727), however undoubtedly illustrates the limitation inherent in the concept of indirect 
discrimination itself. Although indirect discrimination aims to tackle the hidden obstacles 
that stand in the way of women at work, it only discounts those obstacles where they are 
genuinely irrelevant to the work performed. The Concept does not, furthermore, possess 
the ability to restructure our society so as to dismantle the obstacles which women 
continue to face”60
61 Hugh Collins, Discrimination, Equality and Social Inclusion, The Modern Law Review, Blackwell 
Publishing, January 2003, Vol.66, No.1, pages 16-42, at page 30. 
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Latvian law 
Article 29(6) of the Latvian labour law62 and Article 21(4) of the Law on 
social security63 precludes indirect discrimination in the fields of labour 
and social rights. So far there is no cases decided by national courts on 
indirect discrimination: 
The situation in Latvia as regards recognition of indirect discrimination 
fully corresponds to the following situation: 
 
…indirect discrimination is an entirely new concept for most of the 
accession countries. As a recent report makes clear, specific definition of 
both indirect and direct discrimination are often lacking in their 
legislation. And even if these concepts are to be introduced in the near 
future, the experience within the EU Member States shows that it may 
take ages before the concept is properly understood and applied. 
Consequently, there is much progress to be made promotion and 
implementing the concept64
 
 
                                                 
62 Darba likums: LR likums.Latvijas Vēstnesis 105, 2001. 6.jūlijs (Labour Law) 
63 Par sociālo drošību: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis 144, 1995. 21.sepbemris (Law on Social Security) 
64 Sacha Prechal, Equality of treatment, non-discrimination and social policy: achievements in three 
themes, Common Market Law Review 41, pages 533-551, 2004, Kluwer Law International, at pages 
536-537. 
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Chapter 4. 
Equal pay 
EC Law 
The principle of equal pay means that a worker must receive equal pay 
for equal work or work of equal value irrespective of sex. Historically, 
the right to equal pay for equal work was the first provision in the EC 
providing for equality between men and women. Article 119 (now 141) 
was inserted in the EC Treaty in 1957 due to French fear of competitive 
disadvantage “through observing the principle of equal pay for equal 
work more thoroughly” than other Member states1. At that time, the 
provision contained in Article 119 seemed anomalous2, so that for a long 
time it remained unenforced in a number of Member States. 
Only in 1975 was the ECJ asked to give a preliminary ruling on 
Article 119 by the Labour Court of Brussels before which a case was 
brought by an air hostess who claimed equal pay for equal work with her 
male colleagues. In this famous case known as Defrenne II3, the ECJ said 
several important things. First, that Article 119 pursues a double aim – 
not only economic – elimination of competitive disadvantage among 
undertakings which have introduced the principle of equal pay and those 
which have not, but also social – improvement of the living and working 
conditions of peoples4. Second, that Article 119 has direct horizontal 
effect5. Although scholars argue that the wording of Article 119 does not 
fully correspond to the criteria for having direct effect6, most probably 
such decision by the Court was taken to ensure full and immediate 
observance of the principle of equal pay by the Member States which had 
failed to do so since 1964.  
In 1975 the Council adopted Directive 75/117, which 
supplemented the concept of equal pay provided by Article 119. Directive 
75/117 provided for the right to equal pay for work of equal value and put 
specific obligations to the Member States to ensure implementation. 
Amendments on equal pay for work of equal value were made in order to 
comply with International Labour Organization Convention 1007. It has 
                                                 
1 Paul Craig/Grainne De Burca, EU Law, (2003), 3rd edition,Oxford University Press, at page 846. See 
also Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 168, paragraph 
194. 
2 Paul Craig/Grainne De Burca, EU Law, (1998), 2nd edition,Oxford University Press, at page 806. 
3 Case 43-75, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena, European 
Court Reports 1976 Page 00455. 
4 Ibid., paras 8-10. 
5 Ibid., para. 39. 
6 Paul Craig/Grainne De Burca, EU Law, (1998), 2nd edition,Oxford University Press, at page 172. 
7 Ruth Nielsen, European Labour Law, DJOF Publishing, Copenhagen, 2000, at page 199. 
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been pointed out that terms as regards pay and the same work used in 
Article 141 and in Directive 75/117 have the same meaning8.  
 
Definition of pay 
A definition of pay is provided by Article 141(2) of EC Treaty: 
 
…‘pay’ means the ordinary basic or minimum wage or salary and 
any other consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the 
worker receives directly or indirectly, in respect of his 
employment, from his employer.  
Equal pay without discrimination based on sex means: 
(a) that pay for the same work at piece rates shall be calculated on 
the basis of the same unit of measurement; 
(b) that pay for work at time rates shall be the same for the same 
job. 
 
Besides, the ECJ has held that the concept of pay includes any 
consideration paid immediately or in future under a contract of 
employment, legislative provisions, on a voluntary basis9 or collective 
agreement10.  
 
Elements of pay 
The concept of pay provided by Article 141 includes such payments as 
employer’s contributions to private pension funds11, redundancy 
payments12, compensation for unfair dismissal13, travel concessions14, 
                                                 
8 Case C-381/99, Susanna Brunnhofer v Bank der österreichischen Postsparkasse AG, European Court 
Reports 2001 Page I-04961, paragraph 29. 
9 Case C-457/93, Kuratorium für Dialyse und Nierentransplantation e.V. v Johanna Lewark, European 
Court Reports 1996 Page I-00243, paragraph 21.
10 Case C-400/93, Specialarbejderforbundet I Danmark v Dansk Industri, formerly Industriens 
Arbejdsgivere, acting for Royal Copenhagen A/S, European Court Reports 1995 page I-1275.  
The ECJ held:  “The principle of equal pay for men and women also applies where the elements of pay 
are determined by collective bargaining or by negotiation at local level. However, the national court 
may take that fact into account in its assessment of whether differences between the average pay of two 
groups of workers are due to objective factors unrelated to any discrimination on grounds of sex”.  
Case C-127/92, Dr. Pamela Mary Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority and Secretary of State for 
Health, European Court Reports 1993 Page I-05535. The ECJ held: 
“22. The fact that the rates of pay at issue are decided by collective bargaining processes conducted 
separately for each of the two professional groups concerned, without any discriminatory effect within 
each group, does not preclude a finding of prima facie discrimination where the results of those 
processes show that two groups with the same employer and the same trade union are treated 
differently. If the employer could rely on the absence of discrimination within each of the collective 
bargaining processes taken separately as sufficient justification for the difference in pay, he could, as 
the German Government pointed out, easily circumvent the principle of equal pay by using separate 
bargaining processes.” 
11 Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz, European Court Reports 1986 Page 
01607.
12 Case C-262/88, Douglas Harvey Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group, European 
Court Reports 1990 Page I-018899. 
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and bonus payments15. This list is not exhaustive. Pay also includes 
payments which a worker receives from an employer even “not 
performing any work provided for in their contracts of employment”16. 
For example, compensation for attending training courses17, sickness 
allowance18, or maternity allowance19. State social security benefits do 
not fall within the concept of equal pay20. 
 
Occupational social security schemes 
One element of pay - occupational social security - has been discussed in 
EC law especially frequently. In general, the Western European welfare 
system is built on the principle that the state provides minimum social 
protection under the state social security system, while the main part of 
social security is provided by private social security schemes usually 
provided by employers. 
In Bilka-Kaufhaus the ECJ held that benefits paid by an employer under 
an occupational pension scheme constitute consideration received by the 
worker from the employer in respect of employment, thus falling within 
the scope of Article 14121. The case-law of the ECJ on equal treatment 
with regard to occupational pension schemes was codified by the Council 
adopting Directive 86/37822 and amending Directive 97/9623.  These 
Directives apply to occupational pension schemes providing for 
protection against the risks of sickness, invalidity, old age, including 
early retirement, industrial accidents, occupational diseases, and 
                                                                                                                                            
13 Case C-167/97, Regina v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Nicole Seymour-Smith and 
Laura Perez, ECR 1998 Page I-05199. 
14 Case 12/81, Eileen Garland v British Rail Engineering Limited., European Court Reports 1982 Page 
00359.
15 Case 58/81, Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg., European 
Court Reports 1982 Page 02175.
16 Case C-342/93, Joan Gillespie and others v Northern Health and Social Services Boards, 
Department of Health and Social Services, Eastern Health and Social Services Board and Southern 
Health and Social Services Board, European Court Reports 1996 Page I-00475, paragraph 13.
17 Case C-360/90, Arbeiterwohlfahrt der Stadt Berlin e.V. v Monika Bötel, European Court Reports 
1992 Page I-03589, also case C-457/93, Kuratorium für Dialyse und Nierentransplantation e.V. v 
Johanna Lewark, European Court Reports 1996 Page I-00243.
18 Case 171/88, Ingrid Rinner-Kühn v FWW Spezial-Gebäudereinigung GmbH & Co., European Court 
Reports 1989 Page 02743 paragraph 7. 
19 Case 342/93, Joan Gillespie and others v Northern Health and Social Services Boards, Department 
of Health and Social Services, Eastern Health and Social Services Board and Southern Health and 
Social Services Board, European Court Reports 1996 Page I-00475, paragraph 14.
20 Case 80/70.  
21 Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz, European Court Reports 1986 Page 
01607, paragraph 22.
22 Council Directive 86/378/EEC of 24 July 1986 on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women in occupational social security schemes, Official Journal L 225, 
12/08/1986 P.0040-0042. 
23Council Directive 96/97/EC of 20 December 1996 amending Directive 86/378/EEC on the 
implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in occupational social security 
schemes, Official Journal L 046, 17/02/1997 P.0020-0024. 
 56
unemployment and specifies the conditions which are to be considered 
discriminatory. Several of those conditions regarding occupational 
pension schemes deserve more thorough discussion. 
First, similar retirement age. In Barber the ECJ ruled that 
occupational pension schemes fall within the concept of pay provided by 
Article 141, so that different pensionable ages for men and women - 
unlike under the state social insurance system - can not be applicable 
here24. This decision posed many problems regarding its application and 
possible consequences with a retroactive character. Regarding this issue, 
the ECJ held in Ten Over that the Barber judgment is not applicable 
before 17th of May 1990 for those workers who did not claim the right to 
equal pay before national courts. However it does not preclude workers 
from joining occupational pension funds retroactively25 under condition 
that they will make all respective contributions26. This decision earned 
criticism regarding its formal approach and ignorance of social reality. 
Women excluded from the right to join occupational social security 
schemes usually do not have enough money to make contributions to 
schemes retroactively. It was argued that “the ECJ chose to subordinate 
women’s right to equal pay to the financial interest of employers because 
rectifying the employers’ past discrimination involves substantial 
costs”27. And indeed, the Court’s substantiation for limitation to claim 
benefits was “overriding considerations of legal certainty preclude legal 
situations which have exhausted all their effects in the past from being 
called in question where that might upset retroactively the financial 
balance of many” pension schemes28. 
Second, different pensions according to sex which workers receive 
from pension schemes. Nether the legislator by adopting Directive 86/378 
nor the Court have eliminated the crucial inequality between the sexes 
which arises from the different average lifespan of the sexes. In 
particular, insurers - which are usually the owners of private pension 
schemes - apply different actuarial factors according to a person’s sex, 
                                                 
24 In the recent judgment C-19/02, Viktor Hlozek v Roche Austria Gesellschaft mbH., European Court 
Reports 2004 Page I-11491, the Court seemed to overrule the similar retirement age principle. It 
justified different ages for men and women entitling bridging pension under the social plan of an 
undertaking, because the particular social plan was set for the purposes of a single restructuring 
operation and according to an agreement between management and employees. The Court found that 
male and female dismissed employees are not in a similar situation because of different pensionable 
ages under the statutory pension scheme!
25 Case C-57/93, Anna Adriaantje Vroege v NCIV Instituut voor Volkshuisvesting BV and Stichting 
Pensioenfonds NCIV, ECR 1994 page I-4541, paragraph 30. 
26 Case C-128/93,Geertruida Catharina Fisscher v Voorhuis Hengelo BV and Stichting 
Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor de Detailhandel., European Court Reports 1994 Page I-04583, paragraph 
37.
27 Lynn M.Rosebery, The Limits of Employment Discrimination Law in the United States and 
European Community, DJOF Publishing 1999. 
28 Case C-262/88, Douglas Harvey Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group, European 
Court Reports 1990 Page I-018899, paragraph 44. 
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which result in different pensions between males and females who have 
earned equal salary. In Neath the Court held that the use of actuarial 
factors differing according to sex in occupational pension schemes does 
not fall within the scope of Article 14129 or “in other words, funding 
arrangements are usually dictated by the insurance companies that 
administer pension schemes, not by employers”30, so that employers 
cannot be held responsible for this inequality. The only exception allowed 
under EC law was different employers’ contributions if the aim is to 
equalize the amount of final benefits31.  
Nothing had been done to eliminate inequality until adoption of 
Directive 2004/11332, which provides for equal treatment in the field of 
insurance. Article 5 of this directive obliges the Member States to ensure 
that use of sex as a factor in the calculation of premiums and benefits for 
the purposes of insurance and related services of insurers does not result 
in differences in individuals’ premiums and benefits. Since this provision 
refers to all kind of insurance, it applies to private pension schemes, too. 
 
Distinction between State social security schemes and 
occupational social security schemes 
The ECJ has set several criteria according to which a distinction must be 
drawn between the state social security system and occupational social 
security schemes which constitute pay within the meaning of Article 141. 
First in Defrenne I33 it held that state social security is: 
1) directly governed by legislation; 
2) not subject to agreement between employer and employees within 
the undertaking or occupational branch; 
3) obligatorily applicable to the general category of workers. 
In contrast to state social security schemes, in Bilka34 the Court 
repeated that occupational social security schemes: 
1) may be subject to provisions laid down by national legislation; 
however, they are established only by an agreement concluded between 
employer and employees  
2) are supplementary to the statutory social security scheme; 
                                                 
29 Case 152/91, David Neath v Hugh Steeper Ltd, ECR 1993 Page I-06935. 
30 Lynn M. Rosebery, The Limits of Employment Discrimination Law in the United States and 
European Community, DJOF Publishing 1999, at page 382. 
31 Article 6(1)(i) of Directive 86/378 amended by Directive 96/97. 
32 Council Directive 2004/113 of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between men and women in the access to and supply of goods and services.  
33 Case C-80/70, Gabrielle Defrenne v Belgium State, European Court Reports 1971 Page 00445, see 
also case C-110/91, Michael Moroni v Collo GmbH. European Court Reports 1993 Page I-06591, 
paragraph 14.
34 Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz, European Court Reports 1986 Page 
01607, see also case C-110/91, Michael Moroni v Collo GmbH. European Court Reports 1993 Page I-
06591, paragraph 15.
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3) do not receive any public funding. 
However, in Beune35 the ECJ reconsidered the importance of the 
criteria mentioned above. Beune was a case about a pension scheme for 
state officials and the question was whether it fell within the concept of a 
state social security scheme or an occupational social security scheme. 
The Court found that a civil servant pension scheme does not correspond 
to all criteria laid down in Bilka, but it held that: 
 
…considerations of social policy, of State organization, or of ethics or 
even budgetary preoccupations which influenced, or may have 
influenced, the establishment by the national legislature of a scheme 
such as the scheme at issue cannot prevail if the pension concerns only a 
particular category of workers, if it is directly related to the period of 
service and if its amount is calculated by reference to the civil servant’s 
last salary. The pension paid by public employer is therefore entirely 
comparable to that paid by a private employer to his former 
employees.36
 
In Niemi37 the Court clarified the conditions set in Beune on 
pension schemes applicable to employees employed by the State and 
falling within the scope of Article 141. It pointed out that the “decisive 
criterion is the existence of a link between the employment relationship 
and the retirement benefit”38. Further, the ECJ reaffirmed three criteria: 
1) pension concerns only a particular category of workers;  
2) the amount of pension is directly related to the period of service 
completed; 
3) the amount of pension is calculated by reference to a public servant’s 
last salary39.  
 
Sources of discriminatory pay  
Sources of discriminatory pay may vary. It could arise from national 
legislation, collective agreements, or individual employment as well as a 
discriminatory pay-system in an enterprise. However, this enumeration is 
not exhaustive. The Court has constantly held that Article 141 and 
Directive 75/117 preclude unequal pay between workers of opposite 
sexes “whatever mechanism produces such inequality”40. 
                                                 
35 Case C-7/93, Bestuur van het Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds v G. A. Beune, European Court 
Reports 1994 Page I-04471.
36 Case C-7/93, Bestuur van het Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds v G. A. Beune, European Court 
Reports 1994 Page I-04471, paragraph 45, see also in this regard Paul Craig/Grainne De Burca, EU 
Law, (2003), 3rd edition,Oxford University Press, at page 878. 
37 Case C-351/00, Pirkko Niemi, European Court Reports 2002 Page I-07007.
38 Ibid., para. 45.
39 Ibid., para. 47.
40 Case C-381/99, Susanna Brunnhofer v Bank der österreichischen Postsparkasse AG, European Court 
Reports 2001 Page I-04961, paragraph 30. 
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Same work and work of equal value 
Preconditions for comparison  
The “single source” requirement 
It was already mentioned that sources of discriminatory pay may 
originate from legislative provisions, collective agreements, and 
individual employment contracts41 but with the proviso that the source of 
discrimination is unique. This means that directly discriminatory 
legislative provisions do not require the existence of a comparator – an 
employee of the opposite sex earning more for equal work employed by 
the same employer and at the same establishment42. The same principle 
concerns directly discriminatory provisions of a collective agreement43: 
  
The definition of direct discrimination does not require the existence of an actual 
comparator; a mere hypothetical comparison is sufficient to meet the legislative standard. 
... 
On the other hand, we should not exaggerate the revolutionary character of a 
hypothetical comparator. As a recent judgement44 of the ECJ made clear, the alleged 
discrimination must have its origin in a single source.45  
 
This means that discrimination arising from individual employment 
contracts could be claimed only in accordance with the so-called 
comparable worth theory46. The comparable worth theory provides that 
an individual can claim equal pay for equal work if there is a comparator 
– a colleague working at the same establishment47 and employed by the 
                                                 
41 Case 43-75, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena, European 
Court Reports 1976 Page 00455. 
42 Case C-256/01, Debra Allonby v Accrington & Rossendale College, Education Lecturing Services, 
trading as Protocol Professional and Secretary of State for Education and Employment, European 
Court Reports 2004 Page I-00873, paragraph 84.
43 Even more in case C-127/92, Dr. Pamela Mary Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority and Secretary 
of State for Health, European Court Reports 1993 Page I-05535, the ECJ held: 
“22. The fact that the rates of pay at issue are decided by collective bargaining processes conducted 
separately for each of the two professional groups concerned, without any discriminatory effect within 
each group, does not preclude a finding of prima facie discrimination where the results of those 
processes show that two groups with the same employer and the same trade union are treated 
differently. If the employer could rely on the absence of discrimination within each of the collective 
bargaining processes taken separately as sufficient justification for the difference in pay, he could, as 
the German Government pointed out, easily circumvent the principle of equal pay by using separate 
bargaining processes.” 
44 Case C-320/00, A. G. Lawrence and Others v Regent Office Care Ltd, Commercial Catering Group 
and Mitie Secure Services Ltd. , European Court Reports 2002 Page I-07325.
45 Sacha Prechal, Equality of treatment, non-discrimination and social policy: achievements in three 
themes, Common Market Law Review 41, pages 533-551, 2004, Kluwer Law International.  
46 Lynn M. Roseberry, The limits of Employment Discrimination Law in the United States and 
European Community, (1999), Copenhagen, DJOF Publishing, page 183. 
47 Case 43-75, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena, European 
Court Reports 1976 Page 00455, decision. 
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same employer48, or a colleague worked at the same establishment 
employed by the same employer49 .  
With regard to individual employment agreements, writers had 
contrary opinions on whether certain paragraphs of Defrenne II50 and 
Macarthys51 provide evidence that the ECJ does not exclude the 
possibility of a broader comparison of pay than only within one service or 
establishment. Although it has been argued that it is most likely that the 
ECJ’s rulings on the scope of Article 141 limit comparison to one source 
only, there is no clear answer regarding the scope of Directive 75/117, 
which seems to be wider52. 
However, so far the ECJ has not given a broader interpretation of the 
scope of Directive 75/117. In contrast, recent case-law has underlined the 
limited scope of Article 141 - that source must be unique. This means that 
with regard to discriminatory pay arising from individual employment 
agreements, a comparator is mandatory except in cases of discrimination 
against a worker arising from pregnancy and maternity, where a 
comparator is not mandatory53. Moreover, taking account the 
circumstances of particular cases, where employees performed work for 
the same establishment but were employed by different employers, the 
criterion of “single source” was supplemented. If “single source” in 
Defrenne II meant “work carried out in the same establishment”54 then in 
                                                 
48 Case C-320/00, A. G. Lawrence and Others v Regent Office Care Ltd, Commercial Catering Group 
and Mitie Secure Services Ltd. , European Court Reports 2002 Page I-07325, paragraph 17.
49 Case 129/79, Macarthys Ltd v Wendy Smith, European Court Reports 1980 Page 01275. 
50 Case 43-75, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena, European 
Court Reports 1976 Page 00455, paragraph 19 : 
« It is impossible not to recognize that the complete implementation of the aim pursued 
by Article 119, by means of the elimination of all discrimination, direct or indirect, 
between men and women workers, not only as regards individual undertaking but also 
entire branches of industry and even of the economic system as a whole, may in certain 
cases involve the elaboration of criteria whose implementation necessitates the taking of 
appropriate measures at community and national level”. 
51Case 129/79, Macarthys Ltd v Wendy Smith, European Court Reports 1980 Page 01275, paragraph 
10: 
“As the court indicated in the Defrenne judgement of 8 April 1976, that provision applies 
directly, and without the need for more detailed implementing measures on the part of 
the Community or the Member States, to all forms of direct and overt discrimination 
which may be identified solely with the aims of the criteria of equal work and equal pay 
referred to by the Article in question. Among the forms of discrimination which may be 
thus judicially identified, the court mentioned in particular cases where men and women 
receive unequal pay for equal work carried out in the same establishment or service” 
52 Lynn M.Roseberry, The limits of Employment Discrimination Law in the United States and 
European Community, (1999), Copenhagen, DJOF Publishing, at pages 183-186. 
53 Case C-218/98, Oumar Dabo Abdoulaye and Others v Regie nationale des usines Renault SA, ECR 
1999 Page I-05723. 
54 Case 43-75, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena, European 
Court Reports 1976 Page 00455, paragraph 22. 
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Lawrence the criterion “employed by the same employer” was added55. 
The ECJ explains it as follows, that is if: 
 
… the differences identified in the pay conditions of workers 
performing equal work or work of equal value cannot be attributed 
to a single source, there is nobody which is responsible for the 
inequality and which could restore equal treatment. Such a situation 
does not come within the scope of Article 141(1) EC56. 
 
Thus the statement in the preamble of the Recast Directive could seem 
misleading for those who are not very familiar with the case-law of the 
ECJ on this matter: 
 
(10) The Court of Justice has established that, in certain 
circumstances, the principle of equal pay is not limited to 
situations in which men and women work for the same employer. 
 
It is important to note again that such possibility applies only if direct 
discrimination arises from provisions of legislature or collective 
agreements. 
The problem of the single source requirement with regard to 
discrimination arising from individual employment contracts frequently 
does not allow a challenge to discriminatory pay at large. This is because 
of horizontal job segregation or the situation where certain sectors of 
industry still employ male or female workers only. Besides, it is 
characteristic throughout the EU that traditional “male” professions and 
jobs are better paid than “female” professions and jobs57. It follows that: 
 
These differences in pay between male and female workers require a 
much broader analysis than merely a legal one. This is what we may call 
today structural or institutional discrimination, which can only be 
eliminated by additional instruments adopted at Community and national 
level or the parties to collective agreements58. 
 
Other preconditions 
After the single source of discrimination has been established, one should 
confirm whether men and women to whom the principle of equal pay 
                                                 
55 Case C-320/00, A. G. Lawrence and Others v Regent Office Care Ltd, Commercial Catering Group 
and Mitie Secure Services Ltd. , European Court Reports 2002 Page I-07325, paragraph 17. 
56 Ibid., para. 18.
57 Equality between women and men in the European Union, European Commission, Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publication of the European Communities, 2005. 
58 Sacha Prechal, Equality of treatment, non-discrimination and social policy: achievements in three 
themes, Common Market Law Review 41, pages 533-551, 2004, Kluwer Law International, at pages 
546-547. 
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must be applied are in identical or comparable situations59. For example, 
the fact that employees are classified in the same job category under a 
collective agreement does not automatically mean that they perform the 
same work or work of equal value60. Factors such as the nature of the 
work, training requirements, working conditions61, and professional 
qualifications62 could help to establish whether persons are in a 
comparable situation. 
 
Criteria for same work and work of equal value 
Duties must be compared irrespective of title or grade63. Indeed quite the 
opposite, employees formally providing the same services could in fact 
provide the same services but with different content, thus performing 
different work. For example, the content of services provided by 
psychotherapists with the education of psychologists or doctors differs, 
because their respective expertise is grounded in different education 
which provides different knowledge and skills64. 
The ECJ has not set many more criteria except as mentioned for 
comparison of work. Indeed, this is not surprising since it is not an easy 
task to determine whether work is the same, or indeed of equal value. 
Moreover, in general the duty to assess whether work performed is the 
same or of equal value in general lies with national courts65. The 
Community has provided more detailed guidelines on how to assess the 
sameness and equal value of work in the form of soft law only66.  
 
Pay system 
Measurement and comparison of pay 
Article 141(2) provides for measurement of pay. It distinguishes two 
kinds of pay: piece work, and time work. 
                                                 
59 Case C-381/99, Susanna Brunnhofer v Bank der österreichischen Postsparkasse AG, European Court 
Reports 2001 Page I-04961, paragraph 39. 
60 Ibid., para. 44. 
61 Case C-400/93, Specialarbejderforbundet I Danmark v Dansk Industri, fprmerly Industriens 
Arbejdsgivere, acting for Royal Copenhagen A/S, European Court Reports 1995 page I-1275, 
paragraph 33. 
62 Case C-309/97, Angestelltenbetriebsrat der Wiener Gebietskrankenkasse v Wiener 
Gebietskrankenkasse, European Court Reports 1999 page I-02865, paragraph 18. 
63 Lynn M.Roseberry, The limits of Employment Discrimination Law in the United States and 
European Community, (1999), Copenhagen, DJOF Publishing, page 62. 
64 Case C-309/97, Angestelltenbetriebsrat der Wiener Gebietskrankenkasse v Wiener 
Gebietskrankenkasse, European Court Reports 1999 page I-02865, paragraph 20. 
65 Case C-400/93, Specialarbejderforbundet I Danmark v Dansk Industri, fprmerly Industriens 
Arbejdsgivere, acting for Royal Copenhagen A/S, European Court Reports 1995 page I-1275, 
paragraph 42. 
66 Communication from the Commission of 17 July 1996 “A code of practice on the implementation of 
equal pay for equal work of equal value for women and men” COM (96) 336 final. 
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In Royal Copenhagen67 the ECJ admitted that pay for piece work is 
not discriminatory if it depends on individual output. But this is true only 
if remuneration for piece work among workers performing different piece 
work is established. A difference in average pay among two groups of 
workers who perform different piece work does not automatically mean 
that the pay system is discriminatory as far as it is influenced by 
individual output. 
In Barber the ECJ made clear that in order to establish whether the 
principle of equal pay is observed, each element of pay must be 
compared68. But, for example, an inconvenient-hours supplement can not 
be taken as the basis for pay comparison69, because it is obviously pay for 
different working conditions, not for the nature of the work. 
Interestingly, the ECJ itself has seemingly failed to follow the 
obligation to compare each element of pay. Roseberry70 points out the 
cases of Birds Eye Walls71, where the Court took into account total 
pension (occupational and state) income, while in Barber72 it did not take 
into account different pension income for male and female workers 
received from state and occupational pension schemes. These cases show 
that pay measurement and comparison may involve many criteria and 
factors, such as different pensionable age, or actuarial factors.  
 
Criteria 
To be non-discriminatory, a pay system must be based on gender-neutral 
and objective criteria. Gender neutral criteria are those which are possible 
to fulfil for persons of either sex. However, this does not exclude the 
possibility of indirect as well as direct discrimination. 
For example, a pay system which is based only on the physical 
strength criterion obviously discriminates against women workers, 
because they are in general of lesser physical strength73. But this does not 
mean that the pay system can not include any criterion which more 
favours persons of one sex. They just have to be in balance. Namely, an 
                                                 
67 Case C-400/93, Specialarbejderforbundet I Danmark v Dansk Industri, formerly Industriens 
Arbejdsgivere, acting for Royal Copenhagen A/S, European Court Reports 1995 page I-1275. 
68 Case C-262/88, Douglas Harvey Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group, European 
Court Reports 1990 Page I-018899, paragraph 34. 
69 Case C-236/98, Jämställdhetsombudsmannen v Örebro läns landsting, European Court Reports 2000 
Page I-02189, paragraph 54. 
70 Lynn M.Roseberry, The limits of Employment Discrimination Law in the United States and 
European Community, (1999), Copenhagen, DJOF Publishing, page 61. 
71 Case C-132/92, Birds Eye Walls Ltd. v Friedel M.Roberts, European Court Reports 1993 Page I-
05579. 
72 Case C-262/88, Douglas Harvey Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group, European 
Court Reports 1990 Page I-018899. 
73 Case 237/85 Gisela Rummler v Dato-Druck GmbH. , European Court Reports 1986 Page 02101, 
paragraph 15.
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employer is obliged to base its pay system on conditions which are 
equally favourable to both sexes74.   
Such gender neutral criteria as seniority75, training, and mobility76 
could have the same discriminatory effect. Although those criteria - 
unlike physical strength - are not based on general biological differences 
between the sexes, they could put at a disadvantage workers of one sex 
due to socially defined differences. Statistics show that average female 
workers spend much more time for family duties and child-care, thus they 
“are not as able as men to organize their working time flexibly”, “they 
have had less opportunity than men for training or have taken less 
advantage of such opportunity” and they “more frequently suffer an 
interruption of their career”77.   
Objective criteria are those which are of real need to perform work 
duties. From the case-law of the ECJ it follows that objective criteria are 
those which are “of importance for the performance of specific tasks 
entrusted to the employee”78. Thus according to the ECJ in order not to 
be discriminatory each pay system criterion must be assessed from the 
perspective of biological as well as socially defined differences between 
the sexes and from the perspective of objectivity – whether the criterion is 
of importance for performance for the work in question.  
It is notable that indirectly discriminatory criteria could be justified 
by real need on the part of an undertaking. However, this will not be the 
case where a disadvantaged group of workers would be composed only of 
persons of one sex79. 
 
Justifications for unequal pay 
From the discussion above it is clear that direct discrimination is not 
subject to any justification; however, indirect discrimination can be 
justified. Regarding justifications for unequal pay, there are two notable 
cases to mention. 
First, although equal pay issues in principle must be distinguished 
from equal treatment issues, nevertheless in certain circumstances they 
are closely connected. For example, in JamO where working-time of 
midwives was reduced because they must work on a shift basis. The 
question was whether reduction of working time could be taken into 
                                                 
74 Case 237/85 Gisela Rummler v Dato-Druck GmbH. , European Court Reports 1986 Page 02101.
75 Case C-184/89, Helga Nimz v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, European Court Reports 1991 Page I-
00297.
76 Case 109/88, Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Danfoss, European Court Reports 1989 Page 03199. 
77 Ibid., paras. 22, 23 and 24. 
78 Case 109/88, Handels-og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Danfoss, European Court Reports 1989 Page 03199, 
paragraph 22. 
79 Case C-196/02, Vasiliki Nikoloudi v Organismos Tilepikinonion Ellados AE. 
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account for comparison of basic salary. The ECJ did not exclude such 
possibility, if “reduction may constitute an objective reason unrelated to 
any discrimination on grounds of sex such as to justify a difference in 
pay”80. 
Second, an important justification was accepted in Enderby. 
Indirectly discriminatory pay could be justified on economic grounds – 
namely, by the state of the employment market “which may lead an 
employer to increase the pay of a particular job in order to attract 
candidates81  
 
Equal pay during and after pregnancy, maternity and child-
care leave 
Pay during pregnancy 
Generally during pregnancy, the pay of a worker must be at the same 
level as other workers, but only in comparable situations. Directive 92/85 
provides for several obligations to provide a pregnant worker with 
healthy working conditions. However, Directive 92/85 does not explicitly 
deal with equal pay matters in cases where working time or working 
conditions have been adjusted to a pregnant worker or it is impossible and 
pregnant worker must be granted leave or an extension of maternity 
leave. 
How the equal pay principle must be applied to a pregnant worker 
is quite a controversial issue. The ECJ has held that although pregnancy-
related illness or disorders which cause incapacity for work are a specific 
feature of the condition of pregnancy82, nevertheless a woman in such a 
situation has no right to claim full pay. She has the right to receive pay 
which is equivalent to the general sick pay applicable to sick workers, but 
under the condition that sick pay “is not so low as to undermine the 
objective of protecting pregnant workers”83.   
 
Pay during maternity leave 
First, during maternity leave a person is in a special position, “which is 
not comparable either with that of a man or with that of woman actually 
at work”84, so that women on maternity leave have no right to claim the 
                                                 
80 Case C-236/98, Jämställdhetsombudsmannen v Örebro läns landsting, European Court Reports 2000 
Page I-02189. 
81 Case C-127/92, Dr. Pamela Mary Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority and Secretary of State for 
Health, European Court Reports 1993 Page I-05535, paragraph 26. 
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83 Case C-191/03, North Western Health Board v Margaret McKenna, OJ C 281, 22/11/2005, p.2.
84 Case C-342/93, Joan Gillespie and others v Northern Health and Social Services Boards, 
Department of Health and Social Services, Eastern Health and Social Services Board and Southern 
Health and Social Services Board, European Court Reports 1996 Page I-00475, paragraph 17. 
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same pay as workers actually working85. Nevertheless, maternity 
allowance paid by the employer constitutes pay within the meaning of 
Article 141. Second, although she has no right to full pay, this could not 
“be so low as to undermine the purpose of maternity leave, namely the 
protection of women before and after giving birth”86.  
Article 11(3) of Directive 92/85 provides that the minimum amount 
of maternity leave allowance must be “at least equivalent to that which 
the worker concerned would receive in the event of a break in her 
activities on grounds connected with her state of health” or in simple 
words – maternity allowance must be at least equivalent to sick pay.  
Although the wording of Article 11(3) does not explicitly provide that 
sick pay must be understood as sick leave allowance guaranteed by 
national social security legislation, the ECJ has ruled so87, thus narrowing 
the wording of Directive 92/85.  This means that if the employer provides 
employees with higher pay than provided by national social security 
legislation in case of illness, a worker cannot claim higher maternity 
allowance respectively. But the employer must retain acquisition of rights 
under any occupational social security scheme88. Besides, although a 
person on maternity leave cannot claim full pay under Article 141, she 
has the right to claim taking into account in calculating her maternity 
allowance a back-dated pay rise which is awarded between the beginning 
of the period covered by reference pay and the end of maternity leave89.  
 
Pay after maternity leave 
A period of absence due to maternity leave can not be taken into account 
when paying Christmas bonus where that bonus is awarded retroactively 
as pay for work performed in the course of that year. However, it could 
be conditional upon whether the worker is in active employment when 
the bonus is awarded90.  
Regarding sick pay, in Mc Kenna the ECJ held that a general sick-
leave scheme which decreases sick pay after a certain period of absence 
due to health problems in cases where a person was absent before 
maternity leave and continues after maternity leave must guarantee to a 
female worker such sick pay which is not lower than the minimum 
                                                 
85 Ibid., para. 20. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Case C-411/96, Margaret Boyle and Others v Equal Opportunities Commission, ECR 1998 Page I-
06401, paragraph 36. 
88 Case C-411/96, Margaret Boyle and Others v Equal Opportunities Commission, ECR 1998 Page I-
06401., Article 6(1)(g) of Directive 86/378 amended by Directive 97/96, see also case C-356/03.  
89 Case C-147/02, Michelle K. Alabaster v Woolwich plc and Secretary of State for Social Security, 
ECR 2004 Page 0000, paragraph 48. 
90 Case  C-333/97, Susanne Lewen v Lothar Denda, European Court Reports 1999 Page I-07243. 
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amount she was entitled to during the illness which arose while she was 
pregnant91   
 
Equal pay and child-care leave 
The ECJ has held that a person on parental leave cannot be compared to a 
person actually at work, so that a person can not claim equal pay during 
this period92. Even more, a person on parenting leave has no right to 
claim any financial support under EC law. This has a very interesting 
effect on the equal pay principle which is applicable when a person 
returns from parenting leave. In contrast to maternity leave, bonus pay 
awarded as retroactive pay for work performed in the course of the year 
could be reduced pro rata, taking into account parenting leave93. It 
follows that an employer is not under obligation to remedy a decrease in 
pay due to parenting leave. However, Article 141 precludes depriving a 
worker after parental leave from the right to receive bonus pay awarded 
as retroactive pay for work performed in the course of the year because 
women more frequently take parenting leave than men and thus there 
could be a risk of indirect discrimination94. 
 
Distinction between pay and treatment 
The model of EC sex equality law is built so that it distinguishes between 
equal pay and working conditions, although in general it is obvious that 
pay constitutes one of the working conditions. Most probably such 
distinction arose because of the chaotic historical development of EC 
equality law. Namely, that until 1976 there was only provision on equal 
pay, but not on equal treatment. This put the ECJ in quite an uneasy 
situation, which is illustrated in Defrenne III95. The Court could not deny 
that respect for fundamental personal rights is one of the general 
principles of Community law and that there is also no doubt that it 
includes elimination of discrimination based on sex. It also recognised 
that equal pay matters are based on the close connection which exists 
between the nature of services provided and the amount of remuneration. 
Moreover, Article 141 is based on the presumption that all workers are on 
an equal footing,  
 
whereas in many respects an assessment of the other conditions of 
employment and working conditions involves factors connected with the 
                                                 
91 Case C-191/03, North Western Health Board v Margaret McKenna, OJ C 281, 22/11/2005, p.2.
92 Case C-333/97, Susanne Lewen v Lothar Denda, European Court Reports 1999 Page I-07243, paras. 
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93 Ibid. 
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95 Case 149/77, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena, European 
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sex of the workers, taking into account considerations affecting the special 
position of women in the work process96. 
 
In the following cases the ECJ developed clearer criteria for distinction. It 
held that the:  
 
concept of pay, within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 119 
of the Treaty, comprises any other consideration, whether in cash or in 
kind, whether immediate or future, provided that the worker receives it, 
albeit indirectly, in respect of his employment from his employer” 
 
and the 
legal nature of that consideration is not important 97. 
  
Consequently anything that falls outside the definition of pay constitutes 
working conditions, so that provisions of equal treatment are applicable. 
In some cases it is quiet obvious what constitutes working 
conditions and what pay. So in Lommers98, the ECJ repeated that 
although working conditions may have pecuniary consequences it is not 
sufficient to bring them within the scope of Article 14199, so that nursery 
places made available for employees by their employer cannot be 
considered as a matter of equal pay. 
However, in a number of cases the ECJ did not follow its strict 
distinction rules. As Roseberry writes, “the ECJ seemed to reconsider the 
sharp distinction it had drawn between access and amount of benefit”. In 
particular in Bilka-Kaufhaus100 and Nimz101 it held that access to pay falls 
within the scope of Article 141.  
Also controversial is the question whether compensation for unfair 
dismissal constitutes pay within the scope of Article 141.  As Bernard and 
Hepple argue, following the finding of the Court in Gillespie102:  
 
there is a clear distinction between equal pay matters covered by Article 
119 and equal treatment in respect to working conditions which is covered 
                                                 
96 Ibid., para. 22.
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by the Equal Treatment Directive103 …unfair dismissal compensation 
cannot be treated as pay because it does not constitute remuneration for 
work carried out by the employee but is compensation for breach of the 
employee’s working conditions104.  
 
The ECJ rejected this argument105. 
 
Interestingly, although in order to compare basic pay for two 
groups of workers working conditions must be equalized106, nevertheless 
different working conditions could serve the objective justification for 
unequal pay. Thus the Court overruled the principle established in 
Defrenne III that Article 141 “constitutes a special rule, whose 
application is linked to precise factors” such as that “all workers are ex 
hypotesi on an equal footing”107.   
 
Latvian Law 
Labour Law 
Article 60 of the Labour Law provides for the right to equal pay for the 
same work or work of equal value. However, since this provision came 
into force on 1 of June 2002, there have been no cases on equal pay. 
Article 2 of Law on Civil Service provides that regarding pay 
Labour Law is applicable as far as it is not regulated by law in question. 
Since Law on Civil Service does not regulates equal pay matters they are 
fully governed by Article 60 of Labour Law. Experts suppose that this is 
mostly because of lack of information and of a disorganized employment 
market. Even today, a considerable part of the employment market is 
formed by illegal employment and where this is not the case, employees 
are afraid of adverse consequences on the part of the employer and other 
employers in the future108. Besides, there is no complete literature in 
Latvian on the application of Article 60 of the Labour Law, namely an 
exhaustive description of the ECJ case-law on equal pay matters. 
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However, in 2000 Rēzekne City Court delivered a decision109 in a 
case which concerned equal pay. The case concerned the only female 
employee – Abramova – at a printing works enterprise. Eight months 
after her reinstatement according to another court decision on unlawful 
dismissal, the employee was asked to amend her contract of employment 
regarding pay. In particular, instead of salary depending on individual 
output and the profit of the enterprise, Abramova was offered a fixed 
salary each month. She signed the amendments which in reality turned 
out to be decrease in pay by five times. Generally, the amendments to the 
employment contract were contested on account of erroneous 
supposition. Namely, Abramova thought that the provisions of an 
employment contract regarding supplemental pay depending on the profit 
of enterprise did not become void. Besides, breach of the principle of 
equal pay was claimed. In 1999, the old Labour Code was in force. This 
did not contain any provision for EC directives. However, Article 1 of 
that code provided the general principle of labour law that every 
employee is entitled to equal treatment, i.e., irrespective of sex, and 
Latvia was party to ILO Convention No.100 and CEDAW.  Rēzekne City 
Court decided that the amendments to the employment contract were void 
and levied from the employer deferred pay in favour of Abramova. 
However, the decision of Rēzekne City Court was appealed to 
Latgale District Court110. Latgale District Court overruled the previous 
decision on the grounds that there was no erroneous supposition, because 
the conditions of employment in the amendments were defined clearly, 
and - by considerably reducing the salary - the duties were also 
diminished. Besides, the term for bringing an action on amendments of a 
contract of employment was infringed. 
From the perspective of EC law, this case - although prima facie an 
unequal pay case - nevertheless turns out to be an unequal treatment case. 
Buka points out the important circumstance of the case, that reduction of 
salary was simultaneous with reduction of duties, so that the element of 
‘same work’ was not fulfilled111. The unequal treatment aspects of this 
case will be discussed in the chapter on equal treatment.   
 
Occupational social security schemes  
In Latvia, protection exists under occupational social security schemes 
against two risks – old age, and sickness.  
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Latvijas Vēstneša Bibliotēka, 2003. 
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Private pension funds 
Private pension funds are regulated by the Law on private pension 
funds112 and more correspond to the model of supplementary 
occupational pension schemes113. Article 11(3) of the respective law 
provides that all questions regarding participation conditions to a private 
pension plan must be dealt with alike irrespective of sex, origin, property 
status, racial or ethnic origin, or religion. This provision means that the 
principle of gender equality must be applied regarding conditions set both 
by an employer and by a private pension fund. Namely, that private 
pension funds have no right to use actuarial factors in defining private 
pensions114. Recent amendments allow for defined-benefit pension 
plans115. 
However, concerns exist about the provisions of Article 11(3), 
which provides that an employer when deciding on which group of 
employees will be entitled to participate in a private pension plan need 
take account only of such criteria as profession, length of service, and 
position or other objective criteria. With regard to profession and length 
of service, there is risk of indirect discrimination. Professions are 
frequently horizontally segregated between the sexes, so that if an 
employer decides that only employees of one profession are subject to 
participation in a private pension plan and employees of that profession 
consist mainly of one sex, then this could amount to indirect 
discrimination against another group of employees who perform another 
profession and consist of persons belonging to the opposite sex. 
With regard to length of service, it has been mentioned previously 
that in Nimz the Court held that the criterion of seniority is questionable 
and can be accepted with regard to higher pay only if “there is 
relationship between the nature of work performed and the experience 
gained”116. Thus the criterion of length of service provided by the Law on 
private pension funds as well as the provisions of Article 6(1)(c) of 
Directive 86/378 from which it follows that an employer has the right to 
determine a minimum period of employment to obtain rights to join 
scheme, most probably are indirectly discriminatory against women 
employees who interrupt their careers more frequently. Indirectly 
                                                 
112 Par privātajiem pensiju fondiem: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis 1997. 20.jūnijs, Nr.150, ar 
grozījumiem, kas pieņemti 10.11.2005 un izsludināti Latvijas Vēstnesī 2005. 25.novembris, Nr.189 
(Law on private pension funds). 
113 See in that regard case C-110/91, Michael Moroni v Collo GmbH. European Court Reports 1993 
Page I-06591.
114 According to telephone interview with Parex bank information centre, actuarial factors in Latvia 
apply only to life insurance. 
115 Grozījumi likumā „Par privātajiem pensiju fondiem”: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2005. 
25.novembris, Nr.189, 11.panta 11.daļa (Amendments to Law on private pension funds). 
116 Case 184/89, Helga Nimz v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, European Court Reports 1991 Page I-
00297, paragraph 14.
 72
discriminatory conditions regarding access to private pension schemes are 
prohibited under Article 6 of Directive 86/378. 
As to the criterion of position, there could be a case of direct 
discrimination, because formally keeping a higher position does not mean 
that the keeper of a lower position does not perform identical duties or 
duties of equal value, thus having rights to equal pay which also includes 
the right to join an occupational social security scheme117. 
 
Health insurance 
According to Article 4(b) of Directive 86/378, occupational social 
security should be considered to include health insurance certificates 
which an employer provides for employees. In Latvia almost the only 
possible way to obtain a health insurance certificate is when it is provided 
by an employer. It is because individual health insurance certificates can 
avail themselves only a small percentage of the Latvian population and 
consequently insurance companies view risks to insure persons 
individually, since it may not cover expenses based on solidarity 
principle. 
Possession of a health insurance certificate means that an employee 
has the right to receive certain medical treatment on the account of the 
insurer. The scope of medical treatment services which an employee has 
the right to receive on the account of the insurer depends on the health 
insurance certificate program bought by the employer from the insurance 
company.  
In Latvia there are almost no identical heath insurance certificate 
programmes. The service content of a health insurance certificate depends 
on agreement between the employer and the insurer which provides the 
employer with the most acceptable program118. Regarding gender 
equality, it is recognized by research that women visit doctors more 
frequently than men119, thus creating more expense for insurers. 
However, insurance brokers contend that the price of health insurance 
certificates for employees does not depend on the proportion of male and 
female workers employed by the respective employer. Another gender 
equality issue is paid services for birth–giving assistance. This is 
provided by health insurance certificates only if this service is explicitly 
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included in the particular heath insurance certificate program, thus in the 
rest of cases leaving this burden on account of female employees.  
 
Special service pension schemes 
According to Latvian law, persons on military service120, a certain 
category of persons serving at system of Ministry of Interior affairs121, 
prosecutors122, and artists employed by the state or municipality123 are 
entitled to a special long service pension. Recently, the Law on long term 
service pensions for judges was adopted124. Although this kind of pension 
is fully paid by the state budget, nevertheless they correspond to all three 
criteria established by the ECJ in Niemi125, thus falling within the scope 
of Article 141.  Usually the persons listed above are entitled to early 
retirement, thus until they reach statutory pensionable age the special 
pension acts as a bridging pension. After entitlement to old age pension, 
the long term service pension is decreased proportionately to the old age 
pension. Latvia has different pensionable ages under the state statutory 
pension scheme; however, this situation is not in breach of the equal pay 
principle according to the Birds Eye Walls judgement126. 
                                                 
120 Militārpersonu izdienas pensiju likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis 1998. 1.aprīlis, Nr.86 (1147), 
01.04.1998 (Law on pensions for the military). 
121 Par izdienas pensijām Iekšlietu ministrijas sistēmas darbiniekiem as speciālajām dienesta pakāpēm: 
LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis 1998. 16.aprīlis Nr.100/101 (1161/1162) (Law on pensions for 
employees of the system of Ministry of Interior Affairs with special ranks).  
122 Prokuroru izdienas pensiju likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis 1999. 3.jūnijs Nr.181(1641), 
(Law on pensions for prosecutors).  
123 Valsts un pašvaldību profesionālo orķestru, koru, koncetrorganizāciju, teātru un cirka mākslinieku 
izdienas pensiju likums”: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis 2004. 7.jūlijs Nr.106 (3045) (Law on pension 
for artists of state and municipal orchestras, choirs, concert organizations, theatres, and circus).  
124 Tiesnešu izdienas pensiju likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis 2006.7.jūlijs Nr.107 (3475) (Law 
on long term service pensions for judges). 
125 Case C-351/00, Pirkko Niemi, European Court Reports 2002 Page I-07007.
126 Case C-132/92, Birds Eye Walls Ltd. v Friedel M.Roberts, European Court Reports 1993 Page I-
05579. 
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Chapter 5. 
Equal treatment 
 
Equal treatment as a fundamental principle of EC law 
The issue of equal treatment was for the first time discussed before the 
ECJ in Defrenne III1, where a former air hostess claimed discriminatory 
dismissal because according to the employment contract air hostesses are 
dismissed at age 40 while male cabin attendants who carry out the same 
work do not have such a clause in the employment agreement. The Court 
found that the issue concerns equal treatment while the scope of Article 
141 - the only binding non-discrimination provision at that time - no way 
extends to other issues than equal pay. However, it stressed that 
elimination of discrimination based on sex forms a part of fundamental 
rights recognized as one of the fundamental principles of EC law.  
 
Directive 76/207 
Directive 76/207 was adopted on 9 February 1976 and the Member States 
had an obligation to implement it within 30 months. In 2002, Directive 
1976 was amended.  Most amendments reflected the case-law of the ECJ. 
 
Scope  
Directive 76/207 comprises all issues concerning equal treatment in 
employment and occupation. In particular it refers to access to 
employment, vocational training, promotion, working conditions, and 
dismissal as well as referring to Directive 85/92 and 96/34 which deal 
with reconciliation of work and family life. Regarding the latter, the 
scope of matters regarding reconciliation of work and family life was 
extended by amendments to Directive 2002/73 and thus limits to a certain 
extent the ruling in Hoffmann, where the ECJ held that Directive 76/207 
“is not designed to settle questions concerned with the organization of 
family life” and recognizes at least partially the importance of the role of 
family responsibilities played in equality issues in the employment 
market. 
Directive 76/207 does not distinguish between employers and thus 
is applicable to all employees working whether in the private or public 
sector as civil servants2.  The ECJ has recognized that Directive 76/207 is 
                                                 
1 Case 149/77, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena, European 
Court Reports 1978 Page 01365.
2 Case 248/83, Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, European 
Court Reports 1985 Page 01459 para 16.See also case  C-319/03, Serge Briheche v Ministre de 
l'Intérieur, Ministre de l'Éducation nationale and Ministre de la Justice, European Court Reports 2004 
Page I-08807, para 18.
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applicable to detrimental treatment in the employment market arising 
from gender reassignment3.    
Although the principle of equal treatment is applicable to 
professional military service4, nevertheless compulsory military service is 
not subject to Directive 76/207, because unlike professional military 
service it falls outside the scope of Community law and concerns “the 
Member States’ choices of military organisation for the defence of their 
territory or of their essential interests”. Therefore men are not entitled to 
claim delays in their careers due to mandatory military service5.   
Directive 76/207 is applicable to workers, the self-employed and 
also to persons seeking employment or occupation6, thus there is no 
important definition of worker7 or self-employed, since it is applicable to 
all persons seeking or having a connection with the labour market.  
 
Access 
Although Directive 76/207 does not explicitly refer to offers of 
employment, nevertheless the ECJ has recognized that employment 
advertisements are closely connected with access to employment8.   
 
Classification of professions. 
Discrimination in matters regarding access to employment may arise in 
various situations. In Kording9 the ECJ reviewed a situation where 
certain groups of professionals willing to become tax advisors were 
exempted from qualification exams. In order to qualify for that 
occupation without exams, a person had to have been employed for not 
less than 15 years as an executive-class officer or employee of the 
revenue administration. Mrs Kording was refused exemption from the 
qualification exam, because she had worked on a part-time basis. The 
majority of respective part-time workers were women, thus the Court 
found indirect discrimination against female workers, which however 
                                                 
3 Case C-13/94, P v S and Cornwall County Council, European Court Reports 1996 Page I-02143. 
4 Case C-285/98, Tanja Kreil v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, European Court Reports 2000 Page I-
00069. See in detail section on Direct discrimination.
5 Case C-186/01, Alexander Dory v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, ECR 2003 page I-02479. 
6 Article 3(1)(a) of amended Directive 76/207.  
7 Case C-256/01, Debra Allonby v Accrington & Rossendale College, Education Lecturing Services, 
trading as Protocol Professional and Secretary of State for Education and Employment, European 
Court Reports 2004 Page I-00873, para 63 states: 
“In that connection, it must be pointed out that there is no single definition of worker in 
Community law: it varies according to the area in which the definition is to applied (Case 
C-85/96 Martinez Sala (1998) ECR I-2691, paragraph 31)”. 
See also Ruth Nielsen, Gender Equality in European Contract Law, 2004, Copenhagen, DJOF 
Publishing, at page 35. 
8 Case 248/83, Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, European 
Court Reports 1985 Page 01459 paras 42 and 43.  
9 Case C-100/95, Brigitte Kording v Senator für Finanzen, European Court Reports 1997 Page I-05289.
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may be justified by objective factors unrelated to any discrimination 
based on sex. The argument of the defendant, that part-time workers 
acquire necessary skills more slowly, was overturned by the fact that 
previously persons were required to show 5 years of respective 
experience and that the term of employment was extended to 15 years in 
order to discourage the tendency among officials to enter private practice. 
This shows that, contrary to the Court’s finding in Nimz10 that the 
requirement of seniority may be applied only where there is a relationship 
between the nature of the work performed and the experience gained, so 
that the purpose of 15 years working experience was set due to other 
reasons than professional skills obtained, thus the legitimacy of treatment 
between full-time and part-time employees was begin serious doubt. 
In Briheche11 the Court ruled that exemption from the age limit for 
access to public sector employment for widows who have not remarried 
discriminates against widowers who have not remarried, since they are in 
the same situation.  The French Government could not convince the Court 
that this measure falls under Article 2(4) of the Directive allowing for 
positive measures, since women take most of the burden of the family, 
housework, and child rearing and thus they need to be provided with 
special measures facilitating their integration into the labour market. 
The issue of equal opportunities as regards access to work has been 
addressed with regard to pregnant candidates. The Court in Dekker 
established that refusal to employ a pregnant candidate constitutes direct 
discrimination based on sex, because only women could be subject to 
refusal of employment on that ground12. Consequently there is no 
obligation for a candidate to inform the employer of the fact of 
pregnancy13. Besides, in order to qualify such refusal as discriminatory 
no presence of a male candidate is necessary14.  
Contrary to the pregnancy cases described above, the Cresswell 
judgment15 was subject to considerable criticism16. In particular it 
                                                 
10 Case C-184/89, Helga Nimz v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, European Court Reports 1991 Page I-
0029,  para. 14. 
11 Case C-319/03, Serge Briheche v Ministre de l'Intérieur, Ministre de l'Éducation nationale and 
Ministre de la Justice, European Court Reports 2004 Page I-08807.
12 Case C-177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichtig Vormingscentrum voor Jong 
Volwassen (VJV-Centrum) Plus, (1990) ECR page I-03941, para. 12. 
13 Case C-109/00, Tele Danmark A/S and Handels – og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark 
(HK), European Court Reports 2001 Page I-6993. 
14 Case C-177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichtig Vormingscentrum voor Jong 
Volwassen (VJV-Centrum) Plus, (1990) ECR page I-03941, para. 17. 
15 Joined cases C-63/91 and C-94/01, Sonia Jackson et Patricia Cresswell v Chief Adjudication 
Officer., European Court Reports 1992 Page I-04737.  
16 Tamara Harvey, Jo Shaw, Women, work and care: women’s dual role and double burden in EC sex 
equality law, Journal of European Social Policy, 1998, Vol.8, SAGE, London, Thousand Oaks and 
New Delhi, at page 53, Siofra O’Leary, Employment Law at the European Court of Justice. Judicial 
Structure, Policies and Processes, Hart Publishing, Oxford – Portland Oregon, 2002, at pages 230-231. 
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concerned the benefit grant system to persons of working age in order to 
make sufficient income. In order to define the amount of sufficient 
income benefit, childminding expenses were deducted only from earnings 
from employment, but not from allowances paid during vocational 
training and earnings from part-time work constituting less than 24 hours 
weekly work. Two single mothers who had taken up vocational training 
contested those provisions as discriminatory and concerning either equal 
treatment in social security matters as provided by Directive 79/7 or equal 
treatment in employment as provided by Directive 76/207. The Court 
found neither of the directives applicable. In connection with applicability 
of Directive 76/207, the ECJ merely stated that the benefit system in 
question concerns income support for persons with insufficient means to 
meet their needs, not issues concerning access of employment including 
vocational training. The fact that such benefit system may affect a single 
mother’s ability to take up vocational training is not sufficient to take the 
supplementary allowance system into the scope of Directive 76/207.  So 
the Court here did not take into account the real effect of the legislation at 
issue17.  
 
Vocational training 
Article 3(1)(b) of amended Directive 76/207 provides that the right to 
equal access and treatment as regards vocational training comprises all 
levels of vocational training, advanced vocational training, as well as 
retraining and practical work and experience.   
So in Schnorbus18 the ECJ admitted that practical training required 
in order to access employment in the higher civil service falls within the 
scope of Directive 76/207. The problem was that there were not enough 
places for all applicants and that several groups of persons had priority to 
access to that training. One of these priority groups was persons who had 
completed compulsory military service. Since there were not enough 
training places, Ms Schnorbus’ training was delayed for a maximum of 
12 months. The Court first found that there was no direct discrimination 
on grounds of sex19, but conditions governing access to training were 
indirectly discriminatory. And second, that the indirectly discriminatory 
rule is objectively justified by the counterbalance it seeks to establish 
                                                 
17 Siofra O’Leary, Employment Law at the European Court of Justice. Judicial Structure, Policies and 
Processes, Hart Publishing, Oxford – Portland Oregon, 2002, at page 230. See also Opinion of Mr 
Advocate General Van Gerven delivered on 15 May 1992 on joined cases C-63/91 and C-64/91.,  
European Court reports 1992 Page I-04737.
18 Case C-79/99, Julia Schnorbus v Land Hessen, European Court Reports 2000 Page I-10997. 
19 It is arguable whether according to recent case C-196/02, Vasiliki Nikoloudi v Organismos 
Tilepikinonion Ellados AE, where the Court found that direct discrimination arises where sex-neutral 
provisions actually concern a group of persons consisting of one sex only. So since according to the 
facts in Schnorbus only men are subject to compulsory military service, then the rule constitutes direct 
discrimination against females.    
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with regard to effect of delay constituted by compulsory military service. 
Besides, it seemed proportionate delay for other applicants in training 
since it did not exceed 12 months.  
 
 
Promotion 
In Gester20 the rule of the civil service providing that part-time civil 
servants qualify for promotion slower than full-time workers was 
contested, because the majority of part-time workers were women and the 
rule in question did not provide for substantiation of the assumption that 
part-time wormers acquire necessary skills for promotion slower than 
full-time workers. The ECJ, indeed, found here indirect discrimination, 
which nevertheless may be justified by objective factors unrelated to the 
sex of the servant. 
In Thibault the court ruled that absences on grounds of maternity 
leave must be taken into account for assessment of performance for 
promotion21. 
 
Harassment and sexual harassment 
In international and EC law, harassment and sexual harassment are 
recognized as discrimination on grounds of sex. In EC law, harassment 
and sexual harassment are prohibited at the workplace and regarding 
supply of goods and services22.  
Article 2(2) of Directive 76/207, amended by Directive 2002/73, 
gives a definition of both concepts: 
 
Harassment: where unwanted conduct related to the sex of a person occurs 
with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person, and of 
creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment. 
Sexual harassment: where any form of unwanted verbal, non-verbal or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature occurs, with the purpose or effect of 
violating the dignity of a person, in particular when creating an 
intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment. 
 
The definitions contain the following elements: 
- Unwanted conduct. This is not necessarily be the conduct of the 
employer himself. 
- Related to sex of the person or of a sexual nature. 
                                                 
20 Case C-1/95, Hellen Gerster v Freistaat Bayern, European Court Reports 1997 Page I-05253.
21 Case C-136/95, Caisse nationale d’assurance vieillesse des travailleurs salaries (CNAVTS) v 
Evelyne Thibault, European Court Reports 1998 Page I-02011.
22 Directive 2004/113, but this aspect is not covered by this dissertation, thus not discussed here. 
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- With the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and 
of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or 
offensive environment23. 
 
The differences between harassment and sexual harassment are provided 
by the phrases “related to the sex of a person” and “of a sexual nature” 
respectively. 
The differences between both are illustrated by the following example: 
 
An employer who forces his secretary to “enjoy” his pornography in the 
office is not necessarily implying he wants a sexual relationship with her. 
From an evidential point of view, however, the difference between the 
two situations may be very fine, especially when multi-interpretable 
innuendo is at play24.  
 
Sexual harassment is also prohibited by Article 11 of the UN 
Convention of the All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(furthermore – CEDAW). Although Article 11 does not explicitly provide 
for such form of discrimination, the UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (“the Committee”) in its General 
recommendation No.1925 of 11th session on 1992 gives a new 
interpretation of Article 11 which comprises sexual harassment at the 
workplace, too. The Committee gives the following definition: 
 
Sexual harassment includes such unwelcome sexually determined 
behaviour as physical contact and advances, sexually coloured remarks, 
showing pornography and sexual demands, whether by words or actions. 
Such conduct can be humiliating and may constitute a health and safety 
problem; it is discriminatory when the woman has reasonable grounds to 
believe that her objection would disadvantage her in connection with her 
employment, including recruitment or promotion, or when it creates a 
hostile working environment. 
 
It is not clear from the CEDAW definition of sexual harassment 
whether it covers both harassment – unwanted conduct related to the sex 
of the person, and sexual harassment – unwanted conduct of a sexual 
nature. This definition does not clearly distinguish harassment from 
sexual harassment; however, it contains elements of both concepts. 
Moreover, the aim of the definition given by the Committee is to protect 
                                                 
23 Mariam Driessen-Reilly and Bart Driessen, Don’t shoot the messenger: a look at Community law 
relating to harassment in the workplace, (2003) 28 E.L.Rev. Aug., Maxwell and Contributors, at page 
496.  
24 Ibid. 
25 http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recomendations/recomm.htm
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women in the workplace26 in all discriminatory situations there are thus 
no grounds to presume that CEDAW provides only for prohibition of 
sexual harassment. 
The question is whether harassment and sexual harassment can 
appear in the form of direct and indirect discrimination. The author 
argues that it is possible. For example, internal regulation staff of an 
establishment can provide for a dress code, which can directly and 
indirectly harass one of the sexes. An obligation for men and women to 
dress similarly or differently in a harassing way can be expressed in a 
direct and indirect way.  
 The most problematic, however, is enforcement of provisions 
precluding harassment and sexual harassment. Until recently the ECJ and 
CFI had decided only two cases27 on sexual harassment. One of those 
cases was the following28. Ms Campogrande suffered sexual harassment 
from her male colleague who was her boss. Her complaint to the 
employer was conducted but not followed by any express decision, thus 
Ms Campogrande brought an action before the CFI. The CFI held that the 
employer – the Commission - was obliged to open an inquiry in order to 
establish the facts and, if necessary, to determine appropriate 
compensation.  It also held “it to be immaterial that the appellant had not 
proved that she had suffered material damage as a result of the acts of 
harassment alleged, that it had not been established that Mr A. had 
intended to humiliate her and that he had subsequently apologised to 
her”29. Besides, “the Commission had a duty to examine complaints of 
sexual harassment speedily”. Further it held “that the fact that Mr A had 
left the Commission and therefore the alleged harassment had necessarily 
ceased did not remove the duty to open an inquiry speedily” 30. The 
decision of the CFI was upheld by the ECJ. However this is a so-called 
staff case which does not give clear guidance on how to investigate and to 
prove harassment in the workplace other than EU institutions. 
There are no cases on harassment related to the sex of a person 
decided by the CFI or the ECJ so far. 
Although in cases of harassment and sexual harassment - like in all 
other discrimination cases - the burden of proof shifts on to the defendant, 
nevertheless it is not clear what evidence proves “unwanted conduct” 
                                                 
26 Paragraph 17 of General recommendation No 19 of the UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recomendations/recomm.htm
27 Case T-549/93 D v Commission of the European Communities, not available in English and case C-
62/01, Anna Maria Campogrande v Commission of the European Communities, European Court 
Reports 2002 Page I-03793.
28 Case C-62/01 P Anna Maria Campogrande v Commission of the European Communities, European 
Court Reports 2002 Page I-03793.
29 Ibid., para. 8.
30 Ibid., para. 9.
 81
“related to the sex of the person” or “of a sexual nature” and what creates 
“an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment”31
An explanation of the concept of “unwanted conduct” regarding 
sexual harassment is given in Recommendation 92/11332: 
  
It is for each individual to determine what behaviour is acceptable to them 
and what they regard as offensive. Sexual attention becomes sexual 
harassment if it is persisted in once it has been made clear that it is 
regarded by the recipient as offensive, although one incident of 
harassment may constitute sexual harassment if sufficiently serious.  
 
However, it is much more complicated to define what can constitute 
“unwanted conduct” regarding harassment related to the sex of the 
person. 
For example, humour can be harassing, but where is the border line 
between humour and harassment? An American scholar emphasises: “We 
joke to say who is a member of our group and who is an outsider”33. 
Jokes of masculine character can frequently harass women in a male-
dominated work collective. “The context, place, and authorship of jokes 
reveal the distribution and pattern of power as does the ability to trivialize 
or dismiss something as only a joke”34. Humour can be a very good tool 
to prevent women from squeezing into traditionally male professions or 
occupying a higher post.  
The facts show that harassment, bullying and mobbing at the 
workplace affects 8% of the Community’s workforce or 12 million 
people. It causes three suicides per week in Belgium and European 
business is losing profits through absenteeism and turnover of staff35. 
Recommendation 92/11336 also provides that research “in Member States 
has proven beyond doubt that sexual harassment at work is not an isolated 
phenomenon” and it affects millions of women in the EC. 
  It is also unclear who may be sued for harassment or sexual 
harassment – a colleague harasser or an employer who did not manage to 
provide workers with appropriate working conditions. The author 
                                                 
31 Mariam Driessen-Reilly and Bart Driessen, Don’t shoot the messenger: a look at Community law 
relating to harassment in the workplace, (2003) 28 E.L.Rev. Aug., Maxwell and Contributors, at page 
500.  
32 92/191/EEC: Commission Recommendation of 27 November 1991 on the protection of the dignity 
of women and men at work, Official Journal L 049, 24/02/1992 P.0001-0008. 
33 Beth A.Quinn, The Paradox of Complaining: Law, Humor, and Harassment in the Everyday Work 
World, 2000, 25 Law & Social Inquiry, database: Westlaw. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Mariam Driessen-Reilly and Bart Driessen, Don’t shoot the messenger: a look at Community law 
relating to harassment in the workplace, (2003) 28 E.L.Rev. Aug., Maxwell and Contributors, at page 
493.  
36 92/191/EEC: Commission Recommendation of 27 November 1991 on the protection of the dignity 
of women and men at work, Official Journal L 049, 24/02/1992 P.0001-0008. 
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presumes that the actual harasser may be sued, but it does not exclude 
additional responsibility on the part of the employer who, knowing that 
harassment or sexual harassment is taking place, fails to prevent it. 
 
Instruction to discriminate 
According to Article 2(4) of Directive 76/207 amended by Directive 
2002/73, an instruction to discriminate against persons on grounds of sex 
also constitutes discrimination. There is no case-law so far providing for 
interpretation of this provision.  
 
Prohibition of adverse treatment 
Article 7 of amended Directive 76/207 precludes an employer from 
dismissing or treating adversely employees or employees’ representatives 
on grounds that they complain within an undertaking or initiate legal 
proceeding in order to enforce compliance with the principle of equal 
treatment.  
Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207 amended by Directive 2002/73 
prohibits victimisation of a harassed or sexually harassed person.  
According to the ruling in Coote37 Directive 76/207 awards 
protection of ex-employees. It is also stated in point 17 of the preamble of 
amending Directive 2002/73 that amended Directive 76/207 must be 
interpreted in the light of the Coote judgment38.  
 
Participation and treatment within organizations 
Amended directive 76/207 provides for several rights with regard to 
organisations. First, Article 3(1)(d) precludes discrimination within 
organisations of worker or employer or professional organisations. 
Discrimination is also precluded as regards benefits provided for by such 
organisations. Second, Articles 8a(2)(a) and 8c promote involvement of 
organisations in enforcement of the principle of equal treatment. 
 
Other working conditions 
Since adoption of Directive 92/85 providing for special protection of 
women during pregnancy and maternity and Directive 96/34 on parental 
leave, it was necessary to define the relationship between those directives 
and the principle of equal treatment. Amending Directive 2002/73 
introduced into Directive 76/207 provisions codifying the case-law of the 
ECJ in pregnancy, maternity39, and parental cases. Article 2(7) of 
                                                 
37 Case C-185/97, Belinda Jane Coote v Granada Hospitality Ltd., European Court Reports 1998 Page 
I-05199. 
38 See for more detailed analysis of the Coote judgment section Enforcement and remedies. 
39 See for example cases C-136/95, Caisse nationale d’assurance vieillesse des travailleurs salaries 
(CNAVTS) v Evelyne Thibault, European Court Reports 1998 Page I-02011 and C-320/01, Wiebke 
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amended Directive 76/207 provides that persons due to pregnancy and 
maternity may not be treated less favourably and that after maternity, 
paternity, adoption, or child-care leave a worker is entitled to the same or 
an equivalent post and working conditions and shall benefit from any 
improvement to which he/she would have been entitled during absence.  
Working conditions within the meaning of Directive 76/207 also 
constitute family credit which is an income-related benefit awarded in 
order to supplement the income of low-paid workers who are responsible 
for a child40. In contrast to the Cresswell judgment41, the Court found that 
the particular scheme of benefits falls within the scope of Directive 
76/207, because it is not a mere supplementary income for persons with 
insufficient means to meet their needs, but “the aim of the benefit is to 
ensure that families do not find themselves worse off in work than they 
would be if they are not working”42. The author and writers argue that 
Cresswell differs from Meyers only as far as it regards access to 
vocational training, but in substance it dealt with a similar situation43. 
In order to assess whether working conditions are discriminatory, 
each of the key conditions governing employment or professional activity 
must be assessed in so far as those key elements themselves constitute 
specific measures based on their own criteria44.  
 
Treatment of part-time workers  
A considerable part of judgments in the field of EC sex equality law 
concerns issues of part-time workers. Less favourable treatment on 
grounds of part-time employment affects workers not only as regards 
working conditions, but also as regards pay45 conditions and social 
security matters46. 
In general, different treatment between part-time and full-time 
workers is precluded by Directive 97/81. However, it precludes different 
treatment only from the point of view of general equality which may be 
subject to justification in all cases, while the principle of equal treatment 
between the sexes is more limited for justification of discrimination, but 
this is not the main reason why usually discrimination cases between 
                                                                                                                                            
Busch and Klinikum Neustadt GmbH & Co. Betriebs-KG, European Court Reports 2003 Page I-02041, 
para. 38. 
40 Case C-116/94, Jennifer Meyers v Adjudication Officer, European Court Reports 1995 Page I-02131. 
41 Joined cases C-63/91 and C-94/01, Sonia Jackson et Patricia Cresswell v Chief Adjudication 
Officer., European Court Reports 1992 Page I-04737. 
42 Case C-116/94, Jennifer Meyers v Adjudication Officer, European Court Reports 1995 Page I-02131, 
para. 20. 
43 Siofra O’Leary, Employment Law at the European Court of Justice. Judicial Structure, Policies and 
Processes, Hart Publishing, Oxford – Portland Oregon, 2002, at pages 230. 
44 Case C-226/98, Birgitte Jurgensen v Foreningen af Specialleger and Sygesikringens 
Forhandlingsudvalg. European Court Reports 2000 Page I-02447, para. 36. 
45 See for more detail section on Indirect discrimination. 
46 See for more detail section on Social security. 
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part-time and full-time workers are judged from the perspective of sex 
equality law. The main reason lies in the fact that the vast majority of 
part-time workers are women, thus usually differential treatment between 
part-time and full-time workers involves discrimination based on sex.  
So in Kachelmann 47 the Court decided that it is legitimate for 
national law to provide that in the event of dismissals on account of 
economic difficulties of the undertaking, part-time workers may not be 
considered as being in a comparable situation to full-time workers. 
Therefore dismissals of part-time workers by not comparing them with 
full-time workers performing the same work on the basis of social criteria 
is not precluded by Directive 76/207, although it indirectly discriminates 
against women.   
In Wippel the ECJ found that a contract of employment that does 
not specify hours of work and the organisation of working time which are 
dependant upon the quantity of available work does not constitute either 
disadvantageous treatment between part-time and full-time workers 
according to Directive 97/81, or indirect discrimination on grounds of sex 
contrary to Directive 76/207, since employment contracts of full-time and 
part-time workers in the given situation were not comparable, because 
they comprise different conditions of obligations on the part of 
employees48. In Gester49 and Kording50 already described above, part-
time workers had less favourable conditions governing access and 
promotion. 
 
Dismissal  
Continuing the theme of discrimination against part-time workers, the 
ECJ was criticized about the Sidal judgment51, where - without actually 
applying the test of proportionality - it accepted the legality of a national 
provision allowing dismissal of workers employed for less than ten hours 
a week or 45 hours a month without having the right to contest the 
legality of such dismissal on grounds that it alleviated the constraints 
weighing on small businesses52. 
Different pensionable ages allowed in the field of social security 
have several times been used as grounds for justification of 
discrimination on grounds of sex. Miss Marshall was dismissed when she 
                                                 
47 Case C-322/98, Bärbel Kachelmann v Bankhaus Hermann Lampe KG., European Court Reports 
2000 Page I-07505. 
48 Case C-313/02, Nicole Wippel v Peek& Cloppenburg & Co, European Court Reports 2004 Page I-
09483.
49 Case C-1/95, Hellen Gerster v Freistaat Bayern, European Court Reports 1997 Page I-05253.
50 Case C-100/95, Brigitte Kording v Senator für Finanzen, European Court Reports 1997 Page I-
05289.
51 Case C-189/91, Petra Kirsammer-Hack v Nurhan Sidal, ECR 1993 Page I-06185. 
52 Lynn M. Roseberry, The limits of Employment Discrimination Law in the United States and 
European Community, (1999), Copenhagen, DJOF Publishing, page 133. 
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attained the age of 62 on grounds that she had attained retirement age not 
taking into account her wish to work until age 65. The Court in this 
regard pointed out that Article 7 of Directive 79/7 allowing the Member 
States to determine different pensionable ages must be interpreted strictly. 
Consequently, different pensionable ages defined by a Member State do 
not form a valid ground for dismissal according to Directive 76/20753.  
Accordingly, in Roberts the ECJ ruled that in case of mass redundancy, a 
single age for dismissal of men and women involving the grant of an 
early retirement pension does not constitute discrimination based on 
sex54. It is also discriminatory if as a voluntary redundancy incentive 
granted in the form of taxation at a rate reduced by half of sums paid on 
cessation of employment relationship is granted to women who have 
passed the age of 50, but to men who have passed the age of 5555. 
Dismissal of a pregnant worker constitutes direct discrimination based on 
sex56. 
 
Latvian Law 
Labour law 
Article 29(1) defines the general obligations of an employer as regards 
discrimination based on sex. It precludes discrimination as regards 
establishing an employment relationship and during the whole period of 
existence of that relationship, but that prohibition especially concerns 
promotion, defining working conditions, pay or vocational training as 
well as concerning notice of dismissal. 
 
Access 
Article 32(1) provides that a job advertisement must concern both men 
and women except in cases where the sex of the worker constitutes a 
determining factor for performance of work. Although it clearly states the 
obligations of the employer, nevertheless the majority of job offers are 
formulated in one gender only, in that in which that profession provides 
in Latvia. In Latvia an absolute majority of occupations are in the 
masculine gender and only several occupations are traditionally in the 
feminine gender such as nurse and midwife. Point 13 of Regulations of 
                                                 
53 Case 152/84, Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority 
(Teaching), European Court Reports 1986, page 723, paras 34-38. 
54 Case 151/84, Joan Roberts v Tate & Lyle Industries Limited, European Court Reports 1986 Page 
00703.
55 Case C-207/04, Paolo Vergani v Agenzia delle Entrate, Ufficio di Arona, available at  
http://curia.europa.eu/jurisp/cgi-
bin/form.pl?lang=en&Submit=Submit&alldocs=alldocs&docj=docj&docop=docop&docor=docor&doc
jo=docjo&numaff=&datefs=&datefe=&nomusuel=&domaine=&mots=Directive+79%2F7&resmax=10
0
56 Case C-179/88, Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, European Court Reports 1990 Page I-03979. 
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the Cabinet of Ministers No.306 adopted on 18 April 200657 provides that 
if an occupation is represented by women, the title of the occupation must 
be used in the feminine gender. However, there is no word on how to use 
occupations traditionally formulated in the feminine gender. Although the 
Ministry of Welfare states that a job offer shall provide for the title of 
occupation in both genders58, nevertheless there is no such possibility, 
because occupations having a title in the feminine gender have no title in 
the masculine gender. One could say that this is not important, but it is, 
since in Latvia horizontal segregation of professions is manifest and this 
concerns to a higher degree those professions which have their title only 
in the feminine gender. So, all kinds of advertisements starting from 
education offers and ending with work offers make horizontal segregation 
deeper and deeper. However, the Ministry of Welfare considers that the 
Latvian classifier of occupations corresponds to the principle of equality, 
besides it argues that it is based on the ILO Standard Classification of 
Occupations59 where almost all professions are also defined in the 
masculine gender.   
Further, Article 33 provides for job interviews, where it is 
prohibited to ask questions which do not relate to work. It especially 
precludes questions on pregnancy60 and marital status. Article 34 allows 
to challenge refusal of employment on grounds of discrimination.  
The Latvian national courts have dealt with one case regarding 
discriminatory refusal to employ on grounds of sex. This was the Stūriņas 
case61. She was refused a vacancy as a stoker in autumn 2004, despite the 
fact that she had previously occupied this post seven times from October 
1997 till March 2004 on the basis of defined-term contracts for each 
heating season and possessed the qualification of stoker. A job offer was 
published in a local newspaper in November 2004. She applied for the 
vacancy of stoker. However, later when Stūriņa was called to the 
responsible person in municipality, she was told that women will not 
work as stokers any more. The respondent argued that there was no job 
offer. Publication in the local newspaper was mere publication of a 
meeting of the municipality where the question of a vacancy for a stoker 
was discussed and no one in the municipality refused her employment on 
grounds of sex. The Court found that publication in the local newspaper 
                                                 
57 Noteikumi par profesiju klasifikatoru, profesijai atbilstošiem pamatuzdevumiem un kvalifikācijas 
pamatprasībām un profesiju klasifikatora lietošanas un aktualizēšanas kārtību: MK noteikumi Nr.306. 
Latvijas Vēstnesis 2006. 8.maijs, Nr.70 (Regulations on classifier of professions according to their 
basic tasks and qualification requirements and on use and actualization of classifier of professions)  
58 Letter from Ministry of Welfare 26 May 2006 no.S-01-18/1828.  
59 ISCO 88, availible at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/download/res/isco.pdf
60 With one exception which is incompatible with EC law and is discussed in the section on Rights 
during pregnancy.  
61 Cēsu rajona tiesas 2005.gada 3.janvāra spriedums lietā Nr.C11019405. 
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must be considered as a job offer and that Stūriņa had suffered 
discrimination based on sex, because the municipality had failed to prove 
according to Article 29(3) of the Labour law that discrimination was 
based on objective factors, or that sex is the determining factor in 
performance of the work in question. Besides, the fact that none of the 
applicants had received a protocol of the meeting where assessment of 
candidates took place also testified to discrimination. The Court failed to 
distinguishe direct from indirect discrimination. Since Stūriņa was 
refused on grounds that “women will not be employed as stokers any 
more” this must be considered as direct discrimination which may not be 
subject to justification. Stūriņa was awarded compensation for financial 
loss and moral damage62. 
On more case before Stūriņas was delivered by the Supreme Court 
of Latvia. This was the Muhinas case63 where discrimination occurred at 
a time when the present Labour law containing provisions of prohibition 
of discrimination was not in force. In particular, in 2000 in one 
newspaper a job offer for a vacancy as a prison warder was published. It 
stated that the proper candidate would be male, not older than 35 years of 
age, and with secondary education. Muhina applied for that vacancy, but 
was refused by letter in which the head of the prison stated that the 
administration of the prison objected to accepting women in the prison 
service. In the next written letter the head of the prison explained the 
refusal to employ also by heavy working conditions and by specific 
requirements as regards personnel, because the duties entail guarding 
male persons. Later, Muhina initiated proceedings before the national 
court on the basis that she had been discriminated against on grounds of 
sex contrary to the Constitution of Latvia, ILO Convention No.111 
precluding discrimination in occupation, CEDAW, and several more 
international conventions. All three court instances recognized the fact of 
discrimination. Before the Supreme Court, the issue regarding award of 
compensation was contested. However it is worth mentioning some 
judgments by national courts as regards discrimination. The first is that 
Muhina had  herself intentionally generated discrimination, because she 
applied for a vacancy which was explicitly offered to men only and 
second, that since the working conditions in prison are heavy, the refusal 
to employ was based on so-called ‘positive discrimination’. Thereby the 
national courts of Latvia demonstrated lack of knowledge first by trying 
to justify the actions of the employer by legitimising victimisation and 
second, by misinterpreting the concept of positive discrimination.   
 
                                                 
62 The Stūriņas case as regards remedies is discussed in more detail section on Enforcement and 
remedies. 
63 Augstākās tiesas Senāta 2002.gada 8.maija spriedums lietā Nr.SKC-297. 
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Working conditions 
Continuing the discussion on the Abramova case64, which started in the 
section on equal pay, it must be recognized that the case in question 
concerns not equal pay but equal treatment issues, since indeed according 
to the decision of the District court65 Abramova had no right to claim 
equal pay, because according to the amended employment agreement she 
actually performed different work.  However, the District court failed to 
recognize that she was the only women working in the undertaking and 
the only worker whose working conditions were worse. So, it follows that 
there was discrimination based on sex as regards equal treatment and in 
particular working conditions66. Besides, it was not discussed in the 
proceedings, but was mentioned among the facts of the case that shortly 
before discriminatory amendments to the employment contract, the 
undertaking’s action before the national court on dismissal of Abramova 
was rejected. It follows that in substance the case concerned prohibition 
of victimisation.  
 
Dismissal  
The main problem of the Labour law regarding discriminatory dismissal 
is that it precludes only discriminatory notice of dismissal, but does not 
provide for prohibition of discriminatory dismissal. This may arise, for 
example, in a situation where a woman informs her employer of her 
pregnancy only after service of notice of dismissal67, or a fixed-term 
contract is not renewed or extended on grounds of discrimination68. The 
second issue concerns the provisions of Article 47, which allows giving 
notice of termination during the probation period not providing for 
reasons for dismissal. Such provision makes it partially impossible to 
contest such dismissal under Article 48 on grounds of discrimination. 
Besides, Latvian scholars have debated on whether dismissal the during 
probation period as such must be based on substantiated grounds or not69.  
Further, one case on discrimination based on sex was contested 
before the Constitutional court of Latvia70. In particular, it was identical 
                                                 
64 Rēzeknes tiesas 2000.gada 26.janvāra spriedums lietā Nr.2-133/3, Jurista Vārds, 2000.gada 22.jūnijā.  
65 Latgales Apgabaltiesas 2000.gada 19.maija spriedums lietā Nr.2-145A, Jurista Vārds, 2000.gada 
22.jūnijā. 
66 The same opinion is expressed by Arnis Buka in Autoru kolektīvs Ivo Alehno zinātniskajā redakcijā, 
Eiropas Savienības tiesību īstenošana Latvijā, Latvijas Vēstneša Bibliotēka, 2003. 
67 This case is discussed in more detail in the chapter on Rights during pregnancy. 
68 Case C-438/99, Maria Luisa Jimenez Melgar v Ayuntamiento de Los Barrios, European Court 
Reports 2001 Page I-06915. 
69 See in this regard, Ilze Skultāne, Darba devēja uzteikums pārbaudes laikā//Jurista Vārds 30(335) 
10.08.2004.Juris Radzēvičs, Darba likuma nianses//Mans Īpašums, 2002., Nr.11. 
70 Judgment of the Constitutional Court of Latvia in case No.2003-12-01 “On the Conformity of 
Section 41 (Item 1, Sub-item “f”) of the State Civil Service Law with Articles 91, 101 and 106 of the 
Satversme (Constitution)”, delivered on 18th of December 2003, available at 
http://www.satv.tiesa.gov.lv/Eng/Spriedumi/12-01(03).htm  
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to the Marshall case71. Civil servant Galakrodziniece was dismissed when 
she attained pensionable age according to the Law on the Civil service 
providing that a civil servant shall end civil service employment when 
attaining pensionable age and according to the Law on state pensions. In 
general, the Law on state pensions provides for equal pensionable ages – 
62, while the transitional provisions of the respective law provide that an 
equal pensionable age will be attained in year 2008. Until that time, it 
remains different but is subject to a step-by step increase differentiated 
according to sex. At the time of dismissal of Galakrodziniece, according 
to the transitional provisions of the Law on state pensions, the 
pensionable age was different for men and for women. The Constitutional 
court of Latvia found that there were no incompatibilities of law with the 
Constitution of Latvia, but a wrong interpretation had led to 
discrimination based on sex. Although the discriminatory dismissal 
occurred in 2001, nevertheless the Constitutional Court of Latvia referred 
to the Marshall judgment. The only imprecision of the judgement of the 
Constitutional Court it that  it refers to provisions of Directive 2000/78 
when analysing whether the concept of ‘occupation’ comprises civil 
service not taking into account that this directive does not regulate 
prohibition of discrimination based on sex.  Instead it should refer to the 
case Commission v Germany72, where the ECJ explicitly stated that 
principle of equal treatment between mean and women regards public 
service, too.  
 
Part-time workers in Latvia  
According to statistical data, in Latvia part time workers comprise only 
10% of all workers, where 39 500 part-time workers are men, but 66 000 
part-time workers are women73. The problem however may arise from 
difficulties in finding part-time work, which possibly frequently 
precludes women form working at all.  
 
Equal treatment within the civil service 
It has already been discussed above that the principle of equal treatment 
concerns the civil service. However, this is not fully implemented in 
Latvia. Article 2(4) of the Law on the state civil service74 provides that an 
employment relationship within the civil service is regulated by the 
                                                 
71 Case 152/84, Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority 
(Teaching), European Court Reports 1986, page 723. 
72 Case 248/83, Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, European 
Court Reports 1985 Page 01459 para 16. 
73 Darbaspēka apsekojuma galvenie rādītāji 2004.gadā, Latvijas Republikas centrālā statistikas 
pārvalde, Rīga, 2004 
74 Valsts civildienesta likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2000. 22.septembris, Nr.331/333 (Law 
on state civil service) 
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Labour law as regards working time and time-off, pay, material 
responsibility of the employee, and terms as far as these are not regulated 
by the present law.  It follows that there is no provision as regards the 
employment relationship within the civil service precluding 
discrimination based on sex.  
A project of amendments to Article 2(4) of the Law on the state 
civil service providing for the principle of equal treatment and allowing 
applying of norms of the Labour law to relationships within the civil 
service was submitted to the Parliament of Latvia by the Secretariat of 
Integration on June 2005. Since that time no further legislative steps have 
been taken by the Latvian Parliament towards adoption of those 
amendments75.  
 
 
                                                 
75 Project of amendments is available in Latvian at www.saeima.lv under No.1292, 
http://www.saeima.lv/saeima8/reg.likprj. It states: 
Article 2(4)  of Law on state civil service shall provide: 
“Within the state civil service relationship, norms regulating the employment relationship shall be 
applied as regards the principle of equal treatment, prohibition of differential treatment, prohibition of 
adverse consequences, representation and defence of interests of employees, collective agreements, 
working time and time-off, civil liability of a servant and terms as well as other question as far as it 
corresponds to the nature of the legal relationship within the civil service and so far as this law and 
other normative acts provides for different regulation”  
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Chapter 6. 
Social Security 
Directive 79/7 
Social security matters in EC sex equality law are regulated by Directive 
79/7 on progressive implementation of the principle of equal treatment 
for men and women in matters of social security1. This Directive is 
adopted on the basis of Article 308 (ex Article 235) which allows the 
Community to take action in a field where it is not provided with the 
necessary powers, but which is necessary for attainment of operation of 
the common market and the objectives set forth in the EC Treaty. So 
Directive 79/7 is not based on the equality provisions of EC Treaty, 
because at that time only Article 119 (now Article 141) provided for 
equal pay, but social security matters falls outside that concept2.   
 
Scope of Directive 79/7 
Ratione materiae 
Article 3 
Article 3 provides: 
 
1.This Directive shall apply to: (a) statutory schemes which provide 
protection against the following risks:  
- sickness, 
- invalidity.  
- old age,  
- accidents at work and occupational diseases,  
- unemployment.  
(b) social assistance, in so far as it is intended to supplement or replace the 
schemes referred to in (a)”. 
2.This Directive shall not apply to the provisions concerning survivors’ 
benefits not to those concerning family benefits, except in the case of 
family benefits granted by way of increases of benefits due in respect of 
the risks referred to in paragraph 1(a). 
 
In order to fall within the scope of Directive 79/7 a benefit must 
constitute the whole or part of a statutory scheme providing protection 
against one of the risks specified by Article 3(1)(a) or a form of social 
assistance having the same objective3. The mode of payment does not 
play a decisive role as regards identification of a benefit as one which 
                                                 
1 Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the principle 
of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security, Official Journal L 006, 10.01.1979 
P.0024-0025. 
2 Case 80/70. Gabrielle Defrenne v Belgium State, European Court Reports 1971 Page 00445.
3 Case 150/85, Jacqueline Drake v Chief Adjudication Officer, European Court Reports 1986 Page 
01995, paragraph 21.
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falls within the scope of Directive 79/7 However, such benefit must be 
directly and effectively linked to the protection provided against risks 
specified in Article 3(1) of the Directive 79/74. 
In Drake the ECJ found that benefit provided for a person who cares 
for a disabled person forms part of a statutory scheme providing 
protection against invalidity and is thus covered by Article 3(1)(a) of 
Directive 79/75. Further in Smithson6 and Atkins7 it ruled that housing 
benefit and travel concessions do not, because they do not provide for 
direct and effective protection against risks provided by Article 3(1)(a) of 
Directive 79/7. In contrast in Richardson8 the ECJ found that exemption 
from paying charges for supply of drugs, medicines and appliances falls 
within the scope of Article 3(1) of Directive 79/7, because the measure 
affords direct and effective protection against the risk of sickness, while 
in Taylor the Court ruled that winter fuel payment falls within the scope 
of Directive 79/7, because it is granted in form as protecting against risk 
of old-age9.  
Child raising allowance as family benefit does not fall within the 
scope of Article 3 if it does not provide direct and effective protection 
against one of the risks listed in Article 3(1)10.  
 
Exceptions from principle of equal treatment 
Article 7 of Directive 79/7 provides for a list of exemptions from the 
principle of equal treatment in social security matters. It provides that the 
Member States may determine different pensionable ages for men and 
women, that persons raising children may not claim equal treatment with 
regard to old-age pension and other benefits, and a married man may be 
entitled to special advantages in respect to his dependent wife. 
Most of cases decided by the ECJ have arisen due to different 
pensionable ages for men and women allowed as an exemption from 
equal treatment under Article 7(1)(a) of Directive 79/7. 
                                                 
4 Case C-243/90, The Queen v Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte Florence Rose Smithson., 
European Court Reports 1992 Page I-00467, paragraph 14.
5 Case 150/85, Jacqueline Drake v Chief Adjudication Officer, European Court Reports 1986 Page 
01995.
6 Case C-243/90, The Queen v Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte Florence Rose Smithson., 
European Court Reports 1992 Page I-00467. See also joined cases C-63/91 and C-64/91, Sonia Jackson 
et Patricia Cresswell v Chief Adjudication Officer., European Court Reports 1992 Page I-04737 and 
critical opinion of  Siofra O’Leary, Employment Law at the European Court of Justice. Judicial 
Structures, Policies and processes, Hart Publishing, 2002, at page 230. 
7 Case C-228/94, Stanley Charles Atkins v Wrekin District Council and Department of Transport. , 
European Court Reports 1996 Page I-03633.
8 Case C-137/94, The Queen v Secretary of state for Social Security, ex parte Cyril Richardson, 
European Court Reports 1995 Page I-03407. 
9 Case C-382/98, The Queen v Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte John Henry Taylor, 
 European Court Reports 1999 Page I-08955.
10 Joined cases C-245/94 and C-312/94, Ingrid Hoever and Iris Zachow v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
ECR 1996 Page I-04895, paragraph 42. 
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The UK11 was aware of whether it is allowed under Directive 79/7 and 
the derogation provided by Article 7(1)(a) to define different contribution 
periods for men and women arising from different pensionable ages. The 
Courts answered that different contribution periods logically follows from 
different pensionable age12 and are allowed under Article 7(1)(a) and 
tried this finding substantiated by following reasoning: 
 
Although the preamble to the Directive does not state the reasons for the 
derogations which it lays down, it can be deduced from the nature of the 
exceptions contained in Article 7(1) of the Directive that the Community 
legislature intended to allow Member States to maintain temporarily the 
advantages accorded to women with respect to retirement in order to 
enable them progressively to adapt their pension systems in this respect 
without disrupting the complex financial equilibrium of those systems, the 
importance of which could not be ignored. Those advantages include the 
possibility for female workers of qualifying for a pension earlier than 
male workers, as envisaged by Article 7(1)(a) of the Directive13.  
 
However, it is of doubt whether different pensionable age usually 
works in favour of women. So in the Thomas situation where women 
were precluded from receiving severe disablement and invalid care 
allowance since they had reached the pensionable age defined for women. 
The Court in this regard pointed out that discrimination arising from 
different pensionable age and affecting benefit schemes other than old-
age can be justified as being the consequence of determining a different 
retirement age according to sex, if it is necessary to avoid financial 
disequilibrium of the social security system or to ensure consistency 
between retirement pension schemes and other benefit schemes14. The 
ECJ drew the same conclusion in Hepple, where it ruled that it is justified 
under Article 7(1)(a) to pay an allowance provided as compensation for 
an impairment of earning capacity due to accident at work or 
occupational disease, at a reduced rate when the person reaches 
pensionable age, taking into account that women reach pensionable age 
                                                 
11 Case C-9/91, The Queen v Secretary of state for Social Security, ex parte Equal Opportunities 
Commission, European Court Reports 1992 Page I-04297. 
12 The same applies to different calculation of pensions arising from different pensionable ages, see in 
this regard case C-154/96, Louis Wolfs v Office national des pensions (ONP)., European Court Reports 
1998 Page I-0617, however if the Member State defines equal pensionable ages for both sexes the 
method of calculation of pension must be the same. See cases C-154/92, Remi van Cant v Rijksdienst 
voor pensioenen., European Court Reports 1993 Page I-03811, C-172/02, Robert Bourgard v Institut 
national d'assurances sociales pour travailleurs indépendants (Inasti). European Court Reports 2004 
Page I-05823. 
13 Case C-9/91, The Queen v Secretary of state for Social Security, ex parte Equal Opportunities 
Commission, European Court Reports 1992 Page I-04297, paragraph 15. 
14 Case C-382/91, Secretary of State for Social Security v Evelyn Thomas and others, European Court 
Reports 1993 Page I-0124, paragraph 12.
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five years earlier15. This demonstrates that the derogation allowed under 
Article 7(1)(a) does not always work to the advantage of women. The 
case-law discussed above shows that subject to the adverse effect of the 
“privilege” granted under that provision usually affects the most 
unprotected groups of women – those who unable to undertake full 
employment for various reasons. 
The finding in Richardson16 where exemption from paying charges 
for the supply of drugs, medicines and appliances was granted according 
to pensionable ages different for men and women, the Court substantiated 
by saying that this sickness scheme does not influence the financial 
equilibrium of contributory pension schemes, that in certain circumstance 
the Member State is allowed to withdraw certain social security benefits 
in order to control social expenditure and that the situation of men and 
women are comparable situations since women are entitled to continue 
their occupational activities after reaching pensionable age, but men are 
entitled to draw a retirement pension before pensionable age. Almost the 
same substantiation was presented by the Court in the Taylor ruling on 
winter fuel payment17.  
These ruling demonstrates the Court’s neglect of the real situation, 
where women usually retire earlier and are usually entitled to lower 
average pension, thus more deserving special charge exemption for 
medicine than men at the same age, whereas instead the Court offers for 
the Member State to exempt extra social guarantees totally in case of 
financial difficulties. 
In the recent Haackert case, the court clarified that Article 7(1)(a) 
concerns the right to early retirement, which may be defined differently 
according to the sex18.  
However the most important finding regarding different retirement 
ages allowed under Article 7(1)(a) was in Marschall where the Court  
held strictly that different pensionable ages allowed as regards social 
security schemes is not applicable as regards Directive 76/207 or in other 
words, women workers may not be legitimately dismissed on account of 
having reached pensionable age allowing them to receive old-age 
pension19. 
                                                 
15 Case C-196/98, Regina Virginia Hepple v Adjudication Officer and Adjudication Officer v Anna 
Stec., European Court Reports 2000 Page I-03701. 
16 Case C-137/94, The Queen v Secretary of state for Social Security, ex parte Cyril Richardson, 
European Court Reports 1995 Page I-03407. 
17 Case C-382/98, The Queen v Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte John Henry Taylor, 
 European Court Reports 1999 Page I-08955.
18 Case C-303/02, Peter Haackert and Pensionsvericherungsanstalt der Angestellten, Official Journal 
C 94, 17.04.2004., p. 8. 
19 Case 152/84, Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority 
(Teaching), European Court Reports 1986, page 723, paragraphs 34-36. 
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Derogations provided under Article 7(1)(d) allow for granting of 
increases of long-term invalidity, old-age, accidents at work and 
occupational disease benefits for a dependent wife only. So in Bramhill a 
national provision precluded women from the equal right to obtain long-
term increase in old-age pension in respect of dependent spouse. The 
Court held that such provisions cannot be considered discriminatory since 
they are allowed under Article 7(1)(d)20. 
 
Ratione personae 
Article 2 of Directive 79/7 defines persons to whom it is applicable: 
 
This Directive shall apply to the working population  - including self-
employed persons, workers and self-employed persons whose activity is 
interrupted by illness, accident or involuntary unemployment and 
persons seeking employment – and to retired or invalidated workers and 
self-employed persons. 
 
From the finding in Drake on the scope of Article 3(1) of Directive 
79/7 it follows that the working population also comprises persons who 
have given up employment, because one of the risks materializes in 
relation to an ascendant.21
The Court in Riele interpreted Article 2 of Directive 79/7 as 
applicable to persons working or seeking employment “whose occupation 
or efforts to find work were interrupted by one of the risks referred to in 
Article 3 of directive”22.  
In Johnston23 the ECJ held that a person who had interrupted her 
occupational activity due to up-bringing of her child and then was unable 
to search for work because of health condition does not come within the 
scope of Article 2 of Directive 79/7. However, the situation is different if 
sickness occurs when a person after the period of up-bringing of child is 
seeking employment. In other words, a person seeking employment, 
without the necessity to make a distinction as to the reason why that 
person left previous work, comes within the scope of Article 2 of 
Directive 79/7 and consequently must be protected if one of the risks 
specified by Article 3 occurs.  It is for the national court to determine 
whether a person must be considered as seeking employment24.  
                                                 
20 Case C-420/92, Elizabeth Bramhill v Chief Adjudication Officer., European Court Reports 1994 Page 
I-03191.
21 Case 150/85, Jacqueline Drake v Chief Adjudication Officer., European Court Reports 1986 Page 
01995. See also case C-77/95, Bruna-Alessandra Zuchner v Handelskrankenkasse (Ersatzkasse) 
Bremen, European Court Reports 1996, Page I-05689, paragraph 11. 
22 Joined cases 48/88, 106/88, 107/88, J. E. G. Achterberg-te Riele and others v Sociale 
Verzekeringsbank., European Court Reports 1989 Page 01963, paragraph 13.
23 Case C-31/90, Elsie Rita Johnson v Chief Adjudication Officer, European Court Reports 1991 Page 
I-03723. 
24 Ibid., para. 27. 
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In Nolte and Megner the Court ruled that the working population in 
the meaning of Article 2 comprises part-time employment even if it 
constitutes less than 15 hours a week25. Further the Court held that the 
scope ratione personae as defined by Article 2 of Directive 79/7 cannot 
be extended according to the scope ratione materiae defined by Article 3, 
but a person may rely on Directive 79/7 if it bears discriminatory effect as 
regards his/her spouse, if the spouse comes within the scope of the 
Directive26.  
In Zuchner,27 a woman who provided care for her disabled husband 
contested the legality of a national provision awarding financial 
assistance only to those persons who have no other person living in the 
same household who can assist and care for the patient. Mrs Zuchner 
claimed that she came within the scope of Directive 79/7 as working 
population since she undertook an activity - care of her handicapped 
spouse. Besides she had undergone training and if she did not provide 
care it would have be provided by another person in return for payment or 
in a hospital.  However those arguments were rejected by the Court. The 
crucial point founded here was that Mrs Zuchner was not engaged in 
occupational activity and not even seeking work at the time when she 
started to look after her husband28. The Court stated that: 
 
…the term “activity” referred to in relation to the expression “working 
population” in Article 2 of the directive can be construed only as referring 
at the very least to an economic activity, that is to say an activity 
undertaken in return for remuneration in the broad sense.29
 
It follows that Directive 79/7 is not applicable to unpaid family and care 
work usually provided by women to their family members. Writers 
evaluated this ruling very critically: 
 
This harsh ruling failed to take into account of the real economic value of 
the services provided by Ms Zuchner, which went beyond the normal calls 
of married life and for which the State would otherwise have had to pay. 
Furthermore, it sacrificed the spirit of the Directive to its literal 
interpretation; it seems more than probable that most of those who are 
excluded from formal economic work because of caring for an infirm 
                                                 
25 Cases C-317/93, Inge Nolte v Landesversicherungsanstalt Hannover, European Court Reports 1995 
Page I-04625 and C-444/93, Ursula Megner and Hildegard Scheffel v Innungskrankenkasse 
Vorderpfalz now Innungskrankenkasse Rheinhessen-Pfalz, European Court Reports 1995 Page I-04741. 
26 Joined cases C-87/90, C-88/90 and C-89/90, A. Verholen and others v Sociale Verzekeringsbank 
Amsterdam., European Court Reports 1991 Page I-03757. 
27 Case C-77/95, Bruna-Alessandra Zuchner v Handelskrankenkasse (Ersatzkasse) Bremen, European 
Court Reports 1996, Page I-05689. 
28 Ibid., para. 12. 
29 Ibid., para. 13. 
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relative are women and this important group left outside the potential help 
by the Directive30. 
 
Notwithstanding problems related to the Zuchner judgment, it is 
noteworthy to mention that in this case the ECJ clarified the wording of 
Article 2 of Directive 79/7 in general. It clearly stated that Article 2 is 
applicable not only to employed persons and persons seeking 
employment whose activity is interrupted by one of the risks referred to 
in Article 3(1), but also to persons actually working and persons seeking 
employment31. Although this logically derives from the general idea of 
Directive 79/7, nevertheless it is of great importance to say it explicitly, 
since equal treatment first of all depends on an equal amount of 
contributions made by or in favour of actually employed persons and 
persons seeking employment, which later, when social risk occurs, will 
serve as the basis for allowance. 
So, prohibition of discrimination based on sex in the field of social 
security according to Directive 79/7 is limited to scope ratione personae 
as provided by Article 2 and scope ratione materiae provided by Article 3 
taking into account the exemptions provided by Article 7. In reality it 
leaves outside a wide range of issues concerning the disadvantageous 
situation of women performing a traditional role and does not allow to 
deal with equality issues from the perspective of the substantive 
approach, because the scope of Directive 79/7 does not allow for 
thoroughness of review of the real situation governing in society. 
 
Ratione temporis   
The date for implementation of Directive 749/7 was 22 December 1984. 
This means that the Member States were under obligation to provide 
equal treatment in social security matters not only with regard to rights 
acquired starting from this date but also “a Member State may not 
maintain beyond 22 December 1984 any inequalities of treatment which 
have their origin in the fact that the conditions for entitlement to benefit 
are those which applied before that date”32. For example, a Member State 
has no right to provide a transitional provision which requires that a 
married woman who become unemployed before 23 December 1984 
remains subject even after that date to the requirement that she be a 
“wage-earner”33 or apply to women conditions which were not previously 
                                                 
30 Evelyn Ellis, Recent Developments in European Community Sex Equality Law, Common Market 
law Review, 35, 1998, pages 379-408, at page 397. 
31 Case C-77/95, Bruna-Alessandra Zuchner v Handelskrankenkasse (Ersatzkasse) Bremen, European 
Court Reports 1996, Page I-05689, paragraph 11. 
32 Case 384/85, Jean Borrie Clarke v Chief Adjudication Officer, paragraph 9, European Court Reports 
1987 Page 2865, paragraph 10. 
33 Case 80/87, A. Dik, A. Menkutos-Demirci and H. G. W. Laar-Vreeman v College van Burgemeester 
en Wethouders Arnhem and Winterswijk., European Court Reports 1988 Page 01601, in this regard see 
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applied to men34. To correct that situation the Member State may 
introduce provisions implementing Directive 79/7 retroactively35. If the 
Member State introduces transitional social security payments for one 
sex, then the other sex is entitled to the same right even if it infringes the 
national rule of unjust enrichment36.  
In Richardson the national court of the UK asked whether the 
effect of a judgment where the Court found that the right to exemption 
from charges for supply of drugs, medicines and appliances must be 
granted to equal terms to both sexes, should be limited in time so that 
Directive 79/7 may not be relied on for a claim for damages in respect to 
periods prior to the date of the judgment by persons who had not brought 
legal proceedings prior to that date? The Court’s answer was that there is 
no reason for temporal limitation of the Richardson judgment even if it 
causes financial consequences for the Member State37.   
 
Equal treatment under Article 4  
Article 4 of Directive 79/7 precludes direct or indirect discrimination on 
grounds of sex by reference to marital status and concerns the scope and 
conditions of access to the schemes as well as contributions, calculation 
and increases in respect to spouse and dependants. However, Directive 
79/7 does not provide for definitions of direct and indirect discrimination 
and will not be covered by Recast Directive 2006/5438. 
First of all the Court recognized that Article 4(1) is sufficiently 
precise to be relied on directly39. Secondly it is true that although Article 
4 prohibits discrimination, nevertheless persons and issues which qualify 
under Articles 2 and 3 may be subject to justified indirect discrimination. 
So it is allowed to pay increased unemployment benefit for those who 
have dependants40as well as to grant supplement to old-age pension to a 
                                                                                                                                            
also joined cases C-87/90, C-88/90 and C-89/90, A. Verholen and others v Sociale Verzekeringsbank 
Amsterdam., European Court Reports 1991 Page I-03757.  
34 Case C-343/92, M.A. De Weerd, nee Roks, and others v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de 
Gezondheid, Geestelijke en Maatschappelijke Belangen and others, European Court Reports 1994 Page 
I-00571. 
35 Case 80/87, A. Dik, A. Menkutos-Demirci and H. G. W. Laar-Vreeman v College van Burgemeester 
en Wethouders Arnhem and Winterswijk., European Court Reports 1988 Page 01601.
36 Case C-377/89, Ann Cotter and Norah McDermott v Minister for Social Welfare and Attorney 
General, European Court Reports 1991 Page I-01155. 
37 Case C-137/94, The Queen v Secretary of state for Social Security, ex parte Cyril Richardson, 
European Court Reports 1995 Page I-03407. 
38 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in 
matters of employment and occupation (recast), Official Journal L 204/23, 26.7.2006. 
39 Case 7185, State of the Netherlands v Federatie Nederlands Vakbeweging, European Court Reports 
1986 Page 0385, paragraph 18. 
40 Cases 30/85, J. W. Teuling v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Chemische Industrie, 
European Court Reports 1987 Page 02497 and C-229/89, Commission of the European Communities v 
Kingdom of Belgium, European Court Reports 1991 Page I-02205.
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pensioner whose spouse has not yet reached pensionable age and is 
exclusively dependent on that pensioner41, although for those rights far 
more men qualify than women, nevertheless such indirect discrimination 
is justified since it ensures minimum subsistence income. The same is 
true about the rule which - in order to qualify for incapacity for work 
benefit – requires a person to have had a certain income from work in the 
year preceding incapacity, since it corresponds to a legitimate aim of 
social policy. In other words, indirect discrimination may be justified by 
showing that the provision in question corresponds to the principle of 
proportionality42. Besides, the Member States have to adopt new rules 
which have the effect of reducing the number of persons eligible for a 
social security benefit43.  
However, important here is the finding of the Court that social 
policy is a matter for the Member State, which thus enjoys a wide margin 
of discretion as regards the nature of protective measures and the detailed 
arrangements for their implementation44. It may concern the financial 
equilibrium of social security systems45. On the other hand: 
 
…although budgetary consideration may influence a Member State’s 
choice of social policy and affect the nature or scope of the social 
protection measures it wishes to adopt, they cannot themselves 
constitute the aim pursued by that policy and cannot, therefore, justify 
discrimination against one of the sexes46. 
 
In Nolte and Megner the Court held that in the name of social 
policy of the Member State it is allowed to exclude from sickness and 
old-age schemes workers employed for less than 15 hours a week and 
regularly attracting remuneration of up to one-seventh of the monthly 
average salary even if such rule is indirectly discriminatory against 
women47. Here the Court accepted indirect discrimination “with little or 
                                                 
41 Case C-226/91, Jan Molenbroek v Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank, European Court 
Reports 1992 Page I-05943.
42 Case C-229/89, Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium, European Court 
Reports 1991 Page I-02205, paragraph 19.
43 Case C-280/94, Y. M. Posthuma-van Damme v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel, 
Ambachten en Huisvrouwen and N. Oztürk v Bestuur van de Nieuwe Algemene Bedrijfsvereniging., 
European Court Reports 1996 Page I-00179.
44 Case C-229/89, Commission of the European Communities v Kingdom of Belgium, European Court 
Reports 1991 Page I-02205, paragraphs 22 and 23.
45 Case C-172/02, Robert Bourgard v Institut national d'assurances sociales pour travailleurs 
indépendants (Inasti). European Court Reports 2004 Page I-05823, paragraph 43. 
46 Case C-343/92, M.A. De Weerd, nee Roks, and others v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de 
Gezondheid, Geestelijke en Maatschappelijke Belangen and others, European Court Reports 1994 Page 
I-00571. 
47 Cases C-317/93, Inge Nolte v Landesversicherungsanstalt Hannover, European Court Reports 1995 
Page I-04625 and C-444/93, Ursula Megner and Hildegard Scheffel v Innungskrankenkasse 
Vorderpfalz now Innungskrankenkasse Rheinhessen-Pfalz, European Court Reports 1995 Page I-04741. 
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no investigation of the justification offered”48 by the Member State. It is 
argued that in matters of discrimination in the field of social security the 
ECJ applies a looser proportionality test49.  
As regards Article 4(2), which provides that the provisions of 
Directive 79/7 shall be without prejudice to the provisions relating to the 
protection of women on grounds of maternity, there is no case-law of the 
ECJ so far. However, parallels could be drawn with interpretation of 
Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207, which will be discussed in more detail in 
the following chapter.  
 
Social security in Latvia 
Social security system 
The social security system is based on various social rights starting from 
rights for measures for promotion of education and employment and 
ending with the right to healthcare50. Those rights are provided by the 
Law on social security. Article 2 of Law on social security declares that it 
is based on such basic principles as equal treatment, solidarity, social 
insurance and assistance, prophylaxis, autonomy and individual approach. 
Besides, Article 2.1 provides for prohibition of differential treatment in 
the state social security system on grounds of sex, race, colour of skin, 
age, disability, state of health, religious, political or other belief, ethnic or 
social origin, financial or family status or other circumstance. It prohibits 
direct and indirect discrimination and gives definitions of both. Article 2.1 
allows for differential treatment only if differential treatment has a 
legitimate aim and measures for attainment of that aim are proportionate. 
The present thesis will discuss only several components of the Latvian 
social security system – those which concern the subject discussed here. 
In particular, the state social insurance system, social allowances for 
families with children and social assistance for persons of low income as 
far as it affects unemployed persons during the maternity and child-care 
period.  
 
State social insurance system 
Almost the whole social insurance system is built on the state social 
insurance system. As described in the section on equal pay, private 
pension funds occupy a very small part of the Latvian social insurance 
system.  
                                                 
48 Evelyn Ellis, Recent Developments in European Community Sex Equality Law, Common Market 
law Review, 35, 1998, pages 379-408, at page 397. 
49 See in this regard the section on Indirect discrimination. 
50  Par sociālo drošību: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 21.septembris, nr.144 (Law on social 
security), Chapter II. 
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The Latvian state social insurance system provides for insurance against 
the following risks: 
1) old-age pensions; 
2) unemployment; 
3) accidents at work and occupational diseases; 
4) disability; 
5) maternity and sickness51. 
The state social insurance system is built on four special social insurance 
budgets. Those are: 
1) state pension; 
2) employment; 
3) accident at work; 
4) disability, maternity and sickness budgets.52 
 
State social insurance subjects 
Employees in general are subject to mandatory insurance against all risks 
listed above53. Self-employed persons are subject to mandatory insurance 
against risks of old-age, disability, maternity and sickness54 only if their 
income attains a certain level55.  
Several more categories of persons are subject to mandatory state 
social insurance. For example, persons on mandatory military service, 
spouses of diplomats, unemployed disabled persons, and others are 
insured against the risk of old age. For the purposes of this thesis, it is 
important to point out that subject to insurance against risks of old age 
and unemployment are persons on child-care until the child reaches 1.5 
years and persons on maternity and sick leave. Those special groups of 
persons are socially insured by the state or in other words their social 
insurance rate is paid by the state from the state budget or one of the four 
special state social insurance budgets56.  
                                                 
51Par valsts sociālo apdrošināšanu: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1997. 21.oktobris, nr.274/276 (Law 
on statne social insurance) Article 4. 
52 Par valsts sociālo apdrošināšanu: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1997. 21.oktobris, nr.274/276 (Law 
on statne social insurance) Article 7.  
53 Exception, Article 6(2) of the Law on state social insurance provides that employees  who are at 
pensionable age are not subject to insurance against risk of disability, professional diseases and 
unemployment, employees who receive long-term service pension or are disabled persons of III group 
are not subject to insurance against unemployment and occupational diseases. 
54 Exception, Article 6(3) Law on state social insurance provides that self-employed persons who are at 
pensionable age are not subject to insurance against risk of disability.  
55 Noteikumi par valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas obligāto iemaksu objekta minimālo un maksimālo 
apmēru: MK noteikumi Nr.193. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2000. 6. jūnijs, nr.213/218 (Regulations on 
maximum and minimum amount of state social insurance object). The minimum amount for self-
employed persons is 1320 lats per year.  
56 Noteikumi par valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas obligātajām iemaksām no valsts pamatbudžeta un 
valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas speciālajiem budžetiem: MK noteikumi Nr.230. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 
2001. 13.jūnijs, nr.91 (Regulations on state state social insurance payments from state budget and state 
social insurance special budgets) 
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Persons who are not subject to mandatory state social insurance 
can join the state social insurance scheme voluntarily. Persons who do not 
receive old-age pension can insure themselves against the risk of old-age, 
but spouses of self-employed persons who are not at pensionable age can 
voluntarily insure against risks of old-age, disability, maternity and 
sickness57.  
 
Rates of state social insurance  
Employees are subject to state social insurance in an amount of 33.09%58 
of their income, which is only partially paid by employees themselves. 
Employees from their gross salary pay for social insurance only 9%, 
while the employer must bear the remaining 24.09%. This means that the 
employer pays to employee not only gross salary (so called salary on 
paper) but also an extra 24.09% social insurance payments from the gross 
salary of the employee.  
Self-employed persons who have an income of at least 1320 a year 
must pay state social insurance59. A self-employed person who exceeds 
the minimum income is free to choose whether to pay state social 
insurance at the minimum level or more. The amount of minimum 
insurance is 30.2%60 from minimum income.  
Spouses of self-employed persons who are not at pensionable age 
and who have joined the state social insurance system voluntarily must 
pay 30.98% from a voluntarily defined amount of money61. Other persons 
who are not subject to mandatory state social insurance and who are not 
spouses of self-employed persons must pay 24.79 % for insurance for 
old-age pension from a freely defined sum of money.  
The state pays state social insurance payments from the state 
budget for persons on child-care leave for insurance for old-age pension 
                                                 
57 Par valsts sociālo apdrošināšanu: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1997. 21.oktobris, nr.274/276 (Law 
on statne social insurance) Article 5(3)  
58 Noteikumi par valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas iemaksu likmes sadalījumu pa valsts sociālās 
apdrošināšanas veidiem 2006.gadā: MK noteikumi Nr.968. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2005. 23. decembris, 
nr.206 (Regulations on division of state social insurance rate among modes of state social insurance for 
year 2006). According to the Regulations, employee payments must be distributed among special social 
insurance budgets in the following way: 24.79% old-age pension, 1.86% unemployment, 0.25% 
accidents at work and occupational diseases, 3.03% disability, 3.16% maternity and sickness.  
59 Noteikumi par valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas obligāto iemaksu objekta minimālo un maksimālo 
apmēru: MK noteikumi Nr.193. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2000. 6.jūnijs, nr.213/218 (Regulations on 
maximum and minimum amount of state social insurance object).  
60 Noteikumi par valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas iemaksu likmes sadalījumu pa valsts sociālās 
apdrošināšanas veidiem 2006.gadā: MK noteikumi Nr.968. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2005. 23.decembris, 
nr.206 (Regulations on division of state social insurance rate among modes of state social insurance for 
year 2006). According to the Regulations payments by the self-employed must be distributed among 
special social insurance budgets in the following way: 24.79% old-age pension, 3.03% disability, 
2.38% maternity and sickness.     
61 Ibid., according to the Regulations as to spouses of self-employed persons, their payments must be 
distributed among special social insurance budgets in the following way: 24.79% old-age pension, 
3.03% disability, 3.16% maternity and sickness.     
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in an amount of 20% and against risk of unemployment in an amount 
defined by the Cabinet of Ministers (at the moment 1.86%) from a 
constant sum of money: 50 lats62.   
For persons on maternity leave, payments for insurance for old-age 
pension and against unemployment are made from a special disability, 
maternity and sickness social insurance budget. The amount of payments 
for insurance for old-age pension constitutes 20% from the amount of 
maternity allowance, but against risk of unemployment 1.86% of 
maternity allowance63.    
The Cabinet of Ministers each year defines division of insurance 
payments among special social insurance budgets. 
  
Calculation of allowances 
Unemployment allowance 
The right to unemployment allowance is enjoyed by a person who has 
been socially insured for nine months during one year before obtaining 
unemployed status and who has at least one year overall length of service 
or who has been working for at least nine months during the previous 12 
months64. 
The amount of unemployment allowance depends on salary during 
the period taken into account for calculating that allowance and overall 
length of service. This means that those persons who worked altogether 
from one to nine years have the right to unemployment allowance in an 
amount of 50% of their salary earned during the period taken into account 
for calculating that allowance, ten to nineteen years – 55%, twenty to 
twenty-nine years – 60% and more than thirty years of service – 65% of 
salary is paid during the calculation period65. 
The calculation period is six months before two months before the 
month when the status of unemployed person is obtained. For the 
purposes of calculating unemployment allowance, daily income must be 
summed up and divided by the number of days when the person has been 
subject to insurance against the risk of unemployment. This means that 
for the purposes of calculating unemployment benefit, days during which 
a person has not been employed at all are not taken into account. The 
result obtained will form daily unemployment benefit. Notably, during 
sickness and maternity leave as well as during child-care leave persons 
                                                 
62 Noteikumi par valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas obligātajām iemaksām no valsts pamatbudžeta un 
valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas speciālajiem budžetiem: MK noteikumi Nr.230. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 
2001. 13. jūnijs, nr.91 (Regulations on state state social insurance payments from state budget and state 
social insurance special budgets), points 3 and 4. 
63 Ibid., points 14 and 15. 
64 Par apdrošināšanu bezdarba gadījumam: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1999. 15. decembris, 
nr.416/419 (Law on unemployment social insurance), Article 5.   
65 Ibid., Article 7.   
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are subject to insurance against risks of unemployment, thus if those 
periods coincide with the period taken into account for the purposes of 
calculating unemployment benefit then they are taken into account.  
      
Sickness allowance 
Sickness allowance for the first 13 days is paid by the employer. The first 
day of sickness is unpaid, the second and third day must be paid in an 
amount of at least 75% of average gross salary, but from the fourth to 
fourteenth days sickness allowance must be in an amount of at least 80% 
of average salary66.  
Starting from the fifteenth day of sickness, allowance is paid by the 
state social insurance system in an amount of 80% of salary earned during 
the period taken into account for the purposes of calculating that 
allowance. Sickness allowance is provided by the state social insurance 
scheme no longer than 52 weeks if sickness is uninterrupted or 78 weeks 
within a period of three years67.  
For the purposes of calculating sickness allowance for employees, 
income within a period of six months before two months before the 
month when sickness occurred must be taken into account. Income during 
this period must be divided by calendar days during this period not taking 
into account days spent on sick, maternity or child-care leave68. The 
result must be multiplied by 0.8 and the result will form daily sickness 
benefit. If the employee has not worked during the calculation period, 
sickness allowance must be calculated in an amount of 40% of average 
salary in the state. If the employee has not worked during the calculation 
period because of sickness, maternity or child-care leave, then for the 
purposes of calculating sickness allowance, the period before the 
calculation period could take into account up to 32 months before.69   
For the purposes of calculating sickness allowance for a self-
employed person, the sum from which social insurance payments have 
been made within a period of twelve months before three months before 
the quarter when sickness occurred must be taken into account. Sums for 
which social insurance payments have been made during the calculation 
period must be divided by calendar days not taking into account days 
spent on sickness, maternity or child-care leave. The result forms daily 
                                                 
66 Par maternitātes un slimības apdrošināšanu: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 23.novembris, 
nr.182 (Law on maternity and sickness insurance), Article 36. 
67 Ibid, Articles 13 and 17. 
68 Vidējās apdrošināšanas iemaksu algas aprēķināšanas kārtība un valsts sociālās apdrošināšana 
pabalstu piešķiršanas, aprēķināšanas un izmaksas kārtība: MK noteikumi Nr.270. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 
1998. 31.jūlijs, nr.223/224 (Regulations on calculation of average insurance salary and calculation, 
assignation and pay-out of state social insurance allowances). 
69 Par maternitātes un slimības apdrošināšanu: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 23. novembris, 
nr.182 (Law on maternity and sickness insurance), Article 31. 
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sickness allowance70. If the employee has not worked during the 
calculation period, sickness allowance must be calculated in an amount of 
40% of average salary in the state. If a self-employed person has not 
worked during the calculation period because of sickness, maternity or 
child-care leave, then for the purposes of calculating sickness allowance 
the period up to 39 months before the insured event occurred should be 
taken into account71.   
 
Maternity allowance 
Under the state social insurance scheme each employed or self-employed 
woman has the right to 112 days paid maternity leave. If a woman has 
registered with a doctor by the twelfth week of pregnancy for ante-natal 
examinations, then she has the right to an extra 14 days of paid maternity 
leave. An extra 14 days of paid maternity leave applies in case of 
complications arising from giving birth72.  
Maternity allowance is in an amount of 100% of the sum from 
which social insurance payments are paid. This means that maternity 
allowance for employees constitutes 100% of gross salary received 
during the period taken into account for the purposes of calculating 
maternity allowance. Although self-employed persons have the right to 
choose the amount from which they make payments for social insurance, 
however maternity allowance for the self-employed cannot be less than 
the minimum income level which is subject to mandatory state social 
insurance described above. 
Calculation of maternity allowance is subject to the same condition 
as sickness allowance. 
 
Paternity allowance 
Men have rights to ten calendar days paid paternity leave on account of 
child birth. Paternity allowance constitutes 80% of average salary of the 
period taken into account for the purposes of calculating paternity 
allowance73. Calculation of paternity allowance is subject to the same 
rules as sickness and maternity allowance74. 
                                                 
70 Vidējās apdrošināšanas iemaksu algas aprēķināšanas kārtība un valsts sociālās apdrošināšana 
pabalstu piešķiršanas, aprēķināšanas un izmaksas kārtība: MK noteikumi Nr.270. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 
1998. 31.jūlijs, nr.223/224 (Regulations on calculation of average insurance salary and calculation, 
assignation and pay-out of state social insurance allowances) 
71 Par maternitātes un slimības apdrošināšanu: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 23. novembris, 
nr.182 (Law on maternity and sickness insurance), Articles 31and 32. 
72 Ibid, Article 5. 
73 Par maternitātes un slimības apdrošināšanu: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 23. novembris, 
nr.182 (Law on maternity and sickness insurance), Section II A. 
74 Vidējās apdrošināšanas iemaksu algas aprēķināšanas kārtība un valsts sociālās apdrošināšana 
pabalstu piešķiršanas, aprēķināšanas un izmaksas kārtība: MK noteikumi Nr.270. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 
1998. 31.jūlijs, nr.223/224 (Regulations on calculation of average insurance salary and calculation, 
assignation and pay-out of state social insurance allowances). 
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 Accidents at work and occupational disease allowance 
In case of accident at work, where an employee has suffered it is for the 
employer to provide allowance for the first 14 days in an amount of 80% 
of average wage during the period taken into account for the purposes of 
calculating accidents at work and occupational disease allowance75.  
After that period, the Law on mandatory insurance against 
accidents at work and occupational diseases provides for several kinds of 
allowances and remuneration – sickness allowance due to accident at 
work or occupational disease, remuneration for loss of work capacity and 
lump-sum allowance76. The period taken into account for the purposes of 
calculating average insurance salary is six months before two months 
before the month when the occasion of insurance occurred77. If a person 
during the calculation period had not been subject to insurance against 
risk of accident at work or occupational disease, then for the purposes of 
calculating average insurance salary it must be presumed that the person’s 
average insurance salary had been 40% of the officially declared average 
wage in Latvia. Average insurance salary is basic value which is then 
taken into account for calculating sickness allowance due to accident at 
work or occupational disease, remuneration for loss of work capacity and 
lump-sum allowance78.  
Sickness allowance due to accident at work or occupational disease 
starting from the fifteenth day of sickness is provided by the state social 
insurance scheme in an amount of 80% of average social insurance 
salary. It could last for 52 weeks; however, after 16 weeks of sickness a 
commission of doctors decides whether the person is subject to an award 
of allowance for loss of work capacity. If the commission finds loss of 
work capacity of more than 10% then the person has the right to monthly 
loss of work capacity allowance.  If loss of work capacity varies between 
10 and 24%, then the responsible institution could decide instead of 
monthly loss of work capacity allowance to pay a lump-sum allowance 
                                                 
75 Par obligāto sociālo apdrošināšanu pret nelaimes gadījumiem darbā un arodslimībām: LR likums. 
Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 17. novembris, nr.179 (Law on mandatory social insurance against accidents 
at work and occupational diseases), Article 12. 
76 Article 14 of the Law on mandatory insurance against accidents at work and occupational diseases 
provides for several more ways of compensation such as death grant, remuneration for death of bread 
winner, compensation for medical treatment and rehabilitation etc. 
77 Par obligāto sociālo apdrošināšanu pret nelaimes gadījumiem darbā un arodslimībām: LR likums. 
Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 17. novembris, nr.179 (Law on mandatory social insurance against accidents 
at work and occupational diseases), Article 7(1)(5). Obligātās sociālās apdrošināšanas pret nelaimes 
gadījumiem darbā un arodslimībām apdrošināšanas atlīdzības piešķiršanas un aprēķināšanas kārtība: 
MK noteikumi Nr.50. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1999. 19. februāris, nr.48/49 (On calculation and award of 
mandatory social insurance remuneration due to accident at work and occupational disease). 
78 Obligātās sociālās apdrošināšanas pret nelaimes gadījumiem darbā un arodslimībām apdrošināšanas 
atlīdzības piešķiršanas un aprēķināšanas kārtība: MK noteikumi Nr.50. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1999. 19. 
februāris, nr.48/49 (On calculation and award of mandatory social insurance remuneration due to 
accident at work and occupational disease). 
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for loss of work capacity in an amount from 3 to 18 average social 
insurance salaries. 
 
Pensions  
The Law on state pensions provide for old-age pensions, disability 
pensions and pension in case of death of the bread-winner. 
 
Old-age pension 
The right to obtain old-age pension accrues to each person who is at least 
62 years old and has worked for at least 10 years79. At the moment 
pensionable age between men and women is not equal; according to point 
8 of the transitional provisions of the Law on state pensions until year 
2008 pensionable age must be equalized by raising women’s pensionable 
age each year for half a year. The amount of pension is dependent upon 
the insurance sum collected through payments for old-age pension 
insurance. Pension is calculated in accordance with a special formula 
provided by Article 12 of the Law on state pensions. 
 
Disability pension 
The right to disability pension accrues to a person who has been socially 
insured at least three years80. For the purposes of calculating disability 
pension the first average social insurance salary is calculated. For those 
purposes any period of 36 months is taken into during the last five years. 
Usually for calculating average social insurance salary that 36 month 
period is taken into account where the person has had higher income and 
had worked without interruption. If however during the last five years 
there is no period of uninterrupted work for 36 month, any period of 36 
months is taken into account not including those days during which the 
person had not worked81. If the person has not been subject to insurance 
against risk of disability during the last five years then the person has the 
right to disability pension in an amount of the minimum social security 
allowance82.   
 
Pension in case of death of bread-winner 
                                                 
79Par valsts pensijām: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 23.novembris, nr.182 (Law on state 
pensionēs),. Article 11 
80 Ibid., Article 14. 
81 Ibid., Article 16. Telephone interview with State Social Insurance Agency experts on free of charge 
consultation line 8001015 on 11th of July 2006. 
82 Noteikumi par valsts sociālā nodrošinājuma pabalsta un apbedīšanas pabalsta apmēru, tā 
pārskatīšanas kārtību un pabalstu piešķiršanas un izmaksas kārtību: MK noteikumi Nr.561, Latvijas 
Vēstnesis, 2005. 29.jūlijs, nr.119 (Regulations on amount of state social security allowance and death 
grant, and procedure for their award, reassessment and payout). According to the Regulation the 
minimum social security allowance constitutes 45 lats.   
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Right to bread-winner pension accrues to family members who were 
dependent on a dead person. Children of a dead person must be 
considered as dependants irrespective of whether they have been under 
actual maintenance of the dead person. Bread-winner pension is 
calculated on the basis of old-age pension. One child has the right to 50% 
of possible old-age pension, two children up to 75% of possible old-age 
pension, but three and more children  to 90% of possible old age pension.    
 
Social allowances for families with children 
Social allowances are provided by Law on state social allowances83.  
Their purpose is to support particular categories of persons in situations 
when they cannot provide themselves with financial means or they are in 
situations where extra expenses are necessary and the state social 
insurance system does not cover those situations84. For families with 
children, several kinds of allowances are provided – family, adopted child 
care, child-care, disabled child-care and childbirth allowance. In this 
thesis, the provisions of child-birth and child-care will be discussed since 
they are directly connected with the period analysed in this work and 
concern the issue of sex-equality. Provisions on child-birth allowance will 
be discussed in the chapter on rights during maternity leave and after it, 
but the provisions on child-care leave will be discussed in the chapter on 
rights during child-care leave and after it.     
 
Social assistance    
Measures of social assistance are provided by the Law on Social services 
and social assistance85. Measures of social assistance will be discussed in 
this thesis only as far as they concern protection of unemployed persons 
during the maternity and child-care period as far as their income falls 
below the minimum.  In particular, the Law on social services and social 
assistance guarantees to each person an income not lower than the 
guaranteed minimum income declared by the state86. At the moment in 
                                                 
83 Valsts sociālo pabalstu likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2002. 19. novembris, nr.168 (Law on 
state social allowances).  
84 Ibid., Article 2.  
85 Sociālo pakalpojumu un sociālās palīdzības likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2002. 19. 
novembris, nr.168 )(Law on social services and assistance). 
86Sociālo pakalpojumu un sociālās palīdzības likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2002. 19. 
novembris, nr.168 )(Law no social services and assistance), Article 36. 
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Latvia the guaranteed minimum income constitutes 24 lats a month87, but 
for certain groups of persons in Riga it is 45 lats a month88. 
 
General assessment of Latvian social security system 
Looking at the Latvian state social security and insurance system from 
the perspective of gender equality, no explicitly discriminatory norms are 
there found. However, social insurance legislation bears a considerable 
risk of being directly discriminatory as regards social insurance rights 
obtained/lost during the period of maternity leave and negative impact on 
social insurance protection after maternity leave. This issue will be 
discussed in the chapter on rights during maternity leave and after it. 
As regards social allowances for families with children and social 
assistance, legislation provides equal rights for both sexes, but only 
formally. They are frequently subject to less favourable treatment 
indirectly. That issue will be analysed in the chapters on rights during 
maternity leave and after it and on rights during child-care leave and after 
it.      
 
 
                                                 
87 Grozījums Ministru kabineta 2003.gada 9.decembra noteikumos Nr.693 “Noteikumi par garantēto 
minimālo ienākumu līmeni un pabalsta apmēru garantētā minimālā ienākuma līmeņa nodrošināšanai”: 
MK noteikumi Nr.881. Latvijas Vēstnesis 2005. 25. novembris, nr.189 (Amendments to regulations of 
Cabinet of Ministers adopted on 9th of December 2003 “Regulations on guaranteed minimum income 
level and amount of allowance for provision of guaranteed minimum income level”).  
88 Par paaugstināto garantēto minimālo ienākumu līmeni Rīgā: Rīgas domes saistošie noteikumi Nr.84. 
Latvijas Vēstnesis 2005. 24.februāris, nr.32 (On increased guaranteed minimal income level in Riga). 
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Chapter 7. 
Self-employed persons and equality 
 
EC law 
Concept of self-employed 
EU law does not give precise definition on who should be regarded as a 
self-employed person, but the national laws of the Member States differ 
in this respect. It is clear, however, that regarding application of EC law 
documents regarding self-employed persons, the national definition is not 
applicable otherwise it could endanger uniform application of EC law.  
The only thing which the case-law of the ECJ indicates as regards 
characteristics of self-employed status is that a self-employed person does 
not perform duties under subordination of the person who receives 
services1. 
Another problem is that frequently nowadays it is difficult to 
distinguish between employed and self-employed persons2. As the Court 
held in Raulin that the essential characteristic of an employment 
relationship is that for a certain period a person performs services for and 
under direction of another person in return for which he receives 
remuneration3. 
In Allonby the Court held that formal classification of a self-
employed person under national law does not exclude the possibility that 
a person may be qualified as a worker within the meaning of Article 1414. 
In order to assess the nature of a person’s status, it is necessary to 
consider “the extent of any limitation of their freedom to choose their 
timetable, and the place and content of their work” and “the fact that no 
obligation is imposed on them to accept an assignment is of no 
consequence in that context”5. As Nielsen points out: 
 
It is thus up to neither the parties to the contract, nor the national legal 
system to decide the status of a person performing a service as either a 
worker or an independent contractor.6
                                                 
1 Case C-256/01. Debra Allonby v Accrington & Rossendale College, Education Lecturing Services, 
trading as Protocol Professional and Secretary of State for Education and Employment, European 
Court Reports 2004 Page I-00873. Paragraph 68.
2 Ruth Nielsen, European Labour Law, DJOF Publishing, 2000, at page 145. 
3 Case C357/89.V. J. M. Raulin v Minister van Onderwijs en Wetenschappen. European Court Reports 
1992 Page I-01027. Paragraph 10..  
4 Case C-256/01. Debra Allonby v Accrington & Rossendale College, Education Lecturing Services, 
trading as Protocol Professional and Secretary of State for Education and Employment, European 
Court Reports 2004 Page I-00873. Paragraph 71.
5 Ibid., para. 72.
6 Ruth Nielsen, Gender Equality in European Contract Law, 2004, Copenhagen, DJOF Publishing, at 
page 35. 
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It follows that a self-employed person is a person who provides 
services without a timetable in the meaning of working time, not in 
subordination of the person who receives the service, but regarding place 
and content of the work – a self-employed person is responsible for 
achieving an agreed result only. However, writers stress that there is no 
need for a sharp distinction between employment contracts and other 
contracts, since EU discrimination law applies to “matters of employment 
and occupation”7. 
 
Scope of Directive 86/613  
The title of Directive 86/6138 “on application of the principle of equal 
treatment between men and women engaged in an activity, including 
agriculture, in a self-employed capacity, and on the protection of self-
employed women during pregnancy and motherhood” is very promising. 
Indeed Article 4 provides: 
 
As regards self-employed persons, Member States shall take the measures 
necessary to ensure the elimination of all provisions which are contrary to 
the principle of equal treatment as defined in Directive 76/207/EEC, 
especially in respect of the establishment, equipment or extension of a 
business or the launching or extension of any other form of self-employed 
activity including financial facilities 
 
From this provision it follows that a pregnant self-employed person 
has the right not to be discriminated against on grounds of her pregnancy. 
In addition to situations expressly described in Article 4, the reference 
made to Directive 76/207 allows the author to conclude that the 
prohibition to discriminate against a pregnant self-employed person also 
regards the right to engage for performance of service offered by that 
person without any discrimination on the part of the service consumer. 
Besides, the wording of Article 4 provides that discrimination is 
prohibited “in respect to establishment” from which it follows that self-
employed persons may not be discriminated against on grounds of sex on 
the part of persons providing means directly connected with the 
possibility to become able to provide a service within the capacity of self-
employed which includes such things as rent of premises, supply of office 
and other equipment.     
                                                 
7 Ruth Nielsen, European Labour Law, DJOF Publishing, 2000, at page 148. As regards EC sex 
equality law Directive 76/207 refers to “occupation”, Article 141 of EC Treaty, Directive 79/7 is 
applicable to the self-employed.  
8 Council Directive 86/613/EEC of 11 December 1986 on the application of the principle of equal 
treatment between men and women engaged in an activity, including agriculture, in a self-employed 
capacity, and on the protection of self-employed women during pregnancy and motherhood, OJ L 359, 
19.12.1986 P.0056-0058. 
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However, such an interpretation would lead to such a broad 
interpretation of Directive 86/613 as would require limitation of freedom 
of contract law. Recently, Directive 2004/1139 on equal treatment 
between men and women regarding access to goods to and supply of 
goods and services was adopted. This explicitly prohibits the 
discrimination described above and stemming from Directive 86/613. 
Directive 2004/113 clearly provides for limitation of freedom of 
contract10 which is quite a dramatic change required to national civil law 
systems. Lack of case-law on Directive 86/613 does not allow any 
assessment on how broadly the Member States have interpreted Directive 
86/613. However, the implication of Nielsen that implementation of 
Directive 2004/113 “can be seen as reinforcement and further 
development of the already existing directive” 11 testifies that the exact 
scope of Article 4 of Directive 86/613 has been far from clear for the 
Member States.  
The only case referred by the ECJ on interpretation of Directive 
86/613 is Jurgensen.12 Mrs Jurgensen was a self-practising doctor, who 
under a reorganisation scheme of medical practices was required to 
increase annual turn-over in order to remain as a full-time practice. She 
claimed indirect discrimination against female doctors since they had 
spent more time for family responsibilities and thus the turnover of their 
practices is not high enough. From statistical data presented by the parties 
it did not clearly follow that indirect discrimination had taken place. 
However more important than the facts, claim and outcome of this case is 
the interpretation of Directive 86/613 given by the ECJ. This clearly 
states that rights provided by Article 4 of Directive 86/613 must be 
interpreted in combination with Directive 76/20713. Further the Court 
affirmed that the principles applicable for identifying facts of 
discrimination are the same as regards equal pay and equal treatment 
matters14. Besides, the principle of reversed burden of proof is applicable 
to Directive 86/613 as far as self-employed persons are protected under 
Directive 76/207 via Article 4 of Directive 86/61315.  Although Directive 
86/613 in Article 3 prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination, there 
is no definition provided on both concepts. However, since application of 
                                                 
9 Council Directive 2004/113 of 13 December 2004 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between men and women in the Access to and supply of goods and services. 
10 Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/113. 
11 Ruth Nielsen, Gender Equality in European Contract Law, 2004, Copenhagen, DJOF Publishing, at 
page 36. 
12 Case C-226/98. Birgitte Jurgensen v Foreningen af Specialleger and Sygesikringens 
Forhandlingsudvalg. European Court Reports 2000 Page I-02447. 
13 Ibid, para 26. 
14 Ibid., paras. 27 to 30. 
15 Ibid, para. 31. 
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Directive 86/613 goes hand in hand with Directives 76/20716 and 
Directive 2004/113, which provides a definition for direct and indirect 
discrimination, there is no serious doubt that indirect discrimination 
precluded by Directive 86/613 may be applied wrongly.  
 
Equality in social security matters 
According to Article 2 of Directive 79/7, that directive is applicable to 
self-employed persons, too. This means that the state is under obligation 
to treat self-employed persons irrespective of sex. So far the ECJ has 
delivered only one case on application of Directive 79/7 to self-employed 
persons. This was Bourgard17 concerning the right of a self-employed 
man only to obtain early retirement pension on a reduced amount. This 
judgment shows that Directive 79/7 requires equal treatment between 
self-employed men and women, but does not require equal treatment in 
social security matters between workers and self-employed persons.  
 
Latvian law 
Concept of self-employed under Latvian law 
According to the Law on individual (family) enterprises, agricultural and 
fishing farms and individual work18, individual work is entrepreneurship 
where a natural person who has obtained and/or registered in accordance 
with normative provisions undertakes individual work without employing 
other persons.  This law defines the concept of individual worker from 
the aspect of relations between an individual who undertakes individual 
work and the state, which requires proper registration and i if legal norms 
so require – obtaining of licence, while the provisions of the Civil Law on 
Contracts for work-performance regulate the relationship between the 
self-employed and the customer19. A contract for work-performance has 
several characteristic features which distinguish it from an employment 
contract. A contract for work-performance provides for performance of 
work where a particular result must be achieved and work must be carried 
out by the tools of the self-employed and under a free working regime, 
while an employment contract provides for performance of work in 
                                                 
16 The concept of direct and indirect discrimination is also explicitly provided by Recast Directive 
2006/54 which will replace Directive 76/207.  
17 Case C-172/02. Robert Bourgard v Institut national d'assurances sociales pour travailleurs 
indépendants (Inasti). European Court Reports 2004 Page I-05823. 
18 Par individuālo (ģiemenes) uzņēmumu, zemnieka vai zvejnieka saimniecību un individuālo darbu: 
LR likums. Augstākās Padomes MP, 1992. 31.janvāris, nr.4 
19 A contract for work-performance regulates not only relationships between self-employed and 
customers, but also relations between either work-performer (also enterprise, undertaking) and 
customer. 
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general without the aim of achieving a particular result; besides, working 
tools and working time must be provided by the employer20. 
Nielsen indicates that since the concept of worker under 
Community law is very broad, most probably many service contracts 
concluded by small business are governed by EU gender equality rules21. 
This is the exact problem of the Latvian employment market. Since in 
Latvia the employer must bear the costs of social insurance and 
entrepreneurship risk duty22 of the employee, in order to avoid this 
obligation the employer instead of employment contracts concludes 
contracts for work-performance or service contract. Contracts for work-
performance allow the employer to avoid not only social insurance and 
duty, but also observance of other employment rights, such as 
complicated dismissal, prescribed by Labour law. As a result, the status 
of self-employed person is obtained by persons who are quite far from 
being able to undertake their own business.  
In Latvia self-employed persons are frequently poor persons. 
Consequently, they are almost socially unprotected because their income 
does not allow for any savings. The Supreme Court of Latvia has 
delivered two decisions on cases described above. In particular, the 
plaintiffs were passenger bus drivers employed by a municipal 
undertaking providing passenger traffic in one of the regions of Latvia. 
They were employed under employment contracts by the same company 
from 1968, but in 1999 bus drivers were required to conclude service 
contracts and become “self-employed”. The Supreme Court distinguished 
                                                 
20 Civillikums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1994, 30.jūnijs, Nr.75 (Civil Law). Article 2212(1) 
provides: 
“Pursuant to a contract for work-performance, one party undertakes, using the party’s tools and 
equipment and for a fixed fee, to perform for another party and order, the production of some product 
or the conducting to its completion of some activity”.  
Article 28(2) of the Latvian Labour Law provides: 
(2) With an employment contract the employee undertakes to perform specific work, subject to 
specified working procedures and orders of the employer, while the employer undertakes to pay the 
agreed work remuneration and to ensure fair and safe working conditions that are not harmful to health. 
See unofficial English version of Latvian Civil Law and Labour Law at http://www.ttc.lv/?id=59   
The distinction between a contract of work-performance and an employment contract is also drawn in 
several decisions of the Supreme Court of Latvia, in particular, LR Augstākās  tiesas Senāta 09.03.2005 
spriedums lietā Nr.SKC-176, http://www.at.gov.lv/fails.php?id=314, LR Austākās tiesas Senāta 
spriedums lietā Nr.SKC-60 
http://www.at.gov.lv/fails.php?id=481  
21 Ruth Nielsen, Gender Equality in European Contract Law,  2004, Copenhagen, DJOF Publishing, at 
page 36. 
22 Every entrepreneur must pay insurance to a risk fund which provides arrears of pay in case of 
insolvency of another entrepreneur. Likums “Par darbinieku aizsardzību darba devēja maksātnespējas 
gadījumā”//Latvijas Vēstnesis, 188, 28.12.2001.Law on protection of employees in case of insolvency 
of employer. Ministru kabineta 2005.gada 8.novembra noteikumi  Nr.850 “Noteikumi par 
uzņēmējdarbības riska valsts nodevas apmēru un darbinieku prasījumu garantijas fondā ieskaitāmās 
nodevas daļu 2006.gadā//Latvijas Vēstnesis 181, 11.11.2005. Regulations of Cabinet of Ministers 
No.850 of 8th of November 2005 “Regulations on amount of entrepreneurship duty and amount of duty 
which should be transferred to employees request guarantee fund in year 2006”  
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the employment relationship from services provided by self-employed 
persons by stressing that in the cases in question the bus drivers were 
subject to organization of working time and provided work by tools 
(buses) belonging to the employer, thus those features testify to 
employment, not of service provision by the bus drivers23. 
It follows that the concept of self-employed person under Latvian 
law is to great extent similar to that under EC law. 
 
Non-discrimination as regards service provision 
Although Latvian legislation originally does not contain discriminatory 
provisions as regards self-employed persons and their activities, 
nevertheless so far there are no provisions protecting self-employed 
persons from discrimination based on sex when acting in the capacity of 
self-employed persons from other persons, such as, for example, persons 
awarding a service contract or persons providing other services access to 
which is necessary to normally run a self-employed business (e.g., 
discrimination as regards renting business premises). Failure to provide 
self-employed persons with a full set of protection against discrimination 
based on sex is failure to give full effect to Directive 86/613. The term for 
implementation was 1 May 2004. 
A project of amendments to the Civil law which is currently in 
Parliament accepted for reading by the Legal Commission24 will 
hopefully correct this situation. It states: 
 
In making a public offer of a good or service or concluding contract which 
relates to such offer, differential treatment on grounds of sex, age, race, 
colour of skin, ethnic origin, religious, political opinion or belief and other 
circumstances is prohibited. 
Differential treatment comprises direct and indirect discrimination, 
harassment or instruction to discriminate. Differential treatment may be 
justified in case it has legitimate aim and measures chosen for attainment 
of that aim are proportionate.  
It is prohibited to treat directly or indirectly adversely persons who enact 
defence of their rights concerning prohibition of differential treatment. 
                                                 
23Decisions of Supreme Court of Latvia, in particular, LR Augstākās  tiesas Senāta 09.03.2005 
spriedums lietā Nr.SKC-176, http://www.at.gov.lv/fails.php?id=314, LR Austākās tiesas Senāta 
spriedums lietā Nr.SKC-60 
http://www.at.gov.lv/fails.php?id=481  
 
24 This is the second proposal by the Secretariat of Integration for respective amendments to the Civil 
law, which was initially intended to implement Directive 2000/43 only. The Legal Commission has 
once rejected the same project of amendments to the Civil law of almost identical wording on account 
that it does not fit in the Civil law. Now the Legal Commission accepted the project of amendments for 
further law-making process not because the members of that commission understand the sense of non-
discrimination provisions but because of infringement procedure initiated by the Commission against 
Latvia (the author was present at the particular meeting of the Legal Commission of Parliament of 
Latvia on 22.08.2006.)   
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In case a person establishes facts from which it may be presumed that 
there has been direct or indirect discrimination, harassment, instruction to 
discrimination or adverse treatment, it shall be for the respondent to prove 
that prohibition of differential treatment or adverse treatment has not been 
violated.25   
 
However, this project of amendments has several imprecise and 
weak points. First, information reference refers only to Directives 
2000/43 and 2004/113, but the project of amendments also concerns 
provisions of Directives 2000/78 and 86/613, since both latter directives 
require to provide non-discrimination for self-employed persons. Second, 
it fails to mention sexual harassment provided by Directive 2004/113 or 
considers that the concept of harassment comprises sexual harassment 
too. This point is important with regard to Directive 86/613, because it 
refers to Directive 76/207 which now also explicitly precludes sexual 
harassment. Besides, proper implementation of Directive 2004/113 
greatly affects enforcement of Directive 86/613 since as writers point out 
it “can… be seen as a reinforcement and further development of the 
already existing” Directive 86/61326. Third, it puts into one pot the 
concepts of direct and indirect discrimination with harassment and 
instruction to discriminate, not taking into account that the latter concept 
itself may be directly or indirectly discriminatory27.  Fourth, it does not 
distinguish between concepts of “differential treatment” and 
“discrimination”, which although not clearly defined under EC law may 
not correspond precisely to legal theory under Latvian law28. On the other 
hand, Latvian Civil law is a special law which was adopted in 1937 and 
formulated in specific language which does not bear reflection of all 
directives concerned. In particular, all four directives contain a number of 
exceptions, which is impossible to provide in one article of the Civil law, 
thus the authors of the amendments proposed to use the term “differential 
treatment” which itself comprises exceptions to prohibition of 
discrimination and allows for justification of differential treatment arising 
in circumstances allowed for exemption under EC equal treatment 
directives. Fifth, since the wording of the project of amendments reflects 
only general principles of EC equal treatment directives, the author of this 
thesis sees many problems in the future regarding correct interpretation 
and application of that provision.  
                                                 
25 Available at homepage of the Parliament of Latvia (Saeima) www.saeima.lv in Latvian. Translation 
into English by author. 
26 Ruth Nielsen, Gender Equality in European Contract Law, 2004, Copenhagen, DJOF Publishing, at 
page 36. 
27 Article 4(4) of Directive 2004/113 prohibits an instruction to direct or indirect discrimination. The 
same applies to harassment, which may be direct as well as indirect. 
28 See in this regard the section on Equality and non-discrimination and Egils Levits, Par tiesiskās 
vienlīdzības principu//Latvijas Vēstnesis, 08.05.2003., Nr.68(2833). 
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Social security 
As described in the section on social security, in Latvia each self-
employed person whose income attains a certain level29 is subject to 
mandatory statutory social insurance against risks of old-age, disability, 
maternity and sickness30. Provisions on social security, allowances and 
social insurance are sex neutral; however, this is the reason why directly 
discriminatory treatment is possible as regards maternity and paternity 
leave and indirectly discriminatory treatment as regards child-care leave. 
Those issues will be discussed in detail in the sections on the respective 
matters. 
According to Article 6 of Directive 86/613, spouses of self-
employed persons who are not at pensionable age can voluntarily insure 
against risks of old-age, disability, maternity and sickness31. Another 
problem here is the different conditions regarding employed and self-
employed persons for calculating social insurance allowances. The period 
taken into account for the purposes of calculating allowances for the self-
employed is much longer than for employees. It constitutes 12 months 
before three months before the quarter when the socially insured risk 
occurred. This means that, for example, it exceeds the 12 month period 
required for employees under Article 11(4) of Directive 92/85. 
Unfortunately this provision is not applicable to the self-employed. 
Persons working in professions which according to Latvian legislation 
could be performed only in the capacity of self-employed32 are concerned 
about observance of the general principle of equality, since they are not 
free to choose employment from and consequently be protected against 
social risks equally to employed persons. 
 
 
                                                 
29 Noteikumi par valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas obligāto iemaksu objekta minimālo un maksimālo 
apmēru: MK noteikumi Nr.193. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2000. 6.jūnijs, nr.213/218 (Regulations on 
maximum and minimum amount of state social insurance object). The minimum amount for self-
employed persons is 1320 lats per year.  
30 Exception, Article 6(3) of the Law on state social insurance provides that self-employed persons who 
are at pensionable age are not subject to insurance against risk of disability. 
31 Par valsts sociālo apdrošināšanu: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1997. 21.oktobris, nr.274/276 (Law 
on state social insurance), Article 5(3). 
32 According to Article 1(3) of the Law on state social insurance those professions are advocates, 
notaries, sworn auditors, individual practice doctor, pharmacists etc. 
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Chapter 8. 
Enforcement and remedies 
EC law 
Provision of rights in legislative documents is the smallest and easiest 
part on the way to justice.  The most important part is enforcement of 
rights and remedies. In this particular field, the case-law of the ECJ plays 
an extremely important role, which is not surprising, because under EC 
law in principle each Member State is free to choose measures of 
implementation and remedies for breach of EC law. This fact once again 
proves that the seemingly free choice given to the Member States in 
matters of implementation, enforcement, and remedies is to a large extent 
restricted by the enforcement mechanisms and principles elaborated by 
the ECJ.  
 
Direct effect 
Direct effect is a concept allowing in certain circumstances to base a 
claim directly on EC law. The concept of direct effect does not cover 
regulations which are directly applicable1. It could cover provisions of 
the EC Treaty and directives. The concept of “direct applicability” must 
be distinguished from the concept of “direct effect”2. First, direct 
applicability applies to regulations only, while the concept of direct effect 
to the EC Treaty and directives. Second, regulations are directly 
applicable irrespective of any other factor, while the concept of direct 
effect could be applied to provisions of the EC Treaty and directives only 
if they correspond to certain criteria. 
 
Treaty provisions 
The ECJ first faced the question of whether the EC Treaty could be 
directly effective in 1963 in the case of Van Gend3. The ECJ pointed out 
that the EC Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates 
mutual obligations between contracting states; and that the EC Treaty - 
independently from national law - imposes on individuals not only 
obligations but also rights: 
    
…rights arise not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but 
also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly 
                                                 
1 Article 249 EC Treaty. 
2 The ECJ gave a different explanation of concept of direct applicability in case 106/77, 
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA. European Court Reports 1978 Page 
0062: 
“14. Direct applicability ...means that rules of Community law must be fully and uniformly applied in 
all the Member States from the date of their entry into force and for so long as they continue in force”. 
3 Case 26-62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands 
Inland Revenue Administration, European Court Reports, English special edition 1963 Page 00001. 
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defined way upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and 
upon the institutions of the Community…4
 
As a result, the Court held that a Treaty provision can be directly 
effective if it is “clear, negative, unconditional, containing no reservation 
on the part of the Member State, and not dependent on any implementing 
measure”5. 
In the following case Defrenne II the Court found that Article 119 
(now Article 141) of the EC Treaty providing for the right to equal pay 
for equal work irrespective of a worker’s sex is directly applicable; 
moreover, it held that this provision has both vertical and horizontal 
direct effect6. Interestingly, “in contrast to the Treaty provisions in cases 
like Van Gend and Costa7, Article 191 (now 141) did not appear as a 
precise and straightforward negative obligation imposed on the Member 
States”8; nevertheless, the Court recognizes its direct applicability. 
The Treaty of Amsterdam amended the EC Treaty with several 
new provisions regarding non-discrimination and sex equality. In 
particular, Articles 13, 137, and 141 (2)(3)(4) were amended. Neither 
Article 139, nor Articles 137 and 141(3), correspond to the criteria for 
direct effect. However, a question remains about Article 141(2) and (4). 
The ECJ in Defrenne II recognized direct effect for Article 141, which 
now forms only the first part of the whole Article. Most likely Article 
141(2) corresponds to the criteria for direct effect; moreover, it 
supplements and clarifies the first part of the article. However, Article 
141(4) contains an optional right for the Member States, thus clearly can 
not be relied on directly10.  
 
Directives 
In 1974 in the case of Van Duyn the ECJ found:  
 
…It would be incompatible with the binding effect attributed to a 
directive by Article 189 to exclude, in principle, the possibility that the 
obligation which it imposes may be invoked by those concerned. In 
particular, where the Community authorities have, by directive, imposed 
on Member States the obligation to pursue a particular course of conduct, 
                                                 
4 Case 26-62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands 
Inland Revenue Administration, European Court Reports, English special edition 1963 Page 00001. 
5 Paul Craig/Grainne De Burca, EU Law, (1998), 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, p.168. 
6 Case 45-75, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena, European 
Court Reports 1976 Page 00455. 
7 Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., European Court Reports English special edition 1964 Page 
00585. 
8 Paul Craig/Grainne De Burca, EU Law, (1998), 2nd edition, Oxford University Press, p.172. 
9 Christa Tobler, Sex Equality Law under the Treaty of Amsterdam, European Journal of Law Reform, 
vol. 2, No.1, at page 142. 
10 See also opinion on this matter Christa Tobler, Sex Equality Law under the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
European Journal of Law Reform, vol. 2, No.1, at page 142. 
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the useful effect of such an act would be weakened if individuals were 
prevented from relying on it before their national courts and if the latter 
were prevented from taking it into consideration as an element of 
Community law11. 
 
In Ratti12 the Court held that rights provided by a directive can not 
be relied upon by an individual before the date on which the Member 
State has an obligation to implement it. Only if the state fails to 
implement a directive on time, may an individual rely directly on the 
provisions of a directive. Those provisions must be unconditional and 
sufficiently precise.13  
In Francovich14 the Court set more precise conditions for direct 
effect. It held that to determine whether a provision is unconditional and 
sufficiently precise: 
 
 three points to be considered: the identity of the persons entitled to the 
guarantee provided, the content of the guarantee and the identity of the 
person liable to provide that guarantee.15
 
Regarding the provisions of Directives on gender equality, the Court had 
already recognized many of them to be directly effective. Those are 
Articles 5(1)16 and 617 of Directive 7/207, and Article 4(1)18 of Directive 
7/79. 
Although it is stated that Article 6 of Directive 76/207 has direct 
effect, one could argue that it is not so unambiguous. The Court has had 
quite a controversial view on this question. In Colson the Court, referring 
to Article 5 of Directive 76/207, held: 
 
As regards sanctions for any discrimination which may occur, the 
Directive does not include any unconditional and sufficiently precise 
obligation which, in the absence of implementing measures adopted 
within the prescribed time-limits, may be relied on by an individual in 
                                                 
11 Case 41/74, Yvonne van Duyn v Home Office, European Court Reports 1974 Page 01337, paragraph 
12. 
12 Case 148/78, Pubblico Ministerio v Tullio Ratti , European Court Reports 1979, page 1626. 
13 Case 8/81, Ursula Becker v Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt, European Court Reports 1982 Page 
00053. 
14 C-6/90 and C-9/90, Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v Italian Republic, 
parapgraph 12, European Court Reports 1991 Page I-05357. 
15 C-6/90 and C-9/90, Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v Italian Republic, 
paragraph 12, European Court Reports 1991 Page I-05357. 
16 Case 152/84, Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority 
(Teaching), paragraphs 52 and 56, European Court Reports 1986, page 723. 
17 Case C-271/91, M. Helen Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health 
Authority, European Court Reports 1993 Page I-04367. 
18 Case 348/85, Jean Borrie Clarke v Chief Adjudication Officer, paragraph 9, European Court Reports 
1987 Page 2865. 
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order to obtain specific compensation under the directive, where that is 
not provided for or permitted under national law. 19
 
But in Marshall20 the ECJ ruled that “a person who has been injured as a 
result of discriminatory dismissal may rely on the provisions of Article 6 
of the Directive as against an authority of the State…” 
It follows that, if one could rely on Article 6 of Directive 76/207 
before a national court, this provision has direct effect, albeit it was 
denied by the ECJ previously and albeit the provision itself lacks criteria 
for having direct effect. Of the same opinion is Lynn M.Rosebery: “The 
ECJ has held that Article 6 ETD21 is sufficiently precise to have vertical 
direct effect…”.22 She also contends that Article 2 of Directive 75/117 
most likely would have direct effect because it has almost the same 
wording23. 
It has been stressed that - unlike Treaty provisions - a directive can 
have only vertical direct effect. In Marshall the Court ruled: 
 
…the binding nature of a directive, which constitutes the basis for the 
possibility of relying on the directive before a national court, exists only 
in relation to “each Member State to which it is addressed”. It follows that 
a directive may not of itself impose obligations on an individual and that a 
provision of a directive may not be relied upon as such against such a 
person.24
 
This means that rights provided by a directive can be pleaded only against 
the state. But the concept of the state, according to the interpretation of 
the ECJ, can be broadened. An individual can also claim rights provided 
by a directive against state institutions25 and municipalities.26 Although 
the ECJ held that rights provided by a directive can be pleaded only 
against the state (vertical direct effect), nevertheless the Court has 
elaborated the so-called “indirect effect”, which could also give the effect 
of rights provided by directive horizontally. 
 
 
                                                 
19 Case 14/83, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, European Court 
Reports 1984 page 01891, paragraph 26. 
20 C-271/91, M. Helen Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority, 
European Court Reports 1993 Page I-04367. 
21 Directive 76/207.  
22 Lynn M.Rosebery, “The Limits of Employment Discrimination Law in the United States and 
European Community”, DJOF Publishing 1999, page 146. 
23 Ibid., page 147. 
24 Case 152/84, Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority 
(Teaching), European Court Reports 1986, page 723, paragraph 48. 
25 Ibid., paras. 49 and 51 
26 Case 103/88, Fratelli Constanzo SpA v Comune di Milano, paragraphs 30 and 31, European Court 
Reports 1989, page 1839. 
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Indirect effect 
The ECJ has formulated the concept of indirect effect as follows: 
 
…National courts are required to interpret their national law in the light of 
the wording and the purpose of the directive…27
 
Such obligation is binding for national courts in cases concerning issues 
where the state has failed to implement a directive on time28, where 
national law was adopted before a directive and was not intended to 
implement the directive,29 and where the state has implemented a 
directive incorrectly.30  The requirement to interpret national law in the 
light of EC law applies in litigation not only between individual and state, 
but also between two private parties.31
Although it is clear that the principle of “indirect effect” is simple 
“horizontal direct effect”, because it is impossible to interpret provisions 
of national law in the light of a non-implemented directive by not 
imposing obligations upon one of private parties, the Court is unwilling to 
recognize it. Instead, the following explanation has been given:  
 
….That obligation on the part of the national courts to interpret their 
national law in conformity with a directive, which has been reaffirmed on 
several occasions, does not mean that a provision in a directive has direct 
effect in any way as between individuals. On the contrary, it is the 
national provisions themselves which, interpreted in a manner consistent 
with the directive, have direct effect.32   
 
Indeed, indirect effect does not formally directly impose a directive 
obligation on a private party, but indirectly - via interpretation of national 
law. An obligation imposed on a private party could be negative33 or even 
positive34.   
                                                 
27 Case 14/83, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, paragraph 26, 
European Court Reports 1984 page 01891. 
28 Case 14/83, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen,  European 
Court reports 1984 page 01891. 
29 Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacionale de Alimentacion SA, paragraph 8, 
European Court Reports 1992, page I-4135. 
30 Case 14/83, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, European Court 
reports 1984 page 01891, see also Paul Craig/Grainne De Burca, EU Law, (1998), 2nd edition, Oxford 
University Press, p.199. 
31 See also in this respect Lynn M.Rosebery, “The Limits of Employment Discrimination Law in the 
United States and European Community”, DJOF Publishing 1999, page 142-143. 
32 Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacionale de Alimentacion SA, parapgraph 7, 
European Court Reports 1992, page I-4135, paragraph 7. 
33 Ibid. 
34 See for example cases 185/97, Belinda Jane Coote v Granada Hospitality Ltd., paragraph 28, 
European Court Reports 1998 Page I-05199 and  32/93, Carole Louise Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) 
Ltd., European Court Reports 1994 Page I-03567. 
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Creation of a new positive obligation on a private party reflects the 
Coote judgement35. Ms Coote was dismissed on the grounds of 
pregnancy. She brought an action before the court, but then signed a 
mutual settlement with her employer, Granada. After that, she left the job. 
When Ms Coote started to look for new work, she met difficulties, 
because of lack of references from the previous employer. Meanwhile, 
Granada, her former employer, consistently refused to give her 
references. Ms Coote then brought an action before the court, claiming 
that she had been victimised under Article 7 of Directive 76/207. The 
national court doubted whether Article 7 was applicable to a detrimental 
relationship after employment, since the wording of this provision 
provides only for an actual employment relationship. The ECJ held that 
even a directive cannot of itself impose an obligation on individuals, but 
that nevertheless the national courts’ obligation is to interpret national 
law as far as possible in the light of the wording and the purpose of the 
directive36. Since prohibition of discrimination is recognized as a 
fundamental right of Community law as well as the right to defend rights 
before trial, Article 7 in conjunction with Article 6 imposes an obligation 
to provide persons with rights: 
  
to ensure judicial protection for workers whose employer, after the 
employment relationship has ended, refuses to provide references as a 
reaction to legal proceedings brought to enforce compliance with the 
principle of equal treatment within the meaning of the Directive.37
 
It is clear in this case that such interpretation put a new positive 
obligation on a private party (the former employer, Granada), in spite of 
the assertion by the ECJ that “a directive cannot of itself impose 
obligations on an individual and cannot therefore be relied upon as such 
against and individual”38.  
The Court gives the following explanation for the obligation of the 
Court to apply the concept of indirect effect. It contends that Article 10 of 
the EC Treaty obliges the Member States to take all appropriate measures 
to fulfil their obligations under the Treaty. That obligation is binding on 
all authorities of the Member States, including national courts. In turn, 
national courts are under an obligation to provide the legal protection 
                                                 
35 Case 185/97, Belinda Jane Coote v Granada Hospitality Ltd., European Court Reports 1998 Page I-
05199. 
36 Case 185/97, Belinda Jane Coote v Granada Hospitality Ltd., paragraph 18, European Court Reports 
1998 Page I-05199. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Joined cases C-397/01 and C-403/01, Bernhard Pfeiffer (C-397/01), Wilhelm Roith (C-398/01), 
Albert Süß (C-399/01), Michael Winter (C-400/01), Klaus Nestvogel (C-401/01), Roswitha Zeller (C-
402/01) and Matthias Döbele (C-403/01) v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut eV., 
European Court Reports 2004 Page I-08835, paragraph 108.
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which individuals derive from Community law and - according to the 
third paragraph of Article 249 of the EC Treaty - under obligation to 
interpret “domestic law, and in particular legislative provisions especially 
adopted for the purpose of implementing the requirements of a 
directive… in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive 
concerned in order to achieve the result sought by the directive”39. 
In other words: 
 
The requirement for national law to be interpreted in conformity with 
Community law is inherent in the system of the Treaty, since it permits 
the national court, for the matters within its jurisdiction, to ensure the full 
effectiveness of Community law when it determines the dispute before 
it.40
 
Drake contends that the principle of indirect effect is built upon the 
rule of law, and also on Article 10 of the EC Treaty and the principle of 
“effet utile”41. These elements may constitute a general principle of 
Community law, namely the principle of effective judicial protection42. 
Although indirect effect is intended to provide effective judicial 
protection, it is not unrestricted. First, the State may not plead against 
individual obligations provided by a directive which it has failed to 
implement43. Second, indirect effect cannot contradict general principles 
of law or in particular by imposing criminal liability on persons44. Third, 
indirect effect does not oblige interpretation of national law contra legem. 
As Drake points out, from the Wagner45 judgement it follows that the 
duty of purposive interpretation imposed on national courts is not 
absolute and is not designed to give national courts a legislative function 
so as to allow them to re-write national law46. Fourth, in Schijndel47 the 
Court declared that the national court is not obliged to abandon its passive 
                                                 
39 Ibid., paras. 108 to 113.
40 Ibid., para. 114.
41 Sara Drake: Effet utile is an interpretative principle derived from international law and has in the 
context of Community law been defined as requiring the Court of Justice to interpret legal rules 
reasonably, so as not to fail in their aim and objective. 
42 Sara Drake, Twenty years after Von Colson: the impact of “indirect effect” on the protection of the 
individual’s Community rights, European Law Review (2005) 30 June, Sweet & Maxwell and 
Contributors, at page 330. 
43 C-6/90 and C-9/90, Andrea Francovich and Danila Bonifaci and others v Italian Republic, European 
Court Reports 1991 Page I-05357. 
44 See for example, case 80/86, Criminal proceedings against Kolpinghuis Nijmegen BV.,   European 
Court Reports 1987 Page 03969 and joined cases C-74/95 and C-129/95, Criminal proceedings against 
X.,  European Court Reports 1996 Page I-06609.
45 Case C-334/92, Teodoro Wagner Miret v Fondo de Garantía Salarial.,   European Court Reports 
1993 Page I-06911. 
46 Sara Drake, Twenty years after Von Colson: the impact of “indirect effect” on the protection of the 
individual’s Community rights, European Law Review (2005) 30 June, Sweet & Maxwell and 
Contributors, at page 342. 
47 Joined cases C-430/93 and 431/93, Jeroen van Schijndel and Johannes Nicolaas Cornelis van Veen v 
Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten, European Court Reports 1995 Page I-04705. 
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role in a civil suit by going beyond the ambit of the dispute defined by the 
parties themselves and relying on facts other than those on which the 
party with an interest in application of those provisions bases its claim48. 
However it does not exclude cases where parties have defined the ambit 
of a civil suit erroneously by reason of misapplication or 
misinterpretation of EC law. The question arises as to whether the 
national court is then entitled to abandon its passive role. 
 In Schijndel the Court pointed out public interest as the only reason 
for the national court to act on its own motion. It is quite unclear what 
constitutes public interest. Most probably public interest comprises 
observance of fundamental rights since this is one of the cornerstones of a 
democratic society. It follows that in discrimination cases the national 
court must ensure application of a full set of non-discrimination rights. 
Controversy could arise on the question whether public interest comprises 
effective observance of EC law and its uniform application throughout 
the Community. Clearly the Member States would not lose their status of 
democratic states if they did not ensure the full effectiveness of EC law. 
On the other hand, public interest may comprise observance of 
international obligations of the state; moreover, with regard to EC, the 
public has an interest in sustainable economic development.   
Recently the Court has clarified that the national court is required to 
consider the whole body of rules of national law when applying domestic 
provisions adopted for the purpose of transposing a directive in the light 
of that directive49.  Although fully logical with regard to the principle of 
indirect effect, such an obligation sometimes could lead to extension of 
ambit - especially in new Member States, where recognition of the impact 
of the EC on the national law is far from ideal.  
 
Principle of supremacy 
The concept of “indirect effect” to a great extent comes from the principle 
of supremacy of Community law over national law50. It was in Van Gend 
that the ECJ recognized that the “Community constitutes a new legal 
order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited 
their sovereign rights”51. Consequently, in order to ensure the 
effectiveness and uniform application of Community law, domestic law 
                                                 
48 Ibid. 
49 Joined cases C-397/01 and C-403/01, Bernhard Pfeiffer (C-397/01), Wilhelm Roith (C-398/01), 
Albert Süß (C-399/01), Michael Winter (C-400/01), Klaus Nestvogel (C-401/01), Roswitha Zeller (C-
402/01) and Matthias Döbele (C-403/01) v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut eV., 
European Court Reports 2004 Page I-08835, paragraph 120.
50Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., European Court Reports English special edition 1964 Page 
00585. 
51 Case 26-62, NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v Netherlands 
Inland Revenue Administration, European Court Reports, English special edition 1963 Page 00001. 
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cannot take precedence over it. Otherwise the whole idea of the EC 
would be jeopardised52. 
Thus, it follows that EC law takes precedence over national law. 
Respectively precedence of EC law means that norms of national law 
conflicting with EC law are inapplicable, which also precludes “valid 
adoption of new national legislative measures to the extent to which they 
would be incompatible with Community provisions”.53 The principle of 
supremacy obliges every national court; 
  
in a case within its jurisdiction, apply Community law in its entirely and 
protect rights which the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly 
set aside any provision of national law which may conflict with it, 
whether prior or subsequent to the Community rule.54
  
Recently, in Mangold,55 the Court extended the principle of supremacy of 
Community law to a period where transposition has not yet expired. It 
held that a Member State is not allowed to adopt national laws conflicting 
with Community law which is at the stage of implementation, but that the 
national court is obliged to set aside any “provision of national law which 
may conflict with Community law even where the period prescribed for 
transposition of that directive has not yet expired”56. 
 
Remedies 
In the absence of respective Community rules, it is for each Member 
State to lay down detailed procedural rules for safeguarding rights of 
individuals which derive from EC law57. EC sex equality law is governed 
by directives only, thus leaving the Member States free to design 
remedies. However, national provisions must comply with certain general 
principles on EC law remedies and provisions of respective Directives 
which give general guidelines on what remedies should be. The wording 
of the respective articles of the greater part of directives58 is very general: 
 
Member States shall introduce into their national legal systems such 
measures as are necessary to enable all persons who consider themselves 
                                                 
52 Case 6-64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L., European Court Reports English special edition 1964 Page 
00585. 
53 Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA., European Court Reports 
1978 Page 00629, paragraph 17. 
54 Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA., European Court Reports 
1978 Page 00629 paragraph 21. 
55 Case C-144/04, Werner Mangold v Rüdiger Helm, OJ C 36, 11.02.2006. p.10. 
56 Ibid., paragraph 78. 
57 Case C-326/96, B.S. Levez v T.H. Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd., European Court Reports 1998 Page 
I-07835, paragraph 18. 
58 Article 6 of Directive 75/117, Article 6 of Directive 79/7, Article 9 of Directive 86/86/613, Article 12 
of Directive 92/85, Article 10 of Directive 86/378. 
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wronged by failure to apply the principle of equal treatment to pursue 
their claims by judicial process… 
 
But this wording has been interpreted in the line of ECJ judgements and 
thus is quite detailed. Codification of that case-law is provided in 
amended Article 6 of Directive 76/20759, in particular regarding 
compensation. 
 
Principle of effectiveness 
In Von Colson the ECJ held that measures adopted by the Member States 
must be such as to be effectively relied on before national courts by the 
persons concerned60. It is the principle of effectiveness elaborated by the 
ECJ with which remedies of the Member States must comply. The 
principle of effectiveness comprises both procedural and material 
provisions of national law61.  
One part of the principle of effectiveness requires that procedural 
rules laid down by the Member States must not be such as to “render 
virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights 
conferred by Community law”62. The principle of effectiveness refers to 
conditions governing access to the courts, for example such as 
unreasonable time limits63, as well as proceedings in the national court 
where procedure could be conducted improperly64 or the court could fail 
to interpret national law in the light of Community law65.  
However, there is no exhaustive list of cases in which the principle 
of effectiveness must be called into the question, because: 
 
each case which raises the question whether a national procedural 
provision renders application of Community law impossible or 
excessively difficult must be analysed by reference to the role of that 
                                                 
59 Amended by Directive 2002/73. 
60 Case 14/83, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, European Court 
Reports 1984 page 01891, paragraph 18. 
61 Case 68/88, Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic., European Court 
Reports 1989 Page 02965, paragraph 24.
62 Case C-326/96, B.S. Levez v T.H. Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd., European Court Reports 1998 Page 
I-07835, paragraph 18, see also case C-78/98, Shirley Preston and Othes v Wolverhampton Healthcare 
NHS Trust and Others and Dorothy Fletcher and Others v Midland Bank plc., European Court Reports 
2000 Page I-03201, paragraph 31. 
63 Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG et Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland, 
European Court Reports 1976 Page 01989, paragraph 6.
64 Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Jeroen van Schijndel and Johannes Nicolaas Cornelis van Veen v 
Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten, European Court Reports 1995 Page I-04705, 
paragraph 19.
65 Cases C-397/01 and C-403/01, Bernhard Pfeiffer (C-397/01), Wilhelm Roith (C-398/01), Albert Süß 
(C-399/01), Michael Winter (C-400/01), Klaus Nestvogel (C-401/01), Roswitha Zeller (C-402/01) and 
Matthias Döbele (C-403/01) v Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Kreisverband Waldshut eV., European Court 
Reports 2004 Page I-08835, paragraph 114.
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provision in the procedure, its progress and its special features, viewed as 
a whole, before the various national instances.66
 
The second part of the principle of effectiveness requires that penalties 
for breach of EC law must be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive67.  
 
Principle of equivalence 
The principle of equivalence requires that procedural rules and 
substantive rules of national law designed for protection of rights which 
persons derive from EC law must not be less favourable than those 
governing similar domestic actions68.  Put differently, the principle of 
equivalence requires that rules of national law be applied without 
distinction “whether the infringement alleged is of Community law or 
national law, where the purpose and cause of action are similar”69. 
However, the principle does not require extending the most favourable 
rules of national law in a particular field to all actions brought with regard 
to EC law70.   
With regard to what constitutes “similar domestic action”, the ECJ 
has ruled that “the purpose and the essential characteristics of allegedly 
similar domestic actions”71 must be taken into account. Furthermore, the 
national court “must take into account the role played by that provision in 
the procedure as a whole, as well as the operation and any specific 
features of that procedure before the different national courts”72. 
 
Compensation  
Initially, EC law did not provide that in case of discrimination 
compensation must be available as a mandatory remedy. The ECJ when 
interpreting Article 6 of Directive 76/207 did not require compensation as 
mandatory either. However, it is quite difficult to imagine some other 
                                                 
66 Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93, Jeroen van Schijndel and Johannes Nicolaas Cornelis van Veen v 
Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten, European Court Reports 1995 Page I-04705, 
paragraph 19.
67 Case 68/88, Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic., European Court 
Reports 1989 Page 02965, paragraph 24.
68 See for example cases 68/88, Commission of the European Communities v Hellenic Republic., 
European Court Reports 1989 Page 02965, paragraph 24 and C-78/98, Shirley Preston and Others v 
Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust and Others and Dorothy Fletcher and Others v Midland Bank 
plc., European Court Reports 2000 Page I-03201, paragraph 31. 
69 Case C-326/96, B.S. Levez v T.H. Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd., European Court Reports 1998 Page 
I-07835, paragraph 41. 
70 Ibid., para. 42. 
71 C-78/98, Shirley Preston and Othes v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust and Others and 
Dorothy Fletcher and Others v Midland Bank plc., European Court Reports 2000 Page I-03201, 
paragraph 49. 
72 Case C-326/96, B.S. Levez v T.H. Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd., European Court Reports 1998 Page 
I-07835, paragraph 44. 
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sanction than compensation which would satisfy all criteria set by the 
Court, namely, the sanction must: 
1) guarantee real and effective judicial protection; 
2) have a deterrent effect on the employer; 
3) be adequate in relation to the damage sustained.73 
Accordingly, in Colson the Court held that if a Member State chose a 
sanction in the form of compensation, then it must correspond to the 
criteria set out above74. It follows that old Article 6 of Directive 76/207 
has never required Member States to introduce compensation as a 
sanction for discrimination. However, amending Directive 2002/73 laid 
down compensation as a mandatory sanction for all Member States75.   
Presently, Article 6(2) of amended Directive 76/207 codifies all the 
main principles with regard to compensation elaborated by the ECJ. It 
provides, first , that compensation is a mandatory sanction which must be 
introduced in all Member State, second, compensation must be real and 
effective, third, if a Member State chooses compensation in the form of 
reparation for loss and damage sustained, it must be dissuasive and  
proportionate to the damage suffered, fourth, compensation or reparation 
may not be restricted by an upper limit, fifth, the amount of compensation 
or reparation could be restricted in cases where the employer could prove 
that the only discrimination is refusal to take into account a job 
application.         
According to Finland’s Act on equality between women and men76 
which that Member State has introduced, this particular provision takes 
the form of compensation, while Germany77, Netherlands78, and Latvia79 
have chosen the form of reparation of loss and damage. Importantly, 
cases where a Member State chooses compensation in the form of 
reparation of financial loss must be accompanied by moral damage. In 
Colson the Court stressed that pure compensation of loss, “such as, for 
example, the reimbursement of expenses” incurred by a person in 
submitting its application does not satisfy the criteria for effective 
                                                 
73 Case 14/83, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, European Court 
Reports 1984 page 01891, paragraph 23. 
74 Ibid., para. 23. 
75 Article 6(2) of Directive 76/207. 
76 http://www.tasa-arvo.fi/Resource.phx/tasa-arvo/english/authorities/legislation/actonequality.htx  
77 Cases 14/83, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, European 
Court reports 1984 page 01891 and 79/83, Dirut Harz v Deutsche Tradax GmbH, European Court 
Reports 1984. 
78 Case C-177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichtig Vormingscentrum voor Jong 
Volwassen (VJV-Centrum) Plus, (1990) ECR page I-03941. 
79 Article 29(8) of the Latvian labour law provides: 
“(8) If the prohibition against differential treatment and the prohibition against causing adverse 
consequences is violated, an employee in addition to other rights specified in this Law, has the right to 
request compensation for losses and compensation for moral harm. In case of dispute, a court at its own 
discretion shall determine the compensation for moral harm” 
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sanction and effective transposition of Directive 76/207 respectively80. 
Besides, reparation of loss cannot be conditional upon a requirement of 
national law to prove fault on the part of an employer81. 
As regards compensation, this can not be limited by national law 
otherwise the right to adequate reparation for loss and damage would be 
endangered82. Besides, the award of interest is an essential component of 
compensation, because effective compensation cannot “leave out of 
account factors, such as effluxion of time, which may in fact reduce its 
value”83. An upper limit to compensation set by national legislation is 
acceptable where a discriminated-against candidate would not have 
obtained the vacant position, because the candidate engaged had superior 
qualifications. In the particular case of Draehmpaehl84 the Court accepted 
a ceiling of three months salary as effective compensation for 
discrimination suffered in the selection process by way of an employer 
not taking into account an application for the vacancy.    
 
Time limits 
In principle, time limits fall within the competence of the Member States. 
Nevertheless, time limits set by national legislation must correspond to 
the principle of effectiveness and equivalence. As Nielsen points out, 
usually this is a question of where “to strike a balance between 
conflicting principles of legal certainty and of effectiveness”85. In Rewe86 
it was held for the first time that setting reasonable limitation periods for 
bringing proceedings satisfies the principle of effectiveness, inasmuch as 
it constitutes an application of the principle of legal certainty. However, 
time limits must not be such as to make it impossible in practice to 
exercise rights which a person derives from Community law. 
In Levez the Court pointed out:  
 
…that it is compatible with Community law for national rules to 
prescribe, in the interests of legal certainty, reasonable limitation periods 
for bringing proceedings. It cannot be said that this makes the exercise of 
                                                 
80 Cases 14/83, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, European 
Court Reports 1984 page 01891, paragraph 23. 
81 Case C-180/95, Nils Draehmpael v Urania Immobilienservice OHG, European Court Reports 1997 
Page I-02195. 
82 Case C-271/91, M. Helen Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health 
Authority, European Court Reports 1993 Page I-04367, paragraph 30. 
83 Ibid., para. 31. 
84 Case C-180/95, Nils Draehmpael v Urania Immobilienservice OHG, European Court Reports 1997 
Page I-02195. 
85 Ruth Nielsen, European Labour Law, DJOF Publishing, Copenhagen, 2000, at page 427. 
86 Case 33-76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG et Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das 
Saarland., European Court Reports 1976 Page 01989, paragraph 5, see also case C-78/98, Shirley 
Preston and Othes v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust and Others and Dorothy Fletcher and 
Others v Midland Bank plc., European Court Reports 2000 Page I-03201, paragraph 33. 
 131
rights conferred by Community law either virtually impossible or 
excessively difficult, even though the expiry of such limitation entails by 
definition the rejection, wholly or in part, the action brought.87
 
Besides the principle of effectiveness, the principle of equivalence must 
be observed, i.e. time limits for bringing an action regarding EC law must 
no be less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions88.  
Concerning implementation of directives and time limits, the Court 
in Emmott ruled that a Member State cannot set time limits for bringing 
an action until a directive is properly transposed into the domestic legal 
system89. Soon after this, in Steenhorst-Neerings90 the Court departed 
from this approach. It started by distinguishing between two types of 
time-limits, first, those fixing the right to bring an action before the 
national court, and, second, those fixing the right to claim relevant 
benefits. In Steenhorst-Neerings the Court accepted a provision of 
national law which set a time limit for which a person can claim benefits 
retroactively. The ECJ based its decision on the consideration that those 
are different kind of time limits reviewed in Emmott and in Steenhorst-
Neerings.  
The latter situation does not deprive a person of the right to bring 
an action as such, it merely limits the rights which could be claimed, 
while the former deprives an individual of judicial protection altogether91. 
In this case, the ECJ set criteria as to which the time limits fixing the right 
to claim benefits retroactively must correspond. First, if there is a 
possibility to rely on a directly effective provision of a directive, and, 
second, if the principle of equivalence regarding procedural rights is 
observed92.   
Those criteria were affirmed in Johnson II93. In Fantask, a case 
which was not about equal treatment, the Court simplified the criteria and 
required that national provisions for bringing an action must correspond 
to both principles of effectiveness and equality94. It is true that a case 
about time limits which deprives a person from the right to bring an 
action at all is much more serious that that limiting rights which an 
                                                 
87 Case C-326/96, B.S. Levez v T.H. Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd., European Court Reports 1998 Page 
I-07835, paragraph 19. 
88 Case 33-76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG et Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das 
Saarland., European Court Reports 1976 Page 01989, paragraph 6.
89 Case C-208/90, Theresa Emmott v Minister for Social Welfare and Attorney General, European 
Court Reports 1991 Page I-04269. 
90 Case C-338/91, H.Steenhorst-Neerings v Bestuur van de Bedrijsvereniging voor Detailhandel, 
Ambachten en Huisvrouwen, European Court Reports 1993 Page I-05475. 
91 Case C-338/91, H.Steenhorst-Neerings v Bestuur van de Bedrijsvereniging voor Detailhandel, 
Ambachten en Huisvrouwen, European Court Reports 1993 Page I-05475, paragraph 21. 
92 Ibid., paras. 14 to 16. 
93 Case C-410/92, Elsie Rita Johnson v Chief Adjudication Officer, ECR 1994 Page I-05483. 
94 Case C-188/95, Fantask A/S e.a. v Industriministerietb (Erhvervministeriet), European Court Reports 
1997 Page I-06783, paragraphs 47-52. 
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individual can claim. In Emmott the first and most important argument 
put forward by the Court was the right of individuals for certainty95, but 
in Steenhorst-Neerings it overlooked that the right to legal certainty for 
individuals had been infringed in both cases.  In particular, directives are 
addressed to the Member States, which are fully responsible for 
implementation. The ruling in Steenhorst-Neerings and subsequent 
judgments in fact oblige persons to be “in the know” about the whole of 
EC law. General legal certainty has been placed higher than legal 
certainty of individuals. None of the judgments analyses this 
subordination, or how general legal certainty would suffer if individual 
legal certainty were placed above it. Moreover, in Steenhorst-Neerings 
the Court, referring to its ruling in Emmott, did not refer to legal certainty 
of individuals, but put forward the doctrine that time limits set by national 
legislation cannot prevail over direct effect of provisions in a directive96. 
The Court also justified its ruling in Emmott by the different 
circumstances of that case97. But looking at the facts of the Emmott case, 
there is no fact testifying that she was deprived of any means under 
national legislation to claim direct effect of Article 4(1) of Directive 79/7 
at the time it should have had been transposed on 23 of December 1984. 
According to the ruling in Fantask, no excuses for waiting for other ECJ 
rulings regarding a particular non-implemented directive would be taken 
into account for extending time limits set by national legislation, because 
national measures in general corresponded to the principles of 
effectiveness and equivalence.     
Here, a distinction should be made between issues of pay and of 
social security benefits. In Levez98 the Court ruled that setting a time limit 
of two years for the right to claim pay arrears retroactively does not 
correspond to Community law. A common feature of Levez, Steenhorst-
Neerings and Johnson II is that the persons concerned did not possess full 
information of the current situation. Levez did not know that she had been 
paid discriminatory small pay, but Steenhorst-Neerings and Johnson the 
rights provided by Directive 79/7. The outcome is different and drives the 
conclusion that individuals must be aware of their rights provided by 
directives. 
 
 
                                                 
95 Case C-208/90, Theresa Emmott v Minister for Social Welfare and Attorney General, European 
Court Reports 1991 Page I-04269, paragraphs 21 and 22. 
96 Case C-338/91, H.Steenhorst-Neerings v Bestuur van de Bedrijsvereniging voor Detailhandel, 
Ambachten en Huisvrouwen, European Court Reports 1993 Page I-05475, paragraph 22. 
97 Case C-338/91, H.Steenhorst-Neerings v Bestuur van de Bedrijsvereniging voor Detailhandel, 
Ambachten en Huisvrouwen, European Court Reports 1993 Page I-05475, paragraphs 19 and 20. 
98 Case C-326/96, B.S. Levez v T.H. Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd., European Court Reports 1998 Page 
I-07835. 
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Burden of proof  
Directive 97/80/EC99 on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination 
based on sex provides for exemption of discrimination cases from the 
traditional civil suit principle – competition between the parties. In 
particular, individuals who consider themselves to have been wronged by 
discrimination, establish the facts from which discrimination may be 
presumed and then it is for the respondent to prove that there has been no 
discrimination. Directive 97/80 applies to cases covered by Article 141 of 
EC Treaty, Directives 75/117, 76/207, 92/85100 and 96/34101. Although 
not explicitly mentioned in Directive 97/80, it is also applicable to 
Directive 86/378 since occupational social security schemes fall within 
the concept of pay provided by Article 141102. The only equal treatment 
directive left out of the scope of the principle of reverse burden of proof 
is 86/613103, but the principle of reverse burden of proof may be 
applicable to self-employed persons via Directive 76/207104. The wording 
of Article 3 of Directive 97/80 providing that the burden of proof must 
shift to the respondent when the claimant establishes before court facts 
from which discrimination may be presumed, gives room for very broad 
interpretation and application, because “it is for the national court to 
determine if the conditions for shifting the burden of proof are 
satisfied”.105  
There is no extensive case-law of the ECJ on interpretation of this matter; 
however, the ECJ has given the main guidelines. Regarding facts which 
the claimant must present, first of all mere facts are required not evidence 
of discrimination; second, the facts must show only a “prima facie case of 
discrimination”106. For example, a prima facie case of discrimination is 
where pay for women is significantly lower than pay for male colleagues 
                                                 
99 Council Directive 97/80/EC99 of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination 
based on sex. 
100 Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the introduction of measures to encourage 
improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently 
given birth or are breastfeeding (tenth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16(1) of 
Directive 89/391/EEC). 
101 Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework agreement on parental leave 
concluded by UNICEP, CEEP and the ETUC. 
102 Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz, European Court Reports 1986 Page 
01607.
103 Council Directive 86/613/EEC of 11 December 1986 on the application of the principle of equal 
treatment between men and women engaged in an activity, including agriculture, in a self-employed 
capacity, and on the protection of self-employed women during pregnancy and motherhood. 
104 More in section on self-employed persons. 
105 E.Szyszczak, “Remedies in Sex Discrimination Cases”, J.Lonbay, A.Biondi (eds), Remedies for 
Breach of EC Law, Chichester, John Wiley & Sons, 1997. 
106 Case C-127/92, Dr. Pamela Mary Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority and Secretary of State for 
Health, European Court Reports 1993 Page I-05535, paragraph 18, see also case C-196/02, Vasiliki 
Nikoloudi v Organismos Tilepikinonion Ellados AE, paragraph 74. 
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performing the same work of work of equal value107. When shifting the 
burden of proof, the national court must take into account the possibility 
to obtain facts on discrimination by the person possibly discriminated 
against. Here first, the national court must ensure that the burden of proof 
shifts to the employer so as to avoid depriving workers of effective means 
of enforcing their rights108; and the court must also ensure transparency 
of information.  
Transparency was mentioned as a precondition for avoiding 
discrimination in cases regarding equal treatment as regards access to 
employment, in particular interpretation of Article 2(2) of Directive 
76/207/EEC, which allows the Member States to restrict the right of one 
sex regarding access to certain posts109. According to this, the Member 
States before putting a restriction on the right to occupy certain posts 
must provide the Commission and individuals with transparent 
information regarding the validity of such restrictions.  
The second type of ECJ cases where the principle of transparency 
was mentioned is regarding equal pay. The Court has held that “where an 
undertaking applies a system of pay which is totally lacking transparency, 
it is for the employer to prove that his practice in the matter of wages is 
not discriminatory”110. This is because wages frequently consist of 
several elements (for example, basic salary plus different kinds of 
supplement) and those elements are paid taking into account different 
criteria (for example, mobility, training, seniority111), so that the principle 
of transparency is applicable regarding each element of remuneration. 
However, where a person can obtain information, for example regarding 
pay and each element of it, and it is transparent, there is no reason to shift 
the burden of proof to the employer112. 
In order to enforce the reverse burden of proof effectively, the 
Member State are required to adjust national rules where necessary113. 
                                                 
107 See for example case C-127/92, Dr. Pamela Mary Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority and 
Secretary of State for Health, European Court Reports 1993 Page I-05535, paragraph 17. 
108 Case C-127/92, Dr. Pamela Mary Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority and Secretary of State for 
Health, European Court Reports 1993 Page I-05535, paragraph 14. 
109 Case 248/83 Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, European 
Court Reports 1985 Page 01459; Case 318/86 Commission of the European Communities v French 
Republic, European Court Reports 1988 Page 03559. 
110 Case 109/88 Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Danfoss, European Court Reports 1989 Page 03199, 
paragraph 11. 
111 See for example, Case 109/88 Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Danfoss, European Court Reports 1989 Page 03199. 
112 Case C-381/99, Susanna Brunnhofer v Bank der österreichischen Postsparkasse AG, European 
Court Reports 2001 Page I-04961, paragraph 56. 
113 Case 109/88 Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behalf of Danfoss, European Court Reports 1989 Page 03199, 
paragraph  14. 
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Directive 97/80 is not applicable where it is for the competent body or 
court to investigate the facts of the case114.  
 
Legal standing 
In Verholen, with regard to a person’s legal standing in order to claim 
rights derived under Community law, the ECJ held as follows: 
 
While it is, in principle, for national law to determine an individual’s 
standing and legal interest in bringing proceedings, Community law 
nevertheless requires that the national legislation does not undermine the 
right to effective judicial protection… and the application of national 
legislation cannot render virtually impossible the exercise of the rights 
conferred by Community law.115  
 
In particular, the Court ruled that an individual may rely on Directive 
79/7 before a national court if it bears discriminatory effects deriving 
from a national provision regarding his spouse, who is not a party to the 
proceedings, providing that the spouse comes within the scope of the 
directive116.  
In Coloroll117 the Court held that Article 141 of the EC Treaty may 
be relied upon by dependants of employees in order to claim a survivor’s 
pension under an occupational pension scheme. Were it otherwise, “this 
would deprive Article 119 of all its effectiveness as far as survivor’s 
pensions are concerned”118. 
 
Particular remedies in discrimination cases 
Pay 
In Defrenne II the ECJ indicated that Article 119 could be observed in no 
other way than by raising the lowest salaries119. In following case-law 120 
the Court reaffirmed that the only way to remedy discriminatory pay for 
disadvantaged workers is to raise it to levels received by other workers. 
From this case-law it follows that that principle applies to discrimination 
                                                 
114 Article 4(3) of Directive 97/80. 
115 Joined cases C-87/90, C-88/90 and C-89/90, A. Verholen and others v Sociale Verzekeringsbank 
Amsterdam., European Court Reports 1991 Page I-03757, paragraph 24.
116 Joined cases C-87/90, C-88/90 and C-89/90, A. Verholen and others v Sociale Verzekeringsbank 
Amsterdam., European Court Reports 1991 Page I-03757.
117 Case C-200/91, Coloroll Pension Trustees Ltd v James Richard Russel, Daniel Mangham, Gerald 
Robert Parker, Robert Sharp, Joan Fuller, Judith Ann Broughton and Coloroll Group plc., European 
Court Reports 1994 Page I-04389, paragraph 18. 
118 Ibid., para. 19. 
119 Case 45-75, Gabrielle Defrenne v Société anonyme belge de navigation aérienne Sabena, European 
Court Reports 1976 Page 00455, paragraph  
120 See for example, case C-33/89, Maria Kowalska v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, ECR 1990 Page 
I-02591, paragraphs 19 and 20, case 184/89, Helga Nimz v Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg, European 
Court Reports 1991 Page I-00297 , paragraph 18, case C-408/92, Constance Christina Ellen Smith and 
others v Avdel Systems Ltd. European Court Reports 1994 Page I-04435,  paragraph 17.   
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cases, irrespective of whether they originate from individual contracts, 
collective agreements, or national legislation. Interestingly, under Article 
141 a worker performing work of higher value has no right to claim 
higher pay, but only equal to those performing work of lesser value121. 
Such an interpretation of the principle of equal pay testifies a purely 
formal approach. It does not substantially eradicate discrimination in pay. 
 
Occupational social security schemes  
In Barber the Court held that occupational pension schemes fall within 
the concept of equal pay, thus different pensionable ages and 
contributions must be equal122. An obligation to pay non-discriminatory 
benefits for both sexes arises only in respect of periods of service 
subsequent to 17 May 1990123. However it does not preclude joining an 
occupational social security scheme retroactively124 under condition that 
they will make respective contributions125.  
In Coloroll the Court pointed out that Article 119 does not preclude 
measures to achieve equal treatment by reducing the advantages of 
previously favoured workers, but this could be done only after entry into 
force of rules eliminating discrimination126.  Later, this was affirmed in 
Smith127. 
 
Treatment 
In Colson128 the Court held that Article 6 of Directive 76/207 does not 
put an obligation on an employer to conclude an employment contract 
with a candidate discriminated against. Roseberry describes it as follows: 
 
The ECJ has specifically held that the ETD does not give a person a right 
to instatement in a job as a remedy for discriminatory refusal to hire.129
  
                                                 
121 Case 157/86, Mary Murphy and others v An Bord Telecom Eireann., European Court Reports 1988 
Page 00673.  
122 Case C-262/88, Douglas Harvey Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group, European 
Court Reports 1990 Page I-018899. 
123 Ibid. 
124 Case C-57/93, Anna Adriaantje Vroege v NCIV Instituut voor Volkshuisvesting BV and Stichting 
Pensioenfonds NCIV, ECR 1994 page I-4541, paragraph 30. 
125 Case C-128/93,Geertruida Catharina Fisscher v Voorhuis Hengelo BV and Stichting 
Bedrijfspensioenfonds voor de Detailhandel., European Court Reports 1994 Page I-04583, paragraph 
37.
126 Case C-200/91, Coloroll Pension Trustees Ltd v James Richard Russel, Daniel Mangham, Gerald 
Robert Parker, Robert Sharp, Joan Fuller, Judith Ann Broughton and Coloroll Group plc., European 
Court Reports 1994 Page I-04389,  paragraph 33. 
127 Case C-408/92, Constance Christina Ellen Smith and others v Avdel Systems Ltd. European Court 
Reports 1994 Page I-04435 , paragraphs 26 and 27. 
128 Case 14/83, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, European 
Court Reports 1984 page 01891, paragraph 19. 
129 Lynn M.Roseberry, The Limits of Employment Discrimination Law in the United States and 
European Community, DJOF Publishing 1999, at page160. 
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It is important to note that the Court merely held that Directive 76/207 
does not specifically require such a sanction; however, it does not exclude 
the possibility of rights of instatement as one of the possible sanctions in 
the same line with financial compensation130. For example, Italy has the 
sanction of instatement131.  It would appear that in some cases 
instatement could be the only remedy that fulfils the requirement of 
effectiveness. This could be for example where individuals have obtained 
very special education or possess very special knowledge, but posts 
where they could make use of it are of very limited number. It is possible 
that in such a situation no financial compensation could reimburse the 
damage and loss sustained.  
 
State social insurance 
In Sutton the Court held that unlike the case with equal pay in 
discrimination cases regarding social security benefits, an individual has 
no right under Directive 79/7 to claim interest on arrears of benefits. The 
Court substantiated this by saying that the scope of Directive 79/7 is “in 
the context of the award of social security benefits  to establish the 
unlawfulness of such discrimination and to obtain the benefits to which 
they would have been entitled in the absence of discrimination”132. 
However it does not exclude the possibility of claiming loss and damage 
sustained by a discriminated-against individual under the principle of 
state liability, discussed below. 
Nevertheless it raises two questions. First, again a distinction has 
been drawn between the responsibility of employers with regard to equal 
pay and the state with regard to social security benefits. Namely, the state 
seems to be less responsible than the employer for discrimination caused, 
for example the obligation to justify indirect discrimination, where the 
margin of discretion left for the Member State is much broader than for 
employers. Second, the question arises of effectiveness of the remedy, 
because a claim for social security benefits can be legitimately restricted 
with regard to the right receive them retroactively133 and a claim for state 
liability entails an extra obligation to prove mandatory conditions. 
In Cotter the Court ruled that setting the same conditions for 
obtaining social security benefits for both sexes cannot be impeded by a 
                                                 
130 Case 14/83, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, European 
Court reports 1984 page 01891, paragraph 18. 
131 Lynn M.Roseberry, The Limits of Employment Discrimination Law in the United States and 
European Community, DJOF Publishing 1999, at page160. 
132 Case C-66/95, The Queen v Secretary of state for Social Security, ex parte Eunice Sutton European 
Court reports 1997 Page I-02163, paragraph 25.
133 See for example cases C-338/91, H.Steenhorst-Neerings v Bestuur van de Bedrijsvereniging voor 
Detailhandel, Ambachten en Huisvrouwen, European Court reports 1993 Page I-05475 and C-208/90, 
Theresa Emmott v Minister for Social Welfare and Attorney General, European Court reports 1991 
Page I-04269. 
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national law provision prohibiting unjust enrichment even if 
implementation of Directive 79/7 infringes it134. 
 
Remedies in multiple discrimination cases  
Together with adoption of two more directives prohibiting discrimination 
on some other ground than sex, the question of multiple discrimination 
was raised135. So far as it concerns remedies in multiple discrimination 
cases, the Commission indicates that penalties must be higher than 
‘single’ discrimination136. 
 
 
State liability 
The state is liable for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of 
breaches of Community law137. The principle of state liability was 
established in the Francovich138 case, where provisions of a non-
implemented directive were found to be incapable of having direct effect. 
For claiming state liability, certain conditions must be fulfilled. First, the 
rule of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on individuals139; 
second, the breach is sufficiently serious; and third, there must be a direct 
causal link between the breach of the obligation resting on the State and 
the damage sustained by the injured parties140. 
Further in Factortame III141 the Court held that a Member State is 
responsible for breach of Community law, whatever organ of the state is 
responsible for it. The obligation to make good damage caused to 
individuals by breaches of Community law cannot depend on domestic 
rules as to the division of powers between constitutional authorities142. In 
Factortame III the Member States also wanted to clarify the content of 
                                                 
134 Case C-377/89, Ann Cotter and Norah McDermott v Minister for Social Welfare and Attorney 
General, European Court reports 1991 Page I-01155. 
135 Directive 2000/43, paragraph 14 of preamble. 
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Republic, European Court reports 1991 Page I-05357, paragraph 40, see also case C-66/95, The Queen 
v Secretary of state for Social Security, ex parte Eunice Sutton European Court reports 1997 Page I-
02163, paragraph 32.
141 Joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The 
Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others, European Court reports 
1996 Page I-01029. 
142 Ibid., para. 32. 
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conditions for state liability. In particular, what is to be considered as a 
sufficiently serious breach of Community law?  The Court pointed out the 
general principle which provides that a breach is sufficiently serious if the 
Member State has manifestly and gravely disregarded the limits of its 
discretion143. Further it specified that, for example, a breach of 
Community law is sufficiently serious where the Member State does not 
take into account a judgment of the Court finding an infringement of 
Community law, irrespective of whether this is established under the 
procedure of preliminary ruling or clearly flows from already settled case 
law144.  
Further rulings of the ECJ highlight factors which could be taken 
into account when defining a sufficiently serious breach. These include 
the clarity and precision of the rule breached, the amount of discretion 
left to national or Community authorities by that rule, whether the 
infringement and the damage caused was intentional or involuntary, 
whether any error of law is excusable or inexcusable, the fact that the 
position taken by a Community institution may have contributed towards 
the omission, and the adoption or retention of national measures or 
practices contrary to Community law145.  
Persons can claim reparation for loss and damage under the 
principle of state liability under the same conditions laid down for 
reparation of loss and damage for breach of national law. However, those 
conditions must correspond to the principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence146. Reparation of loss and damage sustained as the result of 
breach of Community law cannot be conditional upon a requirement 
provided under national law for existence of fault (intentional or 
                                                 
143 Ibid., para. 55. 
144 Ibid.,para. 57. 
145 Dorothy Gillies, A Guide to EC Environmental Law, Earthcan Publications Ltd, London, 1999, at 
page 97, referring in particular to joined cases C-6/90 and C-9/90, Andrea Francovich and Danila 
Bonifaci and others v Italian Republic, European Court reports 1991 Page I-05357, joined cases C-
46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen v 
Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others, European Court reports 1996 
Page I-01029, case C-392/93, The Queen v H. M. Treasury, ex parte British Telecommunications plc., 
European Court reports 1996 Page I-01631, case C-5/94 The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food, ex parte: Hedley Lomas (Ireland) Ltd., European Court reports 1996 Page I-
02553, joined cases C-178/94, C-179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94 and C-190/94, Erich Dillenkofer, 
Christian Erdmann, Hans-Jürgen Schulte, Anke Heuer, Werner, Ursula and Trosten Knor v 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland., European Court reports 1996 Page I-04845, case C-66/95, The Queen v 
Secretary of state for Social Security, ex parte Eunice Sutton European Court reports 1997 Page I-
02163 and joined cases C-94/95 and C-95/95, Danila Bonifaci and others (C-94/95) and Wanda Berto 
and others (C-95/95) v Istituto nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS)., European Court reports 
1997 Page I-03969.
146 Joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The 
Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others, European Court reports 
1996 Page I-01029, paragraphs 67-70. 
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negligent) going beyond that of a sufficiently serious breach of 
Community law147.  
As regards compensation, this cannot be limited by national law, 
otherwise it will not ensure effective protection of rights of individuals 
derived from Community law or guarantee compensation commensurate 
with the loss and damage sustained. For example, compensation must 
comprise loss of profit. However, a person must show reasonable 
diligence in limiting the extent of loss and damage148.  
Recent case law of the ECJ on state liability deals with liability of 
national courts in correct application of EC law149.  The Court has held 
that the state is liable for a breach of EC law where the national court has 
incorrectly interpreted the law or made an improper assessment of facts 
and evidence. Thus, liability of national courts must be governed by the 
same conditions as other organs of the state. Manifest infringement of 
applicable law by the national court must be assessed under criteria set 
for estimation of sufficiently serious breach of the community law150.   
Some authors discussing the concept of state liability point out that 
this is less favourable for individual remedy than other concepts, such as 
direct or indirect effect. They stress: 
 
The Court should pay more regard to the fact that in relation to the 
protection of the Community rights of individuals, the principle of state 
liability is not a panacea for remedying the defective behaviour of 
Member State. This is because an individual litigant would still need to 
clear a number of hurdles before succeeding with a claim for damages. He 
(or she) would need to satisfy the Community conditions for liability as 
well as any applicable national procedural rules. It should also be noted 
that the action for damages is compensatory in nature and does not 
guarantee the individual that his or her Community right will be enforced. 
There is also the drawback that in such circumstances the individual 
would need to bring two separate actions, which can be costly and time-
consuming.151
  
Nevertheless, the Court in several cases has rejected other EC law 
enforcement mechanisms, such as the obligation of national law to 
                                                 
147 Ibid., para. 80. 
148 Ibid., para. 81-90. 
149 See in particular, case C-224/01 Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich., European Court reports 
2003 Page I-10239 and case C-173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA, in liquidation v Repubblica 
italiana, 
150 Case C-173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA, in liquidation v Repubblica italiana, paragraphs 42 
and 43 
151 Sara Drake, Twenty years after Von Colson: the impact of “indirect effect” on the protection of the 
individual’s Community rights, European Law Review (2005) 30 June, Sweet & Maxwell and 
Contributors, at pages 343-344. She refers to Dougan, M., Craig, Costello, C. 
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interpret national law in compliance with EC law in Wagner152 or 
effective compensation for discrimination on grounds of sex in the field 
of social security in Sutton153, instead advising to bring an action based 
on State liability. 
 
Latvian law 
Establishing discrimination  
The greater part of equality directives have been introduced into the 
Labour Law and different laws on social security. Under these, there are 
no special requirements for establishing discrimination. However, the 
Civil law requires proof of fault in order to establish breach of law or 
agreement.    
So far, Latvian Civil law contains no provisions on non-
discrimination, but draft amendments to the Civil law provide for the 
principle of non-discrimination when making goods and services 
available to the public and making deals154. In the scope of this thesis, the 
draft amendments concern non-discrimination of self-employed persons, 
since the Civil law is the only legislative act governing the operation of 
self-employed persons, in particular by section on service agreements155. 
Therefore the question arises as to how the Civil law must operate in 
order to comply with EC law. 
As mentioned above, under Latvian Civil law establishing 
existence of fault is necessary for unlawful action156. According to 
Article 1640 of the Latvian Civil law, fault can be committed by intent or 
by negligence - gross or ordinary157.  Thus it follows that traditional 
application of the requirement of fault under Latvian Civil law makes 
recognition of discrimination conditional upon ability to prove fault. 
However, national law requiring proof of fault on the part of the 
employer to make him fully liable does not correspond to EC sex equality 
                                                 
152 Case C-334/92, Teodoro Wagner Miret v Fondo de Garantía Salarial.,   European Court reports 
1993 Page I-06911. 
153 Case C-66/95, The Queen v Secretary of state for Social Security, ex parte Eunice Sutton European 
Court reports 1997 Page I-02163.
154 Draft amendments registered at Parliament of Latvia (Saeima) No. 1698 
http://www.saeima.lv/saeima8/mek_reg.fre At the moment amendments are intended to introduce 
Directives 2000/43 (equal treatment irrespective of race or ethnic origin)  and 2004/113 (equal 
treatment between men and women in respect to access to goods and supply of services)  only, while in 
reality introducing provisions of Directives 86/613 (equal treatment between self-employed on grounds 
of sex, as regards establishment and operation of self-employed) and 2000/78 (equal treatment in 
employment irrespective of age, disability, religion or belief, or sexual orientation, as regards self-
employed). 
155 Council Directive 86/613/EEC of 11 December 1986 on the application of the principle of equal 
treatment between men and women engaged in an activity, including agriculture, in a self-employed 
capacity, and on the protection of self-employed women during pregnancy and motherhood. 
156 Civillikums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1994, 30.jūnijs, Nr.75 (Civil Law), Article 1635. 
157 Ibid., Article 1644 . 
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law, because such a requirement could result in exemption from full 
liability. Consequently,  
 
where a Member State opts for a sanction forming part of the rules on 
civil liability, any infringement of the prohibition of discrimination 
suffices in itself to make the person quality of it fully liable, and no regard 
may be had to the grounds of exemption envisaged by national law”158. 
 
Latvian lawyers and scholars have recognized that international law may 
require different interpretation and application of Latvian Civil law. 
Torgāns has stressed that, since Latvia has joined the EU, lawyers must 
reread the Civil law and other laws in order to establish whether their 
interpretation remains the same as until then159. This especially concerns 
the element of fault. Kārkliņš points out that Latvian Civil law does not 
stress the concept of fault as a subjective element, but rather fault as an 
objective element which characterises the juridical nature of unlawful 
action (or inaction)160. It follows that recognition of the fact of 
discrimination suffices of itself to establish full liability on the part of the 
employer. 
 
Compensation  
As mentioned above, Latvia has chosen compensation in the form of 
reparation of loss and damage. Article 29(8) of the Latvian Labour Law 
provides: 
 
(8) If the prohibition against differential treatment and the prohibition 
against causing adverse consequences is violated, an employee in addition 
to other rights specified in this Law, has the right to request compensation 
for losses and compensation for moral harm. In case of dispute, a court at 
its own discretion shall determine the compensation for moral harm. 
 
This provision concerns Directives 75/117, 76/207 and 86/378. Regarding 
application of Article 29(8) of the Latvian Labour law, there have been 
several cases.  
The Sants case concerned rejection of employment on the grounds 
of sexual orientation. Plaintiff Sants161 was not engaged as a teacher 
although he had superior qualifications to the person employed. He 
claimed lost salary for the following school year. The national court 
refused compensation for material loss on the ground that it is 
                                                 
158 Case C-177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichtig Vormingscentrum voor Jong 
Volwassen (VJV-Centrum) Plus, (1990) ECR page I-03941, paragraph 26. 
159 Torgāns K., Vainas vai attaisnojumu meklējumi civiltiesībās. Jurista Vārds, 2005. 31.maijs, nr.20.   
160 Kārkliņš J., Vainas nozīme, nosakot civiltiesisko atbildību”. Jurista Vārds, 2005. 26.aprīlis, nr.15. 
161 Rīgas pilsētas Ziemeļu rajona tiesas 2005.gada 29.aprīļa spriedums lietā Nr.C32242904047505, C-
475/3. 
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unpredictable how long the employment relationship would have lasted if 
Sants had been engaged for that work. Besides, the national court pointed 
out that all four elements have to be proved in order to obtain 
compensation for material loss, including fault on the part of the 
employer, although it does not correspond to EC law.  
Another case was not about discrimination but rather an unlawful 
differential treatment case.  Forest guard Kuzņerevičs162, employed by 
the Latvian State Forest agency, claimed unlawful differential treatment.   
Since Latvian labour law provides for special grounds of discrimination 
(those provided by EC directives) and does not provide for a general 
principle of equal treatment, the national court recognized victimisation 
only, although there was differential treatment, too.  Kuzņerevičs, unlike 
his colleagues performing identical work, did not receive different kinds 
of premium. He claimed non-received premiums totalling 4084 lats163. 
Riga District court held that there is no ground to consider non-received 
premiums and supplemental payments as material loss. Instead, the 
national court decided that the claimant was entitled to compensation for 
moral damage in the amount of 4084 lats. 
Third was the Stūriņas164 case, about discrimination on grounds of 
sex as regards access to employment165. The national court here found 
unlawful discrimination based on sex and awarded her 585.30 lats for 
material loss, which constituted non-received salary for one heating 
season and 1000 lats for moral damage.   
These cases show that the Latvian national courts have a very 
heterogeneous approach regarding what constitutes material loss166. In 
the Sants case, the court did not recognize material loss as lost income in 
the future, while in the Stūriņas case the court took the opposite view. A 
surprise is the decision in the Kuzņerevičs case. It is still unclear why 
premiums and supplemental payments can not constitute material loss; 
moreover, in the situation where Kuzņerevičs performed the same work 
as his colleagues. However, in all three cases it is most likely that the 
criteria set forth in EC law were fulfilled. Moral compensation for Sants 
was 2000 lats, Kuzņerevičs – 4084 and Stūriņa in total received 1585 lats. 
Those sums of money in Latvia could have a dissuasive effect on 
employers and could give satisfaction to claimants.  
                                                 
162 Rīgas Apgabaltiesas Civillietu tiesas kolēģijas 2005.gada 21.septembra spriedums lietā Nr.C 
27175804 CA-2787/19; 2005.g., Latvijas Republikas Augstākās tiesas Senāta 2006.gada 8.februāra 
spriedums lietā Nr.SKC-54. 
163 1 lats = 0,7 euros, 4084 lats are approximately 5800 euros. 
164 Cēsu rajona tiesas 2005.gada 3.janvāra spriedums lietā Nr.C11019405. 
165 The Stūriņas case is discussed in more detail in the section on Equal treatment 
166 And this is not surprising, because until now in Latvia there is no uniform data base where one 
could find all or at least the greater part of judgments delivered by Latvian courts. It is possible that 
even the author of this thesis does not possess full information on discrimination cases reviewed by 
Latvian courts.  
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An interesting point was raised in Kuzņerevičs at cassation 
instance. The employer contended that in Kurzņerevičs case Latvian 
Labour Law on compensation is not applicable because he is a state 
official. State officials are governed by the Law on the state civil 
service167, which provides that the Labour law is applicable to state 
officials only to a certain extent. The Law on the state civil service does 
not provide for prohibition of victimisation. It follows that the claim was 
unfounded.  
However, the employer did not claim entire rejection of the claim. 
It contended that if the court recognized victimisation regarding moral 
compensation, then the Law on calculation and reimbursement of loss 
and damages cause by state administration institutions168 would be 
applicable by analogy. Article 15(3) of that law allows for moral 
compensation of no more than 3000 lats, but in cases where damage is 
not serious instead of compensation the institution could apologise in 
writing or publicly. Although the cassation court did not follow this line 
of reasoning and maintained in force the decision of the appeal court, 
nevertheless it raises the point of incompatibility with EC law of the Law 
on calculation and reimbursement of loss and damages caused by state 
administration institutions. This law is indeed applicable in cases where a 
state official has been discriminated against on grounds of sex. Contrary 
to the requirement that the upper limit of compensation can not be 
provided by national legislation, this is a case where it is not 
implemented.  
One more issue on compensation under Latvian law causes 
reflection. This in particular concerns application of Article 59 of Latvian 
labour law defining the concept of pay in general. In cases on 
reinstatement and compensation for enforced idleness169, the Supreme 
Court of Latvia recognizes claims for compensation for enforced idleness 
for the period a person actually did not work. If the person during the 
period of litigation has found other work, then he/she does not have the 
right to claim compensation for that period. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
has found that compensation for enforced idleness does not fall within the 
concept of pay defined by Article 59 of the Latvian Labour Law170. 
Although equal pay is defined by Article 60 of the Labour Law, there is a 
risk that the principles elaborated by the Supreme Court on the concept 
                                                 
167Valsts civildienesta likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2000. 22.septembris, nr.331/333 (Law on 
state civil service) 
168 Valsts pārvaldes iestāžu nodarīto zaudējumu atlīdzināšanas likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 
2005. 17.jūnijs, nr.96 (3254) (Law on compensation for loss and damage caused by institutions of state 
administration) 
169 Par likumu piemērošanu, izšķirot tiesās darba strīdus. Latvijas Vēstnesis, Jurista vārds, 2005. 
22.februāris, Nr.7 (362), 21.lappuse. 
170 Ibid., 22.lappuse. 
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and award of compensation in cases of unlawful dismissal, reinstatement, 
and compensation for enforced idleness could be applied in case of 
discriminatory dismissal, reinstatement, and compensation - taking into 
account that the ECJ considers compensation for unlawful dismissal as 
constituting pay within the meaning of equal pay171.      
One more case is noteworthy to mention. This is the Muhinas 
case172. At the time when discrimination occurred, the only provision 
allowing claiming compensation was Article 2352a of the Civil law 
precluding infringement of dignity and honour. Muhina contended that 
her dignity had been infringed since refusal to employ implies that the 
worth of women in employment market is of lesser value. The District 
and Supreme courts of Latvia decided that an apology is proper 
compensation for moral damage, taking into account the fact that she had 
herself provoked discrimination by applying for a vacancy addressed to 
men only and that refusal to employ comprises such considerations as 
‘positive discrimination against women, since working conditions in 
prison are heavy’. Although this decision of the Supreme Court may not 
be taken as a point of departure when defining compensation in 
discrimination cases arising from an employment relationship because the 
old Labour code has lost its force, nevertheless it is important to focus the 
attention of Latvian lawyers to the fact that this decision totally 
contradicts EC sex equality law.   
Directive 86/613 has not yet been fully transposed. Since it is 
planned to be fully transposed, with respective amendments to the 
Latvian Civil law, conditions for compensation for discrimination against 
self-employed persons on grounds of sex will be governed by provisions 
of Latvian Civil law. Under Latvian Civil law, there are two kinds of 
reparation. First, reparation for material loss, which comprises decrease 
of property and lost profit; and second, reparation for moral damage. 
Reparation for material damage requires proof of four elements – 
unlawful action, fault, existence and amount of material loss, and causal 
relationship between unlawful action and material loss. As discussed 
above, the ECJ in Dekker173 established that the fact of discrimination 
cannot be conditional upon the existence of fault required under national 
law. The same is true about the requirement of the existence of fault in 
order to claim material loss. Since Latvian Civil law is to a great extent 
based on German civil law traditions, the situation is identical to that 
                                                 
171 Case C-167/97, Regina v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Nicole Seymour-Smith and 
Laura Perez, ECR 1998 Page I-05199. 
172 Augstākās tiesas Senāta 2002.gada 8.maija spriedums lietā Nr.SKC-297. See for more detail in 
section on Equal treatment. 
173 Case C-177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichtig Vormingscentrum voor Jong 
Volwassen (VJV-Centrum) Plus, (1990) ECR page I-03941, paragraph 26. 
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reviewed in Draehmpaehl, where under the BGB174 reparation of loss 
was conditional on the existence of fault. The Court ruled that:  
 
(the) Directive175 does not provide for any exemption from liability on 
which a person guilty of discrimination could rely and does not make 
reparation of such damage conditional on the existence of fault, no matter 
how easy it would be to adduce proof of fault.176
 
Consequently, in cases of discrimination a person does not have to prove 
the existence of fault in order to claim material loss. 
Although draft amendments to the Civil law provide for prohibition 
of discrimination, there are no respective amendments implementing 
effective sanctions, namely the right to moral damage. Recently, Article 
1635 of the Civil law was amended177 and in principle this allows claims 
for moral damage, but under condition that moral damage is proved by 
the claimant. This condition does not correspond to the principle of 
effective remedy, because it makes compensation of moral damages 
conditional upon ability to prove them. Consequently, if the right to 
moral damage is conditional, then also conditional is the right to 
effective, proportionate, and dissuasive compensation178.   
Recently the Kozlovska case179 was decided by Jelgava city court. 
She was refused employment on grounds of her gipsy nationality. As 
regards reasoning on the plaintiff’s right to compensation, the national 
court in its judgment refers not only to Article 29(9) of the Labour law, 
but also to Article 1635 of the Civil law. The court points out that a 
person has the right to claim moral damage as far as the defendant could 
be considered liable, thus showing that the judge is not familiar with the 
Dekker judgement180. One more interesting thing is that when defining 
the amount of moral compensation the national court among such criteria 
as effectiveness, deterrent effect and proportionality, declared that the 
financial situation of the employer must be taken into account. This 
                                                 
174 Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code), case C-180/95, Nils Draehmpael v Urania 
Immobilienservice OHG, European Court Reports 1997 Page I-02195, paragraph 7. 
175 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal 
treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocation training and promotion, and 
working conditions. 
176 Case C-180/95, Nils Draehmpael v Urania Immobilienservice OHG, European Court Reports 1997 
Page I-02195, paragraph 21. 
177 Grozījumi Civillikumā: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2006, februāris, Nr.24 (Amendments to Civil 
Law). 
178 Article 8(2) of Directive 2004/113 explicitly provides for compensation or reparation for loss and 
damage which must be effective, proportionate, and dissuasive. It is true that such an obligation is not 
provided by Directive 86/613. However, draft amendments to the Civil law on non-discrimination were 
intended to introduce Directive 2004/113, which automatically fully introduces Directive 86/613, too. 
179 Jelgavas tiesas 2006.gada 25.maija spriedums lietā Nr. C 15066406. Decision of Jelgava City court 
delivered on 25th of May 2006 in case No.C 15066406. 
180 Case C-177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichtig Vormingscentrum voor Jong 
Volwassen (VJV-Centrum) Plus, (1990) ECR page I-03941, paragraph 26. 
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finding is logical and follows from the principle of proportionality. Thus 
the amount of moral compensation must be defined taking into account 
not only the situation of the claimant but also of the defendant, especially 
if it is a small enterprise. In particular, the national court instead of the 
5000 lats claimed awarded Kozolovska 1000 lats for moral compensation. 
No compensation for material loss was claimed.   
 
Principle of effectiveness 
Here, the author will continue discussion on the right to instatement under 
Community law and effectiveness of remedy. Article 34(2) of the Labour 
law prohibits a claim to conclude a contract with a candidate 
discriminated against. This provision excludes the possibility to obtain an 
effective remedy in cases where financial compensation is not of such 
great importance as obtaining a particular job. Latvia in the EU and in the 
world is considered a small state, so that particular posts are of very 
limited number, while posts where special knowledge is required are even 
more limited in number, if indeed they exist at all. Here, instatement 
possibly could be the only effective remedy for an individual. Moreover, 
for reasons of the small population, relationships among employers are 
very close, while complaining to the court amounts to bad manners. 
According to the experience of employees of the State Human Rights 
Office, many persons who seem to be victims of discrimination are afraid 
to claim their rights before a court because of most probable adverse 
consequences from all employers, in particular in the business field. Fear 
of adverse consequences applies not only to persons living in the 
countryside or small towns but also to workers living in Riga. The only 
way to avoid such adverse consequences would be the obligation to 
instate the person discriminated against if he/she is the most appropriate 
candidate. 
 
Time limits and principle of effectiveness 
Latvian labour law in cases of discrimination allows one month for 
bringing a claim.181 In Rewe182 the ECJ in principle accepted a one-month 
                                                 
181 Acording to Article 34(1) if there has been a discriminatory refusal to employ during one month 
after refusal. Article 48 provides for the right to bring an action before the court during one month after 
possible discrimination: dismissal during the probation period. Article 60 (3) provides one month for 
bringing a claim regarding discriminatory pay. This one month term starts from the moment when the 
employee found out or should have found out about discriminatory pay.   Article 95(2) provides for a 
one-month term for bringing an action before the court in case of unequal treatment in particular 
regarding working conditions, vocational training, or promotion. As under Article 60(3), Article 95(2) 
provides that the one-month term starts to run from the moment when the employee found out or 
should have found out about discriminatory treatment. Article 29(1) prohibits discriminatory dismissal 
and Article 122 provides for one month for bringing an action before the court. The one-month term 
starts to run from receiving notice of termination.  
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term for bringing an action as corresponding to EC law and the principle 
of effectiveness, because it does not render defence of rights impossible 
or excessively difficult. There is a notion that a one-month term for 
bringing a claim before the court in all dismissal and discrimination cases 
was established to satisfy the need for legal certainty of employers. 
The decision in the defence-of-rights Kozlovska case183 includes a 
very interesting finding with regard to the term for defence of rights 
determined by Article 34184. The plaintiff missed the defence of rights 
one-month term because at first she complained to the State human rights 
office, which has an obligation to respond in one month, which in turn led 
to the term for bringing a claim before the court being missed. 
Nevertheless, the national court held that since under Article 34(2) a 
person cannot claim engagement, there is no point in depriving a person 
of the right to claim compensation for unlawful civil action.  
Other types of claims under the Labour law according to Article 
31(1) must be brought within a time limit of two years. According to this 
provision, Gailums185 considers that the right to pay arrears in case of 
discriminatory pay provided by Article 60(2) is restricted retroactively by 
the two-year time limit set forth in Article 31(1) as the generally 
applicable time limit for all types of claims under the Labour law.  
Although in several cases the ECJ has allowed time limits for 
retroactive benefit claim186, nevertheless it has drawn the line between 
interpretation of Directive 79/7 and Directive 76/207 and respectively 
between the remedies available under them. In Colson it ruled that 
compensation must be effective, dissuasive, and proportionate, while in 
Marshall it did not allow an upper limit to be set on compensation. From 
this point of view, setting a two-year limit on the right to claim pay 
arrears to some extent sets an upper limit to the right to claim material 
loss; moreover, it does not allow compensation for material loss to be in 
                                                                                                                                            
182 Case 33-76, Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG et Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das 
Saarland. , European Court reports 1976 Page 01989.
183 Jelgavas tiesas 2006.gada 25.maija spriedums lietā Nr. C 15066406. Decision of Jelgava City court 
delivered on 25th of May 2006 in case No.C 15066406. 
184 Article 34. Consequences of Violating the Prohibition of Differential Treatment when Establishing 
Employment Legal Relationships 
(1) If when establishing employment legal relationships an employer has violated the prohibition of 
differential treatment, the applicant may bring an action to court within one month from the date of 
receipt of refusal by the employer to establish an employment legal relationship with the applicant. 
(2) If employment legal relationships have not been established as a result of violation of the 
prohibition of differential treatment, the applicant does not have the right to request compulsory 
establishment of such relations. 
185 Ingus Gailums, Darba likums. Komentāri. Tiesu prakse, Rīga, 2003, 108.lpp. 
186 See for example, case C-208/90, Theresa Emmott v Minister for Social Welfare and Attorney 
General, European Court reports 1991 Page I-04269 or case C-338/91, H.Steenhorst-Neerings v 
Bestuur van de Bedrijsvereniging voor Detailhandel, Ambachten en Huisvrouwen, European Court 
reports 1993 Page I-05475. 
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an amount that is effective and proportionate and having a deterrent effect 
on the employer.  
In Levez the Court ruled that a national rule limiting an employee’s 
entitlement to arrears of remuneration or damages for breach of the 
principle of equal pay to a period of two years prior to the date on which 
the proceedings were instituted where the employee was misrepresented 
on the level of remuneration is in breach of Community law or more 
particularly the principle of effectiveness187. It follows that the right to 
claim arrears of remuneration according to Article 60(2) cannot be 
restricted to two years prior to the date when the action was brought. Here 
also is inapplicable the condition that in circumstances where the 
employee knew about discriminatory pay but brought an action only after 
some time can be restricted by a two-year limit on arrears188, because 
under Article 60(3) the right to claim compensation for unequal pay is 
restricted to one month from the moment the employee discovered 
discrimination. 
As to the time limit set forth in Article 60(3), this could mislead to 
some extent. According to findings of the Ministry of Welfare189, a one-
month time limit is provided for the purposes of claiming discrimination 
in the past; however, it must be interpreted as allowing at any time 
claiming  equal pay presently and for the future, otherwise employees 
would be deprived of the right to trial . 
 
Time limits and the principle of equivalence 
As mentioned above, the one-month time limit is imposed on all 
discrimination and dismissal cases; other claims under the Labour Law 
are subject to a two-year time limit.  According to the principle of 
equivalence, similar time limits must be applied in cases where the 
purpose and cause of action are similar. 
As regards claims for discriminatory refusal to employ, 
discriminatory treatment, or discriminatory dismissal during a probation 
period - there are no similar claims under national provisions. But 
unequal pay claims could be compared to other claims arising from 
remuneration. For example, an employee has a two-year limit to decide 
whether to claim disbursement of unpaid salary for overtime work. Both 
claims – for discriminatory pay and unpaid overtime work - are claims 
attributable to salary and both are the result of manifestly dishonest 
treatment on the part of the employer; thus according to the principle of 
                                                 
187 Case C-326/96, B.S. Levez v T.H. Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd., European Court reports 1998 Page 
I-07835, paragraphs 32 and  34. 
188 Case C-326/96, B.S. Levez v T.H. Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd., European Court reports 1998 Page 
I-07835, paragraph 20. 
189 Interview with Māris Badovskis director of EU law department of Ministry of Welfare. 
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equivalence a claim for equal pay must be extended to a two-year time 
limit according to Article 31(1). 
In case of dismissal under Article 123, a person can claim an 
extension of one month for bringing a claim for unlawful dismissal. It is 
for the court to decide whether delay in bringing the claim is justified or 
not. Such possibility for extension of time limit is not provided for cases 
of discriminatory refusal to employ, discriminatory dismissal during a 
probation period, and discriminatory treatment, although in these cases an 
individual could be subject to justified delay. Although dismissal cases 
are not similar to discrimination cases, nevertheless it is necessary to take 
into account the role played by the provisions in the procedure as 
whole190. Since a one-month time limit is quite short, clearly the idea of 
Article 123 is not to deprive a dismissed employee of the right to trial in 
case of important reasons impeding bringing the claim, such as illness for 
example. Since the objective of Article 123 is observance of the 
fundamental right to trial, a one-month time limit in discrimination cases 
must be subject to prolongation, otherwise it would be in breach of the 
principle of equivalence.  
The problem with regard to observance of the principle of 
equivalence becomes more serious when analysing the character of time 
limits provided by the Labour Law from the standpoint of legal theory. 
Kalniņš191 argues that the one-month time  limit set forth in Article 122 is 
a preclusive term, while the general two-year time limit set forth in 
Article31(1) is a negative prescription term. A preclusive term limits the 
right to a particular already-prescribed period which cannot be stopped or 
interrupted, while a negative prescription time can be stopped or 
interrupted; besides, observance of a preclusive term is an obligation of 
the court by its own motion, while a negative prescription time must be 
observed only if required by the defendant. He also points out that such 
claims as claims for payment of salary provided by Article 69 or claims 
for payment of average wage in case of downtime provided by Article 
74(1) are governed by the time limit set forth in Article 31(1) or negative 
prescription term. This means that, similar to the claims mentioned, an 
equal pay claim is governed not only by a shorter period for bringing the 
claim, but the type of term as such is different and less favourable192. 
 
                                                 
190 Case C-326/96, B.S. Levez v T.H. Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd., European Court reports 1998 Page 
I-07835, paragraph 44. 
191 Kalniņš E., Prasība par atjaunošanu darbā. Latvijas Vēstnesis, Jurista Vārds, 2004. 6.aprīlis, nr.13 , 
according to him, preclusive term in German is Ausschlussfrist, negative prescription term – 
Verjahrung.  
192 Supreme Court of Latvia in decision delivered on 19th of May 2004 in case No.SKC-229 follows 
the view of Erlens Kalniņš on the character of the one-month term provided by Article 122 of the 
Labour law governing claims for dismissal as a preclusive term. 
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Rights of ex-employees 
Article 6(1) of Directive 2002/73 requires that a person must have the 
right to equal treatment even after the relationship in which the 
discrimination is alleged to have occurred has ended. This provision has 
its roots in the Coote193 case, where a worker after an employment 
relationship had ended was refused references from the previous 
employer as a reaction to legal proceedings brought to enforce 
compliance with equal treatment and thus causing adverse consequences.  
The wording of Article 6(1) of Directive 2002/73 extends the Coote 
judgment by applying the right to sue the previous employer not only to 
victimisation cases but to all unequal treatment cases. In particular, this 
means that Article 9 - providing for prohibition of adverse consequences - 
and Article 95 - providing for equal treatment - must be extended to ex-
employees. Presently, both articles refer to actually employed persons 
only, although proper implementation of Article 6(1) of Directive 
2002/73 obviously requires explicit references to ex-employees too. 
 
Burden of proof 
The principle of reversed burden of proof under Latvian labour law is 
applicable in cases of cause of adverse consequences, all discrimination 
and all dismissal cases. This is provided in Articles 9(2)194, 29(3) and 
125195 respectively. Article 29(3) provides how the burden of proof must 
be shifted to the employer: 
 
(3) If in case of a dispute an employee indicates conditions which may 
serve as a basis for his or her direct or indirect discrimination based on 
gender, the employer has a duty to prove that the differential treatment is 
based on objective circumstances not related to the gender of the 
employee, or also that belonging to a particular gender is an objective and 
substantiated precondition for performance of the relevant work or the 
relevant employment. 
 
                                                 
193 Case C-185/97, Belinda Jane Coote v Granada Hospitality Ltd., European Court reports 1998 Page 
I-05199. 
194 Article 9.  Prohibition on Causing Adverse Consequences 
… 
(2) In case of dispute, if the employee can specify circumstances which could give rise to adverse 
consequences, it is for the employer to prove that sanctions applied to an employee or otherwise 
directly or indirectly caused adverse consequences on him is not due to exercise of employment rights 
in a permissible manner 
195 Article 125.  Duty of Burden of Proof 
The employer has a duty to prove that a notice of termination of an employment contract has a 
legal basis and complies with the specified procedure for termination of an employment 
contract. In other cases when an employee has brought an action in court for reinstatement at 
work, the employer has a duty to prove that, when dismissing the employee, he or she has not 
violated the right of the employee to continue employment legal relationships. 
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In general, Article 29(3) introduces a requirement of EC law. 
However, there is some imprecision. First, the wording of Article 29(3) 
gives the right to an actually employed worker only, while the reversed 
burden of proof is applicable to a candidate and to an ex-employee. 
Although the principle of indirect effect requires the Latvian court to 
interpret Article 29(3) as being applicable to an “unsuccessful” applicant 
or ex-employer too, nevertheless it could result in more complicated 
litigation for claimants, because of the strong tradition in Latvia of 
grammatical interpretation of laws and lack of knowledge of ECJ law.   
Second, for the purpose of more precise implementation the word “facts” 
instead of “conditions” should be used. Third, the wording of Article 
29(3) could lead to an attempt to justify direct discrimination.  
As regards application of the reverse burden of proof in 
discrimination cases, there is the Stūriņas196 case, where the fact of 
discrimination on grounds of sex was proved by the testimony of another 
woman who was orally refused the same vacancy, because “she is a 
woman”. Thus Stūriņas’ allegation of the same orally-expressed 
discriminatory refusal was accepted by the court. However, the strongest 
fact in this case was that Stūriņas had the best qualifications among all 
possible candidates including the person actually employed.  
In the Sants197 case, regarding discrimination on grounds of sexual 
orientation, the facts suggesting that there had been discrimination were 
quite strong. First, Sants is among several persons in Latvia who have 
publicly announced their sexual orientation and this fact was widely 
discussed and reflected in the mass media in Latvia. Second, his 
qualifications were superior to those of the person with whom an 
employment contract was concluded. The court did not accept the claim 
by the respondent that she did know of Sants’ sexual orientation.    
From the cases discussed above it follows that no case has come 
before the Latvian courts based on mere facts, because the facts on 
discrimination in Stūriņa were proved by testimony, but in Sants the facts 
of his orientation were known to almost the entire population, besides his 
qualifications being superior. 
Regarding equal pay, there have been no cases in Latvia. Almost all 
enterprises, including state and municipal employers, stipulate in their 
employment contracts that remuneration is confidential, thus it is almost 
impossible to obtain information regarding pay in an establishment. 
Under Latvian Labour law, only a representative of workers may access 
salary data to check the situation regarding equal pay. However, such 
institutions as worker’s representatives or labour unions operate only in 
                                                 
196 Cēsu rajona tiesas 2005.gada 3.janvāra spriedums lietā Nr.C11019405. 
197 Rīgas pilsētas Ziemeļu rajona tiesas 2005.gada 29.aprīļa spriedums lietā Nr.C32242904047505, C-
475/3. 
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several enterprises and sectors of industry. The situation is made even 
worse by so-called “envelope salaries”. This means that a considerable 
proportion of workers in Latvia officially receive minimum wages and 
the rest “in an envelope”, because most employers do not want to bear the 
burden of income taxes and state social insurance198. Those workers are 
deprived of any chance to claim equal pay.  
It follows that in Latvia it is almost impossible for an employee to 
establish any statistics regarding salaries in an establishment. The only 
possible way effectively to enforce the right to equal pay is for the 
national court to accept rumour and suspicion expressed by the employee 
as a sufficient fact for shifting the burden of proof to the employer.  
It is also difficult to prove discriminatory refusal to employ. The 
Labour law, in particular Article 34(1), does not explicitly provide that 
refusal to employ must be in written form or that reasons for refusal must 
be provided. The recent Kozlovska199 case on refusal to employ on 
grounds of nationality was successfully challenged only because the 
employer gave her written notice where the discriminatory reason was 
explicitly stated200. In particular, the written notice explicitly provided 
that the reason for rejection was her inability to speak in accent-free 
Latvian. It is doubtful whether she would otherwise have succeeded.  
This case was broadly reflected by the mass media, thus almost all 
employers have learned a good lesson that it is not a good idea to give 
written notice. This situation demonstrates that the legislator is under 
obligation to adjust the Labour law in order to provide individuals with 
effective means for maintaining their rights in case of discriminatory 
refusal to employ. 
According to Article 4(3) of Directive 97/80, discrimination cases 
adjudicated by the administrative court are not subject to the reverse 
burden of proof because administrative procedure is based on the 
objective investigation principle conducted by the administrative court. 
Administrative courts are the only competent institutions for state 
officials regarding their employment issues, including possible 
discrimination. The reverse burden of proof is not applicable in criminal 
proceedings, which are governed by the presumption of innocence.  
 
State liability under Latvian law 
As described above, persons can claim reparation for loss and damage 
under the principle of state liability under the same conditions laid down 
                                                 
198 No institution has even provisional data on how much of the employment market consists of 
workers who receive their real salary “in an envelope”   
199 Jelgavas tiesas 2006.gada 25.maija spriedums lietā Nr. C 15066406. Decision of Jelgava City court 
delivered on 25th of May 2006 in case No.C 15066406. 
200 Jelgavas tiesas 2006.gada 25.maija spriedums lietā Nr. C 15066406. Decision of Jelgava City court 
delivered on 25th of May 2006 in case No.C 15066406. 
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for reparation of loss and damage for breach of national law, but those 
conditions must correspond to the principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence201. In Latvia, State liability is provided for by the Law on 
calculation and reimbursement of loss and damage caused by state 
administration institutions202. Although under the State liability principle 
whatever organ of state is liable the Law on calculation and 
reimbursement of loss and damage caused by state administration 
institutions regulates reimbursement of loss and damage caused by state 
administration institutions. No law provides for compensation for loss 
and damage caused by legislative or judicial power, although the same 
law could be applied by analogy.  
As to specific provisions of the Law on calculation and 
reimbursement of loss and damage caused by state administration 
institutions, here issues discussed in Factortame III emerge.  First, Article 
11 of the law obliges a person to show reasonable diligence in limiting 
the extent of loss and damage; second, Article 8(2) allows for 
compensation for lost profit; third, since the administrative process 
provides for the principle of objective investigation carried out by the 
court, a person is not under obligation to prove fault on the part of the 
state institution. The only incompatibility with EC law is provided by 
Article 15(3), which sets an upper limit for compensation for moral 
damage. Thus in certain cases the Law on calculation and reimbursement 
of loss and damage caused by state administration institutions does not 
allow for commensurate compensation and thus does not correspond to 
the principle of effectiveness.  
 
                                                 
201 Joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93, Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The 
Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others, European Court reports 
1996 Page I-01029, paragraphs 67-70. 
202 Valsts pārvaldes iestāžu nodarīto zaudējumu atlīdzināšanas likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 
2005. 17.jūnijs, nr.96 (3254) (Law on compensation for loss and damage caused by institutions of state 
administration) 
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Chapter 9. 
Recast Directive 2006/54 
Recently, four EC sex equality law directives - 75/117, 76/207, 86/378 
and 97/80 - were unified in one recast Directive 2006/541. The purpose of 
the recast is to bring together these directives in a single text as well as to 
codify developments arising out of the case-law of the ECJ. Importantly, 
since the Treaty of Amsterdam there is a single legal basis allowing 
adoption of legislative measures concerning equal treatment and equal 
pay in employment and occupation as provided by Article 141(3). 
From Article 1 it follows that equal pay in the future will constitute 
a working condition and that the term ‘equal treatment’ will comprise 
access to employment, promotion, vocational training, working 
conditions, including pay and occupational social security schemes. 
Further, Article 2 defines such concepts as direct and indirect 
discrimination, harassment, and sexual harassment as well as pay and 
occupational social security schemes, thus extending and defining 
concepts not explicitly provided for by Directives 75/117, 86/378 and 
differently by Directive 97/802. 
Articles 5 to 13 of the Recast Directive deal with occupational 
social security schemes. There are several new provisions. First, part 2 of 
Article 7, which defines the material scope of equal treatment as regards 
occupational social security schemes, codifies the cases of Beune3 and 
Niemi4, where the ECJ held that occupational social security schemes for 
civil servants fall within the concept of pay if paid by reason of the 
employment relationship. Article 13 provides for the right for both sexes 
to claim flexible pensionable age under the same conditions. 
Articles 14 to 16 provide for rights to equal treatment as regards 
access to employment, vocational training, promotion, and working 
conditions. Articles 15 and 16 require workers after maternity, paternity 
and adoption leave to be provided with working conditions no less 
favourable, and to benefit from any improvement in working conditions 
to which they would have been entitled during their absence. True, those 
provisions are identical to the provisions contained in Article 2(7) of 
amended Directive 76/207; however now, according to Articles 1(b) and 
14(1)(c), working conditions comprise pay, too. So, the Recast Directive 
under identical provisions grants entitlement to more rights. This means 
                                                 
1 Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July 2006 on the 
implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in 
matters of employment and occupation (recast), OJ L 204, 26.07.2006. p. 23 – 36. 
2 Definition of indirect discrimination given in Article 2(2) of Directive 97/80 and not allowing for 
hypothetical comparison. 
3 Case C-7/93, Bestuur van het Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds v G. A. Beune, European Court 
reports 1994 Page I-04471.
4 Case C-351/00, Pirkko Niemi, European Court reports 2002 Page I-07007.
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that in future the ECJ will not have to rule on the distinction between the 
concepts of equal treatment and equal pay5.  
Further follows title III, providing for horizontal provisions, which 
means that the Member States must implement the obligations envisaged 
in this title as regards all rights stipulated in previous titles. Article 17 
defined obligations on the Member States as regards defence of rights, 
which are more elaborated than presently provided by Directives 75/117 
and 86/378. The same is true of Article 18, which explicitly provides for 
the right to compensation or reparation in case of unequal pay.  
The provisions of burden of proof will be extended explicitly as 
regards occupational social security schemes. Presently neither Directive 
86/378 nor Directive 97/80 provide for reversed burden of proof. 
However, it is true that that occupational social security schemes are 
covered by that right via Article 141 as provided by Article 3(1) of 
Directive 97/80. The right to reversed burden of proof will be limited as 
regards Directive 92/85. Now according to Article 3(1) of Directive 
97/80, all discrimination matters of Directive 92/85 are provided by the 
right to reversed burden of proof, but after coming into force of the 
Recast Directive and subsequent repeal of Directive 97/80, the reversed 
burden of proof will not be applicable as regards discrimination in the 
field of social security arising from special protection during pregnancy 
and maternity, since Article 19 of the Recast Directive - unlike Article 
3(1) of Directive 97/80 - will not be applicable in statutory social security 
matters. Provisions of actions of equality bodies as provided by Article 20 
will be extended to equal pay and occupational social security matters. 
This provision also refers to future bodies such as the European Institute 
for Gender Equality.      
A new provision is provided by Article 26, which requires the 
Member States to take such positive obligations as prevention of 
discrimination. Importantly, Article 29 requires Member States to apply 
gender mainstreaming in all legislative documents and policies 
concerning areas of the Recast Directive. This means that the Member 
States are obliged to assess the impact on the lives of men and women as 
regards equal opportunities of all new legislative acts or policies at the 
stage of their elaboration, adoption, and implementation6. The 
requirement on gender mainstreaming was introduced by Directive 
2002/73 and provided by Article 1a of amended Directive 76/207, but it 
did not embrace equal pay issues. Although the concept of gender 
mainstreaming was widely used in policy-related areas, it was not defined 
explicitly by a legislative document until adoption of the Recast 
Directive.  
                                                 
5 See in this regard the section on Equal pay. 
6 See also Ruth Nielsen, European Labour Law, DJOF Publishing, 2000, at page 242 
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Interestingly, Article 28 stipulates that the provisions of the Recast 
Directive are without prejudice to national provisions providing for 
special protection of women during pregnancy and maternity. This means 
that EC law sets minimum requirements as regards special protection 
during that period, and as regards the rest, the Member States have a wide 
margin of discretion on how to protect these rights going beyond 
minimum rights provided. Recast Directive 2006/54 should be 
implemented by 15 August 2008, but Directive 75/117, 76/207, 86/378 
and 97/80 will be repealed from 15 August 2009. 
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Part III.  
Rights of persons with regard to child-birth 
 
Chapter 10. 
Rights during pregnancy 
This section deals with International, EC, and Latvian law affecting 
women during pregnancy. The period of pregnancy which coincides with 
maternity leave is not included. Rights during this period will be 
discussed in the next chapter dealing with issues within the period of 
maternity leave.  
 
International Law 
Only two international law documents explicitly provide for special 
protection of pregnant persons. These are the United Nations Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women1 and 
International Labour Organization Maternity protection Convention 
No.183. 
Article 11 CEDAW requires State parties to prohibit dismissal on 
grounds of pregnancy and to provide special protection to women during 
pregnancy in work which is harmful. 
The ILO Maternity protection convention elaborates more on 
protection of pregnant workers. Article 3 provides that State parties must 
ensure that a pregnant worker does not carry out work prejudicial to the 
health of mother and child. However, the convention does not specify 
what agents could be dangerous to the health of a pregnant worker2. 
Article 8 declares illegal dismissal on grounds of pregnancy. The 
provisions of Article 9(2) preclude such requirements as an obligation to 
provide a medical certificate or pregnancy test for a candidate save in 
exceptional cases where performance of the intended work is precluded 
by national legislation or could pose a significant risk to health. Article 5 
imposes the right for leave if a medical certificate during pregnancy 
requires it due to risks arising out of pregnancy. 
Both international law documents are quite blurred as regards 
obligations of health and safety requirements for pregnant workers, 
because nether CEDAW nor the Maternity protection convention 
specifies particular dangerous agents. What is clear is: prohibition of 
dismissal on grounds of pregnancy. Although the provisions of Article 
9(2) were intended for the purposes of health and safety protection of 
                                                 
1 Hereinafter CEDAW. 
2 The matter of working conditions for pregnant workers is little elaborated by Recommendation 
No.191.  
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pregnant workers, nevertheless they allow for discrimination, interference 
in private life and consequent refusal to employ on grounds of pregnancy 
thus endangering the health of a pregnant candidate.  Moreover, Article 
9(2)(a) allows State parties legally to define by national legislation 
instances other than those dangerous for health of a pregnant person when 
a pregnancy test may be declared. Such a provision contravenes ILO 
Discrimination convention No.111, which prohibits any discrimination on 
grounds of sex. 
 
EC law 
EC legislative documents 
Under EC law there are two legislative documents which explicitly 
provide for rights of pregnant persons. The EC Treaty itself does not 
contain any specific provision regarding protection of pregnant persons. 
However, EU institutions have adopted several secondary legislation 
documents dealing with this issue.  
The title of Directive 92/85 on the introduction of measures to 
encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant 
workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding 
testifies to the purpose of the directive. Directive 92/85 is based on 
Article 138 (previously 118a) and Article 16(1) of Directive 89/391 
referring to the necessity to adopt legislative acts in order to protect 
especially vulnerable groups. More particularly, Directive 92/85 was 
officially adopted with the purpose of promoting health and safety of 
workers provided by Article 137.I, as is explicitly stated in Article 1 of 
the Directive defining the purpose of this act.   
However, several facts testify that Directive 92/85 has a double 
purpose, i.e., not only to protect health and safety of pregnant workers, 
but also to ensure equal treatment. The ninth recital of the Preamble of 
Directive 92/85 indicates that protection of the safety and health of 
pregnant workers, workers who have recently given birth, or workers who 
are breastfeeding shall not result in less favourable treatment as regards 
directives on equal treatment between men and women. The problem of 
official recognition of the double aim of the directive originates from lack 
of legal basis in the EC Treaty at the time of adoption of Directive 92/85 
which would allow adoption of a secondary legislative act for protection 
of pregnant workers on grounds of equal treatment; thus, reasons of 
health and safety was used. As to this, a reference appears in the 
preamble of Directive 92/85 on the purpose of equal treatment and the 
fact that Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207 is not able to deal with all 
situations coming before the ECJ. 
Indeed, Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207 gives very poor regulation 
regarding special protection of women during pregnancy and maternity. 
 160
This has already been discussed above in the section on direct 
discrimination, in particular that the legislator had another intention by 
inserting Article 2(3) into Directive 76/207. However, the ECJ in Dekker3 
gave an opposite interpretation to that intended. Moreover, because the 
wording and context of this provision itself is quite unclear, the ECJ in a 
number of cases had to reject arguments of Member States who tried to 
justify different discriminatory provisions on grounds of protection of 
pregnancy and maternity4. However, after adoption of Directive 92/85 the 
ECJ took a new approach as regards protection of pregnant workers and 
workers on maternity leave and afterwards. In case-law subsequent to 
adoption of Directive 92/85, the Court seems to feel as having been given 
the green light for elaborating higher protection for workers during 
pregnancy and the maternity period and afterwards5. On the other hand, 
the appearance of Directive 92/85 has caused considerable problems on 
whether pregnancy and maternity protection remain within the equality 
debate. This will be discussed further below. 
Directive 76/207 itself is also based on the provisions of the EC 
Treaty, which does not say a word about the principle of equal treatment, 
namely Article 308 (ex-article 235). So initially Directive 76/207 was 
adopted in the interests of proper operation of the common market. As 
Bruun argues6, Directive 76/207 was adopted in order to improve the 
situation with shortage of workforce which occurred during the 1970s. 
However, since the Treaty of Amsterdam has amended the EC Treaty 
with several provisions on equal treatment between men and women, 
amendments to Directive 76/207 adopted in 2002 have given another 
legal basis. Directive 2002/737 was adopted on the basis of Article 
141(3), which explicitly empowers EU institutions to adopt secondary 
legislative acts in order to ensure equal treatment between men and 
women in matters of employment and occupation8. Article 2(7) paragraph 
3 of amended Directive 76/207 explicitly provides: 
                                                 
3 Case C-177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichtig Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassen 
(VJV-Centrum) Plus, (1990) ECR page I-03941. 
4 See for example cases C-222/84, 312/86. 
5 For example starting with case C-421/92, Gabriele Habermann-Beltermann v Arbeiterwohlfahrt, 
Bezirksverband Ndb./Oof.e.V., European Court Reports 1994 Page I-01657 and going further with case 
C-32/93, Carole Louise Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd., European Court Reports 1994 Page I-
03567 and C-136/95, Caisse nationale d’assurance vieillesse des travailleurs salaries (CNAVTS) v 
Evelyne Thibault, European Court Reports 1998 Page I-02011.
6 Professor Niklas Bruun, at European Workshop “Perspective and Methods in EU Labour Law” in 
Visby, Sweden, 19-21 June, 2006. 
7 Directive 2002/73/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 September 2002 
amending Council Directive 76/207/EEC on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for 
men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions, OJ L 269/15, 05.10.2002. 
8 See also Christa Tobler, Sex Equality Law under the Treaty of Amsterdam, European Journal of Law 
Reform, Vol.2, No.1. 
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Less favourable treatment of women related to pregnancy and maternity 
leave within the meaning of Directive 92/85/EEC shall constitute 
discrimination within the meaning of this directive. 
 
Equal pay 
Pay matters during pregnancy are governed by Article 141 and Directive 
75/117, but some special aspects by Directive 92/85.  
 
Directive 86/613 
Directive 86/6139 in the period of pregnancy is applicable only so far as 
its Article 4 refers to equal treatment as defined in Directive 76/207 and 
so far as Article 8 obliges the Member States to examine conditions 
regarding possibility of pregnant female self-employed persons and 
pregnant wives of self-employed persons to have access to services of 
temporary replacements or national social services and to be entitled to 
cash benefits under social security schemes.    
 
Directive 79/7 
This matter is covered by Directive 79/710 on equal treatment between 
men and women in matters of social security, which is applicable to 
workers, self-employed as well as persons on involuntary unemployment 
and persons seeking employment. Directive 79/7 is applicable during 
pregnancy, too. 
 
Pay and allowances 
Article 5 of Directive 92/85 provides that where work is considered 
dangerous for the health of a pregnant worker, other working conditions 
or working hours must temporarily be adjusted or the worker must be 
moved to healthy work, but if this is impossible, the worker must be 
granted leave for the whole period necessary to protect her safety. The 
same principle applies to night work. According to Article 7, if a medical 
certificate states that night work is dangerous for a pregnant worker, then 
she must be transferred to daytime work or leave work.  Article 11(1) 
provides that while a pregnant worker is moved to other work or leave is 
granted to her, payment must be maintained in accordance with the 
employment contract or adequate allowance in accordance with national 
legislation. 
                                                 
9 Council Directive 86/613/EEC of 11 December 1986 on the application of the principle of equal 
treatment between men and women engaged in an activity, including agriculture, in a self-employed 
capacity, and on the protection of self-employed women during pregnancy and motherhood, OJ L 359, 
19.12.1986 P.0056-0058. 
10 Council Directive 79/7/EEC of 19 December 1978 on the progressive implementation of the 
principle of equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security, OJ L 006, 10.01.1979 P 
0024-0025. 
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Interpretation of those provisions is given in Padersen11. One of 
the questions referred to the ECJ was whether Danish legislation - 
providing that an employer that considers it impossible to provide work 
for a pregnant employee can send the employee home and pay her half of 
her salary - is compatible with EC law. The answer was no. The Court 
pointed out that such provision is obviously designed to preserve the 
interests of the employer12 and that Directives 76/207 and 92/85 require 
full pay to the pregnant worker if the employer cannot provide her with 
safe work13. It follows that Article 11(1) obliges the employer to pay full 
salary.  
However, no clear answer was given as regards the second part of 
Article 11(1) providing for “adequate allowance” ensured in accordance 
with national legislation or practice. Most probably “adequate allowance” 
provided by national legislation or practice is not in the form of pay but 
rather in the form of social allowance provided by state or municipal 
authorities. As to the level of sick pay for absences connected with 
pregnancy-related illness, the ECJ only pointed out that Directive 92/85 
only allows a ceiling on maternity leave allowance14, but did not deal 
explicitly with what sum of money - in cases where the employer cannot 
provide the pregnant worker with safe working conditions – constitutes 
an “adequate allowance” provided by Article 11(1).  
Besides, Article 7(2)(b) explicitly allows granting of extended 
maternity leave instead of simple paid leave. Although the Court has held 
that Article 11(1) obliges an employer to grant full pay during that leave, 
nevertheless the legislator can “rename” compulsory leave as an 
“extension of maternity leave”. If this is so, then the employer is no under 
obligation to pay a pregnant worker full pay but instead sick pay only at 
the level provided for by national social security legislation15. 
Consequently, Directive 92/85 leaves space for manoeuvre as regards pay 
during leave for pregnant employees granted due to inability of the 
employer to adjust safe working conditions during pregnancy. However, 
the issue regarding extended maternity leave is not so simple, because no 
one could compel women to go on maternity leave other than two 
compulsory weeks16.  
                                                 
11 Case C-66/96, Handels – og Kontorfunktionerernes Forbund I Danmark, acting on behalf of Berit 
huj Pedersen v Fellesforeningen for Danmarks Brugsforeninger and Dansk Tandlegeforening and 
Kristelig Funktioner-Organisation v Dansk Handel & Service, ECR 1998 Page I-07327. 
12 Ibid., para. 56. 
13 Ibid., para. 58. 
14 Case C-66/96, Handels – og Kontorfunktionerernes Forbund I Danmark, acting on behalf of Berit 
huj Pedersen v Fellesforeningen for Danmarks Brugsforeninger and Dansk Tandlegeforening and 
Kristelig Funktioner-Organisation v Dansk Handel & Service, ECR 1998 Page I-07327, paragraph 39. 
15 Case C-411/96, Margaret Boyle and Others v Equal Opportunities Commission, ECR 1998 Page I-
06401, paragraph 35. 
16 Article 8(2) of Directive 92/85. 
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Besides, according to Article 11(4) the Member States can make 
entitlement to “adequate allowance” subject to the condition of eligibility 
for such benefits, although those conditions may not provide for periods 
exceeding 12 months prior to the date of confinement. It follows that 
adequate allowance provided by national legislation or practice referred 
to in Article 11(1) shall not be in the amount of full pay. Although 
Directive 92/85 - unlike regarding maternity allowance - does not put a 
ceiling on the allowance in question17, it does not prohibit national law or 
practice from providing for whatever amount it wishes, presumably on 
condition that adequate allowance under national provisions may not be 
so low “as to undermine the objective of protecting pregnant workers”18. 
Another question concerned the distinction made by national 
legislation between the amount of general sick pay and the amount of sick 
pay due to absences on account of pregnancy-related illness, which was 
half of ordinary sick pay. The Court recalled that sick pay provided by the 
employer falls within the concept of pay under Article 141 and held that 
less favourable treatment of sick workers on account of pregnancy is 
based essentially on pregnancy and thus discriminatory19. The situation 
would correspond to the principle of equal pay only if “sums received by 
employees by way of benefits were equal to the amount of their pay”20. 
 However, this does not necessarily mean that a sick pregnant 
worker is entitled to full pay or an allowance in the amount of full pay. 
The particular circumstances of the Pedersen case must be taken into 
account, namely, that a worker had the right to receive full pay in case of 
sickness, thus full pay here means the same sickness allowance as under 
the general scheme. As regards a possible distinction between general 
sick pay and sick allowance provided by national authorities for a worker 
absent due to pregnancy-related illness, the Court advised the national 
court to be careful as regards observation of the equal pay principle, even 
if the amount of both general sick pay and sick allowance for a sick 
pregnant worker is the same.  
Indeed, this issue would require whether to adopt the approach 
taken by the ECJ in Birds Eye Walls21, where all circumstances  - the 
equal pay principle and statutory provisions - were taken into account, 
and departure from strict application of the equal pay principle was 
                                                 
17 Case C-66/96, Handels – og Kontorfunktionerernes Forbund I Danmark, acting on behalf of Berit 
huj Pedersen v Fellesforeningen for Danmarks Brugsforeninger and Dansk Tandlegeforening and 
Kristelig Funktioner-Organisation v Dansk Handel & Service, ECR 1998 Page I-07327, paragraph 39. 
18 Case C-191/03, North Western Health Board v Margaret McKenna, OJ C 281, 22/11/2005, p.2.
19 Case C-66/96, Handels – og Kontorfunktionerernes Forbund I Danmark, acting on behalf of Berit 
huj Pedersen v Fellesforeningen for Danmarks Brugsforeninger and Dansk Tandlegeforening and 
Kristelig Funktioner-Organisation v Dansk Handel & Service, ECR 1998 Page I-07327, paragraph 36. 
20 Ibid., para. 36. 
21 Case C-132/92, Birds Eye Walls Ltd. v Friedel M.Roberts, European Court Reports 1993 Page I-
05579. 
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justified by equality of outcome, or to decide that a sick pregnant worker 
is entitled to positive measures, namely, the right to receive sick pay 
under general terms from her employer plus an allowance from the 
national authority on account of disadvantages she experienced due to 
pregnancy-related illness22.    
As regards the issue whether a pregnant worker on sick leave due 
to pregnancy-related illness can claim better pay conditions than other 
sick workers, the ECJ in McKenna held not.23 The Court first explained 
why absence due to pregnancy-related illness must be distinguished from 
absence due to other illness as regards dismissal conditions. It stressed 
that in order to ensure health and safety requirements during pregnancy, a 
worker must be protected from dismissal, unlike other sick workers24. 
However, drawing parallels with maternity pay which does not have to be 
in the amount of full salary, the Court concluded that pay during 
pregnancy-related illness does not have to be in full in order to guarantee 
effective protection of a pregnant worker absent due to pregnancy-related 
illness, although provided the principle of equal pay is observed and sick 
pay is the same as under general sick pay conditions25.     
In McKenna, particular attention was drawn to the issue of 
reduction in sick pay after particular periods of absence. Namely, the sick 
pay scheme provided that all employees were entitled to 365 days paid 
sick leave over any period of four years. Full pay was received for 183 
days during a period of 12 months, but if additional sick leave was taken 
during that period then half pay only was provided up to 365 days within 
that four-year period. The question was referred whether sick pay could 
be reduced under this general sick pay scheme in the same way as 
absence due to pregnancy-related illness as to absence due to other 
illnesses. The answer given by the Court is unclear. It states that a female 
worker on sick leave due to pregnancy-related illness and on simple sick 
leave after maternity leave is entitled to sick pay which is not “below the 
minimum amount to which she was entitled over the course of the illness 
which arose during her pregnancy”26. Even more unclear is the obligation 
set forth in paragraph 68 providing that special provisions must therefore 
be implemented in order to prevent such an effect. Since the Court by 
saying this refers to paragraph 62 of the same judgment, this means that 
the words “below the minimum” means that “payment made is not so low 
as to undermine the objective of protection of pregnant workers”, but in 
                                                 
22 Drawing parallels with case C-218/98, Oumar Dabo Abdoulaye and Others v Regie nationale des 
usines Renault SA, ECR 1999 Page I-05723. 
23 Case C-191/03, North Western Health Board v Margaret McKenna, OJ C 281, 22/11/2005, p.2, 
paragraph 62.
24 Ibid., paras. 57 and 58.
25 Ibid., paras. 59to 62.
26 Ibid., paras 67.
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general no other rules than those provided under a general sick pay 
scheme may be applied, because the only thing which must be ensured is 
that “she is treated in the same way as a male worker who is absent on 
grounds of illness”.27 As regards paragraph 68, the only condition here is 
that half of salary provided under a general sickness scheme is not too 
low to undermine the objective mentioned in paragraphs 67 and 62 
respectively. If this is not the case, then it actually allows the conclusion 
that EC law does not require that sick pay after maternity leave must be in 
full, because it does not require it to be so even during sick leave due to 
pregnancy-related illness before maternity leave. It also follows that the 
EC does not provide for the right to claim extension of paid sick leave if a 
worker becomes ill after pregnancy and paid sick leave is exhausted 
during pregnancy-related illness.  
Consequently, pregnancy-related illness is protected only as 
regards not taking into that absence for purposes of calculating an 
absence period allowing dismissal. No special sick pay scheme is 
required for persons absent due to pregnancy-related illness. The general 
sick pay scheme is applicable. The only condition is that during absence 
due to pregnancy-related illness, sick pay under a general sick pay 
scheme cannot be reduced to such a level which would undermine the 
objective of protecting pregnant workers.  
As concerns sick pay due to absence after maternity leave 
connected with pregnancy and birth-giving, a woman is entitled to sick 
pay which is not lower than the minimum amount to which she was 
entitled during illness which arose while she was pregnant. However, the 
Court did not give clear answers to two questions. First, whether after 
maternity leave when 183 days fully paid sick leave expires, the employer 
is allowed to decrease sick pay to half-pay as provided by the general 
sick-pay scheme. What if 183 days fully paid sick leave has expired 
before maternity leave? Second, what sick pay the employer must provide 
to a worker who is sick after maternity leave if the minimum amount of 
sick pay to which a woman was entitled during pregnancy was so low as 
to undermine protection of pregnant workers and the employer 
exceptionally increased that amount? From the wording of the McKenna 
decision it follows that it must be at the previous level. Does this mean 
that a sick worker after maternity leave is entitled to receive sick pay at a 
level which does not undermine the objective of protecting pregnant 
workers? Clearly, that is not what the Court wanted to say. Nevertheless, 
the last paragraph of the second point of the decision is unclear and does 
not give answers to the questions asked above. It follows from the first 
paragraph of the second point of the decision that most probably after 
                                                 
27 Case C-191/03, North Western Health Board v Margaret McKenna, OJ C 281, 22/11/2005, p.2, 
paragraph 62.
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maternity leave the general sick pay scheme is applicable under general 
conditions taking into account the whole period of sick leave taken due to 
pregnancy-related illness that arose before maternity leave.  
Consequently, women who were on sick leave due to pregnancy-
related illness before maternity leave are in a less favourable situation 
than other workers, irrespective of the finding of the court that disorders 
and complications linked to pregnancy and causing incapacity for work 
form part of the risks inherent in the condition of pregnancy and are thus 
a specific feature of that condition.28
 
Equal treatment 
Access  
The Dekker29 case was not only the first case regarding access to work 
connected with pregnancy of a candidate, but also the first case regarding 
pregnancy and equal treatment as such. First, the Court did fundamentally 
find that “only women can be refused employment on grounds of 
pregnancy and such refusal therefore constitutes direct discrimination”30, 
second, that “the absence of a male candidate cannot affect”31 the 
previous finding, thus accepting the hypothetical comparison and third, 
that discrimination of a pregnant candidate, since it is direct, cannot be 
justified by the financial burden put on the employer even if it results 
from national provisions32.   
The second case regarding access of a pregnant candidate was dealt 
with by the Court in Mahlburg33. Mahlburg was employed as an 
operating-theatre nurse under a fixed-term contract, but then an internal 
offer of two vacancies for operating-theatre nurses under an indefinite 
term contract was advertised. She applied for those vacancies. At the 
same time she was pregnant and in order to comply with health and safety 
requirements under national law, Mahlburg was transferred from her 
operating-theatre nurse post to another internal post which did not involve 
any risk of infection. After some time she was refused appointment for 
the post of operating-theatre nurse under an indefinite term contract, 
                                                 
28 Case C-394/96, Mary Brown and Rentokil Limited, European Court Reports 1998 Page I-04185, 
paragraph 22. 
29 Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichtig Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassen (VJV-
Centrum) Plus, (1990) ECR page I-03941. 
30 Case C-177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichtig Vormingscentrum voor Jong 
Volwassen (VJV-Centrum) Plus, (1990) ECR page I-03941, paragraph 12. 
31 Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichtig Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassen (VJV-
Centrum) Plus, (1990) ECR page I-03941, paragraph 17. 
32 Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichtig Vormingscentrum voor Jong Volwassen (VJV-
Centrum) Plus, (1990) ECR page I-03941, paragraph 13. 
33 Case C-207/98, Silke-Karin Mahlburg and Land Meklenburg-Vorpommern, ECR 2000 I-549 
According to the recent ruling in case C-294/04, Carmen Sarkatzis Herrero v Instituto Madrileño de la 
Salud (Imsalud), OJ C 131, 03.06.2006., p.16 Mahlburg concerns access to employment rather than 
promotion. See in this regard the Herrero judgment paragraph 28.  
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because, as the employer contended in written notice, national legislation 
prohibits employing pregnant workers in posts where they are exposed to 
harmful effects of dangerous substances. At the beginning of the 
judgment, the Court makes an interesting distinction. It finds that this is 
not a case of unequal treatment based directly on pregnancy but on 
unequal treatment based on statutory prohibition34. Indeed, in the 
following part there is no word about refusal to accept a pregnant 
candidate for posts involving risk for pregnant workers being direct 
discrimination based exclusively on the fact of pregnancy. Instead, the 
Court elaborated on the principle that special protection during pregnancy 
provided by EC law cannot result in less favourable treatment35. 
However, recognition of direct discrimination follows from the Court’s 
assertion that refusal to employ cannot be justified by financial loss 
which  the employer would suffer by appointing a pregnant woman 
irrespective36 of whether the undertaking is of small or medium size37.    
It must be pointed out that the right to access to employment of 
pregnant persons is governed by Directive 76/207, not by Directive 
92/85. Although one could argue that Directive 92/85 is about health and 
safety, but access to employment is matter of equal treatment or Directive 
76/207, nevertheless parallels could be drawn with dismissal cases, where 
it is recognized that dismissal could negatively affect health of  a woman 
and child or even more, she could decide to terminate her pregnancy38. It 
appears clear beyond doubt that refusal to employ a pregnant worker 
could have the same effect on a pregnant woman as dismissal; thus, 
access issues come within the scope of health and safety issues39. On the 
other hand, EC law health and safety requirements apply so far to 
workers only. Moreover, if application of health and safety requirements 
were extended to pregnant candidates, then how could one distinguish as 
regards health and safety requirements between the most appropriate 
pregnant candidates and other less qualified pregnant candidates? 
Besides, presently according to Colson40 and Hartz41 a Member State is 
                                                 
34 Case C-207/98, Silke-Karin Mahlburg and Land Meklenburg-Vorpommern, ECR 2000 I-549, 
paragraph 21. 
35 Ibid., para. 26. 
36 Ibid., para. 29. 
37 Ibid., para. 28. 
38 In this regard see case C-32/93, Carole Louise Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd., European Court 
reports 1994 Page I-03567, paragraph 21. 
39 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 119, paragraph 
248. 
40 Case C-14/83, Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, European 
Court Reports 1984 page 01891, paragraph 18. 
41 Case C-79/83, Dirut Harz v Deutsche Tradax GmbH, European Court Reports 1984 Page 01921, 
paragraph 18. 
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not obliged to provide the sanction of instatement of a discriminated 
candidate, for if health and safety requirements applied to pregnant 
candidates then their effective protection would be ensured only by way 
of mandatory instatement. It follows that although possible harmful 
effects to the health of a pregnant candidate as a result of discriminatory 
refusal to employ is the same as that of a pregnant worker as a result of 
discriminatory dismissal, nevertheless practical application of extended 
protection of a health and safety requirement to a discriminated candidate 
would pose more uncertainty than practical effect. Besides, Directive 
76/207 is applicable to both cases and provides both – the candidate and 
dismissed worker - the right to claim effective compensation.  
 
Working conditions 
Exposure to agents 
If working duties are liable to involve risks of exposure to the agents 
specified in Annex I of Directive 92/85 and in guidelines adopted in 
accordance with Article 3 of the same Directive, an employer is under 
obligation to assess the nature, degree and duration of exposure to those 
agents and their risks to safety or health and any possible effect on 
pregnancy or breastfeeding. The employer is also obliged to provide all 
protective measures in case of posting of pregnant workers and workers 
who have given birth42
Annex I gives a non-exhaustive list of agents such as physical, 
biological and chemical. The guidelines43 specify physical, biological and 
chemical agents, provide for generic hazards, hazardous working 
conditions and require adjustments to working conditions in order to 
comply with specific needs of pregnant workers and workers who are 
breastfeeding. These include frequent/urgent visits to the toilet, regular 
nutrition, non exposure to nauseating smells, and others. Although such 
working conditions during pregnancy could be of great importance for 
pregnant women, nevertheless the provisions of the Guidelines are not 
legally binding. On that account, a noteworthy ruling of the Court was 
made in Pedersen, where it was held that pregnancy-related minor 
complaints or a mere medical recommendation which does not pose any 
specific risks to pregnancy or an unborn child do not require any special 
                                                 
42 Article 3(1)(f) Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services. Official Journal 
L 018 , 21/01/1997 P. 0001 – 0006. 
43 Communication from the Commission on the guidelines on the assessment of the chemical, physical 
and biological agents and industrial processes considered hazardous for the safety or health of pregnant 
workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (Council Directive 92/85/EEC) 
/* COM/2000/0466 final */ 
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protection44. Although the Court appears to be partially correct, on the 
other hand Foubert also appears to be justified in calling this finding of 
the Court clumsy, because the intention was to say that: 
 
women who decide to stay at home without there being a medical 
certificate attesting to their incapacity to work, are not in the same 
position as sick workers, and therefore, should not be treated as 
sick workers.45
 
On the other hand, the possibility to work during pregnancy is to a great 
extent dependent on the simplest working conditions such as access to 
toilets or nutrition provided by the Guidelines, otherwise the inability of a 
pregnant worker to overcome minor-complaints due to lack of 
appropriate working conditions could result in risk for her health and the 
health of her unborn child. 
Several more Directives provide for specific health and safety 
measures for pregnant workers and workers who are breastfeeding46. If 
assessment reveals risks to the health and safety of a pregnant worker or a 
worker who is breastfeeding, then the employer must temporarily adjust 
safe working conditions or working hours. If adjustment of safe working 
conditions is not possible, then the employer must move the worker to 
another and safer work position. But if such move is also impossible then 
the worker must be granted leave. Article 6 of Directive 92/85 prohibits 
performance of work where a pregnant worker is exposed to agents listed 
in Annex II, section A and where a worker who is breastfeeding is 
                                                 
44 Case C-66/96. Handels – og Kontorfunktionerernes Forbund I Danmark, acting on behalf of Berit 
huj Pedersen v Fellesforeningen for Danmarks Brugsforeninger and Dansk Tandlegeforening and 
Kristelig Funktioner-Organisation v Dansk Handel & Service, ECR 1998 Page I-07327. Paragraph 48. 
45 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 194, paragraph 
433. 
46 See in particular, Council Directive 92/91/EEC of 3 November 1992 concerning the minimum 
requirements for improving the safety and health protection of workers in the mineral- extracting 
industries through drilling (eleventh individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of 
Directive 89/391/EEC). OJ L 348, 28.11.1992, p. 9–24.  
Council Directive 92/57/EEC of 24 June 1992 on the implementation of minimum safety and health 
requirements at temporary or mobile construction sites (eighth individual Directive within the meaning 
of Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC). OJ L 245, 26.8.1992, p. 6–22. 
Council Directive 89/654/EEC of 30 November 1989 concerning the minimum safety and health 
requirements for the workplace (first individual directive within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of 
Directive 89/391/EEC). OJ L 393, 30.12.1989, p. 1–12.
Council Directive 92/104/EEC of 3 December 1992 on the minimum requirements for improving the 
safety and health protection of workers in surface and underground mineral-extracting industries 
(twelfth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC) OJ L 404, 
31.12.1992, p. 10–25. 
Council Directive 96/29/Euratom of 13 May 1996 laying down basic safety standards for the protection 
of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiation. OJ 
L 159, 29.6.1996, p. 1–114..,... 
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exposed to agents listed in Annex II, section B. This means that those 
workers must be moved to another job or granted leave.  
Writers criticise those provisions for allowing employers far too 
much manoeuvre47. They argue that choices given to employers lack 
hierarchy and allow employers “to side-track women who they fear will 
be less productive in the future”. It is suggested that first an employer 
must ensure that it is impossible to adjust safe working conditions and 
only then decide on shorter working hours, then the possibility of a move 
to another job must follow, while granting of leave should be the last 
option only48. The author argues that since Article 2(7) of amended 
Directive 76/207 explicitly provides that women after maternity leave 
must be granted an equivalent post on equivalent terms and conditions 
and according to the principle elaborated by the ECJ that special 
protection during pregnancy cannot lead to less favourable treatment49, 
which means that equivalent job means that occupied before special 
protection because of pregnancy was granted, the law does not allow 
employers to side-track pregnant workers afterwards. The fear is indeed 
true that granting of additional leave does not work in favour of women’s 
professional skills, nor does it guarantee full pay. 
 
Other working conditions 
Article 7 of the Directive provides that if a medical certificate indicates 
that night work is prohibited for the health and safety of a pregnant 
worker or a worker who is breastfeeding, then the worker must be moved 
to day-time work or granted leave or extended maternity leave. As 
Foubert points out: 
 
The extra condition regarding the production of a medical certificate is not 
necessarily at odds with the principle of sex equality in the labour 
market50. 
 
Thus she indicates that the requirement of a medical certificate does not 
mean the legislator’s intent to provide a pregnant worker or a worker who 
is breastfeeding with free choice in line with the principle of equal 
opportunities whether to pursue night work or not.   
                                                 
47 Petra Fourbert, „The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” „Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 113, paragraph 
233. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Case C-136/95. Caisse nationale d’assurance vieillesse des travailleurs salaries (CNAVTS) v 
Evelyne Thibault, European Court Reports 1998 Page I-02011. Paragraph 26.
50 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 114, paragraph 
236. 
 171
Article 9 of Directive 92/85 provides that a pregnant worker has 
the right to ante-natal examinations during working time if it is necessary, 
without loss of pay. 
 
Dismissal 
Article 10 of Directive 92/85 precludes dismissal of a pregnant worker. 
This is allowed only in exceptional cases not connected with pregnancy 
of the worker. Article 10(2) of Directive 92/85 requires that in case of 
dismissal, substantiation must be provided in written form. 
The ECJ has an extended case-law on pregnancy or pregnancy-
related dismissals. The first group of cases concerns dismissal on account 
of absence due to pregnancy-related illness. Altogether there are three 
cases – Hertz51, Larsson52 and Brown53.  
Hertz was dismissed due to absence on account of illness. The 
illness arose after child-birth and confinement as a consequence of it, and 
this fact was common ground between Hertz and her former employer. 
The fact that the illness arose after confinement is very important here; 
nevertheless the national court formulated its question generally, whether 
Article 5(1) in conjunction with Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207 
precludes dismissal on account of absence due to pregnancy- and 
confinement-related illness. The Court’s answer was no, it does not 
preclude such dismissals. In particular, Directive 76/207 does not provide 
for special protection of illness attributable to pregnancy. Besides, the 
Court recognized that there are illnesses typical only for one or other sex; 
however, men and women are equally exposed to illness and if men and 
women are dismissed on account of absence due to illness in the same 
circumstances there is no direct discrimination on grounds of sex54. 
Ms Larsson was dismissed on account of absences due to 
pregnancy-related illness before and after maternity leave. The national 
court was not confident about the ruling in Hertz, because of the 
particular circumstances of that judgment. Although in Hertz the ECJ 
ruled that no absence due to pregnancy-related illness is to be treated 
differently from other illnesses, nevertheless the facts of that case show 
that this was about illness arising after maternity leave. Thus the Danish 
court asked whether it is relevant that the illness arose before maternity 
leave. The Court gave the same answer as in Hertz by clarifying that there 
                                                 
51 Case C-179/88, Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, European Court Reports 1990 Page I-03979. 
52 Case C-400/95, Handels – og Kontorfunktionerernes Forbund I Danmark, acting on behalf of Helle 
Elisabeth Larsson v Dansk Handel & Service, acting on behalf of Futex Supermarked A/S, European 
Court Reports 1997 Page I-02757.
53 Case C-394/96, Mary Brown and Rentokil Limited, European Court Reports 1998 Page I-04185. 
54 Case C-179/88, Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, European Court Reports 1990 Page I-03979, paragraph 17. 
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is no difference when the illness arises - before, during or after maternity 
leave, Directive 76/207 does not provide for special protection of illness 
attributable to pregnancy and confinement. This answer is interesting in 
light of the fact that the Court referred to Directive 92/85, which was 
adopted but not transposed during delivery of the judgment.  In particular, 
it stressed that Article 10 of Directive 92/85 prohibits dismissals “during 
the period from the beginning of their pregnancy and to the end of their 
maternity leave save in exceptional cases unconnected with their 
condition”55, thus dismissals due to absences on account of pregnancy-
related illnesses cannot take place any longer. On the other hand, this 
finding is not applicable to the situation of Ms Larson because the 
transposition period of Directive 92/85 had not yet expired.  
Only a year later, the Court delivered judgment in Brown. Brown 
was dismissed because she was absent for more than 26 weeks – the 
period specified as the dismissal period in her employment contract. She 
was absent due to pregnancy-related illness. The House of Lords before 
the ruling in Larsson referred to the ECJ question whether Directive 
76/207 precludes dismissals on account of absence due to pregnancy-
related illness arising before maternity leave. Although this question was 
almost identical to that referred by the Danish court in Larsson, 
nevertheless the result was absolutely opposite. Eventually, the Court 
recognized that: 
 
disorders and complications, which may cause incapacity for work, form 
part of the risks inherent in the condition of pregnancy and are thus a 
specific feature of that condition56. 
 
Then it went further, specifying - unlike in previous cases - that Article 
2(3) of Directive 76/207 provides not only for protection against 
dismissal during maternity leave but the “principle of non-discrimination, 
for its part, requires similar protection throughout the period of 
pregnancy” 57 and although dismissal occurred at a time when Directive 
92/85 was not even adopted, nevertheless the purpose of that Directive 
and more particularly the provisions of Article 10, must be taken into 
account in the present case58. Finally, it is clear that absences due to 
incapacity for work resulting from pregnancy is a risk inherent to 
pregnancy and thus must be regarded “as essentially based on the fact of 
                                                 
55 Case C-400/95, Handels – og Kontorfunktionerernes Forbund I Danmark, acting on behalf of Helle 
Elisabeth Larsson v Dansk Handel & Service, acting on behalf of Futex Supermarked A/S, European 
Court Reports 1997 Page I-02757, paragraph 25.
56 Case C-394/96, Mary Brown and Rentokil Limited, European Court Reports 1998 Page I-04185, 
paragraph 22. 
57 Ibid., para. 24. 
58 Ibid., paras. 18 and 19. 
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pregnancy”59, thus recognizing - unlike in Hertz and Larsson - that  
pregnancy is not a case where men and women are equally exposed to 
illnesses60.  
The Court recognized the Brown judgment’s inconsistency with its 
previous rulings in Hertz and Larsson by saying “contrary to the Court’s 
ruling in” Larsson61. Such explicit overruling is not a frequent 
phenomenon in the Court’s practice62. The Brown ruling recognizes that 
EC law protects not only women with normal pregnancies but also 
woman with pathological pregnancies63. However, several authors point 
out one deficiency in the Brown judgment – lack of protection after 
maternity leave. The question is, why 
 
… illness attributable to pregnancy, a unique status which deserves 
protection, entails protection only for a certain period of time? 64
 
Why may absence after maternity leave “be taken into account under the 
same conditions as man’s absence, of the same duration, through 
incapacity for work”65? 
One explanation is that the Court chose to apply a substantive 
equality test as regards pregnancy-related illness before maternity leave 
and a comparative test to pregnancy-related illness arising after maternity 
leave66, or substantive and formal equality respectively67. While 
Advocate General Colomer distinguished between normal and abnormal 
pregnancy-related illness, namely, normal – that which arises before 
                                                 
59 Ibid., para. 24. 
60 Case C-179/88, Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk 
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63 Ibid.   
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paragraph 27. 
66 G.F.Mancini and S.O’Lary, The new frontiers of sex equality law in the European Union, (1999) 24 
European Law Review, August, Sweet &Maxwell and Contributors 1999, at page 339. 
67 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 190, paragraph 
336. 
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maternity leave and abnormal – arising after maternity leave68, because 
the 
 
…reason for that distinction lies in the fact that, once a woman has given 
birth and returned from maternity leave, her physiological state is no 
different from that of male workers and, from that time, it is inappropriate 
to draw a distinction by reference to the origin of the illness69. 
 
Interestingly, Advocate General Colomer in his opinion criticises the 
position of the United Kingdom, which proposed to distinguish between 
ordinary or normal risks of pregnancy and abnormal risks of pregnancy 
which occur in the form of illnesses70, therefore in fact himself drawing 
the same wrong line (only in time) between different risks inherent to 
pregnancy. Boch to this extent reminds that the ECJ in Hoffman has 
already defined the purpose of Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207, by saying 
that special protection is intended to protect women until their 
physiological and mental functions have returned to normal after 
childbirth71. Indeed, Advocate General Colomer repeats the same 
mistake, only in a different aspect. He states: 
 
…it is inappropriate to draw parallels or distinctions between two 
pregnant women experiencing more or less easy or problematic 
pregnancies – the point of reference continues to be the male worker.72
 
It follows that although the Brown judgment is a considerable step 
towards substantive equality through recognition that a pregnant woman 
is in a different situation than a sick man, nevertheless formal limitation 
provided by EC law under Directives 76/207 and 92/85 as regards the 
period of protection - from the start of pregnancy and to the end of 
maternity leave - does not guarantee full equality.  
On the other hand, Roseberry argues that one should not 
exaggerate the importance of special protection of pregnant workers in 
case of pregnancy-related illness, because it still occurs in extremely 
                                                 
68 Ibid., at page 190, paragraph 423. 
69 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered on 5 February 1998. Mary Brown v 
Rentokil Ltd. CaseC-394/96. European Court Reports 1998 Page I-04185, paragraph 39. 
70 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered on 5 February 1998. Mary Brown v 
Rentokil Ltd. CaseC-394/96. European Court Reports 1998 Page I-04185, paragraph 63. 
71 Christine Boch, Official: During Pregnancy, Females are Pregnant, European Law Review, October 
(1998) 23, Sweet & Maxwell and Contributors, at page 493, case 184/83. Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer 
Ersatzkasse. ECR 1984 Page 03047. Paragraph 25. 
72 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered on 5 February 1998. Mary Brown v 
Rentokil Ltd. Case C-394/96. European Court Reports 1998 Page I-04185, paragraph 63. However, 
Evelyn Ellis, Recent Development in European Community Sex Equality Law, Common Market Law 
Review, 1998, 35, Kluwer Law International, at page 395 indicates that the approach taken by the 
Court in Hertz and Larsson is preferable, since it is consistent with the structural requirements of 
discrimination law. 
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minor cases73. But Foubert contends that the ECJ in Brown “increased 
protection of (pregnant) women beyond what is necessary to safeguard 
their position in the labour market”74. In her opinion, along with 
Advocates General Colomer and Darmon, excessive protection may lead 
to increase of discrimination, thus worsening women’s position in the 
labour market75.     
The next case to discuss can be put into one line with the 
Mahlburg76 case discussed above. Both Mahlburg and Habermann-
Beltermann77 concern discrimination having its roots in statutory 
requirements for health and safety. Mahlburg was refused as candidate 
for an indefinite term post which involved risks for health because she 
was pregnant at that time. Habermann-Beltermann was engaged for an 
indefinite-term contract for performance of her duties at night time only. 
When she became pregnant, the employer dismissed her on grounds that 
national legislation prohibits employment of pregnant workers at night. 
First, the court recalled that according to Hertz, dismissal of a pregnant 
worker on account of her pregnancy constitutes direct discrimination 
based on sex. Then it started to resolve the question whether a statutory 
provision requiring protection of a pregnant worker could operate by way 
of putting her in a less favourable situation. The Court recognized that 
prohibition of night work for pregnant workers is fully compatible with 
Article 2(3) of the Directive. It pointed out that inability to perform night 
work has a temporal effect, but Habermann-Beltermann had an indefinite 
term contract. Consequently, in those circumstances termination of an 
indefinite term contract for the reason that the pregnant worker could not 
perform her duties temporarily would deprive Article 2(3) of Directive 
76/207 of its effectiveness. 
Mahlburg and Haberman-Belterman caused much uncertainty as 
regards the term of employment agreements, particularly, whether the 
outcome of those cases would be different if both workers had had 
definite term contracts78. This is because the ECJ put special emphasis on 
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74 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
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Ndb./Oof.e.V., European Court Reports 1994 Page I-01657. 
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the fact of indefinite term contracts and temporal inability to perform 
duties. The second matter which raised concern was the phrase in the 
decision “employer and a pregnant employee, both of whom were 
unaware of the pregnancy” when concluding a contract, thus indicating 
that a candidate who is aware of her pregnancy is under obligation to 
inform the employer. Answers all to those questions the ECJ gave later in 
Tele Danmark79 discussed below.   
One more matter which the ECJ failed to do in Haberman-
Belterman was to refer to Directive 92/85, which at the time of delivery 
of the judgment was adopted. This is especially important because Article 
7 of Directive 92/85 deals with night work. In particular, from the 
wording of Article 7(1) read in conjunction with Article 2(a) of the same 
Directive, it follows that it is up to the pregnant worker to choose whether 
to work at night or not. Article 2(a) provides that an employer must 
provide a pregnant worker with safe working conditions only if she 
informs, but Article 7(1) provides that exemption from night work is 
conditional upon a medical certificate indicating that night work is indeed 
risky for the particular worker.  
Most probably at the time of delivery of the Haberman-Belterman 
judgment, none of the judges realised that first, not all pregnancies are 
exposed to risk due to night work and second, that night work is the 
subject of free choice of any pregnant women. Therefore, in substance the 
ECJ by holding that a total prohibition of night work is compatible with 
Article 2(3), went in contradiction with its previous case-law on 
prohibition of night work for all women. In Stoeckel the court, although 
recalling that Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207 could allow a ban on night 
work80, nevertheless indicated that prohibition of night work would lead 
to exclusion of women from undertaking night work, and, moreover, it 
could be a source of discrimination81. The equal treatment principle 
requires that pregnant women must be able to undertake night work, too, 
consequently diminishing the risk of possible discrimination against all 
pregnant workers or candidates. 
In the following Webb judgment, delivered only two months after 
Habermann-Beltermann, the Court for the first time refers to Directive 
92/85 or more particularly to Article 10 by saying: 
 
In view of the harmful effects which the risk of dismissal may have on the 
physical and mental state of women who are pregnant, have recently given 
birth or are breastfeeding, including the particularly serious risk that 
                                                 
79 Case C-109/00, Tele Danmark A/S and Handels – og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark 
(HK), European Court Reports 2001 Page I-6993. 
80 Case C-345/89. Criminal proceedings against Alfred Stoeckel, European Court Reports 1991 Page I-
04047. Paragraph 15. 
81 Ibid.,  para. 19. 
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pregnant women may be prompted voluntarily to terminate their 
pregnancy, the Community legislature subsequently provided, pursuant to 
Article 10 of Council Directive 92/85/EEC of 19 October 1992 on the 
introduction of measures to encourage improvements in the safety and 
health at work of pregnant workers and workers who have recently given 
birth or are breastfeeding (OJ 1992 348, p. 1), for special protection to be 
given to women, by prohibiting dismissal during the period from the 
beginning of their pregnancy to the end of their maternity leave.  
Furthermore, Article 10 of Directive 92/85 provides that there is to be no 
exception to, or derogation from, the prohibition on the dismissal of 
pregnant women during that period, save in exceptional cases not 
connected with their condition82. 
 
The Court indicates that the national court when interpreting Directive 
76/207 is under obligation to take into account Directive 92/85 although 
dismissal took place when it was not even adopted. As regards the facts 
of case, Mrs Webb was employed as a replacement for another worker on 
maternity leave but on an indefinite term contract. When Webb 
discovered that she was pregnant and informed her employer, she was 
dismissed.  
The Court once again rejected the argument of proper functioning of 
the undertaking and based its decision - that such dismissal was 
discriminatory – on the previously elaborated approach that a contract 
was concluded for an indefinite term, so that the worker is prevented 
from performance of her duties only temporarily. It pointed out that the 
fact that Webb was recruited for the purpose of replacing another 
pregnant worker does not affect the decision. Such a distinctive approach 
taken by the Court as regards definite and indefinite term contracts was 
sharply criticized by Foubert, who argues that: 
 
The Court thereby encourages employers, in an attempt to safeguard their 
market position, to recruit temporary staff, for temporary workers can 
easily be dismissed in case of pregnancy. This type of judgment induces 
employers to statistically discriminate against women when hiring labour 
force83. 
 
Finally, in Tele Danmark - delivered seven years after Webb - the Court 
made it clear that the term of employment contract is irrelevant. Article 
10 of Directive 92/85 and Article 5(1) of Directive 76/207 prohibit 
dismissal of a pregnant worker even if she is engaged for a fixed term and 
                                                 
82 Case C-32/93. Carole Louise Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd., European Court Reports 1994 Page 
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83 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
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even if due to pregnancy she could not perform a substantial part of her 
fixed-term employment contract. Tele Danmark is an enterprise which 
engaged Ms Brandt-Nielsen for a period of six months from 1 July 1995. 
In August she informed the employer that she was expecting to give birth 
in early November. Soon after that, she was dismissed on the ground that 
she would be unable to perform a substantial part of her employment 
contract and that by conclusion of a fixed-term employment contract had 
acted in breach of the duty of good faith, because at that time she was 
aware of her pregnancy. The Court, in answer to this, first recalled that no 
arguments on financial loss or improper functioning of the undertaking 
were accepted as justification for dismissal of pregnant workers in 
previous cases, and, secondly, held that “such an interpretation cannot be 
altered by the fact that the contract of employment was concluded for a 
fixed term”84, because duration of an employment relationship is an 
uncertain element – “the relationship may be for a longer or shorter 
period, and is moreover liable to be renewed or extended”85.  
Elaboration of uncertainty of the employment relationship 
presumably has its roots in the theory of economics, which provides that 
competitive undertakings have a sustainable employment strategy which 
usually involves a policy of long-term employment. Such an undertaking 
engages in fixed-term contracts in order to select the best employees. 
However, notwithstanding that, the ECJ based this decision on the 
wording of Directive 76/207 and 92/85 by saying that those directives do 
not distinguish between contracts of definite and indefinite terms. It 
contended that if the legislator wished to exclude fixed-term contracts, 
which form a considerable part of employment relationships, it would 
have done so expressly. Without elaborating on the duty to engage in 
contracts in good faith, the Court also held clearly that failure to inform 
an employer of pregnancy cannot be a reason for dismissal. This is 
logical: since an employer is not allowed to take into account the fact of 
pregnancy, there is no point in asking about it. Moreover, the issue of 
pregnancy is a matter of private life and sometimes at the beginning 
uncertain86, thus special protection of a pregnant worker is conditional 
only upon her wish to inform the employer.  
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On the same day as Tele Danmark, the Melgar87 judgment was 
delivered. Melgar was employed by a municipality on the basis of several 
fixed-term part-time contracts to which she was engaged one after 
another. After a year of that employment, Melgar informed the 
municipality of her pregnancy. The municipality subsequently informed 
her that her present contract would soon cease. The definite-term contract 
did not specify an expiry date. Melgar was offered another, or fifth, fixed-
term contract which provided for an obviously less stable employment 
relationship than the previous one. She did not sign it but instead brought 
an action by claiming reinstatement under the previous contract on the 
ground that she had been discriminated against because of her pregnancy. 
The national court then referred several questions. The first of these was 
whether Article 10 of Directive 92/85 is capable of having direct effect. 
The Court’s answer was yes, since Article 10 imposes on employers a 
precise obligation “which affords them no margin of discretion in their 
performance”88. The second question asked whether Article 10 of 
Directive 92/85 - providing that dismissal of a pregnant worker is allowed 
in cases “not connected with their condition which are permitted under 
national legislation and/or practice” - requires national legislation to draw 
up a list which specifies reasons not connected with pregnancy and 
allowing dismissal of pregnant workers. The ECJ pointed out that 
Directive 92/85 is a minimum requirement directive and does not impose 
an obligation on Member States to draw up such lists89. Article 10 of 
Directive 92/85 also indicates that dismissal could take place only “where 
applicable, provided that the competent authority has given its consent”.  
The fourth question was whether it imposes an obligation on the Member 
State to have such an authority. The response was, no. The words “where 
applicable” indicates that this requirement is applicable only in the 
Member States where a system of prior consent is established90.   
By the third question, the Court was asked whether Article 10 of 
Directive 92/85 precludes non-renewal of fixed-term contracts. The Court 
went on to refer to the Tele Danmark judgment, where it held that 
Directives 76/207 and 92/85 obviously do not distinguish between part-
time and full-time employment contracts. However, Article 10 of the 
Directive does not require renewal of a fixed-term contract which has 
come to an end, and it cannot be regarded as dismissal91. On the other 
hand, if the reason for non-renewal or prolongation is pregnancy or 
                                                 
87 Case C-438/99. Maria Luisa Jimenez Melgar v Ayuntamiento de Los Barrios, European Court 
Reports 2001 Page I-06915. 
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maternity, this constitutes direct discrimination contrary to Articles 2(1) 
and 3(1) of Directive 76/20792.  
The most important finding of the Court in Melgar is that non-
renewal of a fixed-term contract could be contested. Most probably, the 
greater part of Member States’ national laws do not explicitly provide for 
such a right, because it is unlikely that legislators predicted that such a 
situation could arise. The second important finding is that Article 10 of 
Directive 92/85 is capable of having direct effect. Along with other 
dismissal claims, it allows contest of non-renewal of a fixed-term 
contract, and although applicable in this case93, direct effect is restricted 
to vertical relationships only94.                
 
Self-employed persons 
There is no ECJ case-law on interpretation of Directive 86/613 as regards 
equal treatment of self-employed persons during pregnancy. However, 
since Article 4 of Directive 86/613 refers to Directive 76/207, it allows to 
conclude that parallels may be drawn with respective case law regarding 
treatment of pregnant workers. It also allows the author to conclude that a 
person who receives a service is precluded from terminating a service 
agreement due to the mere fact of pregnancy of the service provider, nor 
is it allowed to refuse engagement into a service contract due to 
pregnancy of the service provider. 
As regards the promising title of Directive 86/613, specifying that 
protection of self-employed women during pregnancy and motherhood is 
provided, there is no ground for optimism. Article 8 just obliges the 
Member States to examine the conditions under which self-employed 
women and wives of self-employed persons have access to services 
supplying temporary replacement or national services and are entitled to 
cash benefits under a social security system. As Foubert rightly points 
out, this provision “does not oblige the Member States to take any 
specific action, or any action at all”95.    
This means that Directive 86/613 in its substance does not provide 
for any special right of self-employed women or the wife of a self-
employed person except those provided by Directive 76/207. 
Consequently, in the context of social security, neither Directive 86/613 
nor Directive 79/7 requires any special protection during pregnancy. 
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Directive 79/7 only allows the conclusion that if self-employed persons 
are subject to insurance of risk of sickness, self-employed women are 
entitled to sickness allowance under a statutory social insurance scheme. 
The same is true if the wife of a self-employed person under Article 6 of 
Directive 86/613 has joined a statutory social insurance scheme. 
 
Social security 
Article 4(2) of Directive 79/7 provides that the principle of equal 
treatment shall be without prejudice to the provisions relating to 
maternity protection. There is no case-law of the ECJ on this matter. 
However, if drawing parallels with Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207 the 
wording of both provisions is very similar with the exception of the word 
“pregnancy”. This suggests that Article 4(2) of Directive is not intended 
to give any special right to women during pregnancy.   
The ECJ has ruled with regard to Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207 
that special protection during pregnancy and maternity cannot be subject 
to less favourable treatment96 and such treatment constitutes direct 
discrimination based on sex. In turn, Article 4(1) of Directive 79/7 
prohibits direct and indirect discrimination, so it follows that this 
provision prohibits less favourable treatment in matters of social security 
due to pregnancy.  
Although the McKenna97 case concerned equal pay, nevertheless it 
gives guidance for sickness allowance covered by state social security. 
Consequently, from the McKenna case and Article 4(1) of Directive 79/7, 
it can be presumed that if a pregnancy-related illness occurs and sickness 
allowance is provided by state social security, then most probably 
pregnant workers are subject to the same treatment as other sick workers.  
 
Latvian law 
Labour law 
Latvian Labour law has many explicit provisions concerning special 
protection of pregnant workers and several neutral provisions which 
nevertheless may affect a pregnant worker in a different way than other 
workers. 
 
Access 
Recently Article 33 was amended98. Provisions allowing asking a 
candidate a question on her pregnancy where an employment contract is 
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intended to be concluded for a fixed term, imply that pregnancy could 
render impossible performance of a considerable part of that employment. 
This provision obviously has its roots in the Habermann-Beltermann and 
Webb judgments, where the ECJ put stress on the fact that employment 
contracts are concluded for an indefinite term, thus temporal interruption 
of their performance cannot serve as a basis for dismissal of a pregnant 
worker99.  
As discussed above, the question of fixed-term contracts and 
pregnancy was unclear until the Tele Danmark judgment, where the court 
ruled that neither Directive 76/207 nor Directive 92/85 makes a 
distinction between fixed-term and indefinite term contracts100. Thus, 
fixed term employment does not serve as a basis for refusal to employ or 
dismiss a pregnant person. Consequently, the employer does not have any 
right to ask – but a candidate has a duty to inform - about pregnancy101. 
Amendments to Article 33(2)(1) were prepared by the Ministry of 
Welfare due to the author’s publication of an article on the compatibility 
of Latvian labour law with EC law102. 
Article 36 of the Labour law provides that an employer has the 
right to ask a candidate to undergo medical tests in order to verify 
whether the state of health of the candidate is appropriate for performance 
of the work in question. In the medical certificate, the doctor is allowed to 
show only whether the state of health of a person is appropriate for 
performance of the job or not, without specification of a reason. There is 
a risk that in case of pregnancy of a candidate, a doctor could declare in a 
medical certificate that a candidate is not appropriate for performance of 
intended work. A doctor could derive such a conclusion not because of 
the general state of health of the candidate but because of current 
pregnancy. Since EC law and Latvian labour law preclude refusal to 
employ a candidate on grounds of pregnancy, it follows that correct 
application of Article 36 in conjunction with Articles 3(1) of Directive 
76/207 and Article 34 of the Latvian Labour law require a doctor in a 
medical certificate to specify only whether the general state of health of a 
candidate allows performance of intended work, without taking into 
account her pregnancy.  
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Working conditions 
Exposure to agents  
According to Article 37(7) of the Labour Law, an employer is precluded 
from employing a pregnant worker, a worker who has given birth and a 
year after it or a worker who is breastfeeding in working conditions 
dangerous for the health of the employee and her child after the worker 
has notified her condition by medical certificate. Article 99 (1) of the 
Labour Law obliges an employer after receipt of a medical certificate to 
prevent any risk which could negatively affect the health and safety of a 
pregnant worker by providing safe working conditions or by shortening 
working time so as to allow exclusion of risk. If this is not possible, then 
the employer must move the pregnant worker to other work or if this is 
also impossible – grant leave103. This special treatment to pregnant 
workers is granted by temporary amendments to the employment 
agreement, since Article 99 is provided in the section on amendments to 
employment contracts. 
The Law on health and safety provides that pregnant workers have 
extra rights regarding conditions to health and safety which are subject to 
assessment of exposure to agents and/or medical certificate requiring 
special protection104. Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers “On 
procedure of internal assessment of working environment”105 provides 
section IV on assessment of working environment for pregnant workers 
and workers during the period after birth and women who are 
breastfeeding. Annexes II and III are analogical to Annexes I and II of 
Directive 92/85. Guidelines106 adopted in accordance with Article 3 are 
not reflected in any Latvian normative act. Most probably, they are not 
even translated into Latvian107. As regards non-implementation of 
guidelines, this is not a breach of EC law because guidelines are not 
legally binding; however, according to Article 3(2) of Directive 92/85, 
Member States must bring these guidelines to the attention of all 
employers and all female workers and their representatives.  
As regards other EC directives specifying health and safety 
requirements108, these are implemented in respective regulations of 
                                                 
103 Article 99(2) of the Labour Law. 
104 Darba aizsardzības likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis 2001. 6.jūlijs, nr. 105 (Law on labour 
health and safety protection), Article 22. 
105 Darba vides iekšējās uzraudzības veikšanas kārtība: MK noteikumi Nr.379. Latvijas Vēstnesis 2001. 
29.augusts, nr.123 (On procedure for internal assessment of working environment). 
106 Communication from the Commission on the guidelines on the assessment of the chemical, physical 
and biological agents and industrial processes considered hazardous for the safety or health of pregnant 
workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (Council Directive 92/85/EEC) 
/* COM/2000/0466 final */ 
107 Telephone interview with state official of Unit on Health and safety policies of Work department at 
Ministry of Welfare on 13 July 2006.  
108 Council Directive 92/91/EEC of 3 November 1992 concerning the minimum requirements for 
improving the safety and health protection of workers in the mineral-extracting industries through 
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Cabinet of Ministers which implement the respective directives. 
However, special treatment of pregnant workers under Latvian legislation 
is not limited to EC health and safety legislation only. For example, 
regulations of Cabinet of Ministers “On procedure, on criteria how state 
of health of a sailor is assessed in order to work on board and criteria for 
defining compatibility”109 provides that a person under the age of 18, who 
has not sailed previously or who has not sailed for five years is not valid 
for work on board due to pregnancy, while in the rest of cases a person is 
valid for work on board until the 6th month of pregnancy taking into 
account the functions she has to perform and the shipping area she has to 
sail in. It is highly doubtful whether those restrictions are substantiated 
from the medical point of view. Moreover, there is no difference between 
the effect of sailing on the normal pregnancy of a pregnant sailor who has 
sailed before and on the normal pregnancy of a pregnant sailor who has 
not sailed before. 
 
Other special work conditions 
Article 138(6) provides as follows: 
 
(6) It is prohibited to employ at night persons who are under 18 years of 
age, pregnant women and women for a period following childbirth up to 
one year, but if a woman is breastfeeding then during the whole period of 
breastfeeding, if a medical certificate specifies that night work exposes a 
risk to the health and safety of a woman or her child. 
 
The wording of this provision is unclear, because it is does not explicitly 
provide whether the condition of a medical certificate concerns only the 
breastfeeding period or also the period of pregnancy and one year after 
birth-giving. This situation becomes more confusing due to presence of 
rights on employment of persons under the age of 18. It is clear that the 
                                                                                                                                            
drilling (eleventh individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC). 
OJ L 348, 28.11.1992, p. 9–24.  
Council Directive 92/57/EEC of 24 June 1992 on the implementation of minimum safety and health 
requirements at temporary or mobile construction sites (eighth individual Directive within the meaning 
of Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC). OJ L 245, 26.8.1992, p. 6–22.
Council Directive 89/654/EEC of 30 November 1989 concerning the minimum safety and health 
requirements for the workplace (first individual directive within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of 
Directive 89/391/EEC). OJ L 393, 30.12.1989, p. 1–12.
Council Directive 92/104/EEC of 3 December 1992 on the minimum requirements for improving the 
safety and health protection of workers in surface and underground mineral-extracting industries 
(twelfth individual Directive within the meaning of Article 16 (1) of Directive 89/391/EEC) OJ L 404, 
31.12.1992, p. 10–25. 
Council Directive 96/29/Euratom of 13 May 1996 laying down basic safety standards for the protection 
of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiation. OJ 
L 159, 29.6.1996, p. 1–114.  
109 Kārtība, kādā nosaka jūrnieku veselības atbalstītu darbam uz kuģa, un atbilstības noteikšanas 
kritēriji”: MK noteikumi Nr.374. Latvijas Vēstnesis 2003. 16.jūlijs, nr.105. (On procedure and 
assement of state of health of sailors for work on board and crtieria for defining compatibility).     
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condition of a medical certificate does not concern their rights. According 
to Article 7 of Directive 92/85, Article 138(6) must be interpreted so that 
night work is conditional upon a medical certificate not only for workers 
who are breastfeeding, but also who for those who have recently given 
birth, and pregnant workers. Indeed, the provision which makes 
prohibition of night work conditional upon a medical certificate was 
amended by amendments adopted on 7 May 2004110, soon after accession 
to the EU; thus the intent of the respective amendments was to comply 
with Directive 92/85. Consequently, Article 138(6) must be interpreted in 
the light of Article 7(1) of Directive 92/85, i.e., that night work is 
conditional upon a medical certificate to pregnant workers, workers who 
have recently given birth, and workers who are breastfeeding. 
Article 136(6) precludes employment of a pregnant worker in 
overtime work. Article 136(7) envisages the right of a pregnant worker to 
work overtime if she agrees to it in writing; thus Article 136 will be in 
conformity with Directive 76/207. This is because the provision of 
Article 136(6) is a special protection during pregnancy and maternity 
which goes beyond what is necessary due to biological differences. It 
reflects the socially-construed protection which negatively affects a 
woman’s right to choose for herself conditions of employment. It is 
unclear under what conditions the legislator chose excessive protection of 
pregnant workers. For example, Article 53(2) from the beginning of the 
adoption of the Labour law111 provides that it is allowed to send a 
pregnant worker on a business trip, if she agrees to it in writing. Article 
147(1) implements Article 9 of Directive 92/85 and provides for the right 
to ante-natal examinations if those examinations are impossible outside 
working time.  
Furthermore, the labour law provides pregnant workers with extra 
rights, which is not required by Directive 92/85.  Article 134(2) gives the 
right to a pregnant worker to require part-time work. This right should be 
considered as the voluntary will of a pregnant worker, not as a 
requirement specified by conditions of health and safety or medical 
certificate. If part-time work is necessary for the health and safety of a 
pregnant worker, it is subject to the provisions of Article 99. It is 
important to distinguish part-time work under Articles 134(2) and 99 for 
the purposes of pay, which will be discussed below, and rights after the 
protection period. In particular, if Article 99 interpreted in conjunction 
with Article 154(5) in the light of Article 2(7) of amended Directive 
76/207 requires guarantees of return to an equivalent post after the special 
protection period, Article 134(2) does not specify the rights of an 
employee and the obligations of an employer regarding when, how and if 
                                                 
110 Grozījumi Darba likumā: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis 2004. 7. maijs, nr.72.  
111 The Labour Law was adopted on 20 June 2001 and came into force from 1 July 2002. 
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return to full-time work must be provided to the employee in question. 
Nor does EC law give an answer either, because the right provided by 
Article 134(2) is optional. Moreover, parallels could be drawn with the 
Pedersen case, where the Court ruled that the choice of a pregnant 
employee not to work which is not connected to a pathological condition 
or special risks for an unborn child is not intended to be protected by EC 
legislation112.  
According to Article 150(4), a pregnant worker has the right to 
require annual leave immediately before maternity leave, irrespective of 
the time she has worked for the respective employer, because usually a 
worker could only ask for annual leave during the first year of 
employment with the respective employer after six months of continuous 
employment by that employer.  Article 37(7) of Law on civil service 
provides that a pregnant civil servant may be transferred to another 
populated place only with her consent. 
 
Dismissal 
Article 109(1) of the Labour Law precludes dismissal of pregnant women 
except in cases provided by points 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 10 of Article 101(1). It 
states: 
 
(1) An employer has the right to give a written notice of termination of an 
employment contract only on the basis of circumstances related to the 
conduct of the employee, his or her abilities, or of economic, 
organisational, technological measures or measures of a similar nature in 
the undertaking in the following cases: 
1) the employee has without justified cause significantly violated 
the employment contract or the specified working procedures; 
2) the employee, when performing work, has acted illegally and 
therefore has lost the trust of the employer; 
3) the employee, when performing work, has acted contrary to 
moral principles and such action is incompatible with the continuation of 
employment legal relationships; 
4) the employee, when performing work, is under the influence of 
alcohol, narcotic or toxic substances; 
5) the employee has grossly violated labour protection regulations 
and has jeopardised the safety and health of other persons; 
... 
10) the employer – legal person or partnership – is being 
liquidated. 
 
                                                 
112 Case C-66/96. Handels – og Kontorfunktionerernes Forbund I Danmark, acting on behalf of Berit 
huj Pedersen v Fellesforeningen for Danmarks Brugsforeninger and Dansk Tandlegeforening and 
Kristelig Funktioner-Organisation v Dansk Handel & Service, ECR 1998 Page I-07327. Paragraphs 
48/50. 
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Thus, the requirements of Article 10 of Directive 92/85 are fulfilled. 
Even more113, the Labour law provides an exhaustive list of cases when 
dismissal of a pregnant worker must be considered as exceptional and not 
connected with her pregnancy. The legislator provides more favourable 
treatment for pregnant workers regarding dismissal. Generally applicable 
reasons for dismissal allow dismissal of a worker in several more cases - 
if the worker lacks professional skills, is not able to perform the duties 
engaged for, because of state of health testified to by medical certificate, 
or where a worker who previously had performed the respective duties is 
reinstated, or due to staff reduction114. However it is arguable whether 
conditions governing dismissal of pregnant workers are more favourable 
from the substantive point of view. Instances of dismissal such as lack of 
professional skills or reduction of staff are very easy to prove by the 
employer. If those reasons were allowed to apply to pregnant workers, 
too, then there would be a big risk of abuse of rights by employers. On 
the other hand, why should an employer bear loss caused by an under-
qualified worker only because she is pregnant? And finally, why should 
such reason for dismissal exist at all, if the Labour law provides for a 
probation period which is intended for testing professional skills? A 
possible answer could be that professional skills could be lost during 
employment if occupation requires perpetual training.    
Regarding the prior consent procedure requirement provided for by 
Article 10 of Directive 92/85, it is applicable to members of trade unions 
only. Article 110(1) provides that it is precluded to terminate an 
employment contract with a member of a trade union without the consent 
of the trade union115. This requirement is not applicable if the contract is 
terminated on the basis of provisions of points 4, 8 or 10 of Article 
101(1). This procedure is applicable with regard to termination notice, but 
not to termination of the employment contract itself. The Supreme Court 
of Latvia has held that where an employee joins a trade union after 
receiving notice of termination, Article 110 is not applicable116.  
                                                 
113 In case C-438/99. Maria Luisa Jimenez Melgar v Ayuntamiento de Los Barrios, European Court 
Reports 2001 Page I-06915. Paragraph 37. 
114 Points 6, 7, 8, 9 of Article 101(1) Labour law. 
115 The whole consent procedure is provided by Article 110 Labour law. 
116 Augstākās tiesas Senāta Civillietu departamenta 2004.gada 6.okotobra spriedums lietā Nr.SKC-
515//Jurista Vārds 7(362), 22.02.2005. Decision of Supreme Court of Latvia delivered on 6 October 
2004 in case No.SKC-515. 
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Furthermore, the issue of correct application of Articles 47117 and 48 
in conjunction with Article 109(1) must be discussed, because of one 
decision of the national court of first instance118. Ghadialija was 
employed by the joint stock company “Dambis” as a secretary on 12 
October 2004 with a probation period of three months. On 30 November 
2004 she was notified about her dismissal from 3 December 2004. 
Ghadialija contended that the real reason for her dismissal was her 
pregnancy, because she informed the employer about it verbally. 
However, officially she informed about the fact of her pregnancy on the 
day of dismissal, 3 December 2004, by providing a medical certificate. 
She claimed reinstatement and payment for forced idle-time.  
The employer contended that it did not know about Ghadialija’s 
pregnancy at the moment of notification of dismissal during the probation 
period and that she had not submitted any evidence of the fact that she 
had informed the employer of the fact of pregnancy before notification of 
termination of the employment contract.    
The national court held that Article 46 of the Labour law provides 
for the purposes of testing an employee’s compatibility for a post, while 
Article 47 allows dismissal of an employee during the probation period 
without specifying a reason for dismissal on the part of the employer.    
The national court found that notification of termination of 
employment agreements is not the same as dismissal of an employee and 
that Article 109(1) concerns notice of termination but not dismissal. 
During the time when the termination notice was given, Ghadialija was in 
the 10th week of her pregnancy, thus the pregnancy was not obvious. 
Since Ghadialija had failed to prove that she had informed the employer 
of the fact of pregnancy prior to notice of termination being given, the 
national court had no basis to consider that the employer knew about the 
pregnancy. Consequently, if the employer did not know about her 
                                                 
117 The Labour law provides: 
Article 46.  Specification of a Probation Period 
(1) When entering into an employment contract, a probation period may be specified in order to assess 
whether an employee is suitable for performance of the work entrusted to him or her. If an employment 
contract does not specify a probation period, it shall be regarded as entered into without a probation 
period. A probation period shall not be determined for persons under 18 years of age. 
(2) The term of a probation period may not exceed three months. The said term shall not include a 
period of temporary incapacity and other periods of time when the employee did not perform work for 
justified cause. 
Article 47.  Consequences of a Probation Period 
(1) During the probation period, the employer and the employee have the right to give a notice of 
termination of the employment contract in writing three-days prior to termination. An employer, when 
giving the notice of termination of an employment contract during a probation period, does not have a 
duty to indicate the cause for such notice. 
(2) If the contracted term of a probation period has expired and the employee continues to perform the 
work, it shall be considered that he or she has passed the probation period. 
118 Rīgas pilsētas Centra rajona 2005.gada 26.janvāra spriedums Civillietā Nr.C27176204. Decision of 
Riga City Central district court delivered on 26 January 2006 in case No.C27176204.   
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pregnancy, it was not obliged to obey the provision of Article 109(1), but 
according to Article 47 an employer is not obliged to give reasons for 
dismissal during the probation period. Besides, first, Ghadialija as a 
claimant had failed to prove the facts on which she relied in accordance 
with Article 93 of the Civil procedure law and second, she did not claim 
the invalidity of the termination notice and reinstatement, but according 
to Article 192 of the Civil procedure law, the national court had no right 
to go beyond the ambit of the claim. According to this, national court 
decided that the claim was unfounded. 
This case explicitly demonstrates that the national court is not 
familiar with EC law at all. 
Starting to analyse this case, it is noteworthy that clearly the claim 
was prepared by Ghadialija herself, not by a lawyer. No legal norms were 
mentioned on which claim was based. It follows that if the court had 
accepted such a claim, it was under obligation to apply all provisions of 
law concerning the case in question. The first mistake is that the national 
court did not call into question Article 48 precluding termination of an 
employment contract during the probation period due to discrimination. 
Obviously, the judge did not know that dismissal due to pregnancy is 
direct discrimination; thus, the provisions of Article 109(1) must be 
analysed in conjunction with Article 48.  
Furthermore, since pregnancy was the supposed reason for the 
dismissal, then the issue of reversed burden of proof comes into question. 
According to Article 29(3), a person should present the facts from which 
possible discrimination may be presumed. Sufficient facts are prima facie 
discriminatory facts119. Pregnancy of an employee constitutes a prima 
facie fact of discrimination. It follows that the fact of pregnancy of 
Ghadialija during information on termination of the employment contract 
suffices for the purposes of shifting the burden of proof to the employer. 
 Next comes the issue of the right of the employer under Article 47 
not to specify the reasons for dismissal during the probation period versus 
the reversed burden of proof obligation under Article 48 applicable 
together with Article 29(3). First, there is a big debate on whether 
dismissal on the grounds of Article 47 is subject to a claim before the 
court at all. Kalniņš contends that dismissal on grounds of Article 47 
cannot be contested120, while Skultāne is of the opposite opinion121. The 
                                                 
119 Case C-127/92. Dr. Pamela Mary Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority and Secretary of State for 
Health, European Court Reports 1993 Page I-05535. Paragraph 18. See also case C-196/02.  Vasiliki 
Nikoloudi v Organismos Tilepikinonion Ellados AE. Paragraph 74 
120 Erlens Kalniņš, Prasība par atjaunošanu darbā//Latvijas Vēstnesis, Jurista Vārds, 12 (317), 
30.03.2004. He relies on Article 2(2) of ILO Convention No.158 “Termination of Employment 
Convention” which allows state parties to exclude workers serving a period of probation from 
application of some provisions of this convention; consequently he concludes that the Latvian legislator 
has chosen not to apply the provisions of Article 4 of the convention to workers during the probation 
period.    
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author agrees with the point of view of Skultāne, basically on the grounds 
of right to fair trial and that, irrespective of the probation period, an 
employment contract is a civil law contract and thus subject to challenge. 
Moreover, Article 48 - although it provides for special cases of dismissal 
during the probation period - nevertheless indicates that Article 47 is 
subject to challenge. Regarding the case in question, there is no debate on 
whether she had the right to contest Article 47, because the matter 
concerns discrimination, thus Article 48, which explicitly allows bringing 
a claim before a court, is applicable.  
Coming back to the obligation of the employer to provide under 
Article 48 in conjunction with Article 29(3) reasons for dismissal on 
grounds of Article 47, there arises the question on what right under 
Article 47 the employer has. Is it only a right not to provide a reason for 
dismissal or does it provide the right to dismiss on no ground at all? 
Writers contend that Article 47 does not provide the employer with the 
right to dismiss without reason122. The author also contends that were it 
otherwise, no obligation for the employer would arise with regard to 
Article 48, too. Consequently, proper enforcement of EC sex equality law 
would be jeopardised. Thus it follows that when the national court has 
shifted the burden of proof to the employer in accordance with Article 48 
in conjunction with Article 48, the employer is under an obligation to 
specify objective reasons for dismissal not connected with the pregnancy 
of the worker.  
Besides, since it is a case of a pregnant worker, Article 48 must be 
applied in conjunction with Article 109(1). This means that, if for 
justification of dismissal under Article 48 any objective reason fits that is 
not connected with the sex of the employee, in the present case 
concerning pregnancy reasons for dismissal provided by Article 109(1) is 
applicable for justification of dismissal only.  
As regards justification that the employer was not informed of the 
pregnancy at the time of giving termination notice, there is no clear 
answer from the standpoint of EC law. Under Article 2(a) of Directive 
92/85, protection of a pregnant worker under this directive is conditional 
upon information of the employer123. Consequently, if the employee has 
                                                                                                                                            
121 Skultāne I., Darba devēja uzteikums pārbaudes laikā. Jurista Vārds, 2004. 10. augusts, nr.30. Ilze 
Sultāne is a judge of the Supreme Court of Latvia. She contends that the intent of the Latvian legislator 
when adopting Article 47 was not to deprive a person of the right to a fair trial in breach of Article 92 
of the Latvian Constitution, Article 6 of Convention for the protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, also to German practice.  
122 See in this regard, Ilze Skultāne, Darba devēja uzteikums pārbaudes laikā. Jurista Vārds, 2004. 10. 
augusts. nr. 30. Radzēvičs J., Darba likuma nianses. Mans Īpašums, 2002., Nr.11. 
123 Petra Foubert also expresses fear of application of the provisions of Article 2. See Petra Foubert, 
“The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex Equality, Thoughts 
of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of America”, Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at pages 109-110, paragraph 226. 
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failed to inform her employer, Article 10 is not applicable.  Here comes 
into play Directive 76/207, which also precludes dismissal on grounds of 
pregnancy124, but it does not make prohibition of dismissal of a pregnant 
worker conditional upon information of the employer of the fact of 
pregnancy. Thus application of Article 109(1) can not be conditional 
upon the fact of information.  
Next comes the issue of appropriate remedies under Article 48. 
Kalniņš argues that Article 48 does not provide for the right to 
reinstatement but only for compensation125, Skultāne is of the view that 
Article 47 itself allows claiming reinstatement, if the employer can not 
prove that the person performed work in an unsatisfactory manner126.  
However this is the case where Article 109(1) is involved. In this respect, 
Article 109(1) refers to Article 101, but Article 101 is subject to the 
provisions of Article 122, which provides for the right to claim invalidity 
of notification of termination of an employment contract, and 
reinstatement. Were it otherwise and discriminatory termination of an 
employment contract during the probation period on account of 
pregnancy would be subject to Article 48 and the national court would 
reject reinstatement, the author cannot imagine the amount of 
compensation which would be provided for an unfairly dismissed 
pregnant person. Such dismissal affects her right to maternity allowance 
to which she would not be entitled if unemployed and the amount of 
child-care allowance the amount of which is also directly linked to 
employment and the amount of salary. Besides, the national court must 
take into account the reality of life – pregnant persons have considerable 
difficulties in finding new work. 
The next issue is whether a person whose fixed-term contract 
expires and no new contract is offered by the same employer or renewal 
of a previous one has the right under the Labour law to claim 
discrimination on grounds of sex according to the Melgar case127. Article 
122 provides: 
 
An employee may bring an action in court for the invalidation of a notice 
of termination by an employer within a one-month period from the date of 
receipt of the notice of termination. In other cases, when the right of an 
employee to continue employment legal relationships has been violated, 
he or she may bring an action in court for reinstatement within a one-
month period from the date of dismissal. 
                                                 
124 Case C-179/88. Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, European Court reports 1990 Page I-03979. Paragraph 13. 
125 Erlens Kalniņš, Prasība par atjaunošanu darbā//Latvijas Vēstnesis, Jurista Vārds, 12 (317), 
30.03.2004. 
126 Skultāne I., Darba devēja uzteikums pārbaudes laikā. Jurista Vārds, 2004. 10. augusts, nr.30. 
127 In case C-438/99. Maria Luisa Jimenez Melgar v Ayuntamiento de Los Barrios, European Court 
Reports 2001 Page I-06915. 
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According to Article 122, termination of an employment contract can be 
contested not only in cases when the procedure requires prior notification 
of termination but also in other cases128. Kalniņš as an example of 
instances when termination of an employment contract can be contested 
under Article 122, proposes Article 44(5), 98(1) and 98(4) 129. However, 
those articles explicitly refer to the right of challenge under Article 122. 
 Going back to the Melgar case, where the ECJ held that an 
employee whose fixed-term contract has come to an end and is not 
renewed due to reasons which are subject to protection under Article 10 
of Directive 92/85 constitutes direct discrimination based on sex, it is 
necessary to explore whether the pregnant worker whose fixed-term 
contract has expired has the right to contest its non-renewal. Article 113 
of the Labour law provides that a fixed-term contract comes to an end 
when the term specified in the contract expires. Besides, unlike Articles 
44(5), 98(1) and 98(4), Article 113 does not explicitly refer to Article 
122. Consequently, the legislator has not intended that Article 113 could 
be contested under Article 122. Article 29(1) provides for prohibition of 
discrimination when giving notice of termination, thus it is not applicable 
in cases when a fixed-term contract comes to an end due to expiration of 
the term. Article 109(1) is also not applicable to this case, because it also 
provides for a prohibition on giving a termination notice to a pregnant 
worker. It follows that in principle the Labour law does not allow for 
protection of rights provided by Article 10 of Directive 92/85 as 
interpreted by the ECJ in Melgar.   
In the context of this case it must be noted that the provision of 
Article 10(2) of Directive 92/85 is not fully implemented, since Article 48 
of the Labour law does not provide that for pregnant workers grounds for 
dismissal during the probation period must be provided and that they 
must be in written form. 
 
Pay during pregnancy 
As already described above, Article 99 provides that in case working 
conditions may negatively affect the health of a pregnant worker, the 
employer must adjust safe working conditions and working time, or move 
her to other work or grant leave. During that period, the pregnant worker 
is entitled to average pay.  The provisions of Article 99 are clear, but the 
provision of Article 62 is a little confusing. Article 62 in general provides 
for organization of remuneration, in particular it specifies remuneration of 
time work and piece work. Among that, Article 62(3) states that in cases 
                                                 
128 See also Kalniņš E., Prasība par atjaunošanu darbā. Latvijas Vēstnesis, Jurista Vārds, 2004., 
30.marts, nr.12. 
129 Kalniņš E., Prasība par atjaunošanu darbā. Latvijas Vēstnesis, Jurista Vārds, 2004., 30.marts, nr.12. 
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where, for the protection of health and safety of a pregnant worker the 
norms of piece work are diminished, the employer must retain average 
pay. No word is said in Article 62 on what salary an employer must retain 
for a pregnant worker who performs time work. It is unclear why the 
legislator decided to insert Article 62(3) while Article 99 already 
explicitly regulates this issue. However, taken all together the Labour law 
provides for better conditions than required by Article 11(1) of Directive 
92/85, which also allows for national legislation to provide an adequate 
allowance.  
No other Latvian law than Article 99 of the Labour law provides 
for pay or allowance for the purposes of special protection of health and 
safety of a pregnant worker. This means that a pregnant worker is entitled 
to average pay, which according to the conditions of Article 75 which 
provides for calculation of average pay, constitutes full pay. Average pay 
constitutes full pay if a person has worked during the previous 12 months. 
No periods of sick leave are taken into account for that purpose. 
However, a period of 12 months constitutes 52 weeks but pregnancy-
related illness is a shorter period anyway, thus absences due to 
pregnancy-related illness do not negatively affect calculation of average 
pay. Among other provisions, Article 75(6) provides that average pay of 
hourly work is calculated by dividing the sum of salary during the 
previous six months by hours worked. No solution is proposed for cases 
where a pregnant worker has worked less hours a day due to heath and 
safety protection, but under Article 99 was entitled to average pay which 
constitutes full pay.  
Article 147(1) give the right to a pregnant worker to ante-natal 
examinations during working time, but it is silent about pay, although 
Article 9 of Directive 92/85 requires that ante-natal examinations during 
working time must be “without loss of pay”. Article 62 on organization of 
pay does not provide anything on pay for time spent for ante-natal 
examinations, either. For matters of pay connected with ante-natal 
examinations, Article 99 is also not applicable, because application of 
that provision is conditional upon assessment of health and safety or 
requirements of a medical certificate, while ante-natal examinations are 
not conditional upon special medical certificate because they are an 
integral part of any pregnancy. This Article 9 of Directive 92/85 is not 
fully implemented in Latvian law.  
If a woman decides to work part-time and in accordance with 
Article 134(2) requires part-time work to be arranged by the employer, 
she is not entitled to retention of full pay under Article 99. This is a 
logical conclusion which follows from the different circumstances of 
application of Articles 99 and 134(2). If the provisions of Article 99 are 
subject to mandatory health and safety protection, then the provisions of 
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Article 134(2) if an extra right granted to a pregnant worker which is 
optional and subject to the free choice of worker, apply.   
It is questionable whether matters of sick pay are subject to equal 
pay issues. Sick pay in Latvia is subject to the state social insurance 
system; nevertheless, sick allowance for the first 14 days is paid by the 
employer. The law on maternity and sickness insurance130 provides for a 
minimum amount of sick pay during those first 14 days, but the employer 
is free to provide higher pay whether under an individual employment 
contract or under collective agreement. Since sick pay during that period 
is paid by the employer, it is governed by Article 141 and Directive 
75/117, not by Directive 79/7 which comes into play at the 15th day of 
sickness. 
 
Social security law 
Employed pregnant persons 
Under the Latvian social insurance system, absences dues to pregnancy-
related illness are subject to the general sickness allowance system and 
have no exceptional status. From the case-law of the ECJ, it follows that 
sick pay and consequently also sickness allowance under the state social 
insurance system might not be below the minimum, which means that 
allowance cannot be so low as to undermine the objective of protection of 
pregnant workers. 
Latvian net sickness allowance is higher that net salary. This is 
because sickness allowance is of the amount of 80% of salary131 and is 
free of any taxes while 100% gross salary is subject to income tax and 
partially to state social insurance payments, thus a worker actually 
working receives net salary which constitutes 64% of gross salary.  Since 
sickness allowance is provided by the state social insurance scheme for 
52 weeks if sickness is uninterrupted or 78 weeks within a period of three 
years132 there is no fear that a person could stay unprotected during 
pregnancy-related illness occurring before maternity leave. 
Another issue is recently proposed amendments to the Regulations 
of the Cabinet of Ministers providing that in case of illness lasting for 
more than 6 months, a person must undergo a medical commission in 
order to establish disability. The Ministry of Welfare in this case departs 
from the male norm and does not take into consideration that pregnancy-
related illness could last for 9 months and such illness is not subject to 
establishing disability taking into account the Court’s assertion in 
                                                 
130 Par maternitātes un slimības apdrošināšanu: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 23.novembris, 
nr.182 (Law on maternity and sickness insurance, Article 36.) 
131 Ibid., Article 17. 
132 Ibid., Articles 13 and 17. 
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Brown133, that disorders and complications which may cause incapacity 
for work form inherent risks specific to the condition of pregnancy134. 
As regards calculation of sick pay, recently Article 32 of the Law 
on maternity and sickness insurance was amended135. Now it provides 
that in case a person was on sick leave during the period taken into 
account for the purposes of calculation of sick allowance, the period 
preceding that period must be taken into account up to 32 months 
preceding the moment when actual sickness occurred. Such amendments 
were made due to the efforts of the State Human rights office and the 
author as representative of the non-governmental organization “Latvian 
Coalition for gender equality”. The Ministry of Welfare was advised to 
take into account special protection of pregnant workers who are absent 
due to pregnancy-related illness. Although the cases of the ECJ referred 
to concerned prohibition of dismissal, in particular the Brown case, does 
not concern state social insurance, nevertheless it was argued that women 
cannot be treated less favourably on account of absences due to 
pregnancy-related illness. That argument was accepted by the Ministry of 
Welfare and amendments providing for more favourable calculation of 
sickness allowance than before136 is of general application – they do 
concern all workers. 
 
Self-employed pregnant persons 
A self-employed person in case of pregnancy-related illness has the right 
to sickness allowance starting from the 15th day if illness. The general 
sickness allowance scheme is applicable to them. As regards calculation 
of sickness allowance – a longer period must be taken into account than 
for employed persons137.   
The provisions of amended Article 32 of the Law on maternity and 
sickness insurance discussed above also concerns self-employed persons. 
The period taken into account for the purposes of calculation of sickness 
allowance could be up to 39 months before the quarter when the socially 
insured occasion has occurred138, instead of the previous 40% of average 
wage declared by the government.  
 
                                                 
133 Case C-394/96, Mary Brown and Rentokil Limited, European Court Reports 1998 Page I-04185. 
134 Amendment project adopted by State secretaries on meeting on 10 August 2006 to Regulations of 
Cabinet of Ministers No 152 “Order of handing out sickness certificates” adopted on 3 March 2001. 
135 Grozījumi likumā “Par maternitātes un slimības apdrošināšanu”: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 
2004. 12.decembris.  
136 Previously, Article 32 of the Law on maternity and sickness insurance provided that if during a 
period taken into account for the purposes of calculating sickness allowance a person was absent due to 
sickness, sickness allowance may constitute only 40% of average insurance salary declared by the 
government. 
137 See section on social security. 
138 Article 32(2) of the Law on maternity and sickness insurance. 
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Unemployed persons 
An unemployed person if she is not entitled to unemployed allowance has 
the right to a guaranteed minimum income declared by the state139, which 
presently comprises 24 lats a month140, but for certain groups of persons 
in Riga it is 45 lats a month141. Guaranteed minimum income does not 
protect the health of the mother and expected child, because real living 
costs for one person in Latvia monthly amount to 116 lats142
  
 
                                                 
139 Sociālo pakalpojumu un sociālās palīdzības likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2002. 
19.novembris, nr.168 )(Law on social services and assistance), Article 36. 
140 Grozījums Ministru kabineta 2003.gada 9.decembra noteikumos Nr.693 “Noteikumi par garantēto 
minimālo ienākumu līmeni un pabalsta apmēru garantētā minimālā ienākuma līmeņa nodrošināšanai”: 
MK noteikumi Nr.881. Latvijas Vētnesis 2005. 25.novembris. (Amendments to regulations of Cabinet 
of Ministers adopted 9th of December 2003 “Regulations on guaranteed minimum income level and 
amount of allowance for provision of guaranteed minimum income level”).  
141 Par paaugstināto garantēto minimālo ienākumu līmeni Rīgā: Rīgas domes saistošie noteikumi Nr.84. 
Latvijas Vēstnesis 2005. 24.februāris, nr.32 (On increased guaranteed minimal income level in Riga  
142 Data of Latvian State Central Office of Statistics. 
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Chapter 11. 
Rights during and after maternity leave 
 
This section will deal with rights connected with maternity leave, starting 
from the  beginning and till the end of maternity leave, and the effect on 
subsequent rights of absence on account of maternity leave. 
 
International law 
The same as regards rights during pregnancy, rights during and 
after maternity leave are explicitly provided by only two international law 
documents - the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)1, and the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) Maternity protection 
Convention No.183. 
Article 11(2) (a) and (b) of CEDAW obliges state parties to ensure 
prohibition of dismissal on grounds of maternity leave and to introduce 
maternity leave pay or comparable social benefits without loss of former 
employment, seniority, and social allowances. 
Article 4 of the ILO Maternity protection convention provides for 
maternity leave of not less than 14 weeks and for compulsory maternity 
leave of not less than 6 weeks if so agreed by social partners. Article 5 
requires grant of leave if necessary due to complications arising from 
childbirth. Cash benefits according to Article 6 must ensure maintenance 
of a woman and her child in proper health conditions and suitable 
standard of living. Maternity benefits cannot be less than two-thirds of a 
woman’s previous earnings or the amount taken into account for the 
purposes of calculating maternity benefit. State parties must provide such 
conditions for entitlement to maternity benefits for which the large 
majority of women are able to qualify. If a woman does not meet the 
conditions to qualify for maternity benefits, she must be entitled to 
adequate social assistance. As regards breastfeeding, according to Article 
10 every mother must be entitled to at least one daily break for 
breastfeeding her child.  Recommendations No.95 and No.191 call on 
State parties to provide higher standards of maternity protection, for 
example by providing women with maternity benefits in the amount of 
100% of previous salary and after maternity leave with an equivalent 
position under the same employment conditions taking into account the 
period of maternity leave2.  
 
                                                 
1 Hereinafter CEDAW. 
2 Nevilles Rubin, Evance Kalula, Bob Hepple, Code of International Labour Law. Volume II Book I 
Law, Practice and Jurisprudence, Cambridge University Press, 2005, at pages 580-585. 
 198
EC law 
EC legislative documents 
As with pregnancy issues, maternity issues are explicitly regulated by two 
EC law documents – Directive 76/207 and 92/85. Directive 76/207 after 
amendments clearly provides for the purpose of ex Article 2(3) now 
Article 2(7). In particular, it states the general principle that less 
favourable treatment on grounds of maternity leave constitutes 
discrimination based on sex and provides for the right after maternity 
leave to return to an equivalent post.  
Directive 92/85 provides for the right to maternity leave and its 
minimum length, as well as setting the minimum requirements on 
maternity allowance and prohibition of dismissal. Regarding maternity 
allowance, not only Directive 92/85 but according to the ECJ3 also 
Article 141 and Directive 75/117 come into play, and consequently 
Directives 86/613 and 96/97 on occupational social security schemes. 
Directive 79/7 contains provisions on maternity protection as regards 
state social security systems, and concerns employed and as well 
unemployed persons. As regards the latter category provisions of 
Directive 86/613 provides for some obligations on the part of Member 
States on maternity protection.   
 
Rights during maternity leave 
Purpose of maternity leave 
The purpose of maternity leave was defined by the ECJ in Hofmann. It 
held that maternity leave is intended to protect women in two respects: 
 
First, it is legitimate to ensure the protection of woman’s biological 
condition during pregnancy and thereafter until such time as her 
physiological and mental functions have returned to normal after 
childbirth; secondly, it is legitimate to protect the special relationship 
between a woman and her child over the period which follows pregnancy 
and childbirth, by preventing that relationship from being disturbed by 
multiple burdens which would result from the simultaneous pursuit of 
employment.4
 
The Court has not changed this definition since then5. In Hofmann, 
the Court held that the right to maternity leave falls within the scope 
of Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207. Presently, the right to maternity 
                                                 
3 Case C-342/93. Joan Gillespie and others v Northern Health and Social Services Boards, Department 
of Health and Social Services, Eastern Health and Social Services Board and Southern Health and 
Social Services Board, European Court Reports 1996 Page I-00475. Paragraph 14.
4 Case 184/83. Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse, ECR 1984 Page 03047. Paragraph 25. 
5 See in this regard case C-284/02. Land Brandenburg v Ursula Sass, European Court Reports 2004 
Page I-11143. Paragraph 32.
 199
leave is provided by Article 8 of Directive 92/85, too. Since the 
purpose of Directive 92/85 is health and safety protection, the first 
part of the definition given in Hofman perfectly fits it. The second 
part of the definition of the purpose of maternity leave poses a major 
problem. Writers6 see one of the basic problems of EC equality law 
here. At the time of adoption of the Hofmann judgment, EC law 
provided no provisions no provisions on health and safety. Indeed, 
the definition given in the Hofmann judgment was an interpretation 
of Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207, whose purpose is to establish 
equal treatment.  In turn, equal treatment means that no distinction 
between the sexes may be drawn except as regards biological 
differences, but socially defined differences must be eradicated. The 
second part of the definition, defining the purpose of maternity 
leave, directly contradicts the principle of equal treatment, because it 
provides for socially-defined differences between the sexes – 
namely that women are considered better child-carers. The Court has 
not recognized this problem until presently. Even over fourteen 
years after Hofmann, in Boyle the Court still elaborated on the 
second purpose of maternity by saying that: 
 
The … maternity leave … is intended in particular to provide the woman 
with the guarantee that she can look after her new-born baby in the weeks 
following childbirth7.    
 
Length of maternity leave 
The problem of the presence of socially-defined differences also concerns 
the length of maternity leave defined in EC and international law 
documents. Article 8 of Directive 92/85 provides for at least 14 weeks 
maternity leave. Article 4 of the ILO Maternity Protection Convention 
also provides for at least 14 weeks maternity leave. As Foubert argues, 
medical research shows that the biological needs of women require six to 
eight weeks for physical recovery from delivery and each extra week of 
maternity leave indicates care of the new-born baby, thus going beyond 
biological needs8.  
                                                 
6 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at pages 100 and 115, 
paragraphs 206 and 240; Petra Foubert, Does EC pregnancy and maternity legislation create equal 
opportunities for women in the EC labor market? The European Court of Justice’s interpretation of the 
EC Pregnancy directive in Boyle and Lewen, Michigan Journal of Gender and Law, 2002, University 
of Michigan Law School.  
7 Case C-411/96. Margaret Boyle and Others v Equal Opportunities Commission, ECR 1998 Page I-
06401. Paragraph 61. 
8 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
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However Article 8(2) of Directive 92/85 provides for mandatory 
maternity leave of two weeks, thus allowing the rest to be conditional 
upon the free choice of the woman. Foubert points out that: 
 
This creates the possibility for employers to put pressure on women who 
have just given birth to return to work prematurely. On the other hand, the 
Council did give the Member States the opportunity to oblige women to 
take fourteen weeks maternity leave or even more. This is much more 
than the physically recommended six to eight weeks of rest after 
childbirth.9    
 
It is unclear whether the ILO Maternity Protection Convention 
obliges women to go on 14 weeks maternity leave10. Article 4(1) of the 
Convention provides that in order to obtain rights to maternity leave, 
women should provide their employer with a medical certificate; thus it 
could be presumed that not only the length but also maternity leave as 
such is subject to women’s choice. A different interpretation of that 
provision would contradict Article 8(2) of the Directive. Further, Article 
4(4) of the Convention tries to define compulsory maternity leave of six 
weeks after childbirth, but this is conditional upon the agreement of the 
parties to social dialog.  For EU Member States, this provision cannot be 
conditional even upon agreement of parties to social dialog, again 
because of obligations under Article 8(2) of Directive 92/8511.  
It is interesting to speculate what the legislator was thinking about 
when writing Articles 7(2)(b) and Article 8(2) of the Directive. One 
provision allows grant of extended maternity leave if an employer cannot 
provide a worker with healthy day time work, while the other mentions 
only two weeks compulsory maternity leave. This would be 
understandable if there were no difference between pay, but there is.  
According to Pedersen12, if the employer cannot provide a pregnant 
worker with safe working conditions, then she must be granted leave on 
full pay, while according to Gillespie13, maternity pay does not have to be 
                                                                                                                                            
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at pages 115 and 116, 
paragraphs 240 and 241. 
9 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 116, paragraph 
240. 
10 Maternity Protection Recommendation No.R191, 2000 invites state parties to extend maternity leave 
up to 18 weeks. 
11 Presently ILO Maternity Protection Convention No.183 is ratified by 13 states, of which 7 are EU 
Member States, see ratifications at web page www.ilo.org   
12 Case C-66/96, Handels – og Kontorfunktionerernes Forbund I Danmark, acting on behalf of Berit 
huj Pedersen v Fellesforeningen for Danmarks Brugsforeninger and Dansk Tandlegeforening and 
Kristelig Funktioner-Organisation v Dansk Handel & Service, ECR 1998 Page I-07327. 
13 Case C-342/93. Joan Gillespie and others v Northern Health and Social Services Boards, 
Department of Health and Social Services, Eastern Health and Social Services Board and Southern 
Health and Social Services Board, European Court Reports 1996 Page I-00475.
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in the amount of full pay. So it follows that such inconsistency between 
the two provisions of Directive 92/85 is created by the ECJ. 
In the Boyle judgment, the ECJ ruled on several aspects of 
application of Article 8 of Directive 92/85. First, the Court held that 
although Article 8 of Directive 92/85 provides for a minimum length of 
mandatory and statutory leave, nevertheless it is for the Member States to 
determine when maternity leave is to commence14. Second, it ruled that if 
a person on sick leave gives birth, then in principle the date on which 
paid maternity leave commences may be brought forward, but under 
condition that the worker has expressed her will to go on maternity leave 
before giving birth. Second, the Court ruled that a woman after giving 
birth is allowed, instead of maternity leave, to take sick leave and if sick 
leave ends before the expiry of maternity leave then she has the right to 
continue to be on maternity leave.  
By contrast, an employer may require that a woman is not allowed to 
take sick leave during a supplementary period of maternity leave 
provided as an extra right by the employer unless she interrupts 
supplementary leave and elects to return to work. So, complex problems 
could arise only because sick pay is higher than maternity pay, as in the 
present case. However, this issue will be discussed later.  
As regards the first finding of the Court, here it is crucial that a 
woman notify before sickness that she will take maternity leave. 
Otherwise, her employer could compel her to be on maternity leave for 
no longer than two weeks. This is also pointed out by the Court15. 
Moreover, it recalled the Hertz judgment, where the ECJ held that: 
 
…it is for every member State, within the limits laid down in Article 8 of 
Directive 92/85, to fix periods of maternity leave so as to enable female 
workers to be absent during the pregnancy period in which the disorders 
inherent in pregnancy and confinement occur.16
 
In the context of the present case, this could mean that it is not upon the 
employer’s choice to determine whether a worker is on sick leave or on 
maternity leave. 
The third finding of the Court raises a line of questions. In 
particular, why can an employer not require a woman to elect to return to 
work in order to put herself under a sick leave scheme? As Foubert 
rightly points out, if the legislator has determined that compulsory leave 
must be at least two weeks, then it has presumed that two weeks is 
                                                 
14 Case C-411/96. Margaret Boyle and Others v Equal Opportunities Commission, ECR 1998 Page I-
06401. Paragraphs 49. 
15 Ibid.,  paras. 48 and 49. 
16 Ibid., paras 50. 
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enough to protect women’s health and safety17. Thus the Court’s 
reasoning in Boyle that the employer may not set such conditions because 
it would comprise the purpose of maternity leave – recovery of woman’s 
biological condition - contradicts what the legislator intended. 
Furthermore, the Court held that maternity leave is intended for the 
purpose that a woman can look after her newborn baby, thus once again 
and more explicitly than ever before going beyond health and safety 
purposes and in contrast to the equality principle construing social 
differences between the sexes of women as better child-carers. Besides, 
the Advocate General notes that Directive 92/85 provides for continuous 
maternity leave, which thus cannot be divided into several separate 
terms18.  As regards supplementary maternity leave and the requirement 
to return to work in order to be allowed to take sick leave, Foubert notes 
that this issue was not analysed by the Court from the equality 
perspective. It is clear that this issue falls outside the scope of Directive 
92/85, but does it fall outside Directive 76/207? If supplementary leave is 
not for the purposes of health and safety protection, then its grant to 
women workers exclusively amounts to direct discrimination against 
male workers who are young fathers19.   
 
Financial means during maternity leave 
The Maternity Protection Convention requires cash benefits to be 
provided in accordance with national laws and regulations. The amount 
of those benefits must be at a level that ensures maintenance of a woman 
and her child in proper health condition and sustainable standard of 
living. 
Article 11(2) provides that during maternity leave a woman should 
be maintained with pay or entitled to an adequate allowance. According 
to Article 11(3) an allowance should be considered adequate if it is at 
least equivalent to sick pay.  It must be noted that according to Article 11 
of Directive 92/85 and the case-law of the ECJ, financial means during 
maternity leave could be provided as pay, which falls within the scope of 
Article 141 and Directive 75/117, or as social allowance, which does not 
fall within the scope of the concept of equal pay. Thus maternity pay and 
maternity allowance are governed by different conditions under EC law. 
                                                 
17 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 116, paragraph 
240. 
18 Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered on 19 February 1998. European Court 
Reports 1998 Page I-06401. 
19 Petra Foubert, Does EC pregnancy and maternity legislation create equal opportunities for women in 
the EC labor market? The European Court of Justice’s interpretation of the EC Pregnancy directive in 
Boyle and Lewen, Michigan Journal of Gender and Law, 2002, University of Michigan Law School.  
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Maternity pay 
In Gillespie20 the Court found that if maternity benefit is paid by an 
employer under legislation or collective agreement and is based on the 
employment relationship, then this constitutes pay within the meaning of 
Article 141 and Directive 75/117. However, crucial here was the Court’s 
finding that a woman taking maternity leave is in a special position which 
requires special protection but is not comparable with a man or woman 
actually working21. Consequently, there is no comparator according to 
which pay in accordance with the equal pay principle should be 
determined. Besides, neither Article 119 nor Directive 75/117 requires 
that women should continue to receive full pay. The only point of 
departure as regards the amount of maternity pay is that benefit granted 
must be such as not to undermine the objective of maternity protection22, 
since Directive 92/85 was not applicable ratione temporis to the Gillespie 
case. 
In its Boyle judgment the Court clarified the issue regarding amount 
of maternity pay. It held that the provisions of Article 11(3) requiring 
maternity allowance to be at least equivalent to “that which the worker 
concerned would receive in the event of a break in her activities on 
grounds connected with her state of health, subject to any ceiling laid 
down under national legislation” is applicable to maternity benefits 
“irrespective of whether, in accordance with Article 11(2)(b) of Directive 
92/85, it is paid in the form of an allowance, pay or a combination of the 
two”23. The Court clearly extended the wording of Article 11(3), which 
refers to allowance only, not to pay. As justification for this, the Court put 
forward the argument that pay cannot be lower than required by Article 
11(3), but on the other hand this argument was allowed to make the next 
conclusion, namely that since the provisions of Article 11(3) apply to 
maternity pay, too, it does not have to be higher that sickness allowance 
provided by social security legislation24. This means that if an employer 
provides for higher sickness pay than required by social security 
legislation, then a woman on maternity leave is not entitled to this 
increased pay.  
Foubert is of the same opinion, namely the Court interpreted Article 
11(3) too broadly. She argues: 
                                                 
20 Case C-342/93. Joan Gillespie and others v Northern Health and Social Services Boards, 
Department of Health and Social Services, Eastern Health and Social Services Board and Southern 
Health and Social Services Board, European Court Reports 1996 Page I-00475. Paragraph 14.
21 Case C-342/93. Joan Gillespie and others v Northern Health and Social Services Boards, 
Department of Health and Social Services, Eastern Health and Social Services Board and Southern 
Health and Social Services Board, European Court Reports 1996 Page I-00475. Paragraph 17.
22 Ibid., para. 20.
23 Case C-411/96. Margaret Boyle and Others v Equal Opportunities Commission, ECR 1998 Page I-
06401. Paragraph 33. 
24 Ibid., paras. 34 and 35. 
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… in Article 11(3) reference is made to the ‘worker concerned’ and not to 
‘a worker’ in general. As a consequence, one can perfectly defend the 
view that a worker who is on maternity leave should be paid at least the 
amount she would personally receive in case of absence on grounds of 
illness.25
 
 Following this finding, the Court answered the other preliminary 
questions referred in the Boyle proceedings. It consequently found that it 
is not discriminatory for the employer to require repayment of the 
difference between statutory maternity pay and extra maternity pay 
provided by the employer if the woman fails to return to work one month 
after the birth of the child. 
As regards accrual of pension rights under occupational schemes, 
the Court held that since this issue does not concern maternity pay or falls 
outside Article 11(2)(b), it falls within the scope of Article 11(2)(a) so 
that accrual of pension rights must be considered as other rights 
connected with an employment contract. Consequently, a woman during 
maternity leave is entitled to continue to acquire pension rights and this 
can not be conditional upon whether maternity pay is provided by 
employment contract or national legislation26.  
Notably, the Court in Boyle decided it unnecessary to go into the 
equal pay debate27, which resulted in an inconsistent approach regarding 
equal pay matters. However, this finding allows the conclusion that 
maternity pay is just one element of pay during maternity leave. From 
this standpoint, the finding in the Gillespie ruling that although maternity 
pay comes within the scope of Article 141 and Directive 75/117, but does 
not have to be in the amount of full pay28, obtains a different meaning.  
Recently in Mayer29 the Court reaffirmed that a worker on 
maternity leave is entitled to accrual of pension rights under an 
occupational pension scheme if according to Article 6(1)(g) of Directive 
86/613 such rights are provided by an employment contract or national 
legislation and maternity benefit is paid by the employer. Those rights 
cannot be made conditional upon national legislation that requires taxable 
                                                 
25 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 199, paragraph 
445. 
26 Case C-411/96. Margaret Boyle and Others v Equal Opportunities Commission, ECR 1998 Page I-
06401. Paragraph 85. 
27 Ibid., para 86. 
28 Case C-342/93. Joan Gillespie and others v Northern Health and Social Services Boards, 
Department of Health and Social Services, Eastern Health and Social Services Board and Southern 
Health and Social Services Board, European Court Reports 1996 Page I-00475. Paragraphs 14, 17 and 
20.
29 Case C-356/03. Elisabeth Mayer v Versorgungsanstalt des Bundes und der Länder, OJ C 57, 
05.03.2005., p.11. Paragraphs 27 and 30. 
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income which is not maternity pay. As is clear from the Bilka-Kaufhaus 
judgment, contributions to a private pension fund constitute pay within 
the meaning of Article 14130. It did not examine Directive 92/85, because 
maternity leave in Mayer took place before the period of transposition of 
that directive; however, the Court did not mention that the same applies 
to amendments to Directive 86/613, in particular to Article 6(1)(g), which 
was introduced by amendments adopted in 1996 by Directive 96/97.  
Continuing the debate on what elements comprise pay during 
maternity leave leads to discussion of the Lewen case31. The question was 
whether a worker on maternity and child-care leave is entitled to 
Christmas bonus paid voluntarily by the employer. The Court found that 
since a Christmas bonus is paid voluntarily, it falls within the concept of 
equal pay but not within the concept of maternity pay and allowance 
provided by Article 11(2)(b) of Directive 92/8532. No answer was given 
whether a Christmas bonus paid voluntarily constitutes a right connected 
with an employment contract within the meaning of Article 11(2)(a), as 
was held in Boyle regarding accrual of pension rights under an 
occupational social security scheme. The Court agreed that maternity 
leave must be taken into account for the purpose of awarding bonus 
retroactively as pay for work, but no answer was given whether she is 
entitled to receive it during maternity leave.  
Indeed, the Lewen judgment makes matters with pay and maternity 
pay even more complicated than after Boyle. The Court’s ruling in Lewen 
is inconsistent with the Boyle judgment, since it did not rule on 
interpretation of all EC legislation concerning pay during maternity leave. 
The ECJ ruled only on application of Article 141, Directive 75/117, and 
Article 11(2)(b) of Directive 92/85, but not on Article 11(2)(a). Foubert 
argues that this is because Christmas bonus was paid voluntarily, not 
according to an employment contract. However, such an interpretation of 
Article 11(2)(a) appears too narrow, because “rights connected with 
employment contract” are not mere rights provided by an employment 
contract. Indeed, rights connected with an employment contract as such 
are subject to the equal treatment and pay principle. However, that 
principle also covers voluntary payments33. 
The Abdolaye34 case is one more case where the Court recognized 
benefit paid by an employer to female workers only when they go on 
                                                 
30 Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz, European Court Reports 1986 Page 
01607.
31 Case C-333/97. Susanne Lewen v Lothar Denda, European Court Reports 1999 Page I-07243. 
32 Case C-333/97. Susanne Lewen v Lothar Denda, European Court Reports 1999 Page I-07243. 
Paragraph 23. 
33 Case C-457/93. Kuratorium für Dialyse und Nierentransplantation e.V. v Johanna Lewark, European 
Court Reports 1996 Page I-0024. Paragraph 21.
34 Case C-218/98. Oumar Dabo Abdoulaye and Others v Regie nationale des usines Renault SA, ECR 
1999 Page I-05723. 
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maternity leave as pay within the meaning of Article 141 and Directive 
75/117, which is not discriminatory against male workers, because female 
workers going on maternity leave are in a different situation. This 
different situation forms occupational disadvantages which a female 
worker faces during maternity leave: 
 
First of all, a woman on maternity leave may not be proposed for 
promotion. On her return, her period of service will be reduced by the 
length of her absence; second, a pregnant woman may not claim 
performance-related salary increases; third, a female worker may not take 
part in training; lastly, since new technology is constantly changing the 
nature of jobs, the adaptation of a female worker returning from maternity 
leave becomes complicated.35
 
This list of occupational disadvantages given by the Court is 
somewhat strange, because almost all of them are recognized by the 
Court itself as discriminatory36. In Thibault37 the ECJ held that maternity 
leave must be taken into account for the purposes of assessment of 
performance. It follows that the same applies to a woman actually on 
maternity leave – she is entitled to promotion even when absent. Besides, 
now Article 2(7) of amended Directive76/207 explicitly provides that a 
woman after maternity leave shall benefit from any improvement in 
working conditions to which she would have been entitled during her 
absence. In Gillespie38 and Alabaster39 the Court held that a pay rise 
during maternity leave must be taken into account for calculation of 
maternity pay, so that a woman on maternity leave is entitled to 
performance-related salary increases. As regards training and changing 
technologies “there may be many instances where she does continue 
some training”40 and maternity leave is not so lengthy as to “radically 
affect a woman’s ability to continue to perform her work”41. Indeed, 
technologies are changing fast, but not so fast as to change completely in 
14 weeks.  
                                                 
35 Case C-218/98. Oumar Dabo Abdoulaye and Others v Regie nationale des usines Renault SA, ECR 
1999 Page I-05723. Paragraph 19. 
36 See also Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” 
“Sex Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 176, paragraph 
395. 
37 Case  C-136/95. Caisse nationale d’assurance vieillesse des travailleurs salaries (CNAVTS) v 
Evelyne Thibault, European Court Reports 1998 Page I-02011.
38 Case C-342/93. Joan Gillespie and others v Northern Health and Social Services Boards, 
Department of Health and Social Services, Eastern Health and Social Services Board and Southern 
Health and Social Services Board, European Court Reports 1996 Page I-00475.
39 Case C-147/02. Michelle K. Alabaster v Woolwich plc and Secretary of State for Social Security, 
ECR 2004 Page 0000. 
40 Clare McGlynn, Pregnancy, parenthood and the Court of Justice in Abdoulaye, E.L.Rev. (2000) 25 
Dec, Sweet & Maxwell and Contributors, at page 658. 
41 Ibid. 
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Thus, the reasoning of the Court in Abdolaye is incomprehensible, 
while the argumentation of why only women workers should be entitled 
to a bonus can not be accepted. McGlynn argues that because of this, the 
situation cannot be considered as connected with pregnancy and thus 
requiring a differential. The only acceptable justification would be that 
benefit is made in order to compensate salary lost during maternity leave. 
This benefit is, rather, connected with entry of a child into the family. 
Besides, the disadvantages listed above are faced by a person on child-
care leave, not on maternity leave. It is true that those are women who 
after maternity leave will go on child-care leave and it seems that the 
Court in Abdolaye accepted the reality that “women remain primarily 
responsible for a child” and  
 
For this reason, women should be granted sufficient rights and 
entitlements to enable them to fulfil these existing obligations in a way 
that is least oppressive and rights to which they are already entitled should 
be defended.42
 
As McGlynn continues, this is so-called “maternalist” feminism, which 
seeks to empower women in their traditional nursing role43.  
All these cases demonstrate a fragmentary approach by the ECJ as 
regards pay during maternity leave. Taking together the cases discussed 
above, the concept of pay during maternity leave is a highly complicated 
issue. It comprises several elements – first, maternity pay under Article 
11(2)(b) of the Directive, which also falls within the scope of Article 141 
and Directive 75/117 and according to Article 11(3) must be at least on 
the level of sick pay provided by social security legislation. Second, it 
could comprise elements of pay in accordance with Article 11(2)(a) of 
Directive 92/8544, and Article 141 and Directive 75/11745 (Article 6(1)(g) 
of Directive 86/37846). 
 
Maternity allowance 
Article 11(3) of the Directive explicitly provides for a minimum amount 
of maternity benefit if it is provided in the form of social security 
allowance. It must be at least of the level of sickness allowance provided 
by social security legislation. It is true that maternity allowance does not 
                                                 
42 Clare McGlynn, Pregnancy, parenthood and the Court of Justice in Abdoulaye, E.L.Rev. (2000) 25 
Dec, Sweet & Maxwell and Contributors, at page 661. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Case C-411/96. Margaret Boyle and Others v Equal Opportunities Commission, ECR 1998 Page I-
06401. Paragraph 85. 
45 Case C-333/97. Susanne Lewen v Lothar Denda, European Court Reports 1999 Page I-07243. 
Paragraphs 21, 41, 42. Case C-218/98. Oumar Dabo Abdoulaye and Others v Regie nationale des 
usines Renault SA, ECR 1999 Page I-05723. Paragraph 14. 
46 Case C-356/03. Elisabeth Mayer v Versorgungsanstalt des Bundes und der Länder, OJ C 57, 
05.03.2005., p.11.  
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fall within the scope of Article 141 and Directive 75/11747 and thus equal 
pay cannot be claimed. However, the question is open on whether a 
woman who receives maternity allowance from the state social security 
scheme is to be considered as not linked to her employer by a contract of 
employment relationship according to Article 11(2)(a) of the Directive?  
An interesting question here is the issue of whether under Article 
11(2)(a) accrual of pension rights must be retained if maternity benefit is 
provided by the state social security system. Notwithstanding the fact that 
the Boyle case concerned maternity benefit paid in the form of pay, the 
interpretation of Article 11(2)(a) given in this case does not provide for 
any  argument allowing to distinguish the rights of a worker under Article 
11(2)(a) on account of what kind of maternity benefit she receives under 
Article 11(2)(b) – in the form of pay or social allowance. Moreover, 
Directive 92/85 exists for the purposes of health and safety protection and 
it does not clearly distinguish between those two categories of workers on 
maternity leave.  
It is clear that requirements of heath and safety protection cannot 
be conditional upon the source of maternity benefit. Since contributions 
to an occupational pension scheme have been recognized as a health and 
safety measure, then they are equally applicable to all workers on 
maternity leave. Consequently, although the ruling in Mayer clearly 
provides that rights provided by Article 6(1)(g) of Directive 86/613 to 
retain accrual of pension rights under an occupational scheme during 
maternity leave are only for those who receive maternity pay from an 
employer under an employment contract or national legislation, 
nevertheless, it can be argued that there is such a right under Article 
11(2)(a) of Directive 92/85 for every woman, irrespective of source of 
maternity benefit. 
 
Conditions of calculation of allowance 
EC law provides for several requirements as regards calculation of 
allowance. First, Article 11(4) of Directive 92/85 provides that national 
legislation may set the conditions for eligibility for maternity benefit, but 
those conditions cannot provide for more than 12 months prior 
employment. This requirement may be applied to maternity allowance 
and to maternity pay.  
Second is the finding in Gillespie that a worker on maternity leave 
must receive a pay rise awarded before or during maternity leave48. This 
means that a pay rise during that period must be taken into account for 
                                                 
47 Case 80/70. Gabrielle Defrenne v Belgium State, European Court Reports 1971 Page 00445.
48 Case C-342/93. Joan Gillespie and others v Northern Health and Social Services Boards, 
Department of Health and Social Services, Eastern Health and Social Services Board and Southern 
Health and Social Services Board, European Court Reports 1996 Page I-00475. Paragraph 22.
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calculation of maternity pay. This requirement also concerns a back-dated 
pay rise49.  
In Alabaster the ECJ reaffirmed this finding by holding that even if 
the period to be taken into account for the purposes of calculating 
maternity pay is defined by national legislation and that period does not 
cover maternity leave, then a breach of Article 141 and Directive 75/117 
occurs in the case of a pay rise during maternity leave or outside the 
period taken into account for the purposes of calculating maternity 
benefit. In other words, for the purposes of calculating maternity pay, the 
maternity period and the period which is not taken into account for the 
purposes of calculating maternity pay must also be taken into account if 
during those periods pay is raised50. The Court refused to give guidance 
on how this requirement should be fulfilled as regards calculation 
methods. Indeed, if calculation of maternity pay is provided by national 
legislation, then it is almost impossible to give a uniform formula 
corresponding to the findings in Gillespie and Alabaster, except when the 
period taken into account for the purposes of calculating maternity pay 
covers the period of maternity leave.   
The ILO Maternity protection Convention gives extended 
minimum requirements on calculation of maternity allowance. Article 
6(3) provides that if maternity benefit is based on previous earnings, the 
amount of benefit shall constitute at least two-thirds of the woman’s 
previous earnings. Article 6(4) requires that a woman shall receive 
maternity benefit in an amount of at least two-thirds of previous earnings 
irrespective of other calculation methods provided by national legislation 
or practice. Differently from the provisions of Article 11(4) of Directive 
92/85, Article 6(5) of the Maternity Protection Convention requires that 
conditions for qualification for cash benefits must be satisfied by a large 
majority of women. However, it is clear that the requirements of Article 
11(4) of Directive are able to satisfy a large majority of employed 
women.    
 
Treatment during maternity leave 
Access and working conditions 
Maternity leave is not an obstacle for access to employment, and a person 
on maternity leave could be subject to working conditions. The recent 
case of Herrero51 reflects those rights. Ms Herrero applied and during 
maternity was appointed to the post of administrative assistant. She was 
                                                 
49 Case C-147/02. Michelle K. Alabaster v Woolwich plc and Secretary of State for Social Security, 
ECR 2004 Page 0000. 
50 Ibid, para 48. 
51 Case C-294/04, Carmen Sarkatzis Herrero v Instituto Madrileño de la Salud (Imsalud), OJ C 131, 
03.06.2006., p.16. 
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required to take up the post within one month. Ms Herrero replied that the 
period for taking up the post must be extended until the end of maternity 
leave, and that the period during which she was appointed for the post - 
but could not take it up due to maternity leave - must be taken into 
account for the purposes of calculating her seniority.  The national court 
was not sure whether Ms Herrero enjoyed the rights claimed according to 
EC law, and thus referred preliminary questions to the ECJ. 
Interestingly, the ECJ considered that the case of Ms Herrero as a 
question of access to employment rather than promotion, although 
previously she worked for the same employer as a temporary employee. 
Consequently, the Court found that Directive 92/85 had no relevance in 
the case. It recalled the Thibault52 case, where the Court held that Article 
2(3) of Directive 76/207 precluded less favourable treatment as regards 
access and working conditions, since the aim of the directive is to ensure 
substantive, not formal, equality. It follows, so the Court held, that an 
employer cannot refuse to hold open a vacancy for a candidate because 
she is precluded due to maternity leave from employment from the outset. 
As regards calculation of seniority, the Government of the United 
Kingdom argued that this case must be distinguished from cases where a 
worker already employed is entitled to any improvements in working 
conditions during maternity leave, because in the present case taking up 
of the post was deferred until the end of maternity leave. The Court 
rejected this argument by citing the Opinion of the Advocate General, 
who considered that since the aim of Directive 76/207 is not formal, but 
substantive, equality, it precludes less favourable treatment irrespective of 
whether it affects an existing employment relationship or a new 
employment relationship. At the end of the judgment, the Court stressed 
that the position of a woman on maternity leave is incomparable to that of  
a man, thus the fact that men would never enjoy such treatment has no 
bearing53.  
 
Dismissal 
Article 10 of Directive 92/85 precludes dismissal of a worker on 
maternity leave, save in exceptional cases not connected with maternity 
leave. Presumably, the only case when a person on maternity leave could 
be dismissed is only due to insolvency of the employer. On the other 
hand, a worker could be dismissed if the employer discovers an essential 
breach of working regulations which had taken place before maternity 
leave. However, those are only suggestions and since according to the 
                                                 
52 Case C-136/95, Caisse nationale d’assurance vieillesse des travailleurs salaries (CNAVTS) v 
Evelyne Thibault, European Court Reports 1998 Page I-02011.
53 Case C-294/04, Carmen Sarkatzis Herrero v Instituto Madrileño de la Salud (Imsalud), OJ C 131, 
03.06.2006., p.16, paragraph 46. 
 211
Melgar judgment “exceptional cases not connected with their condition” 
is not even a subject for national legislation to provide an exhaustive list 
for such instances54, interpretation of this provision remains within the 
competence of the employer and afterwards, consequently, for the 
national court.  
 
Rights after maternity leave 
Employment rights after maternity leave 
After maternity leave, only one right is provided by Directive 92/85 
concerning health and safety protection. This is the right for workers who 
are breastfeeding. The remaining issues are covered by Directive 76/207 
and Article 141 and Directive 75/117. After amendments to Directive 
76/207, Article 2(7) now explicitly provides for the right after maternity 
leave to return to at least an equivalent job to the previous one plus 
benefit from any improvement in working conditions to which the 
employee would be entitled during her absence. Besides, it provides that 
less favourable treatment of a worker related to maternity leave within the 
meaning of Directive 92/85 must be considered as discrimination. No 
such right is provided by EC legislation regarding pay.   
 
Breastfeeding 
Working conditions of workers who are breastfeeding are subject to 
assessment under Article 4. If risk is recognized, then working conditions 
in accordance with Articles 5 and 6 must be adjusted. Under Article 7, 
workers who are breastfeeding may not be obliged to perform night work 
if a medical certificate specifies that it is necessary for the safety or health 
of the worker. However, one important item is missing – the right to time 
off for breastfeeding. This is provided only in Guidelines55, which are an 
advisory document only56.     
     
Promotion 
In the Thibault case57, due to absences a woman was precluded from 
assessment of her performance for the purposes of promotion. This was 
                                                 
54 Case C-438/99. Maria Luisa Jimenez Melgar v Ayuntamiento de Los Barrios, European Court 
Reports 2001 Page I-06915. Paragraph 38. 
55 Communication from the Commission on the guidelines on the assessment of the chemical, physical 
and biological agents and industrial processes considered hazardous for the safety or health of pregnant 
workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (Council Directive 92/85/EEC) 
/* COM/2000/0466 final */ 
56 In contrast to what Petra Foubert argues in “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the 
European Community” “Sex Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative 
Leaps to the United States of America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 
2002, at page 219, paragraph 493. 
57 Case C-136/95, Caisse nationale d’assurance vieillesse des travailleurs salaries (CNAVTS) v 
Evelyne Thibault, European Court Reports 1998 Page I-02011.
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conditional upon presence at work for a particular period during the year 
taken into account for assessment. The facts of the case show that she was 
absent on account of sickness several times during pregnancy and 
afterwards she was on maternity leave. She claimed that the period of 
maternity leave must be taken into account for the purposes of calculation 
of work actually performed in order to be assessed for promotion. The 
Court ruled that not taking into account maternity leave for the purposes 
of assessing performance constitutes direct discrimination based on 
grounds of sex.  It once again stressed that special protection under 
Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207 cannot result in less favourable 
treatment, so that an employer is obliged take into account time spent on 
maternity leave for the purposes of assessing performance. 
This is the first case where the ECJ refers to substantive equality58. 
However, in the point of view of legal writers it is not so clear whether 
such a situation is directly discriminatory. According to Foubert: 
 
It all depends on the rule that is being tested: the neutral rule of six months’ presence at 
work (which would imply indirect discrimination), or the rule that the period of 
maternity leave should be added to other period of absence (which would involve direct 
discrimination)59.   
 
The Court reaffirmed the same approach in its Sass judgment60.  
This case concerned assessment of performance of civil servants in East 
Germany. A collective agreement for this group of civil servants provided 
how length of service should be calculated for the purposes of seniority 
before the reunification of Germany. It provided that for assessing 
performance during maternity leave, the legislation of the Federal 
Republic of Germany must be taken into account, but the length of 
maternity leave under the legislation of the Democratic Republic of 
Germany was 20 weeks, while under the legislation of the Federal 
Republic of Germany only 8 weeks. As a result, the German Civil service 
refused to take into account the extra 12 weeks which Mrs Sass spent on 
maternity leave while she was employed under the legislation of the 
Democratic Republic of Germany. The Court found that Mrs Sass had 
suffered discrimination based on sex precluded by Article 2(3) of the 
Directive, because: 
 
                                                 
58 See also Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” 
“Sex Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 179, paragraph 399 
59 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 180, paragraph 
402. 
60 Case C-284/02, Land Brandenburg v Ursula Sass, European Court Reports 2004 Page I-11143.
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she will not attain the higher salary grade until 12 weeks after a male 
colleague who started work in the former GDR on the same day as she 
did.61
 
Further, the Court did not uphold the argument that maternity leave which 
exceeds the mandatory two weeks as referred in Article 8 of Directive 
92/85 should be decided as simply a benefit for women. It first of all 
pointed out that Directive 92/85 is not applicable to the proceedings 
because the events took a place before the implementation date of that 
directive and secondly, that Article 8 of the Directive requires at least 14 
weeks maternity leave, which does not preclude Member States providing 
more than 14 weeks maternity leave. If that extended leave is considered 
for the purposes of Article 8 of Directive 92/85, then it must be 
considered as statutory leave for protection of a woman who has given 
birth. 
As already discussed above, it is dangerous for the Court to 
interpret Directive 92/85 in a way that goes far beyond what is necessary 
taking into account biological differences. Here, a right is given to the 
Member States to extend statutory maternity leave beyond what is 
necessary for recovery after birth by giving – 6-8 weeks. Instead, the ECJ 
again refers to the second aim of maternity leave – protection of the 
special relationship between mother and child, in contrast to the sole 
purpose of maternity leave provided by the legislation of the Federal 
Republic of Germany – protection of a woman who has given birth.  
However, assessing the outcome of the judgment from the point of view 
of substantive equality as regards this particular case, it achieves equality 
of result, but does not promote it for the future.  
 
Working conditions 
Two ECJ cases clarify the right to annual leave and the effect of 
maternity leave on that right. First, in Boyle the Court ruled that 
Directives 92/85 and 76/207 do not preclude a clause in an employment 
contract which provides that a woman ceases to acquire the right to 
annual leave during supplementary maternity leave provided by the 
employer. The right of accrual of annual leave constitutes a right 
connected with the employment contract of workers for the purposes of 
Article 11(2)(a) of Directive 92/85; thus, a woman possesses this only 
while she is on statutory maternity leave. 
Debates among legal writers arose on the question claimed by the 
plaintiff whether such a clause in an employment contract constitutes 
indirect discrimination against female workers, since a substantially 
greater proportion of women than men take periods of unpaid leave 
                                                 
61 Ibid., para 51.
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because they take supplementary maternity leave. The Court ruled that 
since supplementary maternity leave is an extra right granted to women 
workers, they can not claim discrimination. Foubert rightly argues to the 
contrary, that the Court again failed to recognize that supplementary 
maternity leave in fact amounts to child-care leave, because it obviously 
goes beyond maternity protection, thus discriminating against male 
workers who are precluded from their child-rearing62.    
On this issue, Advocate General Colomer has pointed out the 
following: 
 
Quite apart from the fact that I consider that reserving solely to women 
the availability of unpaid leave to look after a newborn child does not help 
promote equality of opportunity between the sexes, since what it does in 
reality is to perpetuate in society the idea that it is women who as a matter 
of priority should take care of the children - with all the concomitant 
adverse effects on their future careers - I do not share the view put 
forward by the applicants.63
 
The right to annual leave was also discussed in the Gomez case64. 
Here, two issues arose. First, whether a person has the right to annual 
leave if it coincides with the general period of annual leave fixed in a 
collective agreement.  The Court found that although the right to accrual 
of annual leave is a right connected with an employment contract and 
thus falling within the scope of Article 11(2)(a) of Directive 92/85, 
nevertheless determination of when paid annual leave should take a place 
falls within the scope of Directive 76/20765. Since Article 2(3) of that 
directive precludes less favourable treatment on grounds of maternity 
protection, Article 5(1) must be interpreted that a worker must be able to 
take annual leave in a period other than agreed by collective agreement66. 
 The second question related to the number of days of annual leave 
to which the worker concerned is entitled. Directive 93/104 provides for 
minimum days of annual leave which each Member State must introduce. 
However, it does not preclude provision of more favourable rights, i.e., 
the right to longer annual leave under national legislation. The question 
                                                 
62 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
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was whether Article 11(2)(a) entitled a worker on maternity leave to 
accrual of minimum-length paid annual leave as provided by Directive 
93/104 or for a longer period of paid annual leave as provided by national 
legislation. The answer given by the Court was logically that a worker on 
maternity leave must acquire more favourable rights to paid annual leave 
than provided for all workers under national legislation67.    
 
Dismissal 
Directive 92/85 does not provide for any special protection for women 
who return to work after maternity leave. It follows that as regards special 
protection of workers who are breastfeeding, Directive 76/20768 applies. 
Cases on the effect on rights of a female worker due to pregnancy-related 
illness were more thoroughly discussed in the chapter on rights during 
pregnancy. However, the question remains why pregnancy-related illness 
occurring before maternity leave should be distinguished from 
pregnancy-related illness occurring or following maternity leave. 
Notwithstanding previous discussion that possibly protection of 
pregnancy-related illness goes beyond what is necessary to safeguard the 
position of a female worker in the labour market69, and may lead to 
increase of discrimination70 but that this problem occurs in extremely 
minor cases71, nevertheless such distinction lacks substantiated grounds 
from the point of view of substantive equality. A person who suffers from 
pregnancy-related illness after maternity leave would not have been sick 
if she had not decided in favour of pregnancy. This fact makes it different 
from other kinds of illness and thus for the purposes of attaining 
substantive equality this interpretation of Directive 76/207 should be 
overruled72.  
 
Pay 
There is no case-law of the Court regarding pay after maternity leave. 
Thus this issue poses may questions. It is clear that pay to a worker after 
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maternity leave falls within the scope of Article 141 and Directive 
75/117. Thus, a woman worker after maternity leave doing the same work 
or work of equal value in comparison to her male colleagues should be 
remunerated in the same amount as her male colleagues. This holds true, 
notwithstanding that usually for the purposes of calculation of pay several 
criteria are taken into account. However, it is unclear when criteria fall 
within the scope of Directive 75/117 and when within the scope of 
Directive 76/207. In Rummler73 and Danfoss74 criteria such as seniority, 
training, mobility, and physical strength fall within the scope of Directive 
75/117, but in Herrero75 calculation of criteria of seniority falls within 
the scope of Directive 76/207.  
It is unclear whether the Herrero judgment refers to seniority taken 
into account for the purposes of promotion or also for the purposes of pay 
alone. Looking more closely at those criteria, it is most probable that a 
woman after maternity leave will not have lost her physical strength, 
although she could be missing training and mobility76 because of 
breastfeeding and the traditional role of child-carer. Do Article 141 and 
Directive 75/117 allow those criteria to be taken into account for the 
purpose of calculating pay for a worker after maternity leave? Directive 
75/117 does not refer to maternity protection; thus, it does not give an 
answer. Possibly, the answer could be found in Gillespie77 and 
Alabaster78, where the Court held that a pay rise during maternity leave 
must be taken into account for calculation of maternity pay. However, 
one could distinguish this as concerning maternity pay, not pay after 
maternity leave. 
Even less clarity exists with regard to women workers who have 
received their maternity benefits in the form of allowances from the state 
social security system. Only Lewen gives a clear answer as regards 
entitlement to Christmas bonus, i.e., that for the purposes of calculating 
this bonus the period spent on maternity leave must be taken into 
account79.  
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 Social rights  
Directive 79/7 contains Article 4(2), providing that equal treatment shall 
be without prejudice to the provisions relating to the protection of women 
on the grounds of maternity. There is no case law as regards maternity 
protection and equal treatment in social security. However, since the 
provisions of Article 4(2) of Directive 79/7 and Article 2(3) of Directive 
76/207 are almost similar by referring to the general principle of sex 
equality, it could be argued that Article 4(2) of Directive 79/7 must be 
interpreted as precluding less favourable treatment on grounds of 
maternity. Thus it follows that women because of maternity leave should 
not lose any social rights or be precluded from acquiring new ones during 
maternity leave as if she were working in order to be able to enjoy all 
social rights after maternity leave.  
Directive 79/7 does not provide for maternity protection schemes 
as such and does not provide for an obligation to equal participation in 
maternity protection schemes if created by the Member States. It allows 
the Member States to introduce maternity social insurance schemes to 
which the only contributors are women, because only they could face the 
social risk of maternity. An obligation to contribute to a state social 
insurance scheme for the risk of maternity for women does not contradict 
the principle of equal pay, but only since social security falls outside the 
concept of equal pay80
 
Self-employed 
No EC legislative document provides for the right to retain service 
contracts during maternity leave. Moreover, no right to maternity 
allowance is provided for by EC legislation. Directive 86/613 provides 
for the right voluntarily to join contributory social security schemes for 
spouses of self-employed persons. However, it does not guarantee 
protection during maternity leave, because this provision does not require 
that state contributory social security schemes cover maternity. Maternity 
allowance could be provided by other social security means; thus, neither 
self-employed nor their spouses are granted maternity protection under 
EC legislation. 
  
Unemployed 
International law is silent about social protection of unemployed persons 
during the maternity period, while Article 2 of Directive 79/7 is 
applicable to persons affected by involuntary unemployment. 
Accordingly, interpretation of Article 2 in conjunction with Articles 4(1) 
and (2) requires special protection of unemployed persons during the 
                                                 
80 Case 80/70 Gabrielle Defrenne v Belgium State, European Court Reports 1971 Page 00445.
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maternity leave period. Suspension of unemployment benefit or not 
granting another instead would put unemployed women during the 
protected maternity period in a disadvantageous situation in comparison 
to unemployed males who are available for work search.     
 
Latvian law 
Labour law 
Length of maternity leave 
Article 154 (1) provides for maternity leave of 56 days before and 56 
days after expected birth-giving. Besides, if a woman has attended the 
doctor and has registered as a person under medical supervision due to 
pregnancy by the 12th week of pregnancy, then according to Article 
154(2) she is entitled to extra leave of 14 days. So, working women in 
Latvia are usually entitled to 18 weeks maternity leave in all, which 
considerably exceeds the time necessary due to biological differences. 
Interestingly, in contrast to Article 8 of Directive 92/85 and the ECJ 
ruling in Boyle81, Article 37(7) provides for 4 weeks compulsory 
maternity leave, two weeks before and two weeks after birth-giving.  
Looking closer at the provisions of Article 8 of Directive 92/85, this 
could be confusing, because it provides for “at least two weeks before 
and /or after confinement”. Such a mistake is not surprising, taking into 
account that Latvian officials are keen on the case-law of the ECJ.   
 
Working conditions during maternity leave 
According to Article 152(2), during maternity leave a woman acquires 
the right to annual leave. 
 
Pay during maternity leave 
Latvian legislation does not provide for maternity pay, only for maternity 
allowance under the state social security system. So an employer is not 
under obligation to pay any money to women on maternity leave, unless 
a collective agreement provides for it or the employer pays something 
voluntarily.  
As regards occupational pension schemes, Article 6(1)(g) of 
Directive 86/378 is not applicable here, because maternity benefit is not 
paid by the employer, which is one of the preconditions for claiming 
retention of acquisition of pension rights under occupational social 
security schemes. 
Another issue concerns health insurance provided by the employer. 
If this does not cover paid birth-giving and ante-natal services, it does 
                                                 
81 Case C-411/96, Margaret Boyle and Others v Equal Opportunities Commission, ECR 1998 Page I-
06401, paragraph 49. 
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not breach Directive 86/378, since that directive does not provide for any 
positive obligation as regards pay (occupational social security schemes). 
It requires formal equality only. 
 
Working conditions after maternity leave 
Article 154(5) provides for an obligation during maternity leave to retain 
previous work, but if this is not possible then the employer must provide 
women with equivalent work with same working and employment 
conditions. Besides, Article 149(6) obliges provision to women after 
maternity leave with all improvements as regards employment conditions 
as if they were not absent on account of maternity leave.    
Interestingly, this right is given to women after maternity leave 
under Article 99. It provides that if a medical certificate so requires, 
during a period of one year after birth-giving, women must be provided 
with respective work and health conditions. This provision does not 
concern breastfeeding workers. Presumably, this provision does not 
exceed what is necessary due to biological differences, because it could 
accommodate typical after-birth depression without taking sick-leave. 
Article 150(4) provides for the right to claim annual leave after the 
end of maternity leave. In this regard, Article 149(4) does not allow 
transfer to the next year of half the annual leave of pregnant workers and 
workers after maternity leave during one year after birth-giving if this is 
necessary for the functioning of the enterprise according to Article 
149(3). Article 134(2) provides for the right for women to claim part-
time work during one year after birth-giving; this also applies to women 
who are breastfeeding. It is undeniable that the extra right given to a 
woman only because she has given birth less than a year ago 
demonstrates that the Latvian legislator considers women as the main 
child-carers.  
 
Breastfeeding 
According to Article 99(3), workers who are breastfeeding cannot be 
exposed to risk of unhealthy working conditions. Under Article 138(6), 
women who are breastfeeding could indicate by medical certificate that 
night work is unhealthy for them. Then the employer must provide day 
work or extra leave. Article 53(2) allows women who are breastfeeding 
on a business trip only if they agree to it in written form. Article 136(7) 
after recent amendments allows women who are breastfeeding to work 
over-time if they agree to it in written form.  
 
Feeding 
Article 146 provides for the right to any worker (male or female) who 
has a child under one and half years old to have time-off for feeding. The 
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break should be at least 30 minutes long and not less often than after 
every three hours. If a worker has more than one child under the age of 
one and a half, she or he is entitled to at least a one-hour break. Breaks 
could be added to the general break or transferred to the beginning or to 
the end of the working day. Breaks for feeding must be paid in full. Piece 
work must be remunerated according to average earnings.  
There is no data available on how workers use rights provided by 
Article 146. Looking from the practical point of view, this right enables 
any worker who has a child under one and a half years to have a working 
day one hour shorter. The rights provided under Article 146 could be 
useful as they are intended in case more than two children were born and 
the father of those children works so close to home that he could indeed 
give assistance to child feeding. It is unlikely that this right is widely 
used in the private sector. 
 
Dismissal 
According to Article 109(1), an employer is precluded from dismissal of 
women during a period comprising a year after child-birth; this also 
applies to women who are breastfeeding, save in cases provided by 
Article 100 (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (7).82  
 
Pay 
From the provisions of Article 149(6) it follows that a woman after 
maternity leave is entitled to pay which she would received if she had not 
been absent on account of maternity leave. 
However, there is one problem regarding equal pay. This concerns 
calculation of average pay. Article 75 provides that average pay must be 
calculated on the basis of pay during the previous six months. If a worker 
has not worked during that time for the purposes of calculation of average 
pay, then a period of six months prior to those six months must be taken 
into account. If a worker has not worked during that period too, then for 
the purposes of calculation of average wage the minimum wage defined 
by government must be taken as a basis. No exceptions are provided for 
lack of salary on account of maternity leave.  Although maternity leave 
could last somewhat longer than four months, nevertheless the situation 
could arise where a woman has been on sick leave for 8 months (on 
account of pregnancy-related illness, for example) during the previous 
year and the rest on maternity leave. In such a situation she would be 
placed in a worse situation than a man who has been on sick leave for 8 
months.  
 
                                                 
82 See in this regard the section on Rights during pregnancy. 
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Social law 
Employed 
Maternity allowance 
As already described in the section on social security, maternity benefit in 
Latvia is paid in the form of an allowance under the state social security 
scheme. The amount of maternity allowance exceeds normal salary. It 
constitutes 100% of gross salary received during the period taken into 
account for the purposes of calculating maternity allowance. So, it 
corresponds to the requirements of substantive equality, unless an extra-
large bonus is paid by the employer while women are on maternity leave.  
One element of calculating maternity benefit does not correspond to the 
ILO Maternity protection convention which Latvia ratified recently83. 
According to Articles 6(3) and 6(4) of that Convention, maternity benefit 
shall comprise at least 2/3 of a woman’s previous earnings, or maternity 
benefit calculated according to another method must also be not less than 
2/3 of previous earnings. The Law on maternity and sickness insurance 
provides that if a woman has not been subject to social insurance against 
risk of maternity, she is entitled to maternity allowance in an amount of 
40% of average social insurance salary in Latvia which does not 
correspond to 2/3 of previous earnings provided by the ILO Maternity 
protection convention84.  
 
Acquisition of state social insurance rights during maternity leave 
As described in the section on social security in Latvia, working and self-
employed persons acquire state social insurance rights through monthly 
social insurance contributions.  During maternity leave it is the state – not 
the employer and worker or self-employed themselves - that makes 
monthly contributions for state social insurance. However, persons on 
maternity and sick leave are not insured by the state against all risks (old-
age pension, unemployment, accidents at work and occupational diseases, 
disability, maternity, and sickness), but only against old-age pension and 
unemployment. Thus, persons during maternity and sick leave do not 
obtain full protection against risks of accidents at work, occupational 
diseases, disability, maternity, and sickness. 
Although persons on maternity leave are insured for old-age 
pensions, nevertheless the amount of contributions for old-age pension, 
on which later depends the amount of old age pension, is at a lower rate 
than if the person were working. The State old-age pension is calculated 
on the basis of savings formed from state social insurance contributions 
                                                 
83 Latvia has ratified the ILO Maternity protection convention on 23rd of March 2006//Latvijas 
Vēstnesis 60(3428), 13.04.2006. 
84 Par maternitātes un slimības apdrošināšanu: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 23.novembris, 
nr.182 (Law on maternity and sickness insurance), Article 31(6). 
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made for this purpose85. In particular, the amount contributed for old-age 
pension of a working person constitutes 24.79% of gross salary, while for 
a person on maternity leave it constitutes only 20% of maternity 
allowance, which itself is equivalent to gross salary86. It follows that 
persons on maternity leave each month lose their contribution to old-age 
pension in an amount of 4.79% of their gross salary or its equivalent – 
maternity allowance. This does not correspond to the requirements of 
Article 4(1) in conjunction with Article 4(2) of Directive 79/7. It is 
noteworthy that insurance against the risk of unemployment during 
maternity leave was introduced only recently. Before, the situation was 
such as to deny the right of a woman who has not worked for 9 months 
after maternity leave to unemployment allowance. After respective 
publications by the author of this thesis on this allegedly discriminatory 
legislation87, respective amendments were prepared by the Ministry of 
Welfare and adopted by Parliament88.  
 
State social insurance rights after maternity leave 
Lack of insurance during maternity leave against such risks as accidents 
at work, occupational diseases, disability, maternity, and sickness could 
negatively affect women after maternity leave. 
 
Calculation of sickness allowance 
As already described in the section on social security, for the purposes of 
calculating sickness allowance insurance, contributions during a period of 
six months before the two months before the month when sickness 
occurred are taken into account89.  Income during this period must be 
divided by calendar days during the period not taking into account days 
spent on sick, maternity, or child-care leave90. If the employee has not 
worked during the calculation period, sickness allowance must be 
calculated in an amount of 40% of average salary in the state. Such 
provision clearly operated against persons who due to sickness and 
                                                 
85 Par valsts pensijām: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 23.novembris, nr.182 (Law on state 
pensions), Article 12. 
86 Noteikumi par valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas obligātajām iemaksām no valsts pamatbudžeta un 
valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas speciālajiem budžetiem: MK noteikumi Nr.230. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 
2001. 13.jūnijs, nr.91 (Regulations on state state social insurance payments from state budget and state 
social insurance special budgets), points 14 and 15. 
87 Kristīne Dupate, Vai darba likums atbilst Eiropas Savienības tiesībām. Jurista Vārds, 2004. 
21.septembris, 28.septembris Nr.36(341), 37(342).   
88 Grozījumi likumā „Par valsts sociālo apdrošināšanu”: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis 2005. 31.marts 
nr.51 (amendments to Law on state social insurance) 
89 Vidējās apdrošināšanas iemaksu algas aprēķināšanas kārtība un valsts sociālās apdrošināšana 
pabalstu piešķiršanas, aprēķināšanas un izmaksas kārtība: MK noteikumi Nr.270. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 
1998. 31.jūlijs, nr.223/224 (Regulations on calculation of average insurance salary and calculation, 
assignation and pay-out of state social insurance allowances)  
90 Ibid.   
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maternity leave together were without insurance contributions during the 
calculation period. For the purposes of eliminating such discriminatory 
requirements against persons on maternity leave, Article 31 of the Law on 
maternity and sickness insurance was amended91. Now it provides that if 
an employee has not worked during the calculation period because of 
sickness, maternity, or child-care leave, then - for the purposes of 
calculating sickness allowance - a period up to 32 months before the 
calculation period can be taken into account92.  Although this provision 
helps to eliminate indirect discrimination against women on child-care 
leave, nevertheless it does not fully guarantee elimination of 
discrimination against workers on maternity leave during the calculation 
period. This is in cases there was pay rise during maternity leave. 
 
Calculation of accidents at work and occupational disease allowances 
For the purposes of calculating allowances due to accidents at work and 
occupational diseases, the method used is almost the same as with 
sickness allowance. The period for calculating average insurance salary 
which then serves as a base for calculating allowances for different 
accidents at work and occupational disease is the six months before two 
months before the month when the incident occurred.  No possibility is 
provided for lack of insurance contributions against risks of accident at 
work and occupational disease due to maternity leave in combination 
with sick leave. Instead, point 32 provides for an insurance salary of 40% 
of average salary in the state, if the person was not insured during the 
calculation period against those risks93. Thus the method of calculation of 
insurance salary taken as a basis for the purposes of calculating 
allowances due to accidents at work and occupational diseases 
discriminates against women and is contrary to the obligation provided by 
Directive 79/7.   
 
Entitlement to and calculation of disability pension 
Article 16(3) of the Law on state pensions provides that if a person five 
years preceding an award of disability pension was not subject to 
insurance against disability, she is entitled to disability pension in the 
amount of state social accommodation allowance, which presently 
                                                 
91 Grozījumi likumā „Par maternitātes un slimības apdrošināšanu”: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 
2004. 21.decembris,  Nr.203 (amendments to Law on maternity and sickness insurance) 
92 Par maternitātes un slimības apdrošināšanu: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 23.novembris, 
nr.182 (Law on maternity and sickness insurance). 
93 Obligātās sociālās apdrošināšanas pret nelaimes gadījumiem darbā un arodslimībām apdrošināšanas 
atlīdzības piešķiršanas un aprēķināšanas kārtība: MK noteikumi Nr.50. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1999. 
19.februāris, nr.48/49 (On calculation and award of mandatory social insurance remuneration due to 
accidents at work and occupational diseases). 
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consists of 45 lats a month94. Consequently, persons on maternity leave 
are subject to this provision since they are not insured against risk of 
disability. 
Besides, according to Article 16(1)(1) of the Law on state 
pensions, for the purposes of calculating disability pension, insurance 
salary of any 36 consecutive months in a period of five years before the 
award of disability pension is taken into account. Usually taken into 
account is that period of 36 months when insurance salary (or income) 
was highest. However, lack of special provisions about persons on 
maternity leave precludes those persons from the right to the highest 
disability pension possible if a pay rise guaranteeing a higher insurance 
salary was given during maternity leave which is not taken into account 
for the purposes of calculating disability benefit. 
It follows that Latvian social insurance legislation contains many 
provisions that fail to conform with Directive 79/7 and that discriminate 
against persons on grounds of sex due to maternity leave. 
 
Self- employed 
Self-employed persons are subject to mandatory insurance against risks 
of old-age, disability, maternity, and sickness95 only if their income 
attains a certain level96. So, if the level of income of a self-employed 
person during a year does not exceed 1320 lats or 110 lats a month, then 
she is not subject to state social insurance. Self-employed persons on 
maternity leave are also subject to old-age and disability insurance only. 
So, after maternity leave they may have less favourable conditions as 
regards calculation of sickness allowance97 and disability pension98. 
Contributions for old-age insurance during maternity leave are also less 
than during periods actually worked.   
In Latvia, self-employed persons are frequently poor. Part of this 
group is made up of those who are only formally self-employed but who 
                                                 
94 Noteikumi par valsts sociālā nodrošinājuma pabalsta un apbedīšanas pabalsta apmēru, tā 
pārskatīšanas kārtību un pabalstu piešķiršanas un izmaksas kārtību: MK noteikumi Nr.561, Latvijas 
Vēstnesis, 2005. 29.jūlijs, nr.119 (Regulations on amount of state social security allowance and death 
grant, and procedure for their award, reassessment and pay-out). According to the Regulations, 
currently the minimum social security allowance amounts to 45 lats.   
95 Exception, Article 6(3) of the Law on state social insurance provides that self-employed persons who 
are of pensionable age are not subject to insurance against risk of disability.  
96 Noteikumi par valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas obligāto iemaksu objekta minimālo un maksimālo 
apmēru: MK noteikumi Nr.193. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2000. 6.jūnijs, nr.213/218 (Regulations on 
maximum and minimum amount of state social insurance object). According to the Regulations, the 
minimum amount for self-employed persons is 1320 lats per year.  
97 Vidējās apdrošināšanas iemaksu algas aprēķināšanas kārtība un valsts sociālās apdrošināšana 
pabalstu piešķiršanas, aprēķināšanas un izmaksas kārtība: MK noteikumi Nr.270. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 
1998. 31.jūlijs, nr.223/224 (Regulations on calculation of average insurance salary and calculation, 
assignation and pay-out of state social insurance allowances).    
98 Par valsts pensijām: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 23.novembris, nr.182 (Law on state 
pensions) 
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are de facto employees of employers that want to avoid taxes. Another 
problem here consists of the different conditions regarding employed and 
self-employed persons for calculation of social insurance allowances. The 
period taken into account for calculating allowances for the self-
employed is much longer than for employees. This constitutes the 12 
months before the 3 months before the quarter when the socially insured 
risk occurred. Consequently, it exceeds the 12-month period required for 
employees under Article 11(4) of Directive 92/85. Unfortunately, this 
provision is not applicable to the self-employed. Persons working in 
professions which according to Latvian legislation could be performed 
only in a self-employed capacity 99 are concerned about observance of the 
general principle of equality, since they are not free to choose the form of 
employment and, as a corollary, be protected against social risks equally 
to employed persons. 
 
Unemployed persons 
Article 2 of Directive 79/7 provides that it is applicable to all persons 
who are involuntary unemployed or seeking employment. Article 4(1) 
precludes direct or indirect discrimination based on sex, while Article 
4(2) provides, in line with interpretation of Article 2(3) of Directive 
76/207, that women shall not be subject to less favourable treatment on 
grounds of special maternity protection. It follows that unemployed 
women who have been involuntary dismissed or are actively seeking 
work should be granted paid maternity leave. Indeed, due to biological 
needs, unemployed women, unlike men, are precluded for some period 
from active work-search. So, under Latvian law unemployed women on 
maternity leave are precluded even from the right to receive 
unemployment benefit100. Pregnant unemployed women are protected 
only if incapacity for work (illness or the right to maternity leave) arises 
during one month after dismissal, then she qualifies for sickness 
allowance without losing the subsequent right to unemployment 
allowance. Those provisions are of general applicability to all 
unemployed workers to whom incapacity for work due to sickness occurs 
during one month after unemployment occurred101. Unemployed women 
also have the right to receive maternity allowance in case of liquidation of 
                                                 
99 Par valsts sociālo apdrošināšanu: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1997. 21.oktobris, nr.274/276 (Law 
on statne social insurance). According to Article 1(3) those professions include advocates, notaries, 
sworn auditors, doctors in sole private practice, pharmacists, and others. 
100 Bezdarbnieku un darba meklētāju atbalsta likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2002. 29.maijs, 
nr.80 (Law on support of unemployed persons and job seekers), Article 14.  
101 Par maternitātes un slimības apdrošināšanu: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 23.novembris, 
nr.182 (Law on maternity and sickness insurance), Article 15(1). 
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the employer enterprise, but not later than 210 days after liquidation102. 
This means that only those ex-workers who at the date of liquidation were 
pregnant for more than 2 weeks are entitled to maternity allowance. It is 
indeed strange to presume that pregnancy lasts only 38 weeks (taking into 
account the right to maternity leave 8 weeks prior to expected child-birth) 
while for the medically normally pregnancy lasts 40 weeks. So, current 
Latvian social insurance law does not provide for protection of all 
unemployed women as regards maternity leave and allowance, contrary 
to Directive 79/7.  
                                                 
102 Par maternitātes un slimības apdrošināšanu: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 23.novembris, 
nr.182 (Law on maternity and sickness insurance), Article 8. 
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Chapter 12. 
Rights during and after paternity leave 
EU law 
Article 2(7) of Directive 76/207 provides that rights provided by this 
directive shall be without prejudice to rights on paternity leave if the 
Member State decides to provide for such right. Besides, a Member State 
which provides for paternity leave shall protect a person on paternity 
leave against dismissal, provide for the right to return to previous work or 
equivalent work on terms not less favourable, and benefit from any 
improvements to which he would have been entitled during absence. 
This provision was introduced by amendments adopted as 
Directive 2002/73 on 23 September 2002 and was subject to introduction 
until 5 October 2005. The preamble (point 13) of Directive 2002/73 refers 
to the Resolution of the Council on the balanced participation of women 
and men in family and working life1, which recognizes in political terms 
the problem of unequal sharing of family duties, which impedes 
attainment of equality in the employment market, and the necessity for 
involvement of fathers in child-care through granting them a non-
transferable right to paternity leave. Consequently, this resolution led to 
provision of paternity leave as an aspect of sex equality, now contained in 
Article 2(7) of amended Directive 76/207.  
There is no case law of the ECJ on interpretation of that provision 
so far. However, since the optional right (optional for the Member States) 
to paternity stands beside the right to maternity leave, it could be 
presumed that rights provided during and after paternity leave are subject 
to the same interpretation and application as regards rights during and 
after maternity leave. 
The section on maternity leave began discussion on the purpose of 
maternity leave. It was argued that in order to eliminate statistical 
discrimination in the labour market and socially construed stereotypes, 
special maternity protection should reflect only biological differences2. It 
is also once again stressed in the preamble (point 12) of Directive 
2002/73 that the purpose of special protection of pregnancy and maternity 
is due to biological differences. Nevertheless, the ECJ has repeatedly 
stressed the second purpose of maternity leave defined by itself – the 
special relationship between mother and child – which goes beyond 
                                                 
1 Resolution of the Council and of the Ministers for employment and social policy, meeting within the 
Council of 29 June 2000 on the balanced participation of  women and men in family and working life 
(2000/C 218/02), OJ C 218/5, 31.07.2000. 
2 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts on Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at pages 100 and 107, 
paragraphs 206 and 217. 
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biological differences and refers to motherhood rather than maternity3. 
This was sharply criticised, since it thereby enhances the socially-defined 
stereotype of woman as main child-carer.  
Presently in the Member States where paternity leave is provided, 
this issue must be analysed from a different angle. The author argues that 
the purpose of paternity leave is to involve the father in child-care and 
encourage him to spent more time with the family - thus enhancing 
fatherhood, which is equal to motherhood - instead of enhancing the 
bread-winner role by working long hours. It follows that the aim of 
paternity leave is not to settle biological differences but to shift socially-
construed stereotypes from one to another – from the father as bread-
winner not involved in child-care to a father who is not the only bread-
winner and who shares child care responsibilities.  
This revelation changes much of the effect on women’s 
discrimination of the second aim of maternity leave defined by the ECJ. It 
follows that if a Member State has provided for the right to paternity 
leave, a period of maternity leave which exceeds the period necessary for 
physical recovery after child-birth obtains another status in the eyes of 
equality law – both cover parenthood. Thereby the father and mother 
obtain equal social roles concerning child-care. Besides, provisions on 
paternity leave allow revision of the norm of ‘normal worker’, who was 
previously seen as a worker without family responsibilities and constantly 
available for work4.    
It is noteworthy that issues of the right to paternity leave under EC 
law arose before adoption of amendments to Directive 76/207. In 1998 
the staff case Burill and Guerra5, both officials of the Commission, 
contested a provision of Staff Regulations allowing women only to take 
maternity leave for not less than 16 weeks, thus precluding child-care 
sharing between them on a part-time basis. The applicants argued that 
time off provided by maternity leave which is intended to secure the 
relationship between mother and child and going beyond physical needs 
for recovery after birth-giving, must be available for both parents under 
the principle of equal treatment. The Court gave no argument on the issue 
                                                 
3 Tamara Harvey, Jo Shaw, Women, work and care: women’s dual role and double burden in EC sex 
equality law, Journal of European Social Policy, 1998, Vol.8, SAGE Publications, at page 51. 
4 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 352, paragraphs 
774 and 775. 
5 Case T-51/98, Ann Ruth Burill and Alberto Noriega Guerra v. Commission, 1999 ECR II-1059. See 
analysis of this case also in Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the 
European Community” “Sex Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative 
Leaps to the United States of America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 
2002, at pages 139-142. 
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of motherhood covered by maternity leave. It merely once again recalled 
that maternity leave by its second aim covers motherhood and that it is 
not in breach of the principle of equal treatment. No issue of equality 
between motherhood and fatherhood was analysed. The Court further 
ruled that a woman is not compelled to take all maternity leave and that 
she can start work after child-birth whenever she is able to produce a 
medical certificate testifying to her recovery.  
Looking at this situation from the point of view of Article 2(7) of 
Directive 76/207, it must be mentioned that both maternity and paternity 
leave is based on an individual non-transferable right and that recognition 
of fatherhood as equal to motherhood requires that paternity leave must 
be as long as the length of maternity leave, which exceeds the 6-8 weeks 
necessary for physical recovery.            
 
Latvian law 
Labour law 
Article 155(1) of the Latvian Labour Law provides for the right to 10 
calendar days paternity leave for the father of a child. A father could 
obtain this right immediately after child birth but not later than until the 
child is two months old. Article 155(6) obliges employers to provide the 
father with previous or equivalent work, with not less favourable 
conditions of employment. Article 149(6) entitles the father after 
paternity leave to benefit from all improvements of employment 
conditions to which he would have been entitled.   
 
Social law 
Section II A of the Law on maternity and sickness insurance provides for 
the right to paid paternity leave. Paternity allowance is paid from the 
special disability, maternity, and sickness social insurance budget6. The 
amount of paternity leave is 80% of average insurance contribution 
salary. Average social contribution salary is calculated in the same way as 
for the purposes of calculating sickness and maternity allowance and 
provided by the same Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers7. It 
provides for taking into account six months income before two months 
before the month when paternity allowance is claimed. Average daily 
social contribution salary constitutes the sum of income divided by days 
actually worked and not taking into account time spent on sickness and 
                                                 
6 Par sociālo drošību: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 21.septembris, nr.144 (Law on social 
security), Article 11. 
7 Vidējās apdrošināšanas iemaksu algas aprēķināšanas kārtība un valsts sociālās apdrošināšana pabalstu 
piešķiršanas, aprēķināšanas un izmaksas kārtība: MK noteikumi Nr.270. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1998. 
31.jūlijs, nr.223/224 (Regulations on calculation of average insurance salary and calculation, 
assignation and pay-out of state social insurance allowances).   
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child-care leave. No exception concerns time spent on another paternity 
leave. 
 
Acquisition of social rights during paternity leave 
A person on paternity leave does not acquire any state social insurance 
rights. This means that regarding all risks socially insured against under 
state social security, the scheme has a 10-day gap.   No social insurance is 
provided by the state as during maternity leave during which a person is 
insured against unemployment and old-age pension8. This clearly 
constitutes direct discrimination based on sex, on the basis that maternity 
leave is also concerned to constitute and protect the special relationship 
with the child. 
If a woman due to biological differences needs 6 to 8 weeks for 
physical recovery, 10 weeks under Latvian legislation is provided for the 
purposes of the special relationship between mother and child, while for 
fathers it is 10 days. So both situations are comparable. Not going here 
into the debate as to why mothers have a longer time than fathers for 
creating a relationship with their children, sex equality law would require 
that a male during 10 days paternity leave acquires at least the same 
social rights as women on maternity leave. Article 21 of the Law on social 
security, which is an umbrella law, precludes any direct or indirect 
discrimination based on sex. It follows that lack of a right to acquire 
social insurance rights during paternity leave is discriminatory. The same 
is true about the amount of paternity allowance, which constitutes only 
80% of social insurance contribution wages, while maternity allowance 
constitutes 100% of social contribution wages. 
 
Social rights after paternity leave 
Since men do not acquire any state social insurance rights during 
paternity leave, it affects their social rights under the state social 
insurance system. First, men lack contributions for old age pension. 
However, the effect is minor, because individual pension savings 
according to which old-age pension is calculated must consist of at least 
10 years’ contributions9. So, the effect on the sum contributed at least for 
10 years is not affected considerably by 10 days when insurance against 
this risk was interrupted, nevertheless it formally discriminates against 
men. Besides, a situation could arise where that a person reaches 
pensionable age but precisely lacks time spent on paternity leave to fulfil 
the condition of at least 10 years contributions for old-age pension. Such 
                                                 
8 Par sociālo drošību: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 21.septembris, nr.144 (Law on social 
security). 
9 Par valsts pensijām: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 23.novembris, nr.182 (Law on state 
pensions), Article 11. 
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a situation is again discriminatory in comparison to women on maternity 
leave.   
Secondly, as regards disability pension, a person is entitled if 
socially insured for at least three years before disability occurred. So one 
could easily be lacking disability pension, because of being on paternity 
leave during which there is no insurance against any social risk. As 
regards calculation of disability pension – the formula is such as not 
negatively to affect the amount of that allowance for persons who were 
on paternity leave previously, if the condition of a three-year qualifying 
period for disability pension is met. 
Third, when calculating sickness allowance, the formula for 
calculating average insurance contribution salary does not provide for 
exemption of periods spent on paternity leave, unlike for persons on 
maternity leave10. This means that conditions for calculating sickness 
allowance are less favourable for those who were on paternity leave. 
Persons may suffer from this disadvantage 9 months after paternity leave. 
Fourth, as regards allowances because of accidents at work and 
occupational diseases, the formula for calculating remuneration for loss 
of work capacity and remuneration for loss of bread-winner is less 
favourable for those who were on paternity leave, because monthly social 
insurance salaries covering the six month period before two months 
before the month when the incident occurred must be added up and 
divided by the months in which social insurance contributions against this 
risk were made11. The problem is that one of these months could involve 
a lower social insurance salary due to a gap during paternity leave. 
However, the same problem could affect a woman on maternity leave. 
She could be in an even worse position if she returns and starts to work in 
the last days of the month. This would mean that for the purposes of 
calculating respective allowances, one day’s social insurance salary 
would be taken into account as a whole month’s income. 
Fifth, regarding unemployment benefit, a person after paternity 
leave is not in a less favourable situation with regard to calculation of 
allowance, since days during which that person has not been insured 
against the risk of unemployment are not taken into account for the 
purposes of calculating unemployment benefit12. Problems could arise 
                                                 
10 Vidējās apdrošināšanas iemaksu algas aprēķināšanas kārtība un valsts sociālās apdrošināšana 
pabalstu piešķiršanas, aprēķināšanas un izmaksas kārtība: MK noteikumi Nr.270. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 
1998. 31.jūlijs, nr.223/224 (Regulations on calculation of average insurance salary and calculation, 
assignation and pay-out of state social insurance allowances)    
11 Obligātās sociālās apdrošināšanas pret nelaimes gadījumiem darbā un arodslimībām apdrošināšanas 
atlīdzības piešķiršanas un aprēķināšanas kārtība: MK noteikumi Nr.50. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1999. 
19.februāris, nr.48/49 (On calculation and award of mandatory social insurance remuneration due to 
accidents at work and occupational diseases), point 30. 
12 Vidējās apdrošināšanas iemaksu algas aprēķināšanas kārtība bezdarbnieka pabalsta apmēra 
noteikšanai un bezdarbnieka pabalsta un apbedīšanas pabalsta piešķiršanas, aprēķināšanas un izmaksas 
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when due to paternity leave a person does not qualify for unemployment 
benefit as such because he was not socially insured against 
unemployment risk for at least 9 months during the last 12 months. A 
month in which a person has been insured against unemployment risk for 
at least one day is taken as if that person was insured for the whole 
month.  
All these incompatibilities are not precluded by Directive 79/7, 
since exemption is provided only for maternity periods, although 
according to the analogical legal method Article 4(2) could be applied to 
persons on paternity leave, too. As regards Latvian law, it has already 
been stated above that the Law on social insurance is an umbrella law of 
the whole social security system in Latvia, thus the principles defined in 
it apply to state social insurance legislation. Article 21 of that law 
precludes any direct or indirect discrimination based on sex, so the 
incompatibilities described above amount to breaches of that provision, if 
drawing parallels with the rights of persons on maternity leave. 
 
Social dimension 
The right to paid paternity leave in Latvia was introduced in 2004. Since 
that time, a small percentage of young fathers have used that right: in 
2004 – 4521 (19.5%) fathers, 2005 - 5495 (23.5%) fathers, in comparison 
to 23 284 women on maternity leave in 2004 and 23 528 in 200513. 
However, the statistics show a promising future since the data are 
improving. So, during the first six months of 2006 10 680 children were 
born and 3107 fathers took paternity leave (29%)14. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
kārtība: MK noteikumi Nr.32. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2000. 28.janvāris, nr.26/28 (Conditions on 
calculation of average social insurance contribution salary for the purposes of calculation of 
unemployment allowance and its award, calculation and pay-out) point 2.2. 
13 Research “Men in the Latvian Public Environment: Policy, Social and Economic Aspects”, Men 
Equal Men Different (EC GRANT No VS/2005/0343), Ministry of Children and Family Affairs of 
Republic of Latvia, 2006. 
14 Sannija Matule, Vecāki stereotipu gūstā”. Latvijas Vēstnesis Pluss, 2006. 10.augusts, nr.123 
10.08.2006. 
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Chapter 13. 
Rights during and after child-care leave 
 
International Law 
The only international law document that attempts to address the reality 
of the necessity to reconcile work and family life is the ILO Workers with 
Family Responsibilities Convention No.1561. The title is promising, 
while the text fails to hold state parties to any particular obligation other 
than aiming at a national policy enabling persons with family 
responsibilities who are engaged or who wish to engage in employment 
to exercise their right without discrimination. The only concrete 
obligation put on state parties is to provide that family reasons shall not 
constitute a valid reason for termination of employment. However, this 
could be easily evaded by primary reasons of such dismissals, which are 
usually absence of continuous availability for full-time work. 
Interestingly, although the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and fundamental freedoms2 (“the Human Rights Convention”) 
does not provide for the explicit right not to be discriminated against on 
grounds of sex in the field of social security, nevertheless there was an 
attempt to contest the right to parental allowance given to mothers only. 
This was the Perovich case3 where a father who was precluded from the 
right to parental allowance under Austrian law contested the 
compatibility of this provision with Articles 8 and 14 of the Human 
Rights Convention. The European Court of Human Rights first found that 
parental leave allowance cannot itself amount to failure to respect family 
life, since Article 8 does not impose any positive obligation on the States 
parties to the Human Rights Convention. However, the situation is 
different when Article 14 comes into play, because “the subject matter of 
disadvantage … constitutes one of the modalities of the exercise of a right 
guaranteed”4. So it follows that Article 14 taken together with Article 8 is 
applicable. The main difficulty was that events took place in 1989, but the 
decision of European Court of Human Rights was delivered in 1998. The 
European Court of Human Rights recognised this by saying that as 
regards child-care both parents are similarly placed and that advancement 
                                                 
1 Availible at ILO home page www. ilo.int 
2 Malcom D.Evans, Blackstone’s International Law Documents 4th edition, Blackstone Press Limited, 
1999. 
3 Judgment of European Court of Human Rights delivered on 27th March 1998 in case Petrovich v. 
Austria (156/1996/775/976), available at home page of European Court of Human Rights 
www.echr.coe.int/echr, 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=156/1996/7
75/976&sessionid=8329678&skin=hudoc-en
4 Ibid, para. 28. 
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of the equality of the sexes is today’s major goal of the Council of 
Europe.  
However, the finding was that both parents must have the same 
rights to look after their child is quite recent and that still “the 
Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing 
whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations 
justify a different treatment in law”5. So since at the end of 1980s it was a 
common standard for Contracting States that parental allowances were 
not provided for fathers, there is no violation of Article 14 taken together 
with Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention. The Petrovich 
judgement was supplemented by the concurring opinion of one judge and 
dissenting opinions of two judges which were absolutely opposite and 
demonstrating the strength of stereotypes governing among judges. So 
concurring opinion presented the view that the right to parental allowance 
granted to mothers only is “indisputably inspired by the biological and 
psychological bond between mother and child… Certain claims in this 
sphere sometimes result more from personal convenience than any 
overriding need”6. The European Court of Human Rights decided that 
granting parental leave allowance to mothers only does not infringe 
Article 8 providing for the right to respect for family and private life read 
in conjunction with Article 14 providing for non-discrimination.  
 
EU law 
Legislation 
Directive 96/34 
On 14 December 1995, general cross-industry organizations (UNICE, 
CEEP, and the EUTC7) concluded a framework agreement on parental 
leave. In order to put it into effect, on 3 June 1996 the Council adopted 
Directive 96/348. 
Directive 96/34 provides for an individual right9 of at least three 
months child-care leave. Particular stress is put on non-transferability of 
                                                 
5 Ibid, para. 38. 
6 Concurring opinion of judgment of European Court of Human Rights delivered on 27 March 1998 in 
case Petrovich v. Austria (156/1996/775/976), available at home page of European Court of Human 
Rights www.echr.coe.int/echr, 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=156/1996/7
75/976&sessionid=8329678&skin=hudoc-en  
7 The main organizations representing confederations of European employers’ and employees’ 
representatives. See Siofra O’Leary, Employment Law at the European Court of Justice. Judicial 
Structures, Policies and processes, Hart Publishing, 2002, at page 237. 
8 Council Directive 96/34/EC of 3 June 1996 on the framework agreement on parental leave concluded 
by UNICE, CEEP and the EUTC, Official Journal L 145, 19/06/1996 P.0004-0009, CONSLEG – 
96L0034 – 16/01/1998 – 11 P. 
9 Gwennaele Bruning, Janneke Plantega, Parental leave and equal opportunities: experiences in eight 
European countries, Journal of European Social Policy, SAGE, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, , 
London 1999, Vol.9 No.3,at page 196. 
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that right in order to involve both parents in child-care10. A person should 
be entitled to use the right to parental leave until a child reaches 8 years. 
Conditions of access and other rules on the right to parental leave are left 
to be defined by each Member State. Those conditions may include, e.g., 
the right to part-time child-care leave, an obligatory period of not more 
than one year of service in order to qualify for that right, the right of the 
employer to delay child-care leave in particular circumstances.   
Workers on parental leave must be protected against dismissal, or 
dismissal is precluded by reason of use of rights of parental leave. After 
parental leave, a person must have the right to return to the same or 
equivalent work and benefit from any improvement arising from national 
law or collective agreement. An important difference between rights after 
parental leave and after maternity or paternity leave is that the worker is 
not entitled to benefit from improvements arising from individual 
employment contracts or working conditions to which she/he would have 
been entitled during her/his absence11.  
Concerning Article 2(7) of Directive 76/207, the  purpose of stating 
that Directive 96/34 is without prejudice to equal treatment between men 
and women seems unclear, since the provisions of Directive 96/34 apply 
equally to both men and women. Possibly it implies equality regarding 
working conditions, which concerns parental leave exceeding the 
minimum requirement provided by Directive 96/34. In principle, that 
directive does not preclude the Member States from still granting longer 
parental leave for the mother than for the father of a child. 
As regards social security during and after parental leave, those matters 
are fully left for the competence of the Member States, although implying 
the importance of the continuity of entitlements to social security.  
Implementation deadline for Directive 96/34 was 3 June 1998. However 
Directive 96/34 does not cover the full spectrum of child-care issues 
involved, such as equal pay.  
 
Directive 79/7 
Article 7(1)(b) explicitly excludes the right to claim equal treatment in 
the field of social security concerning acquisition of benefit entitlements 
following periods of interruption of employment due to bringing up 
children. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 Points 7 and 8 of the Preamble of the Framework agreement on parental leave. 
11 See in this regard Article 2(7) of amended Directive 76/207. 
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Case-law of the ECJ 
Child-care issues under Directive 76/207 
Before adoption of Directive 96/34, child-care issues were dealt with 
from the perspective of Directive 76/207. In Commission v Italy12 the 
Court decided that it is not discrimination within the meaning of 
Directive 76/207 if national law provides for initial adoption leave of 
three months for the mother only, because “by the legitimate concern to 
assimilate as far as possible the conditions of entry of the child into the 
adoptive family to those of the arrival of a new-born child in the family 
during the very delicate initial period”13.  
In Hofmann14 the Court refused to recognize the equal right of both 
parents to leave which was provided by national legislation in the form of 
extended maternity leave. Instead it ruled that any leave called maternity 
leave and intended to protect motherhood complies with Article 2(3) of 
the Directive and that that directive is not intended to deal with 
organization of family life15. So in principle in Hofmann the Court 
recognized that EC law protects motherhood or the right of the mother to 
be protected during child-care leave if the Member State so decides, 
while the father under Directive 76/207 is not entitled to fatherhood or 
protection during child-care leave. Writers also stress that Hofmann 
 
offers the archetypical statement of the perpetuation of ‘separate spheres’ 
ideology in EC law, and the acceptance of the private sphere as beyond 
the reach of (EC) law. Here the use of a model of women as different in 
fact perpetuated a stereotype of women as care-givers.16
 
In Busch17 the Court recognized that returning to work following 
parental leave constitutes an employment condition within the meaning of 
Article 5(1) of Directive 76/207. This finding is in particular important as 
regards application of Directives 92/85 and 96/34 in combination. 
However, as in pregnancy and maternity cases, the Court did not mention 
Directive 96/34, which was applicable to particular events of the Busch 
case in both aspects – regarding the time and facts of the case18 and thus 
                                                 
12 Case 163/82, Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic, European Court Reports 
1983 Page 03273.
13 Case 163/82, Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic, European Court Reports 
1983 Page 03273, paragraph 16.
14 Case 184/83, Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse, ECR 1984 Page 03047. 
15 Ibid., paras. 24 to 28. 
16 Tamara Harvey, Jo Shaw, Women, work and care: women’s dual role and double burden in EC sex 
equality law, Journal of European Social Policy, 1998, Vol.8, SAGE, London, Thousand Oaks and 
New Delhi, at page50. 
17 Case C-320/01, Wiebke Busch and Klinikum Neustadt GmbH & Co. Betriebs-KG, European Court 
Reports 2003 Page I-02041, paragraph 38. 
18 Point 6 of Clause 2 of Directive 96/34 entitles a worker after child-care leave to return to the same 
working conditions.   
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failed to draw a connection between Directive 96/34 and Directive 
76/207. 
 
 Child –care issues under Directive 79/7 
In the eyes of Directive 79/7 child-care benefit could come within its 
scope only under Article 3(2) as family benefit, the amount of which is 
affected by increases of social security benefits against risks of disability, 
old-age, accidents at work, occupational diseases, and unemployment19. It 
also follows that Directive 79/7 is not applicable even if child-care 
becomes one of the risks protected under a statutory scheme20.  
 
Child-care issues under Directive 96/34 
Although according to Article 220 of the EC Treaty the ECJ has an 
exclusive right on interpretation and application of EC law, nevertheless 
Point 6 of Clause 4 of the Framework agreement on parental leave 
adopted by Directive 96/34 requires the ECJ to ask for an opinion of 
signatory parties regarding interpretation of this agreement.    
In Commission v Luxembourg21 the Court declared void provisions 
of Luxembourg law which provided that in case during parental leave the 
right to maternity leave arises, parental leave comes to an end. In this 
regard the ECJ pointed out that Directive 96/34 grants an individual right 
to parental leave the length of which cannot be affected by any other 
leave22. So if such a situation occurs, women are entitled to maternity 
leave but afterwards to the deferred portion of parental leave.  
With regard to persons who are entitled to child-care leave under 
Directive 96/34, the Court clarified that this right cannot depend on the 
birth of a child and the expiration of the time-limit given for 
implementation of Directive 96/34. For the purposes of application of 
rights provided by Directive 96/37, it is important that at the expiration of 
the time-limit given for implementation of Directive 96/34 the child has 
not reached the age of eight.   
 
Child-care issues under Article 141 and Directive 75/117 
It is clear that Directive 96/34 does not oblige employers or the state to 
provide workers with either pay or allowances during child-care leave. It 
is also clear that no obligatory other rights arising from an employment 
                                                 
19 Joined cases C-245/94 and C-312/94, Ingrid Hoever and Iris Zachow v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 
ECR 1996 Page I-04895, paragraphs 41 and 42 and Tamara Hervey, Jo Shaw, Women, work, and care: 
Women’s dual role and double burden in EC sex equality law, Journal of European Social Policy, 
1998, 8 (1), SAGE, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi , at page 53. 
20 Article 3(1)(b) of Directive 79/7. 
21 Case C-519/03, Commission of the European Communities v Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, OJ C 
143, 11.06.2005. p.11. 
22 The ECJ draw parallels with annual leave and case C-342/01, Marka Paz Merino Gomez v 
Continental Industrias del Caucho SA, European Court Reports 2004 Page 00000. 
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contract need be provided to a worker during that period, unless 
normative acts provide for special rights in connection with child-care 
leave.  
So in Lewen23 the Court clarified that a person on child-care leave 
is not entitled to Christmas bonus. But in order to eliminate indirect 
discrimination against women, according to Article 141 after child-care 
leave a person must be entitled to a bonus which is awarded retroactively 
as pay performed in the course of that year. That bonus, however, could 
be reduced pro rata taking into account time spent on child-care leave.  
In Mau24 the ECJ decided that under Directive 80/987 a person on 
child-care leave in case of insolvency of the employer is not entitled to 
claim non-received salary, since their employment relationship is 
suspended on account of that leave, and confers no right to remuneration. 
Misleading in that regard is the term used in Mau - “insolvency 
benefit”25, which more characterises extra benefit to which a person is 
entitled in case of employer insolvency and respective dismissal provided 
under national legislation26. This benefit is in particular intended to help 
overcome difficulties in connection with unemployment, which a person 
on child-care leave would face sooner or later. So since this issue 
involves indirect discrimination with regard to pay27, and from the 
standpoint of substantive equality, a person on child-care leave would 
have been entitled to this kind of insolvency dismissal benefit.   
In Gewerkschaftbund28 the provisions of German law were 
contested. In particular, it provided that a period of mandatory military 
service must be taken into account for the purposes of calculating length 
of service and consequently it must be taken into account for the purposes 
of calculating termination payment. At the same time, the 
Mutterschutzgesetz provided that parental leave could not be taken into 
account for the purpose of entitlement of an employee based on length of 
service. Taking into account that persons on parental leave are close to 
100% women, while persons on mandatory military service are close to 
100% men, the provisions of German law indirectly discriminate against 
women. This claim was rejected by the ECJ on the grounds that both 
                                                 
23 Case C-333/97, Susanne Lewen v Lothar Denda, European Court Reports 1999 Page I-07243. For 
more detailed discussion see Eugenia Caracciolo di Torella, Childcare, employment and equality in the 
European Community: first (false) steps of the Court, 2000, 25 E.L.Rev. June, Sweet & Maxwell and 
Contributors. 
24 Case C-160/01, Karen Mau v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, (2003) ECR I-04791. 
25 Ibid., para. 8. 
26 Articles 101(10)  and 112 of Latvian labour law. 
27 Referring to cases C-333/97, Article 141 precludes indirect discrimination arising from child-care 
leave, but the finding of the Court that payment of benefits could be conditional upon presence at work 
is problematic. 
28 Case C-220/02, Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, Gewerkschaft der Privatangestellten v 
Wirtschaftskammer Österreich, ECR 2004 Page 00000. 
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situations are incomparable – parents take parental leave in the interests 
of the child and the family, while persons do mandatory military service, 
although sometimes extended on a voluntary basis, in the collective 
interests of the nation. Besides, the voluntary nature of parental leave “is 
not lost because of difficulties in finding appropriate structures for 
looking after a very young child, however regrettable such situation may 
be”29. This ruling once again illustrates that the equality approach taken 
by the Court must be evaluated on the grounds of thoroughness of review 
of de facto situations30. The ruling lacks a substantive approach because 
of the superficial comparison of both situations. If the only reasons which 
the Court found different were the mandatory and voluntary character and 
individual and collective interests which distinguishes both situations, 
then it is not convincing. Lack of child-care facilities and services makes 
parental leave mandatory, but since Europe faces a lowering of the birth 
rate and consequent ageing of the population, child-raising is no longer 
only a matter of family interest31.  
 
Latvian law 
Labour law 
Article 156 of the Labour Law provides for the right to child-care leave. 
Every worker who has a child has the right to up to one and a half years 
leave. This may be divided into several parts and used until the child 
reaches eight years old. Workers must inform their employer in writing 
about the beginning and length of child-care leave one month beforehand. 
Time spent on child-care leave is taken into account for the purposes of 
calculating length of service. After child-care leave, a worker is entitled 
to return to the previous or equivalent work on the same conditions of 
employment as before leave. Besides, Article 149(6) provides that a 
person after child-care leave is entitled to any improvements of 
employment conditions as if she/he had not been on parental leave, which 
exceeds minimum requirements of Directive 96/34.   
 
Social law 
Social rights during child-care leave 
Article 7 of the Law on state social allowances provides for child-care 
allowances to which are entitled unemployed persons, employed persons 
on child-care leave, and employed persons actually working.  Child-care 
allowance is provided until a child reaches two years. Child-care 
allowance is not provided when the mother of the child is on maternity 
                                                 
29 Ibid., para. 60. 
30 Oddny Mjoll Arnardottir, “Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/London/New York, 2003, at page 31. 
31 Particular stress on those facts is put in point 7 of the Preamble to the Agreement on Parental leave. 
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leave. Here, the legislator has forgotten about the possibility of the father 
being on paternity leave, thus allowing fathers to receive paternity and 
child-childcare allowances simultaneously and discriminating against 
mothers, or allowing mothers to take child-care leave while the father is 
already on paternity leave thus institutionalising the mother as child carer.  
Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers32 provide detailed rules on child-
care allowance. Until a child reaches one year old, one of parents is 
entitled to child-care allowance of 70% of average social insurances 
contribution salary. The average social insurance contribution salary is 
calculated by adding 12 months social insurance salary (gross salary) and 
dividing by 12. The twelve-month period taken into account for 
calculating average social insurance contribution salary is the three-
month period before the month when the child was born. It is interesting 
that for calculating child-care allowance, state social insurance 
contributions are taken into account although this allowance is not subject 
to the state social insurance system, but is paid by means of the state 
budget. 
Child-care allowance for employed persons who are on child-care 
leave cannot be less than 56 lats but may not be more than 392 lats a 
month, while child-care allowance for employed persons who are 
working constitutes 50% of the child-care allowance which they would 
receive if they were on child-care leave, but not less than 56 lats. For a 
child between the ages of one and two, one of the parents receives 30 lats 
a month.  
Presently, the idea of child-care leave and allowance has partially 
lost its sense, since parents could work full-time with one of them 
receiving 50% of the child-care allowance, whereas child-care leave was 
intended to provide the child with parental care in the first years of life. 
This situation has occurred because of a judgment of the Constitutional 
Court of Latvia33 and resulting amendments to Article 7 of the Law on 
state social allowances in a situation of approaching parliamentary 
                                                 
32 Noteikumi par bērna kopšanas pabalsta un piemaksas pie bērna kopšanas pabalsta par dvīņiem vai 
vairākiem vienās dzemdībās dzimušiem bērniem apmēru, tā pārskatīšanas kārtību un pabalsta un 
piemaksas piešķiršanas un izmaksas kārtību: MK noteikumi nr.644, Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2006. 
11.augusts, Nr.128 (3496) (Regulations on amount of child care allowance, additional payment of 
child-care allowance on account of birth of two and more children in one birth, on revision of that 
allowance and on procedure of award and pay-out of allowance and additional payment). 
33 Latvijas Republikas Satversmes tiesas 2005.gada 4.novembra spriedums lietā Nr.2005-09-01 „Par 
Valsts sociālo pabalstu likuma 7.panta pirmās daļas 1.punktā ietvertā nosacījuma – „ja šī persona nav 
nodarbināta (nav uzskatāma par darba ņēmēju vai pašnodarbināto saskaņā ar likumu „Par valsts sociālo 
apdrošināšanu”_ vai ir nodarbināta un atrodas bērna kopšanas atvaļinājumā” – atbilstību Latvijas 
Republikas Satversmes 91., 106. un 110.pantam”. Decision of the Constitutional Court of Latvia in 
case No.2005-09-01 ”On Compliance of the Condition Incorporated in Section 7 (Item 1 of the First 
Paragraph) of the Law on State Social Allowances – “if this person is not employed (is not considered 
to be an employee or self-employed person in accordance with the Law on State Social Insurance) or is 
employed and is on parental leave” with Articles 91, 106 and 110 of the Republic of Latvia Satversme 
(Constitution), available at http://www.satv.tiesa.gov.lv/  
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elections34. But it all started when in 2004 politicians in Latvia decided 
that the birth rate in Latvia is catastrophically low and to reform 
legislation on child-care allowances. At that time, the child-care 
allowance was 30 lats per month until the child reached two years.  At the 
end of 2004, the Parliament adopted amendments to Article 7 of the Law 
on state social allowances, providing for a new concept for the amount of 
child-care allowance during a child’s first year of life35. In that regard, the 
resulting Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers36 provided for a 
considerable rise in the amount of child-care allowances. At the same 
time, amended Article 7 of the Law on state social allowances precluded 
parent from right to receive at least partial child-care allowance in case he 
or she works part time. 
The Constitutional Court of Latvia in case No.2005-09-01 declared 
part of the provisions of Article 7 of the Law on state social allowances to 
be unconstitutional. In particular, Article 7 provided that only those 
persons who do not work or are employed but are on child-care leave are 
entitled to child-care allowance. It did not provide for the right to at least 
partial child-care allowance in cases where a parent tries to reconcile 
child-care with part-time work. Only those parents who had a child 
between one and two years old - and thus an allowance of 30 lats a month 
only - were allowed to work part-time.  
The idea of totally precluding parents on child-care leave from 
working was based on stereotypes that a child receives the best care only 
if one or both parents look after it 24 hours a day for one year. Although 
the right to child-care leave was provided for both sexes, this was purely 
formal. The opinion of the legislator presented by representatives of 
Parliament and the Ministries of Welfare and Children and Family Affairs 
fully reflected patriarchal attitudes about women’s main responsibility: 
child–rearing,  with adoption of laws that are appropriate only to those 
parents who live together with their spouse and have only one child.   
Although the constitutionality of Article 7 of the law on state social 
allowances was contested on the grounds of sex equality under Article 91 
of the Satversme (Constitution of Latvia), nevertheless the Constitutional 
Court ruled from the perspective of Article 110 of the Satversme, which 
provides that the state especially cares and supports families and children. 
The Constitutional Court found that the part of Article 7 of the law on 
                                                 
34 Grozījumi Valsts sociālo pabalstu likumā: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis 2006. 7.marts, Nr.38 
(amendments to the Law on state social allowances). 
35 Grozījumi Valsts sociālo pabalstu likumā: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis .2004. 25.novembris, 
Nr.174 (amendments to Law on state social allowances) 
36 Kārtība, kādā piešķir un izmaksā bērna kopšanas pabalstu un piemaksu pie bērna kopšanas pabalsta 
par dvīņiem vai vairākiem vienās dzemdībās dzimušiem bērniem: MK noteikumi Nr.1003. Latvijas 
Vēstnesis, 2004. 12.decembris Nr.198 (zaudējuši spēku) (On procedure under which award and pay-out 
of child-care allowances and additional payment of child-care allowance on account of birth of two and 
more children in one birth) 
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social allowances which does not allow for reconciliation of work and 
family life simultaneously by precluding parents from working part-time 
and from receiving at least partial child-care allowance does not provide 
for best possible support for families with children. In particular, the 
measures opted for by the legislator are not proportionate for attaining a 
legitimate aim – a rise in the birth rate and provision of the best possible 
care for children. However, the claimants, one of whom was the author of 
this thesis, put more stress on equal opportunities of the sexes. It was 
proved during those proceedings that approximately 98% of persons on 
child-care leave are women. If precluded from part-time work during 
child-care leave, they are under risk of loss of qualifications and of 
subsequent unemployment. This is not taking into account other 
disadvantages in the employment market that arise due to absence on 
account of child-care leave, such as election to academic posts37, which 
requires certain pedagogical and scientific work to done during the 
previous year.   
In accordance with this judgment, Parliament made amendments 
which now allow working full-time and receiving 50% of the child-care 
allowance, thus losing the sense of child-care allowance as such and from 
the legal point of view making it closer to a fertility grant.  
Currently, several more cases are pending before the Constitutional 
Court of Latvia on the constitutionality of the provisions of Article 7 of 
the Law on social allowances and provisions on rights to child-care 
allowance. In particular under question are the constitutionality of an 
upper limit to the child-care allowance and of different treatment between 
parents who actually work and who are on child-care leave38. 
 
 Social rights after child-care leave 
Persons on child-care leave are insured under the state social insurance 
system against risks of unemployment, and for old-age pension. Those 
rights are provided until a child reaches 1.5 years39. The amount of 
contributions constitutes 20% from 50 lats for old-age pension and 
generally applicable percentage from 50 lats40 for insurance against risk 
                                                 
37 Particular situation of one of the claimants. 
38 Ierosinātas lietas Nr.2006-10-03 un 2006-11-03 Par Ministru kabineta 2004. gada 7. decembra 
noteikumu Nr. 1003 “Kārtība, kādā piešķir un izmaksā bērna kopšanas pabalstu un piemaksu pie bērna 
kopšanas pabalsta par dvīņiem vai vairākiem vienās dzemdībās dzimušiem bērniem” 3.1. punktā 
ietverto vārdu “ne vairāk kā 392 lati mēnesī” atbilstību Latvijas Republikas Satversmes 91. pantam un  
Nr.2006-07-01 Par likuma "Grozījumi Valsts sociālo pabalstu likumā" 1. panta daļas, ar kuru Valsts 
sociālo pabalstu likumā ieviests jauns 7. panta pirmās daļas 3. punkts, un 2. panta atbilstību Latvijas 
Republikas Satversmes 110. pantam. 
39 Par valsts sociālo apdrošināšanu: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1997. 21.oktobris, nr.274/276 (Law 
on statne social insurance), Article 6. 
40 Noteikumi par valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas obligātajām iemaksām no valsts pamatbudžeta un 
valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas speciālajiem budžetiem: MK noteikumi Nr.230. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 
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of unemployment defined by Cabinet of Ministers which presently 
constitutes 1.86%41. This means that social insurance during child-care 
leave provided by the state is of minimum amount and even less than for 
a person receiving the minimum salary, which is currently 90 lats. 
Consequently, in case unemployment occurs right after child-care leave, a 
person is entitled to minimum unemployment allowance, but if 
unemployment occurs during a period of 9 months after the end of child-
care leave, then a person’s unemployment allowance would still be 
partially calculated on the basis of social insurance contributions 
provided by the state during child-care leave, thus diminishing the 
respective allowance. 
The capital from which old-age pension is calculated also suffers 
loss during child-care leave because of the very low amount of social 
insurance contributions provided by the state. The situation is slightly 
better regarding calculation of maternity and sickness allowance, since 
Article 32 of the Law on maternity and sickness insurance requires taking 
into account of social insurance contributions made up to 32 months 
before the normal calculation period usually taken into account for the 
purposes of calculating those allowances. However, it does not eliminate 
differential treatment in comparison to other colleagues who have not 
been on child-care leave, whose allowances are calculated on the basis of 
a more recent period, which may reflect a pay rise.         
A person after child-care leave risks qualifying for minimum 
disability pension. Article 16(3) of the Law on state pensions provides 
that a person who has not been subject to disability insurance during five 
years before the award of disability pension is entitled to minimum 
disability pension, which presently amounts to 45 lats a month42. 
If after child-care an accident at work or occupational disease 
occurs, then a person up to four months after the end of child-care is 
entitled to the minimum social allowance or an allowance amounting to 
40% of the average insurance contribution salary in the state43.  
                                                                                                                                            
2001. 13.jūnijs, nr.91 (Regulations on state state social insurance payments from state budget and state 
social insurance special budgets), points 3 and 4. 
41 Noteikumi par valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas iemaksu likmes sadalījumu pa valsts sociālās 
apdrošināšanas veidiem 2006.gadā: MK noteikumi Nr.968. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2005. 23.decembris, 
nr.206 (Regulations on division of state social insurance rate among modes of state social insurance for 
year 2006) 
42 Noteikumi par valsts sociālā nodrošinājuma pabalsta un apbedīšanas pabalsta apmēru, tā 
pārskatīšanas kārtību un pabalstu piešķiršanas un izmaksas kārtību: MK noteikumi Nr.561, Latvijas 
Vēstnesis, 2005. 29.jūlijs, nr.119 (Regulations on amount of state social security allowance and death 
grant, and procedure for their award, reassessment and pay-out).    
43 Obligātās sociālās apdrošināšanas pret nelaimes gadījumiem darbā un arodslimībām apdrošināšanas 
atlīdzības piešķiršanas un aprēķināšanas kārtība: MK noteikumi Nr.50. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1999. 
19.februāris, nr.48/49 (On calculation and award of mandatory social insurance remuneration due to 
accidents at work and occupational diseases). 
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The author argues that all instances of less favourable treatment 
arising from child-care leave in the field of state social security can be 
contested before the national courts of Latvia as indirect discrimination 
based on sex. Article 2.1 of the Law on social security, which is an 
umbrella law, prohibits indirect discrimination based on sex in the system 
of social security in Latvia. No other law in the field of social security 
provides for any exemptions as regards discrimination, so no provision 
provides for the exemption stipulated in Article 7(1)(b) of Directive 79/7. 
Since the Member States may not invoke non-implemented provisions of 
directives against individuals44, it follows that indirect discrimination on 
grounds of sex arising on account of child-care leave is precluded under 
Latvian legislation.     
 
Self-employed 
Self-employed persons have the same right to child-care leave and 
allowance under the same conditions as employed workers45 but because 
of incomplete and low level social insurance during child-care leave, self-
employed persons face almost the same disadvantages as employed 
workers. The disadvantages are almost the same, because self-employed 
persons are subject to insurance against the risks of old-age, disability, 
maternity, and sickness46.    
 
Unemployed 
Child-care allowance for unemployed persons consists of a flat rate 
allowance of 50 lats a month, while unemployed persons are socially 
insured for old-age pension and the risk of unemployment under the same 
conditions as employed and self-employed persons. So, unemployed 
persons benefit from child-care leave.   
 
Social dimension 
Reform of child-care allowances, which provided one of the parents with 
an allowance in the amount of previous salary until the child-reaches 1 
year, was intended to increase the birth rate in middle-class families. 
                                                 
44Case 152/84, Marshall v Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area Health Authority (Teaching), 
European Court Reports 1986, page 723. 
45 Grozījumi Valsts sociālo pabalstu likumā: LR likums, Latvijas Vēstnesis 2006. 7.marts, Nr.38 
(amendments to the Law on state social allowances). Noteikumi par bērna kopšanas pabalsta un 
piemaksas pie bērna kopšanas pabalsta par dvīņiem vai vairākiem vienās dzemdībās dzimušiem 
bērniem apmēru, tā pārskatīšanas kārtību un pabalsta un piemaksas piešķiršanas un izmaksas kārtību: 
MK noteikumi nr.644, Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2006. 11.augusts, Nr.128 (3496) (Regulations on amount of 
child care allowance, additional payment of child-care allowance on account of birth of two and more 
children in one birth, on revision of that allowance and on procedure of award and pay-out of 
allowance and additional payment) . 
46 Exception, Article 6(3) of Law on state social insurance provides that self-employed persons who are 
of pensionable age are not subject to insurance against risk of disability.  
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However, after two and a half years of practice, statistics show that the 
birth rate is increasing in families with low income. The average child-
care allowance in 2006 is only 68 lats47, and only 4% of new mothers 
receive 392 lats. As a result, many families belonging to the category of 
social risk make babies as a business in order to receive 50 lats a month 
for one year48. This is a considerable income in the countryside, with its 
high rates of unemployment and alcoholism.  
Politicians until now wanted to solve the problems of the birth rate only 
by increasing extraordinary (child-birth allowance intended to buy 
necessary things for a new born-baby) or short-term child allowances. 
The state does not provide a long-term policy for families and children.  
The state does not discuss problems of lack of child-care facilities when 
children are between the ages of one and two. During that period, one 
parent is entitled to 30 lats child-care allowance, which is not enough for 
survival, while the real survival minimum for one person amounts to 
around 120 lats. Besides, according to the Labour law, child-care leave is 
provided for 1.5 years. This means that in combination with maternity 
leave a mother could stay at home without loss of employment until her 
child reaches 1 year and 7 months. Social insurance by the state is 
provided only until a baby reaches 1.5 years.  
Kindergartens are available from the age of two. However these are 
largely lacking. In 2006, around 15 000 children waited in line for 
kindergarten. Such a situation results in unemployment of their mothers.  
In May 2006, 12.3% of unemployed persons were women after child-care 
leave49.  
The government is currently trying to resolve this situation by 
making plans on building and opening new kindergartens. Only recently, 
the prime minister stressed that women face difficulties in returning to the 
labour market after child-care leave50. However this is not due to 
awareness of gender equality, but because of lack of workforce that has 
arisen recently in Latvia.    
The key problem is still that almost 100% of persons on child-care 
are women51 and that the nearest future does not promise considerable 
changes in this regard. For example, since discussion on reform of child-
care allowances started, the term ‘child-care’ allowance obtained a new 
name ‘mother’s salary’. So it is called by everybody – starting with 
                                                 
47 Sanita Jemberga, Brīvpusdienas – lūdzu, dzīvokli – nē. Diena, 2006. 12.augusts, Nr.186 
48 Ibid. 
49 Vajag darbinieku? Meklē NVA! Komersanta Vēstnesis, Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2006. 28.jūnijs, nr.31, 
16.lappusē. 
50 Vairāk kā 1000 bērniem nav vietu Rīgas bērnudārzos, www.delfi.lv , 16.08.2006. 
51 No institution has precise data, because they identify persons not on grounds of sex but on grounds 
of personal ID. A letter from the State Social Insurance Agency provided to the Constitutional Court of 
Latvia in connection with case 2005-09-01 presumes that women comprise 98% of persons on child-
care. 
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politicians and state officials and ending with journalists and the average 
citizen, who is no longer able to recognize what kind of allowance  the 
term ‘child-care allowance’ covers.  
The opinion of the anthropologist authors of the recent research 
“Men in the Latvian Public Environment: Political, Social and Economic 
Aspects” is that Latvian legislation is appropriate for equal parenting, but 
the major obstacle to involvement of fathers in child-care is stereotypes. 
However, another anthropologist, Putniņa52, argues the opposite. She 
contends that legislation must be such as to stimulate overcoming of 
stereotypes, but that present legislation stimulates cementing of 
stereotypes. For example, present legislation does not allow equal 
parenting or the possibility to share child-care leave between parents on a 
part-time basis. Instead, it offers full-time work and half child-care 
allowance for one parent. Taking into account the low average income in 
Latvia, this results in the traditional division of roles between parents – 
the mother takes child-care leave on a full-time basis, but the father 
remains in the role of bread-winner. For most families, this is the only 
acceptable way from the financial point of view. The reason is that part-
time child-care and working for one parent incurs an extra financial 
burden – during absence on account of part-time work of one parent, a 
baby sitter must be paid. This leads to the situation where child-care 
allowance, which forms 50% of the normal child-care allowance, 
constitutes the pay of the baby sitter, while the family must live on 1.5 the 
salary of both parents. Instead, if parents decide to divide roles 
traditionally, then the family income remains at the previous level – the 
mother receives child-care allowance at the level of previous earnings, 
the father proceeds with his usual employment, and no need arises for 
extra baby sitter expenses, because the mother performs child-care.      
 
 
 
                                                 
52 Interview on 22nd of August. She is a Ph.D. (Cambridge University). 
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Part IV.  
Conclusions and proposals 
 
Chapter 14. 
Conclusions 
Problems of EC sex equality law concepts and of 
implementating EC sex equality law into the Latvian legal 
system 
Equality and non-discrimination 
The main problem as regards the differential approach which is applied in 
the EC and Latvian legal systems is that it does not always guarantee 
substantive equality. Even less, it is not always able to catch 
discrimination. In order to improve the situation there is no need for 
dramatic change as regards legal theory. As Mjoll rightly stresses, 
strictness of review of the situation defines whether an approach is formal 
or substantive1. In turn, the requirement of strict review of legal and 
factual situations2 compels itself to depart from the male as a norm and to 
take into account hidden social obstacles which women face3. For 
example, in the widely criticized Helmig case4 the Court took into 
account the reality of women’s lives – part-time employment in order for 
the rest of working time to be spent on household and family work - then 
                                                           
1 Oddny Mjoll Arnardottir, “Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/London/New York, 2003, at page 31: 
The review of discrimination is undertaken though analysis in two principal steps. The 
first step in analysis must establish the existence and basis of differentiation. Following 
that the question arises whether the differentiation is justified and the objective and 
reasonable justification test decides where the line between banned discrimination and 
permitted or even desirable differentiation lies. Strictness or leniency in the review, 
placing respectively maximal or only minimal burdens on the establishment of difference 
of treatment and the justification for differentiation, implies whether the approach is 
formal or substantive. Thus the strictness of review becomes absolutely instrumental in 
positioning a case on the sliding scale from formal to substantive equality. 
2 Levits E., Par tiesiskās vienlīdzības principu. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2003. 8.maijs, Nr.68. 
3 For example, although Levits (Par tiesiskās vienlīdzības principu. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2003. 8.maijs, 
Nr.68) in Latvian legal theory places special protection during pregnancy and maternity under social 
protection measures thus demonstrating the male norm as the point of departure. EC law by Directive 
92/85 and the ECJ by its ruling in Gillespie (Case C-342/93, Joan Gillespie and others v Northern 
Health and Social Services Boards, Department of Health and Social Services, Eastern Health and 
Social Services Board and Southern Health and Social Services Board, European Court Reports 1996 
Page I-00475) has defined special pregnancy and maternity protection as a sui generis situation, thus 
formally showing that the point of departure is not the male norm. However, both approaches - 
whatever norm they have as a point of departure - award women the same protection and neither of 
them guarantees substantive equality.  
4 Joined cases C-399/92, C-409/92, C-425/92, C-34/93, C-50/93 and C-78/93, Stadt Lengerich v 
Angelika Helmig and Waltraud Schmidt v Deutsche Angestellten-Krankenkasse and Elke Herzog v 
Arbeiter-Samariter-Bund Landverband Hamburg eV and Dagmar Lange v Bundesknappschaft Bochum 
and Angelika Kussfeld v Firma Detlef Bogdol GmbH and Ursula Ludewig v Kreis Segeberg, ECR 1994 
Page I-05727. 
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the decision would be favourable to the part-time or simply 
corresponding idea of substantive equality5. The doctrine of strictness of 
review is not limited to a real comparator: it could as well be 
hypothetical. For example, it fits for comparison of financial needs of 
women on maternity leave and the person actually working, taking into 
account the judgment in Gillespie6, where the Court said that a woman on 
maternity leave is not entitled to benefit in the amount of full pay, not 
taking into account the most probable fact that their financial needs do 
not diminish on account of maternity leave. 
 
Direct discrimination 
EC law 
As regards establishing direct discrimination, according to the recent 
Nikolaudi7 judgment a neutral provision may form not only indirect 
discrimination but also direct discrimination where it affects a group of 
persons consisting of one sex. Unclear here remains the situation where a 
neutral provision affects only one person, whether it must be considered 
as a directly or indirectly discriminatory situation. Moreover, it is very 
interesting in the present situation where a hypothetical comparison is 
allowed under both – direct and indirect - discrimination definitions 
provided by amended Directive 76/207. The case-law of the ECJ has not 
delivered a case so far on direct discrimination by using a hypothetical 
                                                           
5 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 212, paragraph 477 
argues: 
In my view, the reason the Court preferred not to see discrimination in Helmig is 
connected with the fact that all the involved employees were women who were 
commonly assumed to work part-time merely in order to have more time to spend with 
their children in the private sphere of the household and family. The decision that there 
was no differential treatment between full-time and part-time employees and hence no 
discrimination, allowed the court to silently endorse the idea that an hour lost for 
childcare or household activities does not justify any extra financial compensation. In 
other words: the background idea seems to be that childcare and household activities are 
economically uninteresting and that, as a consequence, the ability to accomplish those 
tasks should not be rewarded. By contrast, one hour of free time grabbed from a worker 
who adapts to the (male) norm of full-time work and no family responsibilities, is worth 
an overtime bonus. Apparently, the restriction on a full-time employee’s leisure time 
seems more worthy of financial compensation than the restriction on a part-time 
employee’s ‘free’ time that is used for activities connected with childcare and household. 
I cannot discard the impression that the Court would have decided Helmig in a different 
way should the complainants have been male full-time workers with two part-time jobs 
for different employers. After all, in that case, overtime work imposed by any of the two 
employers would imply less leisure for the full-time worker, who is generally assumed 
not to spend his free time on childcare or household activities. 
6 Case C-342/93, Joan Gillespie and others v Northern Health and Social Services Boards, Department 
of Health and Social Services, Eastern Health and Social Services Board and Southern Health and 
Social Services Board, European Court Reports 1996 Page I-00475.
7 Case C-196/02, Vasiliki Nikoloudi v Organismos Tilepikinonion Ellados AE, OJ C 106, 30.04.2005., 
p.1. 
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comparator, except in pregnancy cases8. So far the ECJ has demonstrated 
a strict approach as regards the possibility to justify direct discrimination. 
However, such a strict approach may lead to compelled departure from 
legal theory; for example, such a position may lead to an escape from 
justification of direct discrimination through non-comparability of 
situations9. 
As regards exemptions, the ECJ has mandated the Member States 
to depart from the equal treatment principle when the sex of the worker as 
a determining factor is defined on the basis of socially construed 
stereotypes10. Although special protection during pregnancy and 
maternity under Article 2(7) of amended Directive (ex Article 2(3)) must 
be interpreted strictly in the sense that it may not be applied “for special 
protection measures” to women outside that special period11, nevertheless 
it still mandates the Member States for quite a wide discretion (Boyle) as 
regards special protection measures during pregnancy and the maternity 
period which frequently goes beyond biological differences and reflects 
socially construed stereotypes of woman as the main child-carer12. 
Positive measures allowed under Article 141(4) according to the 
interpretation given by the ECJ present an individual right approach, 
while the present state of the disadvantageous situation of women in the 
labour market requires a group approach in order to attain equality.     
 
Latvian law 
Provisions of EC law as regards the concept of direct discrimination are 
properly introduced into the Latvian legal system; however, the case-law 
of national courts shows that judges do not pay much attention to 
qualification of direct or indirect discrimination and to the presence or 
lack of a comparator. In other words, judgments do not reflect reasoning 
from the perspective of legal theory, which sooner or later may lead to 
                                                           
8 See for example, 177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichtig Vormingscentrum voor Jong 
Volwassen (VJV-Centrum) Plus, (1990) ECR page I-03941 and C-179/88, Handels- og 
Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, European Court Reports 
1990 Page I-03979. 
9 See in this regard, case C-342/93, Joan Gillespie and others v Northern Health and Social Services 
Boards, Department of Health and Social Services, Eastern Health and Social Services Board and 
Southern Health and Social Services Board, European Court Reports 1996 Page I-00475 and Sacha 
Prechal, Equality of treatment, non-discrimination and social policy: achievements in three themes, 
Common Market Law Review 41, pages 533-551, 2004, Kluwer Law International, see footnote at 
page 545. 
10 See cases, 248/83, Commission of the European Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, 
European Court Reports 1985 Page 01459, paragraph 34 and C-273/97 Angela Maria Sirdar v The 
Army Board and Secretary of State for Defence, ECR 1999 Page I-07403. 
11 See for example cases C-345/89, Criminal proceedings against Alfred Stoeckel, European Court 
Reports 1991 Page I-04047 and C-285/98, Tanja Kreil v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, European Court 
Reports 2000 Page I-00069.
12 See case C-411/96, Margaret Boyle and Others v Equal Opportunities Commission, ECR 1998 Page 
I-06401, paras 49 and 50. 
 250
improper legal qualification of discriminatory situations and possible 
misidentification of indirect discrimination. The second issue is the 
misleading wording of Article 29(3) of the Labour Law, which indicates 
that direct discrimination may be justified. 
 
Indirect discrimination 
EC law 
The definition provided for by amended Directive 76/207 allows for 
hypothetical comparison. Unlike the definition provided by Directive 
97/80, it does not require statistical data showing that a substantially 
higher proportion of members of one sex suffer from disadvantage. The 
new definition provides for the obligation to review objective justification 
under the proportionality test13; however, it concerns equal treatment 
only. The three-stage proportionality test elaborated in Bilka-Kaufhaus14 
by the ECJ was not applied always and fully as regards social security 
matters. Directive 79/7 does not provide for such an obligation either. It 
seems that the ECJ applies a looser proportionality test as regards social 
security15 and social policy matters16, thus setting different standards for 
employers and the Member States. Taking into account the scope of 
competence and amount of financial resources available to the Member 
States in comparison to employers, such different standards are 
unacceptable.  It is also unacceptable with regard to the principle of equal 
treatment as a fundamental principle of the EC and equality before the 
law. 
 
Latvian law 
The concept of indirect discrimination is formally introduced in Latvian 
legislative acts, but since it is a new concept, there is a necessity for 
information campaigns in order properly to enforce that principle in the 
whole legal system. 
 
Equal pay 
EC law   
The major obstacles on the way to substantive equality as regards equal 
pay matters in the eyes of the present writer are two – a single source 
requirement or a requirement which limits comparison of pay to a single 
source – one employer, a collective agreement or legislative provision - 
                                                           
13 Unlike the ECJ ruling in case C-189/91 Petra Kirsammer-Hack v Nurhan Sidal, ECR 1993 Page I-
06185. 
14 14 Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz, European Court Reports 1986 Page 
01607.
15 See for example, case C-226/91, Jan Molenbroek v Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank, 
European Court Reports 1992 Page I-05943 paragraph 13. 
16 See for example, case C-281/97 Andrea Krüger v Kreiskrankenhaus Ebersberg, European Court 
Reports 1999 Page I-05127.
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and lack of criteria helping to define work of equal value. If both 
problems were solved, it would allow elimination of cross-industry 
discrimination as well as discrimination as regards pay on account of 
horizontal segregation of the employment market. Presently, EC law 
distinguishes between the concepts of equal treatment and equal pay, 
which sometimes may lead to confusion and unpredictable legal 
consequences, especially in national courts17. However, this deficiency 
will be eliminated by Recast Directive 2006/54, which defines the 
concept of equal pay as a working condition.   
 
Latvian law 
Lack of information on provisions prohibiting discriminatory pay and 
lack of knowledge on interpretation of equal pay provisions provided by 
Article 60 of the Labour law are seen as a major obstacle to equal pay 
claims in Latvia. Those claims are also restricted by the practice of 
private employers to require confidentiality on salaries among employees, 
and illegal employment relationships comprising lack of employment 
contract or only partially legitimised wages.  Equal pay problems in the 
field of occupational social security schemes may be only minor, since 
such system of social security is not widespread in Latvia and with regard 
to private pension funds differential actuarial factors are prohibited. 
 
Equal treatment  
EC law 
Equal treatment is limited similarly to the concept of equal pay. Namely, 
comparison is restricted to the single source, which precludes fighting 
discrimination in the more general context of the employment market. An 
important finding of the Court was that refusal to employ and dismissal 
on grounds of pregnancy constitutes direct discrimination based on sex18. 
In this regard it is noteworthy to mention that although Directives 92/85 
and 96/34 were adopted as other provisions than sex equality, 
nevertheless in reality they form an integral part of EC sex equality law.  
However, incoherency on the legal basis of said directives with EC sex 
equality law constitutes one of the key problems. It serves to split issues 
arising in connection with child-birth from sex discrimination arising 
within the employment market, in spite of the fact that in the majority of 
cases discrimination within the labour market arises in connection with 
child-birth.  
                                                           
17 See in this regard the situation described by Catherine Barnard, Bob Hepple, Indirect Discrimination: 
Interpreting Seymour-Smith, Cambridge Law Journal, July 1999, 58(2), at pages 404-405. 
18 Cases C-177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichtig Vormingscentrum voor Jong 
Volwassen (VJV-Centrum) Plus, (1990) ECR page I-03941, para. 12 and C-179/88, Handels- og 
Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, European Court Reports 
1990 Page I-03979. 
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Amendments to Directive 76/207 finally defined as discrimination 
harassment and sexual harassment, which according to research are quite 
widespread phenomena and it is reasonable to consider that it causes 
financial loss to employers on account of loss of productivity19. However, 
the author is anxious about effective enforcement of those concepts, since 
the burden of proof provisions alone do not resolve fully problems 
connected with proof of sexual harassment.    
 
Latvian law 
Special provisions regarding pregnancy, maternity, paternity, and child-
care are seen outside equal treatment matters. It must be provided 
explicitly that less favourable treatment on grounds of pregnancy, 
maternity and paternity constitutes direct discrimination based on sex, but 
less favourable treatment on grounds of child-care constitutes indirect 
discrimination. Article 29(1) must also provide that discrimination is 
prohibited not only as regards notice of dismissal but also dismissal and 
renewal of a fixed term contract. The latter is necessary to comply with 
the provisions of Article 10 of Directive 92/85 and the ruling in Hertz20, 
but the former in order to comply with the Melgar judgment21. The 
wording of Article 32(1) is formulated unclearly, since it is formulated in 
the negative but provides for a positive obligation. It must be stated 
clearly that job advertisements must concern both sexes. According to 
Article 2(4) of the Law on the state civil service, civil servants under 
national law are not subject to the right to equal treatment22. This is 
contrary to EC sex equality law. Much more attention must be paid to the 
enforcement of equal treatment provisions.   
 
Social security 
EC Law 
Although Directive 79/7 brought many changes favouring women, 
nevertheless it retains exemptions which, taken together, affects women 
more negatively than men. In particular, it concerns exemption of the 
Member States from the obligation to insure persons during and after the 
child-raising period with social security guarantees. Different pensionable 
                                                           
19 Evelyn Ellis, EU Anti-Discrimination Law, Oxford EC Law Library, Oxford University Press, 2005, 
at pages 236-240. 
20 If Article 10 of Directive 92/85 is applicable only to those workers who have informed their 
employer of pregnancy, then Article 5(1) of Directive 76/207 precludes dismissal of a pregnant worker 
(case C-179/88, Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, European Court Reports 1990 Page I-03979) without precondition of 
information. 
21 Case C-438/99, Maria Luisa Jimenez Melgar v Ayuntamiento de Los Barrios, European Court 
Reports 2001 Page I-06915. 
22 Valsts civildienesta likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2000. 22.septembris, Nr.331/333 (Law 
on state civil service). 
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ages allowed under Directive 79/7 does not remedy this substantive 
inequality, since this “advantage” granted to women is effective only in 
several Member States23 and, indeed, it does not always work in favour of 
women themselves24. Besides, as regards case-law of the ECJ, it has 
given to the Member States broader competence than to anybody else 
concerning justification of indirect discrimination by sometimes not 
requiring proving proportionality of discriminatory measures at all25. The 
case-law of the ECJ also allows exemption of certain categories of 
persons from the social security system or certain benefits26. It is obvious 
that such actions usually work to the disadvantage of part-time workers or 
workers with low income, of which the majority are women. So Directive 
79/7 not only fails to catch inequality arising from unequal division of 
family and child-care responsibilities between men and women, in 
particular when women are on child-care leave, but also allows indirect 
discrimination against women in part-time employment who try in this 
wise to reconcile work and family life27.    
 
Latvian law 
The Latvian social security system at first glimpse does not provide for 
any directly discriminatory provision distinguishing, for example, 
between married and single women or widows or widowers, since it is a 
recent creation – only from the beginning of the 1990s. Besides, it has 
inherited the traditions of the Soviet social security system which did not 
explicitly distinguish between rights of men and women. However, major 
problems arise with regard to social rights after maternity, paternity, and 
child-care leave. The social security system has failed to accommodate 
special treatment with regard to maternity and paternity leave in a non-
discriminatory way. The child-care social security system discriminates 
against women indirectly. 
                                                           
23 Lynn M.Roseberry, The Limits of Employment Discrimination Law in the United States and 
European Community, DJOF Publishing, Copenhagen, 1999, at page 171 the writer states that “only 
four countries have maintained different pension ages and they disadvantage both men and women in 
different ways”. The author has no information on new Member States. 
24 See in this regard the section on Social security and cases C-382/91, Secretary of State for Social 
Security v Evelyn Thomas and others., European Court Reports 1993 Page I-0124 and  C-196/98, 
Regina Virginia Hepple v Adjudication Officer and Adjudication Officer v Anna Stec., European Court 
Reports 2000 Page I-03701. 
25 See in this regard cases C-317/93, Inge Nolte v Landesversicherungsanstalt Hannover, European 
Court Reports 1995 Page I-04625 and C-444/93, Ursula Megner and Hildegard Scheffel v 
Innungskrankenkasse Vorderpfalz now Innungskrankenkasse Rheinhessen-Pfalz, European Court 
Reports 1995 Page I-04741 and the section on Indirect discrimination. 
26 Case C-280/94, Y. M. Posthuma-van Damme v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel, 
Ambachten en Huisvrouwen and N. Oztürk v Bestuur van de Nieuwe Algemene Bedrijfsvereniging., 
European Court Reports 1996 Page I-00179.
27 See in this regard also Tamara Harvey, Jo Shaw, Women, work and care: women’s dual role and 
double burden in EC sex equality law, Journal of European Social Policy, 1998, Vol.8, SAGE, London, 
Thousand Oaks and New Delhi. 
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Self-employed 
EC law 
EC law provides self-employed persons with the right to equal treatment 
by three legislative documents – Directives 86/613, 2004/113 and 79/7. 
However, they comprise more negative obligations than positive.  This 
especially concerns Directive 79/7, which does not oblige the Member 
States to provide any particular social security protection but just obliges 
them to obey the prohibition on discrimination. As regards social security 
during maternity, there is no provision under EC law, including Directive 
86/613, obliging Member States to provide self-employed women with 
special maternity protection.  
 
Latvian law 
Self-employed persons are not protected under Latvian law in other fields 
than social security. Although there is a project of amendments to Latvian 
Civil law to Article 14031, it will take much effort to adopt, taking into 
account the resistance of deputies and their lack of knowledge in the field 
of anti-discrimination law. But the most important aspect after adoption 
of said amendments to the Civil law will be their enforcement and proper 
interpretation and application.  As regards social security under statutory 
social security schemes, the legislator must reconsider whether different 
rules on calculation and entitlement to social allowances in comparison to 
employed persons are legitimate under the general principle of equality, 
because under Latvian law several occupations persons may perform in 
the capacity of self-employed only.  
 
Enforcement and remedies 
EC law 
Although EC law formally leaves enforcement and remedy matters for 
the choice of the Member States, nevertheless it has elaborated a number 
of effective enforcement and remedy tools. These include direct and 
indirect effect, the principles of effectiveness and equivalence, the 
reversed burden of proof as well as the right to effective, dissuasive and 
proportionate compensation and state liability. 
However, it is unclear why the ECJ distinguishes between 
enforcement and remedy measures as regards labour and social security 
rights. In particular, why is a person discriminated against precluded from 
claiming arrears of benefit28, but the claim for benefits itself may be 
restricted by a time limit as regards retroactive entitlement to the social 
                                                           
28 Case C-66/95, The Queen v Secretary of state for Social Security, ex parte Eunice Sutton European 
Court Reports 1997 Page I-02163.
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benefit in question29? Although arrears of benefits may be claimed 
through state liability, nevertheless this entails an extra obligation to 
prove mandatory conditions. EC law does not provide for an exhaustive 
remedy if the national court has failed to ask for a preliminary ruling and 
this has led to a wrong case outcome30. Although such failure may be 
contested under state liability, nevertheless it does not guarantee that the 
same mistake will not be committed again. 
 
Latvian law   
The burden of proof provisions of outcome Labour law must be 
amended31 in order to specify that outcome word ‘facts’ does not require 
evidence but indicate that facts must testify to prima facie 
discrimination32. 
As regards provision on equal pay provided by Article 60, time 
limits for bringing a claim for unequal pay must be equalized with other 
claims concerning pay matters from one month to two years in order to 
comply with the principle of equivalence. Besides, it must be explained to 
lawyers that arrears of pay is not restricted to the general time limit of 
two years governed by the Labour law, otherwise remedies for unequal 
pay would be precluded from effectiveness. 
Article 34(2) - which provides that no instatement may be required 
by a discriminated person - must be revised, since in a small country in 
certain circumstances the obligation to conclude an employment contract 
may be the only effective remedy. While Article 34(2) does not provide 
for instatement, the one-month term for bringing a claim must be revised, 
since - as correctly pointed out by the judge in the Kozlovska case33 - 
such a short (one–month) term may be justified only in cases possibly 
resulting in a reinstatement obligation for the purposes of legal certainty 
of the employer.  
Case practice of the national courts shows that there is some 
difficulty in proving financial loss in discrimination cases34. Possibly this 
                                                           
29 See for example cases C-338/91, H. Steenhorst-Neerings v Bestuur van de Bedrijsvereniging voor 
Detailhandel, Ambachten en Huisvrouwen, European Court Reports 1993 Page I-05475 and C-208/90, 
Theresa Emmott v Minister for Social Welfare and Attorney General, European Court Reports 1991 
Page I-04269. 
30 See in particular, case C-224/01 Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich., European Court Reports 
2003 Page I-10239 and case C-173/03 Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA, in liquidation v Repubblica 
italiana, 
31 Case 109/88 Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, acting on behaf of Danfoss, European Court Reports 1989 Page 03. 
32 Case C-127/92, Dr. Pamela Mary Enderby v Frenchay Health Authority and Secretary of State for 
Health, European Court Reports 1993 Page I-05535. 
33 Jelgavas tiesas 2006.gada 25.maija spriedums lietā Nr.15066406. 
34 In this regard see, Sants (Rīgas pilsētas Ziemeļu rajona tiesas 2005.gada 29.aprīļa spriedums lietā 
Nr.C32242904047505, C-475/3) and Kuzņerēvičs (Rīgas Apgabaltiesas Civillietu tiesas kolēģijas 
2005.gada 21.septembra spriedums lietā Nr.C 27175804 CA-2787/19; 2005.g., Latvijas Republikas 
Augstākās tiesas Senāta 2006.gada 8.februāra spriedums lietā Nr.SKC-54).  
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is because a very interesting approach is taken as regards compensation 
for enforced idleness in unfair dismissal cases in general. However, since 
EC law requires the right to both kinds of compensation - for financial 
loss and moral damage - national courts must rethink their approach, 
which presently tends to refuse award of financial loss, instead awarding 
compensation for moral damage only. Article 1635 of the Civil Law must 
be amended by provisions not requiring proof of the existence of moral 
damage, because the right to compensation for moral damage may not be 
conditional upon requirements of national law which may exempt a 
person liable for breach of prohibition of discrimination from full 
liability35. The same is true about requirements of proof of financial loss. 
Establishing the fact of discrimination is enough to exclude a claimant 
from the obligation to prove the existence of fault36.    
 
Recast Directive 2006/54  
Article 28 of Recast Directive 2006/54 does not pose much optimism as 
regards elimination of discrimination arising from special protection 
during pregnancy and maternity. It is true that rights provided for 
protection during pregnancy and maternity vary considerably from 
Member State to Member State. This especially concerns the right to 
extend maternity leave to a period which is several times longer than 
necessary for physical recovery. Besides, it must be taken into account 
that excessive protection of women during that special period may 
increase discrimination against women in general. Such a wide margin of 
discretion left for the Member States does not help in attaining the goal 
provided by points 11 and 26 of the Recast Directive, stating that it is 
necessary to work on further elimination of discrimination, in particular 
arising from the difficulty of combining family and work commitments 
and poor involvement of fathers in child-care. Positive features of the 
Recast Directive include putting the equal pay principle under working 
conditions, defining direct and indirect discrimination as regards equal 
pay, and explicitly defining the concept of gender mainstreaming.  
 
Legal regulation of pregnancy and maternity under EC and 
Latvian law 
EC Law 
Analysis of rights during pregnancy and maternity under EC law has 
revealed a line of problems. It is clear that not only Directive 92/85, but 
                                                           
35 Case C-177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichtig Vormingscentrum voor Jong 
Volwassen (VJV-Centrum) Plus, (1990) ECR page I-03941. 
36 Cases C-177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichtig Vormingscentrum voor Jong 
Volwassen (VJV-Centrum) Plus, (1990) ECR page I-03941 and C-180/95, Nils Draehmpael v Urania 
Immobilienservice OHG, European Court Reports 1997 page I-02195. 
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also EC sex equality legislation sometimes lead to discrimination against 
pregnant persons and persons during maternity leave and after it. Besides, 
here a major role is played not by the legislator but by the ECJ.    
 
Role of Directive 92/85 in discrimination against workers 
during pregnancy and maternity   
Does Directive 92/85 lift pregnancy and maternity out from the 
equality debate?  
Foubert argues that Directive 92/85 - since it is based on health and safety 
measures - lifts selected issues of pregnancy and maternity out of the 
equality debate37. It institutionalises pregnancy as a sui generis situation 
which is incomparable to “any other situation in which a male or female 
worker may find him or herself”38. The author of the present thesis agrees 
with this finding, but only partially. The author suggests that it is not 
Directive 92/85 which allows for discriminatory treatment or lifting out 
of pregnancy and maternity protection from the equality debate. It is the 
ECJ that did it by interpreting EC legislation in an inconsistent and 
discriminatory way. Therefore, the author suggests looking closer at this 
problem. First of all, the provisions of legislation must be discussed. It is 
clear that after amendments to Directive 76/20739 the special treatment 
provided by Directive 92/85 cannot be lifted out of the equality debate. 
Article 2(7) of amended Directive 76/207 precludes unfavourable 
treatment related to pregnancy and maternity protection, thus presently 
this is no longer an issue at all.  
The problem of pregnancy and maternity as a sui generis situation 
most of all concerns pay issues. However, one should not exaggerate this 
problem as regards EC legislation. It is true that EC sex equality 
legislation contains only one equal pay provision regarding maternity 
protection. This is Article 6(1)(g) of Directive 86/378, which provides 
that persons on maternity leave are entitled to retention of accrual of 
pension rights if it is provided by agreement or national legislation and 
paid by the employer. General EC legislative acts on equal pay - Article 
114 and Directive 75/117 - are silent on this issue. Maternity pay and 
allowance matters are provided by Article 11 of Directive 92/85, which 
consists of several parts. Of particular importance with regard to the equal 
pay debate is the relation between subparts (a) and (b) of part (2). Article 
11(2)(b) speaks about adequate maternity pay, while Article 11(2)(a) 
requires ensuring of rights connected with employment contracts. 
                                                           
37 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at pages 195, 205, 
paragraphs 438, 471. 
38 Ibid., at page 195, paragraph 438. 
39 Directive 2002/73. 
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Consequently, before making a conclusion on whether Directive 92/85 
lifts equal pay matters during pregnancy and maternity out of the equality 
debate, the case-law of the ECJ must be discussed secondly. 
As regards the case-law of the ECJ on equal treatment during 
pregnancy and maternity, there are no issues falling outside the equality 
debate due to special protection awarded under Directive 92/85. There 
were only two cases regarding interpretation of Directive 92/85 regarding 
equal treatment – Boyle40 and Gomez41. In both, the question of accrual of 
paid annual leave was discussed. Although that discussion was formally 
outside the equality debate, because reference was made to Article 
11(2)(a) only, nevertheless the outcome was in accordance with the 
present requirements of Article 2(7) of Directive 76/207. 
As regards equal pay, the only matter which is seemingly lifted out 
of the equality debate is maternity pay. But it is only seemingly. As 
argued above, maternity benefit provided by Article 11(2)(b) of the 
Directive is only one element of the whole pay which women on 
maternity leave may be entitled to. Such judgments as Boyle42, Mayer43, 
Lewen44 and Abdoulaye45 indicate that additional to maternity benefit 
provided by Article 11(2)(b) of the Directive, women on maternity leave 
are entitled to accrual of pension rights under occupational social security 
schemes under Article 11(2)(a) of Directive 92/85 and Article 6(1)(g) of 
Directive 86/378, accrual of Christmas bonus - where that bonus is 
awarded retroactively as pay for work performed in the course of that 
year - and lump-sum payments for persons going on maternity leave 
under Article 14146. Thus Directive 92/85 itself does not say that pay 
during maternity leave must be at least to the level of sick pay only. The 
pay level during maternity leave to a great extent depends on 
interpretation of Article 11(2)(a). The Court, by holding in Boyle that 
accrual of pension rights is guaranteed by Article 11(2)(a), opens the gate 
                                                           
40 Case C-411/96, Margaret Boyle and Others v Equal Opportunities Commission, ECR 1998 Page I-
06401. 
41 Case C-342/01, Marka Paz Merino Gomez v Continental Industrias del Caucho SA, European Court 
Reports 2004 Page 00000. 
42 Case C-411/96, Margaret Boyle and Others v Equal Opportunities Commission, ECR 1998 Page I-
06401. 
43 Case C-356/03,. Elisabeth Mayer v Versorgungsanstalt des Bundes und der Länder,OJ C 57, 
05.03.2005., p.11. 
44 Case C-333/97, Susanne Lewen v Lothar Denda, European Court Reports 1999 Page I-07243. 
45 Case C-218/98, Oumar Dabo Abdoulaye and Others v Regie nationale des usines Renault SA, ECR 
1999 Page I-05723. 
46 A similar idea to this was suggested by Eugenia Caracciolo di Torella and Annick Masselot, 
Pregnancy, maternity and the organization of family life: an attempt to clarify the case law of the Court 
of Justice, European Law  Review (2001) 26, Sweet & Maxwell and Contributors, at page 251. They 
suggest that the Court distinguishes between two forms of remuneration – under Article 11(2)(b) of 
Directive 92/85 and under Article 141, but the author of this thesis suggests that Article 11(2)(a) is also 
involved and if taken in connection with Article 141 it could bring other elements of equal pay during 
maternity leave about equality.  
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to other judgments providing for rights to other elements of pay to which 
a worker on maternity leave is entitled. This is because accrual of pension 
rights is one of the elements of equal pay under Article 14147 and thus 
excludes any doubt that rights provided by Article 11(2)(a) concern 
treatment, not pay. Article 11(2)(a) excludes maternity benefit, which is 
only one element of equal pay. Besides, the amount of maternity pay 
itself was restricted by the Court, not by Directive 92/85. It was the Court 
in Boyle which declared that the provisions of Article 11(3) apply not 
only to maternity allowance but also to maternity pay48.     
Besides, the Court has only two cases where it has given rulings 
based purely on Directive 92/85. These are Boyle49 and Gomez50 as 
regards accrual of paid annual leave. The rest of the judgments are based 
either on equality law or on both equality law and Directive 92/8551. 
Thus, the provisions of Directive 92/85 itself are not the real cause for 
lifting special protection of women during pregnancy and maternity out 
of the equality debate. However, it is true that Directive 92/85 has 
encouraged the ECJ to lift certain issues of pregnancy and maternity out 
of the equality debate and that several provisions could lead to 
discrimination.  
 
Length of maternity leave 
Foubert argues that Directive 92/85:  
 
allows Member States to go further than mere protection of physical 
differences between men and women. It allows Member States to go so 
far that they may potentially endanger the general principle of sex equality 
in the labour market.52
 
Indeed, the length of maternity leave provided for by Article 8 of 
Directive 92/85 is longer than would be necessary due to biological 
                                                           
47 Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz, European Court reports 1986 Page 
01607.
48 Case C-411/96, Margaret Boyle and Others v Equal Opportunities Commission, ECR 1998 Page I-
06401. 
49 Ibid.. 
50 Case C-342/01, Marka Paz Merino Gomez v Continental Industrias del Caucho SA, European Court 
Reports 2004 Page 00000. 
51 Cases C-66/96, Handels – og Kontorfunktionerernes Forbund I Danmark, acting on behaf of Berit 
huj Pedersen v Fellesforeningen for Danmarks Brugsforeninger and Dansk Tandlegeforening and 
Kristelig Funktioner-Organisation v Dansk Handel & Service, ECR 1998 Page I-07327, C-109/00, 
Tele Danmark A/S and Handels – og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark (HK), European 
Court Reports 2001 Page I-6993 and C-320/01, Wiebke Busch and Klinikum Neustadt GmbH & Co. 
Betriebs-KG, European Court Reports 2003 Page I-02041. 
52 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 210, paragraph 
471. 
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differences53. And as Foubert rightly points out, the Council by granting 
maternity leave focused not on the mother’s recovery only, but also on 
care of the baby54. However, the Council is not the author of the purposes 
of maternity leave under EC law. The aims of maternity leave were 
defined by the ECJ eight years before adoption of Directive 92/8555. 
Besides, Article 8 of Directive 92/85 provides for only two weeks 
compulsory leave. The rest is optional. As regards the possibility to 
provide for longer than 14 weeks maternity leave, Directive 92/85 allows 
that, but the ECJ encourages it56.  The length of maternity leave is the 
only matter which Directive 92/85 allows to go beyond what is necessary 
due to biological differences, but again this provision has its roots in the 
case-law of the ECJ. 
 
Limited rights during breastfeeding 
Directive 92/85 provides for rights of workers who are breastfeeding only 
so far it concerns exposure to dangerous agents, while it says nothing on 
breaks necessary for breastfeeding as such. What is the use of protection 
of breastfeeding workers if they do not have the right to time to 
breastfeed? It is notorious that the average woman does not have enough 
milk to express and to leave for the next 8-10 hours for work. Besides, 
storage of breast milk is complicated. Guidelines advise provision of 
several special working conditions, but unfortunately they are only soft-
law documents, thus advisory. It follows that Directive 92/85, intended to 
stipulate several real biological differences especially, lacks one of them.   
 
Lack of health and safety protection regarding access to employment 
Directive 92/85 does not protect health and safety of candidates for 
vacancy, nor does it explicitly prohibit rejection of employment on 
grounds of pregnancy. One could say that this is a discrimination issue, 
but drawing parallels with prohibition of dismissal stipulated in Article 
                                                           
53 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 115, paragraph 
240. 
54 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 116, paragraph 
240. 
55 See in this regard case 184/83, Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse, ECR 1984 Page 03047, 
paragraph 25. 
56 In several cases the ECJ has pointed out that Article 8 of Directive 92/85 requires at least 14 weeks 
of continuous leave. See cases C-411/96, Margaret Boyle and Others v Equal Opportunities 
Commission, ECR 1998 Page I-06401, paragraphs 49 and 66 and case C-284/02, Land Brandenburg v 
Ursula Sass. , European Court Reports 2004 Page I-11143, paragraph 44. Although the Sass judgment 
establishes substantive equality, nevertheless the ECJ could at least imply that provisions of 
Mutterschutzgesetz is what is deserved for gender equality in contrast to  20 weeks of maternity leave, 
which obviously  goes beyond  biological differences.
 261
92/85, rejection of employment does not differently affect a woman’s 
health and safety.     
 
Distinction between pay and allowance 
The author of this thesis is also concerned about the provisions of Article 
11 of Directive 92/85 which distinguishes between pay and allowances.  
At the time of adoption of Directive 92/85, the legislator knew that non-
discrimination issues regarding pay and allowances are governed by 
different EC normative acts (equal pay by Article 141 EC Treaty, 
Directive 75/117, Directive 86/378, but allowances by Directive 79/7) 
and a different approach elaborated by the ECJ. In particular, those 
receiving allowance are much more limited regarding the right to claim 
equality. Besides, issues on the amount of allowances under Article 11 
are fully delegated for determination to the Member States, which has the 
right to ensure them “in accordance with national legislation”. Thus 
Article 11 permits different treatment between persons receiving pay and 
allowances. This constitutes differential treatment under general 
principles of equality, which preclude differential treatment of persons in 
similar situations. However, the problem here is that differential 
treatment of persons varies from one Member State to another. The only 
actor which could change this is the EU as legislator.  
 
Role of EC sex equality legislation in discriminatory treatment of 
persons during pregnancy and maternity 
Equal treatment and meaning of the term “without prejudice” 
Formulation of Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207 has posed many 
problems. This provision has been misunderstood by a number of 
Member States and interpreted by the ECJ opposite to the legislator’s 
original intent57. Indeed, the formulation is: “This Directive shall be 
without prejudice to provisions concerning the protection of women, 
particularly as regards pregnancy and maternity”58. 
Presently, this provision as Article 2(7) after amendments to 
Directive 76/207 has clarified the meaning and scope of protection 
against discrimination during pregnancy and maternity. It provides for the 
main principle – that rights awarded under Directive 92/85 cannot serve 
as a ground for less favourable treatment, and for the right to return to the 
same or an equivalent job. However, Article 2(7) does not cover all issues 
regarding treatment of a worker who is pregnant, on maternity leave, or 
afterwards as a breast-feeding worker. First of all, Directive 76/207 does 
not clearly preclude refusal to hire on grounds of pregnancy or during 
maternity leave and secondly, it does not preclude discrimination against 
                                                           
57 See sections on direct discrimination and rights during pregnancy. 
58 Article 2(3) (now 2(7)) of Directive 76/207. 
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a breastfeeding worker and does not explicitly allow for special 
protection of breastfeeding workers. Significantly, Article 2(3) (now 
Article 2(7)) was amended by Directive 2002/73 only so far as it partially 
codifies the interpretation given by the ECJ on interpretation of old 
Article 2(3). Article 2(7)59 presents no new initiatives by the EU 
legislator. Articles 2(2)(c) and 15 of the Recast Directive provide for the 
same rights as present Article 2(7) of amended Directive 76/207.    
        
Equal pay 
Article 141 EC Treaty and Directive 75/117 itself do not contain any 
guidance as regards pay matters during pregnancy and maternity. The 
only equal pay provision protecting women during maternity leave is 
provided by Article 6(1)(g) of Directive 86/378.  The EU legislator has 
expressed its attitude to pay issues during pregnancy and maternity 
through Article 11 of Directive 92/85. Thereby the legislator has failed to 
draw a strong link between health and safety and equality and has left too 
much space for the ECJ to lift out pay issues from the equality debate.  
The Recast Directive does not promise to bring about changes 
regarding pay during pregnancy and maternity. It does not provide for the 
right not to be discriminated against as regards equal pay connected with 
pregnancy and maternity. Instead, Article 2(2)(c) read in conjunction with 
Article 4 indicates that while a woman is not at work Directive 92/85 is 
applicable. The only promising provision is Article 28(1) which concerns 
the equal pay provision of Article 4, too. Thus, according to the Recast 
Directive, equal pay matters similarly as equal treatment matters should 
now be “without prejudice” to the protection of women during pregnancy 
and maternity. 
 
Maternity protection under Directive 79/7 
Although Directive 79/7 contains an almost identical provision to old 
Article 2(3) of Directive 76/207, nevertheless it is not clear what level of 
protection Article 4(2) of Directive 79/7 provides for. Presumably, 
Article 4(2) of Directive 79/7 should be interpreted in line with Article 
2(3) of the Directive, that less favourable treatment due to special 
protection during pregnancy is not allowed. Those matters urge to be 
clarified on the part of the legislator. 
 
Lack of self-employed persons’ protection during pregnancy and 
maternity 
EC law does not require protection of self-employed persons during 
pregnancy and maternity.  The title of Directive 86/613 is promising; 
however, the content of that directive does not provide for any substantial 
                                                           
59 Except paragraph 4 of Article 2(7) of Directive 76/207. 
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right during that period. Thus the EU legislator draws a very sharp 
distinction between rights of workers and self-employed persons, 
although frequently they are in quite similar situations. Neither Directive 
86/613 nor Directive 79/7 oblige Member States to provide the self-
employed with a statutory sickness scheme; thus, if pregnancy-related 
illness occurs, self-employed women stay unprotected. 
 
 
Role of the ECJ in discriminatory treatment of workers during 
pregnancy and maternity 
Inconsistent application of EC sex equality law and Directive 92/85 
The author of this thesis suggests that the reason for discriminatory 
treatment and pay during pregnancy and maternity leave is not EC 
legislation – EC sex equality legislation and EC legislation on health and 
safety measures - but the case-law of the ECJ, which is inconsistent and 
incoherent in itself. Although the ECJ is under different constraints, 
nevertheless  
 
there remains a sufficient degree of inconsistency in the interpretation 
which the Court of Justice has given over the years to suggest that there 
remains an important interpretive space which the Court can justly be 
encouraged to exploit to its maximum degree.60
 
First of all, this concerns pay during maternity. Altogether, four 
provisions of EC law are involved – Articles 11(2)(a) and 11(2)(b) of 
Directive 92/85, Article 141 EC Treaty, and Article 6(1)(g) of Directive 
86/378. As argued above, maternity benefit is only one element of equal 
pay during maternity leave, which according to Gillespie61 and Boyle62 is 
subject to two EC law provisions: Article 141 and Article 11(2)(b) of 
Directive 92/85.  Then follows one more element of the concept of equal 
pay – accrual of pension rights under occupational social security 
schemes. This element, according to Boyle63 and Meyer64, is governed by 
three EC law provisions – Article 11(2)(a) of Directive 92/85 and Article 
6(1)(g) of Directive 86/378, but according to Bilka - Kaufhaus65 matters 
                                                           
60 Tamara Harvey, Jo Shaw, Women, work and care: women’s dual role and double burden in EC sex 
equality law, Journal of European Social Policy, 1998, Vol.8, SAGE Publications, at page 47. 
61 Case C-342/93, Joan Gillespie and others v Northern Health and Social Services Boards, 
Department of Health and Social Services, Eastern Health and Social Services Board and Southern 
Health and Social Services Board, European Court Reports 1996 Page I-00475.
62 Case C-411/96, Margaret Boyle and Others v Equal Opportunities Commission, ECR 1998 Page I-
06401. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Case C-356/03, Elisabeth Mayer v Versorgungsanstalt des Bundes und der Länder, OJ C 57, 
05.03.2005., p.11. 
65 Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus GmbH v Karin Weber von Hartz, European Court Reports 1986 Page 
01607.
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referred by Directive 86/378 are subject to Article 141 EC Treaty. In this 
regard it is not clear why the Court in Boyle did not refer to Directive 
86/378. Almost the same is so about Meyer, in that although Directive 
92/85 was not applicable to the current facts66 the Court should at least 
have referred to Article 11(2)(a) of Directive 92/85 and Boyle for the 
purposes of coherency.  
Incoherency is also a feature of those rulings on equal pay elements 
which fall under Article 11(2)(a) and under Article 141 EC Treaty. For 
example, in Lewen67 the Court analysed rights to Christmas bonus during 
maternity leave only from the perspective of Article 141. The ECJ did the 
same in Abdoulaye68 regarding lump-sum payment for workers going on 
maternity leave. In both cases, no references were made to the role of 
Article 11(2)(a) of Directive 92/85. 
The second set of cases is on equal treatment. Here are fewer 
inconsistencies; however, the Court also refers to Directive 92/85 
chaotically. Formally, Directive 92/85 was not applicable in Habermann-
Beltermann69, Webb70, Thibault71, Larsson72, Brown73 and Sass74. 
Nevertheless, the Court did refer to Directive 92/85 in Larsson75, Sass  
and Brown76. In Sass it simply established that the events took place 
before the adoption of Directive 92/85, while in Brown it advised the 
national court to take into account the general context of Directive 92/85 
when applying Directive 76/207.  
The author argues that for the purposes of coherency, the Court 
should have referred in all cases mentioned to Directive 92/85, firstly in 
order to show the conjunction between Directives 76/207 and Directive 
92/85, and secondly in order to ensure proper application of those 
directives by national courts.  
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67 Case C-333/97, Susanne Lewen v Lothar Denda, European Court Reports 1999 Page I-07243. 
68 Case C-218/98, Oumar Dabo Abdoulaye and Others v Regie nationale des usines Renault SA, ECR 
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Elisabeth Larsson v Dansk Handel & Service, acting on behaf of Futex Supermarked A/S, European 
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In Mahlburg77 the ECJ also did not refer to Directive 92/85 
although the events took place in 1995, when Directive 92/85 had to be 
implemented. One could argue that Mahlburg concerned access to 
employment which is not covered by Directive 92/85, but the author 
argues that this case concerns working conditions during pregnancy, 
which is the exact issue of Directive 92/85. Therefore, the Court failed to 
refer to all EC legislative acts governing the particular case. The same 
problem occurred in Herrero, which also concerned not only access to 
employment but also accrual of seniority - rights connected with an 
employment contract as provided by Article 11(2)(a) of Directive 92/85. 
Nevertheless, the Court did not take it into account78 and ruled that 
accrual of seniority during maternity leave when a successful candidate 
cannot take up a new post due to maternity leave falls within the scope of 
Directive 76/207 only. It failed to recognize that Article 11(2)(a) of 
Directive 92/85 is also applicable here, but substantive equality requires 
that lack of a formally written employment contract does not render that 
provision inapplicable.       
It follows that the case-law of the ECJ demonstrates considerable 
inconsistency and incoherence as regards application of rights provided 
by EC legislation during pregnancy and maternity leave. Legislation of 
the EC itself allows interpretation so as to ensure substantive equal 
treatment and equal pay.    
 
Discriminatory interpretation of EC sex equality law 
Purpose of maternity leave 
The second purpose of maternity leave declared by the ECJ, namely, that 
maternity leave protects the special relationship between mother and 
child79, is a key aspect in discriminatory interpretation of EC legislation 
by the ECJ. Thereby the Court cultivates a socially-construed stereotype 
of woman as the better child-carer, which is one of the main causes of 
discrimination and fewer opportunities for women in the labour market. 
Besides, the Court judges related cases in the light of the second aim of 
maternity leave. So, starting with Hofmann, where it decided not to 
intervene in issues on additional maternity leave which in reality was 
child-care leave,  the Court then went on, ending with additional unpaid 
maternity leave as a special advantage granted to women only in Boyle80. 
If such an approach to the differences between men and women was 
                                                           
77 Case C-207/98, Silke-Karin Mahlburg and Land Meklenburg-Vorpommern, ECR 2000 I-549. 
78 In paragraph 32 it ruled the opposite, that Directive 92/85 has no relevance in answering the 
questions referred. 
79 Case 184/83, Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse, ECR 1984 Page 03047, paragraph 25. 
80 Case C-411/96, Margaret Boyle and Others v Equal Opportunities Commission, ECR 1998 Page I-
06401, paragraph 79. 
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understandable during adoption of the Hofman judgment in 1984, then it 
is unacceptable nowadays81.   
 
Length of maternity leave 
Excessive length of maternity leave which exceeds the necessary term for 
physical recovery after birth is closely connected with the previous 
problem. Indeed, in order to fulfil the second aim of maternity leave the 
mother should be granted additional weeks of maternity leave to be able 
to look after her baby full-time without interruptions due to difficulties of 
physical recovery after birth-giving. 
Although the cause of excessive length of maternity leave is 
Directive 92/85, nevertheless the Court has authority at least to indicate to 
the Member States that excessive length of maternity leave impedes 
attainment of substantive equality. So the Sass case was surely 
appropriate to raise a discussion for the future on the purpose of maternity 
leave. However, the Court did not highlight the approach taken by the 
Federal Republic of Germany, which accepts only the first aim of 
maternity leave – protection of a woman who has given birth82.   
 
Maternity pay  
The Court deserves considerable criticism for its finding in Gillespie that 
neither Article 141 nor Directive 75/117 requires that women continue to 
receive full pay during maternity leave83. Nothing precluded the Court 
from finding that the principle of equal pay requires an award of full pay 
to women during maternity leave. However, it depends how literally 
Article 11(3) is read, because it does not explicitly require that maternity 
benefit in the form of pay must be at the level of sick pay, but it concerns 
maternity benefit in the form of an allowance84. 
However, the Court did not stop at this finding. In Boyle the Court 
reaffirmed its judgment in Gillespie by extending the provisions of 
                                                           
81 The second aim of maternity leave was mentioned recently in the Sass judgment, case C-284/02, 
Land Brandenburg v Ursula Sass. , European Court Reports 2004 Page I-11143, paragraph 32. In the 
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Department of Health and Social Services, Eastern Health and Social Services Board and Southern 
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“The decision in Gillespie was clearly dictated by policy. By opting for the guarantee of merely an 
adequate allowance for female workers on maternity leave, the Court endorsed the solution already 
negotiated at political level between the Member States in the form of Directive 92/85”. 
Siofra O’Leary, Employment Law at the European Court of Justice. Judicial Structure, Policies and 
Processes, Hart Publishing, Oxford – Portland Oregon, 2002, at page 199. 
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Article 11(3) of Directive 92/85 to maternity benefit in the form of pay85. 
Besides, it ruled that Article 11(3) does not refer to sick pay provided by 
the employer but requires maternity benefit to be at least in the amount of 
sick pay provided by national legislation, thus diminishing maternity 
benefit to the least amount possible under Directive 92/85. Considerable 
doubt exists whether such was the intent of the legislator86, otherwise it 
would have so provided expressly.  
 
Distinction between pregnancy-related illness before and after maternity 
leave 
The Court, by accepting the distinction between pregnancy related illness 
before and after maternity leave in Brown87, has made an arbitrary 
distinction. Such finding has no legal grounds. If illness is found to be 
pregnancy-related, then there is no difference when it occurs or how long 
it lasts88. As regards arguments that sex equality law deserves only 
protection of normal illnesses89 and the issue of pregnancy-related illness 
occurs in extremely minor cases90, the author argues that nevertheless it is 
a problem which could affect women only, thus from the perspective of 
substantive equality, pregnancy-related illness should be awarded 
protection irrespective of when it takes place.   
 
Reasons for discriminatory treatment of persons during pregnancy 
and maternity under EC law 
EC legislation 
The author of this thesis is not familiar with the particular legislative 
process and ambitions of the Member States during adoption of Directive 
92/85 and EC sex equality legislation, thus she could only guess as to the 
possible reasons why the EC legislator adopted provisions discriminating 
against persons during pregnancy and maternity leave.   
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Directive 92/85 
The author could explain over-lengthy maternity leave only by 
stereotypes of women’s role which governs the legislator in the same way 
as the majority of society91. While space left to the Member States by 
Article 8 of Directive 92/85 for variation of the length of maternity leave 
as well as the obligation for only two weeks compulsory maternity leave 
testifies to the necessity to accommodate divergent national practices92.  
Interestingly, the legislator still makes a distinction between maternity 
pay and allowance. It is true that EC sex equality legislation also 
regulates issues on equal pay and equality in matters of social security 
distinctly, but why is this principle binding on health and safety 
legislation? Why does the legislator not hesitate to put a heavier burden 
on employers rather than on the state social security system? 
 
EC sex equality law 
Lack of regulation on pay during pregnancy and maternity regarding 
equal pay matters can be explained only by lack of political will. Article 8 
of Directive 92/85 does not solve pay issues in terms of equality. Article 
28(1) of the Recast Directive, which introduces the “without prejudice” 
principle, also as regards equal pay, does not promise many changes in 
that respect. It does not provide for an obligation to ensure full pay during 
pregnancy and maternity. 
 
The ECJ 
Lack of consistent legal technique (method) as regards cases on 
discrimination due to pregnancy and maternity 
The case law of the ECJ testifies to a differential approach. This approach 
as described before is based on the formal equality doctrine, but has 
accommodated certain elements of substantive equality. In Thibault the 
ECJ explicitly recognized the presence of substantive equality in EC 
law93. So as regards sex equality, the ECJ has accommodated such 
element of substantive equality as positive measures94 and certain rights 
of persons during pregnancy and maternity. The difference between 
positive measures and special needs during pregnancy and maternity 
exists as regards the approach taken under substantive equality. If the 
former is provided in order to eliminate socially-construed obstacles, then 
                                                           
91 The same was suggested by Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the 
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the latter requires grant of rights guaranteeing equality of result or 
outcome, because they arise due to biological differences. 
As to rights during pregnancy and maternity, the ECJ so far has 
applied substantive equality as equality of results concerning equal 
treatment. In particular, it has elaborated the principle that special 
protection of women workers during pregnancy and maternity cannot be 
subject of less favourable treatment95. Other biological differences, which 
need to be accommodated during pregnancy and maternity, lack 
substantive equality protection. Such an approach - when the ECJ applies 
partially substantive and partially formal equality without any system - 
creates chaotic legal regulation of rights during this period. Besides, the 
chaos increases when the Court tries to escape by partially 
accommodating biological differences.  
So the brightest example is accommodation of pregnancy-related 
illness. As regards treatment, the period before maternity leave is 
protected (substantive equality), but after maternity leave a sick male is 
the comparator (formal equality), as regards pay96, before maternity leave 
a pregnant worker is entitled to sick pay under a general scheme on 
condition that it does not undermine the objective of protecting pregnant 
workers (partial accommodation – neither formal nor substantive 
equality), but after maternity leave she is subject to the general sick pay 
scheme (formal equality)97. This, then, demonstrates that the equality 
approach applied could vary within the scope of one situation and be 
different with regard to treatment and pay. 
As regards partial accommodation, the brightest example is 
maternity benefit. The rulings in Gillespie and Boyle on maternity pay 
cannot be considered either as a formal or as a substantive equality 
approach. On the one hand, the ECJ recognizes the necessity to protect 
the biological differences of women during maternity leave, contrary to 
the formal approach, by recalling substantive equality and the sui generis 
situation of women during that period, but on the other hand it fails to 
accommodate it under the substantive equality approach by recalling 
equal pay provisions which so far have been subject to the formal 
equality approach only.    
Although ruling on equal pay matters during maternity leave is 
restricted to a certain extent by the provisions of Directive 92/85, 
nevertheless the ECJ has failed to keep pregnancy and maternity 
discrimination as direct discrimination, thus it would be better to allow 
justification of direct discrimination in very limited instances.  Thereby 
                                                           
95 Case C-136/95, Caisse nationale d’assurance vieillesse des travailleurs salaries (CNAVTS) v 
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the ECJ has created a legal trap in the form of lack of any legal technique 
(method) which compels changing or hiding comparators and escaping 
recognition of direct discrimination through the non-comparability 
argument98. 
 
Why not substantive equality immediately or social, economic, and 
political obstacles of the ECJ  
First of all, judges are members of society and they to a great extent 
reflect almost the same understanding of sex equality as does society. A 
second and very important obstacle is the composition of the Court. Only 
recently were women appointed as judges of the ECJ99. Thirdly, an 
excessive financial burden would be put on the shoulders of employers if 
the Court decided to award women full pay during pregnancy and 
maternity.  As pointed out by employers in a number of cases already 
judged, the special protection during pregnancy and maternity as it stands 
now already imposes a considerable financial burden100. This on the other 
hand could indeed lead to an increase of overall discrimination against 
women in the labour market101. A fourth reason, which is political, is 
respect of sovereignty of the member states. This is the main reason 
which compels the Court to divide unequally the burden of benefits 
connected with pregnancy and maternity between employer and state 
social security systems, by setting different rules for both of those actors. 
Besides, that is the main reason which does not allow alternative action – 
in order to avoid increase of sex discrimination in general - to put the 
financial burden mainly on the state social security system. 
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Latvian Law  
Labour Law 
Article 37(7) of the Labour Law provides for 4 weeks compulsory 
maternity leave while EC law requires only two weeks compulsory leave. 
The right provided by Article 134(2) allowing to require a woman worker 
only for part-time work for one year after birth-giving even if she does 
not breastfeed, discriminates against male workers and cements women in 
their traditional care-giver roles. 
The decision of the Latvian national court in Ghadialija102 shows 
that rights provided for special protection of women workers during 
pregnancy, maternity, and breastfeeding are seen as falling outside or not 
concerning prohibition of discrimination based on sex. Article 47 does 
not provide that in case of dismissing a pregnant worker during the 
probation period, she must be given a written dismissal notice with 
reasons provided for that dismissal according to the requirements of 
Article 10 of Directive 92/85. The Latvian legislator must provide an 
explicit right to contest non-renewal of a fixed-term contract on grounds 
of discrimination based on sex according to the ECJ’s ruling in 
Melgar103.  
Article 75 providing for calculation of average wage does not 
envisage a different situation for a pregnant worker, a worker after 
maternity leave, and a worker on breastfeeding. First, it does not provide 
that calculation of average salary cannot be less favourable on grounds of 
previous absence on account of maternity leave and second, it does not 
provide that calculation of average salary cannot be less favourable on 
grounds that the worker has been awarded special protection rights on 
account of pregnancy, maternity, or breastfeeding.    
The Ministry of Welfare, which is the responsible institution for 
implementation of EC sex equality law, contrary to Article 3 of Directive 
92/85 has not translated or informed employers of Guidelines on 
assessment of working conditions of pregnant workers, workers who have 
recently given birth, or who are breastfeeding104. 
Article 36 of the Latvian labour law may be applied in a 
discriminatory way, if a doctor issuing a medical certificate on the 
suitability of a candidate’s state of health is not informed that pregnancy 
of a candidate can not be taken into account. The same is true about 
Article 138(6), because the wording is unclear. This could be read in two 
                                                           
102 Rīgas pilsētas Centra rajona 2005.gada 26.janvāra spriedums Civillietā Nr.C27176204. Decision of 
Riga City Cetral district court delivered on 26 January 2006 in case No.C27176204.   
103 Case C-438/99. Maria Luisa Jimenez Melgar v Ayuntamiento de Los Barrios, European Court 
Reports 2001 Page I-06915. 
104 Communication from the Commission on the guidelines on the assessment of the chemical, physical 
and biological agents and industrial processes considered hazardous for the safety or health of pregnant 
workers and workers who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding (Council Directive 92/85/EEC) 
/* COM/2000/0466 final */ 
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ways: as precluding night work for pregnant workers, women during the 
period following childbirth up to one year, either altogether, or as being 
conditional upon a medical certificate specifying that night work is 
dangerous during those periods. 
Some provisions of the Latvian labour law obviously exceed needs 
arising from the biological differences between the sexes. First of all 
comes length of maternity leave constituting 18 weeks instead of the 
biologically necessary 6 to 8 weeks after birth, and second, provisions of 
Articles 53(2), 134(2), 136(7) and 138(6) providing for special rights to 
women during a one-year period following child-birth, which perpetuates 
the image of women in their traditional role of main child-carer.  
Contrary to the requirements of Directive 86/613, pregnant self-
employed persons and self-employed persons during maternity are not 
protected by any piece of Latvian legislation against discriminatory 
treatment. There are amendments to the Latvian Civil law in Parliament 
on prohibition of discrimination also as regards service contracts; 
however, those amendments do not explicitly refer to introducing 
obligations provided by Directive 86/613. 
 
Social security Law 
Although employed women in Latvia have a right during maternity leave 
to a high maternity allowance comprising 100% of gross salary without 
tax reduction, this is not so as regards accrual of other social insurance 
rights during maternity leave, which results in possibly less favourable 
social insurance rights after maternity leave. In particular, since during 
maternity leave a woman is insured only against risks of old-age and 
unemployment, after maternity leave she may be subject to less 
favourable conditions of calculation of sickness, accidents at work, and 
occupational disease allowances and disability pension, so that she would 
be entitled to a lesser amount than if she had been working. Besides, 
insurance against old-age during maternity leave is provided in a lesser 
amount than during period actually worked. During maternity leave, 
contributions to old-age insurance constitutes only 20% of allowance 
(equivalent to gross wage) while during the period actually worked those 
contributions constitute 24,79% of wages. Since self-employed persons 
are subject to the same social insurance principles, self-employed persons 
during and after maternity leave face and might face similar 
disadvantages as employed persons described above.  
 
Legal regulation of paternity under EC and Latvian law 
EC Law 
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The status of the right to paternity leave under EC law is poor. First, 
because it is optional and second, because it does not draw any parallels 
with the period of maternity leave which is provided in order to ensure 
motherhood. Thus, legitimatisation of fatherhood does not resolve the 
problem of the discriminatory second purpose of maternity leave. 
Besides, no provision requires parental leave to be of the same length and 
period of maternity leave, which exceeds the 6-8 weeks necessary for 
physical recovery after childbirth. It follows that although amendments to 
Directive 76/207 referring to paternity leave is a considerable step 
towards sex equality, nevertheless it is just at the stage of beginning and 
far from the requirements of substantive equality, since it does not require 
revision of maternity leave and does not require an award to fatherhood 
and motherhood of equal rights to leave.   
 
Latvian law 
Latvia has made a positive step towards substantive equality by 
introducing the right to paid paternity leave. However, the length of 
paternity leave is incomparably short to the length of maternity leave, 
which exceeds the period for physical recovery. If a father has the right to 
10 days leave for enhancement of fatherhood, then a woman has the right 
to at least 10 weeks leave for the same purpose, not taking into account 
the time given for establishing a relationship with the child parallel to 
physical recovery. 
Although the right to paternity leave is introduced, nevertheless 
Latvia has failed to implement that right in conformity with the principle 
of equal treatment between the sexes as regards social rights, because 
fathers on paternal leave - as opposed to mothers on maternity leave - are 
not awarded any social insurance, which could adversely affect their 
social insurance rights after that leave. In particular, a father - due to 
absence of social insurance on account of paternity leave - risks not 
qualifying for old-age and disability pension, as well as for 
unemployment allowance. Besides, the formula for calculating sickness 
allowance does not provide for exemption of periods of paternity leave, 
unlike periods of maternity leave. Although there is no explicit provision 
under EC law for equal treatment as regards paternity leave and social 
rights, nevertheless Directive 79/7 prohibits discrimination, while in 
Latvia the social security umbrella law provides for prohibition of 
discrimination105, which allows claiming equal treatment for men on and 
after paternity leave.    
 
                                                           
105 Par sociālo drošību: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 21.septembris, nr.144 (Law on social 
security), Article 21. 
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Legal regulation of child-care under EC and Latvian law 
EC Law 
Although adoption of Directive 96/34 was a big step towards sex 
equality, nevertheless its provisions are minimal. First, because of the 
short duration of child-care leave required, and second because  
provisions requiring pay or allowance during that leave are absent. 
Besides - and this is the most important aspect of Directive 96/34 - it does 
not preclude the Member States from adopting the right to child-care 
leave of different length, dependent on the sex of the person. Most 
probably the general principle of equality between men and women under 
EC law could consider as discriminatory the grant of child-care leave of 
different length dependent on sex. However, this does not preclude the 
Member States from granting child-care leave in the form of extended 
maternity leave, as legitimised in Hofmann106. 
The weakness and poverty of Directive 96/34 is not only pointed 
out by scholars107, but is also reflected by the paucity of preliminary 
questions that came before the ECJ on its interpretation. Despite 10 years 
having passed since adoption of Directive 96/34 and recognition of child-
care as one of the key aspects impeding attainment of equal opportunities 
and participation of men and women in the employment market108, no 
new legislative initiatives have been taken so far. The principle of 
equality between the sexes is not enforceable under EC law as regards 
social security matters, since this is explicitly exempted by Article 7(1)(b) 
of Directive 79/7. 
 
Latvian law 
Although since adoption of new child-care allowance policies, in 
particular by raising the amount of child-care allowance until a child 
reaches the age of one almost up to the level of previous salary, 
nevertheless this was not intended to evaluate the previously unpaid work 
of child-raising predominantly by women, but rather because of growing 
awareness of the dramatically decreasing birth rate and consequent 
ageing of the population. Besides, child-care allowance reform adopted in 
its first wording was intended to strengthen women in their traditional 
                                                           
106 Case 184/83, Ulrich Hofmann v Barmer Ersatzkasse, ECR 1984 Page 03047. 
107 See in this regard Siofra O’Leary, Employment Law at the European Court of Justice. Judicial 
Structures, Policies and processes, Hart Publishing, 2002, at page 239 and Eugenia Caracciolo di 
Torella, Childcare, employment and equality in the European Community: first (false) steps of the 
Court, 2000, 25 E.L.Rev. June, Sweet & Maxwell and Contributors. 
108 See “A Roadmap for equality between women and men – 2006-2010 – Communication from the 
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions” which was adopted on 1 March 2006. 
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roles by providing that higher financial means justifies prohibition of 
part-time work, thus diminishing the possibility of effectively reconciling 
work and family life and future opportunities in the labour market.  
The right to child-care leave provided for both parents has so far 
been of little use, because of the stereotypes prevailing in society and still 
produced by politicians and the mass media by calling increased child-
care allowances “‘mammies’ salary”. No political discussion has been 
raised so far in the public domain in Latvia on unequally shared breaks on 
account of child-care leave between both parents as an obstacle for 
attaining sex equality.  Even the Constitutional Court of Latvia ruled on 
the prohibition to combine paid child-care leave with part-time work not 
from the perspective of sex equality or Article 91 of the Constitution, but 
from the perspective of family rights or Article 110 of the Constitution109.  
Although the Constitutional Court of Latvia declared that total exclusion 
of the right to child-care allowance of those parents willing to combine 
part time work with child-care, is unconstitutional, nevertheless it led to 
an even more senseless provision on child-care leave and allowance. 
 Amendments providing that one parent is entitled to 50% of child-
care allowance even if she/he works full-time lacks the sense of child-
care leave and allowance as such. Besides, it makes combining paid 
child-care leave by both parents on a part-time basis impossible. As a 
result, the traditional division of responsibilities between parents is the 
only acceptable way for the majority of the population of Latvia, taking 
into account their difficult financial situation.        
The disproportion of women and men taking child-care leave is 
dramatic. Nevertheless, no political steps are taken towards changing 
attitudes. Politicians are ready to deal only with the consequences caused 
to women in the labour market on account of child-care leave. However, 
Latvian law allows for contesting indirect discrimination against women 
in the field of statutory social security arising due to child-care leave. 
These are in particular, decrease in old-age and disability pension, and 
allowances for sickness, maternity, accident at work or occupational 
disease. Article 2.1 of the Law on social security precludes indirect 
discrimination based on sex in the whole social security system in Latvia 
and no provision refers to the exemption provided by Article 7(1)(b) of 
                                                           
109 Latvijas Republikas Satversmes tiesas 2005.gada 4.novembra spriedums lietā Nr.2005-09-01 „Par 
Valsts sociālo pabalstu likuma 7.panta pirmās daļas 1.punktā ietvertā nosacījuma – „ja šī persona nav 
nodarbināta (nav uzskatāma par darba ņēmēju vai pašnodarbināto saskaņā ar likumu „Par valsts sociālo 
apdrošināšanu”_ vai ir nodarbināta un atrodas bērna kopšanas atvaļinājumā” – atbilstību Latvijas 
Republikas Satversmes 91., 106. un 110.pantam”. Decision of the Constitutional Court of Latvia in 
case No.2005-09-01 “On Compliance of the Condition Incorporated in Section 7 (Item 1 of the First 
Paragraph) of the Law on State Social Allowances” – “if this person is not employed (is not considered 
to be an employee or self-employed person in accordance with the Law on State Social Insurance) or is 
employed and is on parental leave” with Articles 91, 106 and 110 of the Republic of Latvia Satversme 
(Constitution), available at http://www.satv.tiesa.gov.lv/  
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Directive 79/7. Several cases would possibly compel the respective state 
institutions to rethink policies regarding child-care leave and more 
concentrate on those issues from the perspective of sex equality.  
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Chapter 15. 
Proposals 
 EC law 
Proposal for legal technique (method) for accommodating 
pregnancy and maternity under substantive equality 
Whether comparator is necessary 
The comparator is the essence of sex equality law110. Although a 
substantive equality approach does not require a comparator, nevertheless 
a comparator is necessary in order to recognize how a disadvantaged 
group is affected adversely by prevailing norms and in order to set a point 
of departure for benefit redistribution111. Thus the author argues that sex 
equality law requires a comparator, because this is the basic element on 
which the legal technique of equality law is built. Existence of a 
comparator does not prevent equality being substantive, and in this regard 
the author agrees with Mjoll, who considers that the strictness of review 
of a given situation testifies to whether a formal or substantive equality 
approach is applied112.   
The situation with a comparator as regards rights during pregnancy 
and maternity is complicated. First of all, rights during pregnancy and 
maternity comprise two elements – negative obligations to refrain from 
discriminatory treatment, and positive obligations requiring special 
treatment113. Second, both negative and positive obligations entail two 
issues – treatment and pay.  
                                                           
110 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 217, paragraph 
489, Oddny Mjoll Arnardottir, “Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/London/New York, 2003, at page 29, Robert 
Wintemute, When is Pregnancy Discrimination Indirect Sex Discrimination?, Industrial Law Journal, 
Vol 27, No.1, March 1998, Industrial Law Society, at page 25, Evelyn Ellis, Recent Developments in 
European Community Sex Equality Law, CMLR, 35, 1998, Kluwer Law International, at page 395. 
111 Robert Wintemute, When is Pregnancy Discrimination Indirect Sex Discrimination?, Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol 27, No.1, March 1998, Industrial Law Society, at footnote 7 the role of comparator is 
substantiated as follows: 
“To some women, and some members of minorities defined by ethnicity, disability or sexual 
orientation, comparison is anathema because of the implication that the comparator represents ‘the 
norm’. But comparison is both an essential aspect of equality arguments and a social reality where 
society is set up by majority or a dominant group (men) with its own needs in mind. Because the status 
quo reflects the needs of this majority or men, the minority or women must use comparisons with the 
majority or men to show how the status quo affects them adversely”. 
112 Oddny Mjoll Arnardottir, “Equality and Non-Discrimination under the European Convention on 
Human Rights”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/London/New York, 2003, at page 31. 
113 Robert Wintemute, When is Pregnancy Discrimination Indirect Sex Discrimination?, Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol 27, No.1, March 1998, Industrial Law Society, at page 35. 
See for a different concept of positive and negative protective measures Petra Foubert, “The Legal 
Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex Equality, Thoughts of Social and 
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As regards negative obligations, the Court has chosen a male 
comparator. Although in such negative obligations cases as Dekker114 and 
Hertz115 the Court ruled that a male comparator is irrelevant, nevertheless 
the model of treatment required by the Court is presumed treatment of a 
male in the same situation. Since a male cannot be pregnant, he could 
never be refused employment or dismissed on grounds of pregnancy, thus 
since non-discrimination law requires equal treatment irrespective of sex, 
in order not to be discriminated against a pregnant female - as regards 
access and dismissal116 - must be treated as if she were male, thus not 
pregnant. 
Positive obligations, however, require special treatment where a 
male cannot be the comparator, but importantly here - absence of a 
comparator concerns treatment, not pay. As regards pay, a male 
comparator is the right one in order to ensure equal distribution of 
benefits or equality of results, but special treatment must be provided not 
according to the comparator but according to the special needs of women 
based on pure biological differences.   
 
Who is the right comparator?  
It is true that a woman during pregnancy and maternity could have 
several comparators – e.g., all other workers, male workers, sick male 
workers, herself not being pregnant117. It is true that all these groups 
could be comparators, but not under sex equality law. Under sex equality 
law, the sex of a person is a prohibited trait; thus, comparison to a group 
which does not consist exclusively of persons belonging to the opposite 
sex would fall not under sex equality law but under the general principle 
of equality.118
 
Are situations comparable? 
Another element of equality law is comparability of situations. One could 
argue that a woman during pregnancy and maternity cannot be compared 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of America”, Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 108, paragraph 222. 
114 Case C-177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichtig Vormingscentrum voor Jong 
Volwassen (VJV-Centrum) Plus, (1990) ECR page I-03941. 
115 Case C-179/88, Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk 
Arbejdsgiverforening, European Court Reports 1990 Page I-03979. 
116 According to Article 10 of Directive 92/85 dismissal of a pregnant worker entails not only negative 
but also positive measures, which is not discussed in the present sentence. 
117 Simon Honeyball, Pregnancy and Sex Discrimination, Industrial Law Journal, Vol 29, No.1, March 
2000, Industrial Law Society, at page 50, Robert Wintemute, When is Pregnancy Discrimination 
Indirect Sex Discrimination?, Industrial Law Journal, Vol 27, No.1, March 1998, Industrial Law 
Society, at page 25, Sandra Friedman, Discrimination Law, Oxford University Press, 2002, at page 9.  
118 This is what Simon Honeyball argues, in Pregnancy and Sex Discrimination, Industrial Law Journal, 
Vol 29, No.1, March 2000, Industrial Law Society and Sacha Prechal, Equality of treatment, non-
discrimination and social policy: achievements in three themes, Common Market Law Review 41, 
pages 533-551, 2004, Kluwer Law International. 
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with a man because they are in different situations. However, sex equality 
law prohibits differentiation on grounds of sex, thus substantively the sex 
of a person cannot be a reason for discriminatory or less favourable 
treatment.  
Here, the argument of Levits fits perfectly. He contends that the 
principle of general equality and the principle of non-discrimination are 
of opposite construction. If the former principle requires that two similar 
situations must be treated similarly, but two different situations 
differently, then the latter principle requires the opposite – two different 
situations, which are considered different because of a prohibited trait 
(sex), must be treated equally. This is of course mentioned as regards 
negative obligations, but could as well be applied to positive obligations. 
Namely, in a situation where males and females receive different 
treatment according to biological differences, it is a valid argument for an 
equal pay claim, since equality is not only about treatment but also and 
mostly about financial resources.  
Moreover, according to the strictness of the review doctrine 
proposed by Mjoll, this is exactly the case – thorough comparison of 
situations of men at work and women on maternity leave would prove 
that their financial needs or rights to previous standard of living do not 
differ, thus they are in comparable situations and deserve equal treatment 
as regards pay. In this regard, the author proposes to add to Levits’ 
construction the following – two different situations, which are different 
because of biological differences between sexes, must be treated equally 
as regards pay.  
 
Direct or indirect discrimination?  
Since in Dekker the Court found discrimination on grounds of pregnancy 
to be direct sex discrimination, many writers have been involved in 
discussion whether pregnancy and maternity discrimination is direct or 
indirect.  
Robert Wintemute  argues that direct discrimination occurs where a 
woman is in the same situation as a man but is treated differently because 
of pregnancy (Dekker, Webb), while indirect discrimination occurs where 
a woman is in a different situation with her special needs which need to 
be accommodated  - requires neutral treatment (pregnancy-related illness 
– Hertz, maternity pay – Gillespie) 119.  
                                                           
119 Robert Wintemute, When is Pregnancy Discrimination Indirect Sex Discrimination?, Industrial Law 
Journal, Vol 27, No.1, March 1998, Industrial Law Society, at pages 30-31. 
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Foubert argues that determining the kind of discrimination depends 
on the angle from which the law is formed. In particular, she argues about 
the facts in Thibault120 that: 
 
It all depends on the rule that is being tested: the neutral rule of six 
months’ presence at work (which would imply indirect discrimination), or 
the rule that the period of maternity leave should be added to another 
period of absence (which would involve direct discrimination)121.  
 
Following direct and indirect sex discrimination definitions provided by 
amended Directive 76/207, it is indeed highly complicated to distinguish 
between direct and indirect sex discrimination regarding pregnancy and 
maternity cases. Notwithstanding, the author of this thesis would argue 
that the Court in Dekker established a new trait which precludes 
discrimination against pregnancy (and presumably maternity). Although 
pregnancy is a sub-trait of the trait “sex”, nevertheless the author suggests 
that according to the wording of the Dekker judgment122 the Court 
intended that sub-trait to function independently. Thus it means that 
pregnancy is a sub-trait of sex discrimination law, which always creates 
direct discrimination based on sex.  
Consequently, all discussion on whether pregnancy (maternity) 
discrimination is direct or indirect becomes useless, since irrespective of 
the neutrality of the provision or composition of the affected group, less 
favourable treatment on grounds of pregnancy (or maternity) is declared 
to be direct sex discrimination. However, it is clear why discussion on 
pregnancy discrimination as direct or indirect has arisen. First of all, the 
author suggests that the Court in Dekker123 considered ruling that 
discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy is direct discrimination, 
because at the time of delivery of that judgment indirect discrimination 
could be proved only by statistical data. That made it practically 
impossible to prove indirect discrimination on grounds of pregnancy. 
 Presently, however, the situation has changed, in that the wording 
of the definition of indirect discrimination provided for by amended 
Directive 2002/73 allows for a hypothetical comparator. Secondly, at the 
time of delivery of the Dekker judgment the Court did not acknowledge 
                                                           
120 Case C-136/95, Caisse nationale d’assurance vieillesse des travailleurs salaries (CNAVTS) v 
Evelyne Thibault, European Court Reports 1998 Page I-02011.
121 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 180, paragraph 
402. 
122 Case C-177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichtig Vormingscentrum voor Jong 
Volwassen (VJV-Centrum) Plus, (1990) ECR page I-03941, paragraph 12: 
“In that regard it should be observed that only women can be refused employment on grounds of 
pregnancy and such refusal therefore constitutes direct discrimination on grounds of sex” 
123 Ibid. 
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what kind of difficulties it would have to face in future cases as regards 
pregnancy and maternity because of holding it as direct discrimination. In 
particular, difficulties concerned redistribution of resources by putting a 
considerable financial burden on employers and thus making a 
substantive approach to pregnancy and maternity issues incomprehensible 
to the majority of society and policies of the Member States. This led to 
the mess described above. In particular, as Sacha Prechal rightly points 
out 124, recognition of pregnancy discrimination as direct and 
consequently under EC law not allowing for justification, posed another 
problem – the Court instead of qualifying direct discrimination cases has 
held that situations are incomparable. The brightest example is 
Gillespie125.   To resolve this problem within the scope of pregnancy as 
direct discrimination of sex, some scholars126 suggest allowing 
justifications for direct discrimination but only for limited instances 
provided by written legislation. At the same time, other scholars consider 
justification of direct discrimination as undermining the dignity of the 
person127.  In this regard, it is noteworthy to mention that EC legislation 
allows direct discrimination on grounds of disability to be avoided 
through the “reasonable accommodation” argument128. 
 
Thoroughness of review as legal technique (method) and 
how to promote substantive equality. 
Although the present writer finds the Mjoll doctrine - which provides that 
a formal or substantive equality approach depends on thoroughness of 
review on comparability of situations – to be the most appropriate legal 
technique for attaining substantive equality, nevertheless there are two 
problems relating to its application. 
First, it may lead to empowerment of sexes in their traditional 
roles. As the brightest example is part-time workers’ discrimination 
cases, which through the concept of indirect discrimination accommodate 
the fact that women usually work part-time in order to be able to do 
                                                           
124 Sacha Prechal, Equality of treatment, non-discrimination and social policy: achievements in three 
themes, Common Market Law Review 41, pages 533-551, 2004, Kluwer Law International, at page 
545. 
125 Case C-342/93, Case C-342/93, Joan Gillespie and others v Northern Health and Social Services 
Boards, Department of Health and Social Services, Eastern Health and Social Services Board and 
Southern Health and Social Services Board, European Court Reports 1996 Page I-00475.
126 Sacha Prechal, Equality of treatment, non-discrimination and social policy: achievements in three 
themes, Common Market Law Review 41, pages 533-551, 2004, Kluwer Law International, at page 
545, John Bowers, Elena Moran and Simon Honeyball, Justification in Direct Sex Discrimination: A 
Reply, Industrial Law Journal, Vol 32, No.3, September 2003, Industrial Law Society, at page187. 
127 John Bowers, Elena Moran and Simon Honeyball, Justification in Direct Sex Discrimination: A 
Reply, Industrial Law Journal, Vol 32, No.3, September 2003, Industrial Law Society, at page185 
refers to the opinion of Gill and Monaghan. 
128 Article 5 of Directive 2000/78 and see also Lisa Waddington and Mark Bell, More Equal than 
others: Distinguishing European Union Equality Directives, CMLR, 38, 2001, Kluwer Law 
International, at pages 596-597. 
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unpaid home work129. On the other hand, the law may not do very much 
about changing of stereotypes, this is more the task of education policy, 
but the present generation living in traditional patriarchal roles deserves 
de facto equality now notwithstanding the fact of accommodation of 
traditional roles.    
The second problem relates to the limited competence of the EC 
legislator and the ECJ as interpreter, which does not allow for 
thoroughness of review when assessing comparability of situations. This 
is because of a major deficiency of EC sex equality law, which applies to 
labour market issues only130, but ignores the fact that inequality has its 
roots in family life131. While this remains so, attainment of substantive 
equality under EC law will be impossible. However, there have been a 
number of cases where the cause of a regrettable judgment delivered by 
the ECJ was the formal approach taken by the Court rather than its 
limited competence under EC law132. This fact has much to do with the 
general opinion prevailing in society and among judges who are members 
of that society. So, development of the case-law of the ECJ itself testifies 
to how the Court itself has changed social values, which consequently 
allows for a more thorough review of comparability of the situations in 
question133. It follows that notwithstanding the difficulties and limited 
competence of the ECJ as regards possible application of thoroughness of 
review, it is the best way towards attainment of substantive equality. 
 
 
Proposal for maternity and paternity leave cost-bearing 
In a considerable part of the cases decided by the ECJ, the real cause of 
pregnancy discrimination was the cost borne by the employer on account 
                                                           
129 See in this regard the section on Indirect discrimination and Hugh Collins, Discrimination, Equality 
and Social Inclusion, The Modern Law Review, Blackwell Publishing, January 2003, Vol.66, No.1,  
pages 16-42, at page 30. 
130 Of course by Directive 20004/113 the field of application is extended, but it has no meaning 
concerning the problem presently discussed. 
131 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 94, paragraph 197. 
132 See in this regard, Tamara Harvey, Jo Shaw, Women, work and care: women’s dual role and double 
burden in EC sex equality law, Journal of European Social Policy, 1998, Vol.8, SAGE, London, 
Thousand Oaks and New Delhi. 
133 See for example, cases with regard to protection concerning pregnancy-related illness C-179/88, 
Handels- og Kontorfunktionaerernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk Arbejdsgiverforening, European 
Court Reports 1990 Page I-03979 versus case C-394/96, Mary Brown and Rentokil Limited, European 
Court Reports 1998 Page I-04185, also the right to adoption leave Case 163/82, Commission of the 
European Communities v Italian Republic, European Court reports 1983 Page 03273 versus the 
provisions of Directive 96/34, status of employment-related social allowances joined cases C-63/91, C-
64/91, Sonia Jackson et Patricia Cresswell v Chief Adjudication Officer., European Court Reports 
1992 Page I-04737 versus case C-116/94, Jennifer Meyers v Adjudication Officer, European Court 
Reports 1995 Page I-02131.   
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of maternity leave134. This suggests that on many occasions 
discrimination arises due to improper division of costs.135 In order to 
avoid statistical discrimination against women in the labour market, the 
cost of maternity leave must be taken off the employer as much as 
possible136. Instead, maternity benefit may be provided under statutory 
social security schemes or other collective funds, where either all workers 
or all employers would contribute a certain levy in order to bear maternity 
costs under the principle of solidarity137. Although Foubert138 proposes to 
share maternity costs between the mother and father, the present author 
finds this proposal totally unfitted to the reality of new Member States, 
where incomes are so low as not to allow for savings.  
 
Proposals for the future 
There are several more points of crucial importance which must be 
advised for revision under EC law. Those are:   
 - Rethinking the legal basis for Directives 92/85 and 34/96, likewise with 
Directive 2006 in order to clearly bring questions of regulating biological 
differences between the sexes and reconciliation of work and family life 
within the framework of EC sex equality law. 
 - Rethinking special protection during pregnancy and maternity in order 
to accommodate only biological differences139 in order to provide equal 
rights to motherhood and fatherhood. 
 - For more effective attainment of those goals, use of more economic 
than human rights arguments is essential. Although openly no one denies 
the importance of observing human rights, nevertheless financial interests 
play a major role. Proposed amendments to EC legislation must be 
substantiated by the argument that equal-parenting ensures more available 
work force, keeps women workers within the labour market, while 
empowerment of fatherhood distributes cost-bearing connected with 
child-care among employers and decreases statistical discrimination 
                                                           
134 See for example, case C-177/88, Elisabeth Johanna Pacifica Dekker v Stichtig Vormingscentrum 
voor Jong Volwassen (VJV-Centrum) Plus, (1990) ECR page I-03941. 
135 Siofra O’Leary, Employment Law at the European Court of Justice. Judicial Structures, Policies and 
processes, Hart Publishing, 2002, at page 212. She states: 
“Nowhere is the State factored into the equation as a third, yet implicated party, to which 
costs can be spread” 
136 As Siofra O’Leary mentions, in Employment Law at the European Court of Justice. Judicial 
Structures, Policies and processes, Hart Publishing, 2002, at page 213, footnote 104, the Government 
of the UK in order to implement Directive 92/85 chose to pass the whole burden of maternity benefit to 
employers.   
137 Such a requirement is also stipulated by Article 6(8) of ILO Maternity protection convention 
No.183. 
138 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 218, paragraph 
491. 
139 Ibid. 
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against women. Those improvements will also stimulate an increased 
birth-rate.  
All those measures taken together improve the economy of the 
Member States, allowing attaining of political and economic aims, and at 
the same time raising the level of human rights protection. An equal-
parenting approach will also stimulate rethinking of the male norm as the 
point of departure instead of providing for a norm presenting a worker 
with family responsibilities140. 
 
Latvian law 
Proposals for amendments to Latvian Labour Law 
*In order to avoid misinterpretation and misapplication of special 
protection measures awarded to pregnant workers and workers during 
maternity and paternity periods, Article 29(1) must be amended with 
explicit norms providing that less favourable treatment on grounds of 
pregnancy, maternity (including breastfeeding), or paternity constitutes 
direct discrimination based on sex.  
*Article 29(1) must provide that prohibition of discrimination concerns 
not only notice of dismissal but also dismissal itself and non-renewal of 
fixed-term contract on discriminatory grounds. 
*Article 29(3) should not indicate that direct discrimination may be 
justified. Instead, present Article 29(3) may be formulated as provided by 
Article 4(1) of Directive 97/80. 
*Article 29(3) must be amended in order to provide claimants with an 
effective right to a reversed burden of proof. In this regard, Article 29(3) 
must explain that ‘facts’ here means not evidence but facts indicating 
prima facie discrimination 
*Article 32(1) should provide for a positive instead of a negative 
obligation to address job advertisements to persons of both sexes. That 
will clarify the obligation of employers when formulating job 
advertisements.   
*Article 34(2), which provides that no instatement may be required by a 
discriminated person, must be revised, since in a small country in certain 
circumstances the obligation to conclude an employment contract may 
provide the only effective remedy. While Article 34(2) does not provide 
for instatement, the one-month term for bringing a claim must be revised, 
since as correctly pointed out by the judge in Kozlovska141 such a short 
one-month term may be justified only in cases possibly resulting in a 
                                                           
140 Petra Foubert, “The Legal Protection of the Pregnant Worker in the European Community” “Sex 
Equality, Thoughts of Social and Economic Policy and Comparative Leaps to the United States of 
America”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/New York, 2002, at page 353, paragraph 
776. 
141 Jelgavas tiesas 2006.gada 25.maija spriedums lietā Nr.15066406. 
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reinstatement obligation for the purposes of legal certainty of the 
employer.  
*Article 37(7) should provide for two weeks compulsory maternity leave 
instead of four. 
*Article 47 must provide that in case of dismissal during the probation 
period of a pregnant worker, a dismissal notice must be given in writing 
with duly substantiated grounds. 
* In order to comply with the principle of equivalence, the one month 
term provided by Article 60(3) for contesting unequal pay must be 
prolonged to two years, as applicable to other claims arising on account 
of pay. Besides, Article 60(3) must specify that missing the term for 
bringing an action does not preclude claiming equal pay at any time as 
regards the current situation.  
*Article 75 must provide for the situation where a worker has not had 
salary on account of maternity leave, taking into account that calculation 
of average wages for that worker may not be less favourable. 
*Article 36 must provide that pregnancy may not be taken into account 
when assessing suitability of state of health of a candidate for 
performance of the work in question. 
*Article 138(6) must clearly provide that night work is prohibited for 
pregnant workers, workers who have recently given birth, or who are 
breastfeeding - only if it is specified by a medical certificate 
*The legislator must rethink the provisions of Articles 53(2), 134(2), 
136(7) and 138(6) providing that women are awarded special protection 
one year after birth-giving, because it does not reflect the biological 
differences of the female sex, but rather a socially-construed stereotype of 
the woman as child-carer. 
*Article 134(2) stipulating that the employer must provide a woman with 
part-time work for a year after child-birth if she so requires, discriminates 
against male workers by not allowing male workers effectively to 
reconcile work and family life and by setting different conditions for 
child-care according to sex. Besides, this provision must be analysed 
together with the right to divided child-care allowance – 50% of the 
allowance to each parent who works part-time on account of the rights 
provided by Article 134(2).  
*Article 147(1) providing for the right to ante-natal examinations during 
working time if such examinations are not possible outside it, must 
provide, according to the requirements of Article 9 of Directive 92/85, 
that during those examinations the employer has an obligation to provide 
this right without loss of pay. 
 
Proposals for amendments to Latvian statutory social 
security law 
 286
Maternity leave 
In order to comply with the provisions of Directive 79/7, the only 
possible way is to insure women during maternity against all social risks 
in the same way as any worker actually working, or if women are self-
employed – in the same way as any self-employed person actually 
performing activity.  For the purposes of guaranteeing equal rights, the 
level of social insurance must correspond to previous salary.  
However, if following the equality principle accurately, then social 
insurance during maternity leave must include any pay rise, since 
otherwise  persons on maternity leave will be placed in a less 
advantageous position in comparison with their working colleagues, since 
in case of a pay rise social insurance contributions and consequently 
social insurance allowances of working colleagues would be higher than 
those of persons on maternity leave, because their social insurance 
contributions will not reflect the pay rise.  Consequently, in order to 
eliminate this discriminatory situation, contributions during maternity 
leave against all social insurance risks must be in an amount 
corresponding to the salary which a person on maternity leave would 
have received if she was present at work. 
 
Paternity leave 
Since the right to paternity leave is an exclusive right granted to male 
persons only, this period must be awarded special rights on the same 
basis as award of rights during maternity. Although no explicit social 
security rights during paternity leave are provided under EC and Latvian 
law, nevertheless in order to comply with the principle of equality 
provided by Directive 79/7 and Article 21 of the Law on social 
security142, fathers on account of paternity leave like mothers on 
maternity leave may not be subject to less favourable treatment in the 
field of social security. Thus the author sees award of full social 
insurance during paternity leave by the state as the only solution. 
 
Child-care leave 
First of all, the legislator must think of provisions of Latvian law which 
allow any indirect discrimination arising out of low social insurance 
during child-care leave to be caught. Here, there may be two solutions – 
to provide persons on child-care leave with statutory social insurance in 
the amount of their previous wages, or to implement the provisions of 
Article 7(1)(b). However, the second solution is questionable, because 
Directive 79/7 is subject to progressive implementation of the equality 
principle in social security matters, which means that under Article 8 the 
                                                           
142 Par sociālo drošību: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis 1995. 21.septembris, Nr.144 (Law on Social 
Security). 
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Member States shall periodically review exemptions allowed under 
Article 7(1). Consequently, it is highly questionable whether the 
Commission in the present situation will allow Latvia to step backwards 
after having once already decided that exemption under Article 7(1)(b) 
must be deleted.  Instead, it is reasonably for the Ministry of Welfare to 
calculate the possible expenses of the state budget or social insurance 
budgets143 on account of full statutory social insurance of persons on 
child-care leave. 
The legislator must rethink the aim and purpose of child-care 
allowance provided under Latvian law, since now it provides child-care 
allowance to one of the parents even if he/she works full time; on the 
other hand it does not in reality provide for the possibility of one parent to 
work part-time, since it involves financial loss. Such a provision will be 
effective with regard to the best possible child-care, involvement of 
fathers in child-care, and leaving mothers within the employment market 
only if both parents could receive child-care allowance in an amount of 
50% under condition that they work part-time and share child-care 
responsibilities between them.  
 
Proposals for amendments to other laws 
*Latvian Civil law must be amended by Article 14031 as soon as 
possible. Since the wording of that provision is very general and does not 
provide for nuances required by EC law, after the amendments 
responsible institutions must provided the public with exhaustive 
information on proper interpretation and application of Article 14031 
according to EC law requirements.  
*Article 1635 must be amended by insertion of discrimination cases as 
not requiring proof of the existence of moral damage. Besides, the Civil 
law must provide that in order to obtain financial loss on account of 
discrimination, proof of existence of fault may not be required. 
*Article 2(4) of Law on the state civil service must be amended as soon 
as possible in order to implement EC law provisions of equal treatment in 
the field of public service. 
 
                                                           
143 It was proposed recently by the Ministry of Welfare to move child-care allowances from the 
category of state allowances paid from the state budget under statutory social insurance schemes paid 
by social insurance contribution budgets. LM Grib atcelt kopšanas pabalsta griestus, portāls 
www.delfi.lv, publicēts 2006. 20.jūlijā, http://www.delfi.lv/archive/article.php?id=15004402 (aplūkots 
2006. 20.jūlijs) 
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Thesis for defence 
EC law 
*The ‘difference’ approach presently used by EC law does not guarantee 
substantive equality between the sexes. However, this finding has its 
explanation not in the fact that the ‘difference’ approach is based on a 
formal equality approach, but in the fact that the ECJ has applied an 
incoherent legal technique for comparison of situations. So, in order to 
attain substantive equality there is no need to switch from the ‘difference’ 
approach to the substantive equality approach, but to apply doctrine 
which provides that a substantive equality outcome depends on the 
thoroughness of review of the comparable situations in question. Besides, 
the essence of equality law lies in the existence of a comparator, whether 
real or hypothetical. This is important to escape recognition of a sui 
generis situation which may lead to unequal treatment. Thoroughness of 
review of the situations in question, which is governed by biological 
differences based on sex, must provide equality of results. Thoroughness 
of review of situations must also provide for equality of result in 
situations where differences of treatment have arisen due to stereotypes 
and there is no possibility to eliminate such actually existing disadvantage 
through other measures. Moreover, in cases where disadvantage may be 
eliminated, thoroughness of review of situations must lead to an outcome 
which provides for equal opportunities. However, it must be taken into 
account that full application of the legal technique of thoroughness of 
review by the ECJ is restricted on account of its limited competence, 
which deals with aspects of organization of family life, which is the 
source of inequality,  only to a certain extent.          
*Not taking into account deficiencies of legal technique, attaining 
substantive equality is also precluded by the fact that special protection 
during pregnancy and maternity is provided by Directive 92/85, which 
constitutes part of health and safety provisions, not EC sex equality law. 
Such legal basis allows the ECJ to avoid reviewing pregnancy and 
maternity cases in the context of sex equality, which moves away from 
attaining substantive equality. 
*Some scholars consider that several provisions of Directive 92/85 are 
discriminatory. The author has analysed the case law of the ECJ 
interpreting Directive 92/85, and has drawn the conclusion that the ECJ 
interprets the provisions of Directive 92/85 in a more discriminatory way 
than they actually are. 
*Although EU institutions in their political documents provide that both 
parents play an equal role in child-care and upbringing, nevertheless 
normative acts provide different rights for motherhood and fatherhood 
respectively. Evidence of this appears from the length of maternity leave, 
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which exceeds the time for accommodating biological differences, and 
the aims of leave defined by the ECJ which provides for special 
protection of motherhood. Since EC law does not protect fatherhood, it 
violates the equal treatment principle and does not stimulate attainment of 
self-provided objectives in the field of human rights and economic 
development. Besides, the EU legislator fails to take into account that 
excessive protection during pregnancy and maternity increase the 
possibility of discrimination against all women in the labour market. 
Latvian law 
Labour law 
*In order to avoid misinterpretation and misapplication of special 
protection measures awarded to pregnant workers and workers during 
maternity and paternity periods, Article 29(1) should be amended with 
explicit norms providing that less favourable treatment on grounds of 
pregnancy, maternity (including breastfeeding) or paternity constitutes 
direct discrimination based on sex.  
*Article 29(1) should provide that prohibition of discrimination concerns 
not only notice of dismissal but also dismissal itself and non-renewal of 
fixed-term contracts on discriminatory grounds. 
*Article 29(3) should not indicate that direct discrimination may be 
justified. Instead, the present Article 29(3) may be formulated as provided 
by Article 4(1) of Directive 97/80. 
*Article 29(3) should be amended to provide claimants with effective 
rights to reversed burden of proof. In this regard, Article 29(3) should 
explain that ‘facts’ here means not evidence according to the Civil 
Procedure law but facts indicating prima facie discrimination. 
*Article 32(1) should provide for a positive instead of a negative 
obligation to address job advertisements to individuals of both sexes. 
That will clarify the obligation of employers when formulating job 
advertisements.   
*Article 34(2) which provides that no instatement may be required by a 
discrimination victim should be revised, since in a small country in 
certain circumstances the obligation to conclude an employment contract 
may be the only effective remedy. While Article 34(2) does not provide 
for instatement, the one-month term for bringing a claim should be 
revised, since as correctly pointed out by the judge in the Kozlovska case, 
such a short term - one month - may be justified only in cases possibly 
resulting in a reinstatement obligation for the purposes of legal certainty 
of employers.  
*Article 37(7) should provide for two weeks compulsory maternity leave 
instead of four. 
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*Article 47 should provide that in case of dismissal of a pregnant worker 
during the probation period, a dismissal notice must be given in written 
with duly substantiated grounds. 
* In order to comply with the principle of equivalence, the one-month 
term provided by Article 60(3) for contesting unequal pay should be 
prolonged to two years as applicable to other claims arising on account of 
pay. Besides, Article 60(3) should specify that missing of the deadline for 
bringing an action does not preclude claiming at any time equal pay as 
regards the current situation.  
*Article 75 should provide for the situation where a worker has not had 
salary on account of maternity leave taking into account that calculation 
of average wages for that worker may not be less favourable. 
*Article 36 should provide that pregnancy may not be taken into account 
when assessing suitability of state of health of the candidate for 
performance of work in question. 
*Article 138(6) should clearly provide that night work is prohibited for 
pregnant workers, workers who have recently given birth or who are 
breastfeeding only if this is specified by medical certificate 
*The legislator should rethink the provisions of Articles 53(2), 134(2), 
136(7) and 138(6) providing that women are awarded special protection 
one year after childbirth, because this reflects - not the biological 
differences of the female sex, but rather a socially-construed stereotype of 
women as main child-carers. 
*Article 134(2) - stipulating that employers must provide a woman with 
part-time work for a year after child-birth if she requires - again stresses 
the stereotype of woman as the main child-carer.  
*Article 147(1) - providing for the right to ante-natal examinations during 
working time if such examinations are not possible outside it - should 
provide that during those examinations the employer must provide this 
right without loss of pay, in accordance with the requirements of Article 9 
of Directive 92/85. 
Statutory social insurance law  
* Article 7(2) of the Law on social allowances should be amended by 
providing that an individual is precluded from the right to child-care 
allowance if he/she or the other parent is on maternity or paternity leave. 
*In order to comply with the provisions of Directive 79/7, women during 
maternity should be insured against all social risks like any worker 
actually working; or, if women are self-employed – like any self-
employed person actually performing an activity. For the purposes of 
guaranteeing equal rights, the level of social insurance should correspond 
to the previous salary. 
*Since the right to paternity leave is an exclusive right granted to males 
only, this period must be awarded special rights on the same basis as the 
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award of rights during maternity in accordance with the principle of equal 
treatment, under the provisions of the Law on social security1. According 
to this, individuals on paternity leave must be socially insured against all 
risks provided by the statutory social security scheme. 
*In order to eliminate the present situation, allowing bringing a claim on 
indirect discrimination against women after child-care leave regarding 
less advantageous treatment in statutory social security schemes, the 
Latvian state should calculate the possible expenses of either the state or 
social insurance budget for full social insurance of persons during child-
care leave. According to the availability of financial resources, Latvia has 
either to provide parents with full social insurance during child-care leave 
or ask the European Commission for permission to provide exemption 
under national law, in order to discharge its responsibility for this indirect 
discrimination. 
*The legislator should rethink the aim and purpose of child-care 
allowance provided under Latvian law, since now it provides child-care 
allowance to one of the parents even if he/she works full time, but on the 
other hand it does not in reality provide for the possibility for one parent 
to work part-time, since it involves financial loss. Such provision will be 
effective with regard to the best possible child-care, involvement of 
fathers in child-care and leaving mothers within employment market only 
if both parents receive child-care allowance in an amount of 50% on 
condition that they work part-time and share child-care responsibilities 
between them.  
Other laws 
*Long-term service pensions provided by special national laws fall within 
the concept of equal pay; thus they are subject to stricter review from the 
point of view of equal treatment. 
*Latvian Civil law should be amended by Article 14031 as soon as 
possible. Since the wording of that provision is very general and does not 
provide for the nuances required by EC law, after amendments the 
responsible institutions should provide the public with exhaustive 
information on proper interpretation and application of Article 14031 
according to EC law requirements.  
*Article 1635 should be amended by inserting that discrimination cases 
do not require proof of existence of moral damage. Besides, the Civil law 
should provide that in order to obtain financial loss on account of 
discrimination, proof of existence of fault may not be required. 
*Article 2(4) of the Law on the state civil service should be amended as 
soon as possible in order to implement EC law provisions of equal 
treatment in the public service field. 
                                                 
1 Par sociālo drošību: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis 1995. 21.septembris, Nr.144 (Law on Social 
Security). 
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cases C-63/91 and C-64/91., European Court reports 1992 Page I-04737  
 
C-158/91 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 27 October 1992. Criminal 
proceedings against Jean-Claude Levy. European Court reports 1993 Page I-04287 
C-189/91 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Darmon delivered on 25 November 1992. Petra 
Kirsammer-Hack v Nurhan Sidal. European Court reports 1993 Page I-06185 
C-200/91 JOINED OPINIONS OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL VAN GERVEN DELIVERED 
ON 28 APRIL 1993.  GERARDUS CORNELIS TEN OEVER V STICHTING 
BEDRIJFSPENSIOENFONDS VOOR HET GLAZENWASSERS- EN 
SCHOONMAAKBEDRIJF. MICHAEL MORONI V COLLO GMBH. DAVID 
NEATH V HUGH STEEPER LTD. COLOROLL PENSION TRUSTEES V JAMES 
RICHARD RUSSELL AND OTHERS. European Court reports 1993 Page I-04879 
C-226/91 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 17 September 1992. Jan 
Molenbroek v Bestuur van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank. European Court reports 1992 
Page I-05943 
C-338/91 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Darmon delivered on 31 March 1993. H. Steenhorst-
Neerings v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel, Ambachten en 
Huisvrouwen. European Court reports 1993 Page I-05475 
C-132/92 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Van Gerven delivered on 15 July 1993. Birds Eye 
Walls Ltd. v Friedel M. Roberts. European Court reports 1993 Page I-05579 
C-343/92 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Darmon delivered on 8 December 1993. M. A. De 
Weerd, née Roks, and others v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor de Gezondheid, 
Geestelijke en Maatschappelijke Belangen and others. European Court reports 1994 
Page I-00571 
 
C-410/92 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Gulmann delivered on 1 June 1994. Elsie Rita Johnson 
v Chief Adjudication Officer. European Court reports 1994 Page I-05483 
C-421/92 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 27 January 1994. Gabriele 
Habermann-Beltermann v Arbeiterwohlfahrt, Bezirksverband Ndb./Opf. e.V. European 
Court reports 1994 Page I-01657 
C-32/93 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 1 June 1994. Carole Louise 
Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK) Ltd. European Court reports 1994 Page I-03567 
C-342/93 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Léger delivered on 6 June 1995. Joan Gillespie and 
others v Northern Health and Social Services Boards, Department of Health and Social 
Services, Eastern Health and Social Services Board and Southern Health and Social 
Services Board. European Court reports 1996 Page I-00475 
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C-400/93 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Léger delivered on 21 February 1995. 
Specialarbejderforbundet i Danmark v Dansk Industri, formerly Industriens 
Arbejdsgivere, acting for Royal Copenhagen A/S. European Court reports 1995 Page I-
01275 
C-444/93 JOINED OPINION OF MR ADVOCATE GENERAL LEGER DELIVERED ON 31 
MAY 1995. INGE NOLTE V LANDESVERSICHERUNGSANSTALT HANNOVER. 
URSULA MEGNER AND HILDEGARD SCHEFFEL V 
INNUNGSKRANKENKASSE VORDERPFALZ, NOW 
INNUNGSKRANKENKASSE RHEINHESSEN-PFALZ. European Court reports 1995 
Page I-04625 
C-450/93 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 6 April 1995. Eckhard Kalanke v 
Freie Hansestadt Bremen. European Court reports 1995 Page I-03051 
C-457/93 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 29 June 1995. Kuratorium für 
Dialyse und Nierentransplantation e.V. v Johanna Lewark. European Court reports 
1996 Page I-00243 
 
C-116/94 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Lenz delivered on 11 May 1995. Jennifer Meyers v 
Adjudication Officer. European Court reports 1995 Page I-02131 
C-280/94 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Fennelly delivered on 14 December 1995. Y. M. 
Posthuma-van Damme v Bestuur van de Bedrijfsvereniging voor Detailhandel, 
Ambachten en Huisvrouwen and N. Oztürk v Bestuur van de Nieuwe Algemene 
Bedrijfsvereniging. European Court reports 1996 Page I-00179 
C-1/95 Joined opinion of Mr Advocate General La Pergola delivered on 22 October 1996. 
Hellen Gerster v Freistaat Bayern. Brigitte Kording v Senator für Finanzen. European 
Court reports 1997 Page I-05253 
C-66/95 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Léger delivered on 19 September 1996. The Queen v 
Secretary of State for Social Security, ex parte Eunice Sutton. European Court reports 
1997 Page I-02163 
C-77/95 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered on 11 July 1996. 
Bruna-Alessandra Züchner v Handelskrankenkasse (Ersatzkasse) Bremen. European 
Court reports 1996 Page I-05689 
C-136/95 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered on 9 January 1997. 
Caisse nationale d'assurance vieillesse des travailleurs salariés (CNAVTS) v Evelyne 
Thibault. European Court reports 1998 Page I-02011 
C-180/95 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Léger delivered on 14 January 1997. Nils 
Draehmpaehl v Urania Immobilienservice OHG. European Court reports 1997 Page I-
02195 
C-400/95 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered on 18 February 1997. 
Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund i Danmark, acting on behalf of Helle 
Elisabeth Larsson v Dansk Handel & Service, acting on behalf of Føtex Supermarked 
A/S. European Court reports 1997 Page I-02757 
C-409/95 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 15 May 1997. Hellmut Marschall 
v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen. European Court reports 1997 Page I-06363 
C-66/96 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered on 10 
July 1997. Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund i Danmark, 
acting on behalf of Berit Høj Pedersen v Fællesforeningen for Danmarks 
Brugsforeninger and Dansk Tandlægeforening and Kristelig Funktionær-
Organisation v Dansk Handel & Service. European Court reports 1998 
Page I-07327 
C-326/96 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Léger delivered on 12 May 1998. B.S. 
Levez v T.H. Jennings (Harlow Pools) Ltd. European Court reports 1998 
Page I-07835 
C-394/99 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered on 5 
February 1998. Mary Brown v Rentokil Ltd.  European Court reports 
1998 Page I-04185
C-411/96 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered on 19 
February 1998. European Court reports 1998 Page I-06401
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C-158/97 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Saggio delivered on 10 June 1999. 
Georg Badeck and Others, interveners: Hessische Ministerpräsident and 
Landesanwalt beim Staatsgerichtshof des Landes Hessen. European 
Court reports 2000 Page I-01875 
C-167/97 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Cosmas delivered on 14 July 1998. 
Regina v Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Nicole Seymour-
Smith and Laura Perez. European Court reports 1999 Page I-00623 
C-185/97 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Mischo delivered on 2 April 1998. 
Belinda Jane Coote v Granada Hospitality Ltd.  European Court reports 
1998 Page I-05199 
C-237/97 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Saggio delivered on 16 July 1998. AFS 
Intercultural Programs Finland ry. European Court reports 1999 Page I-
00825 
C-309/97 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Cosmas delivered on 19 January 1999. 
Angestelltenbetriebsrat der Wiener Gebietskrankenkasse v Wiener 
Gebietskrankenkasse. European Court reports 1999 Page I-02865 
C-333/97 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered on 4 
March 1999. Susanne Lewen v Lothar Denda.  European Court reports 
1999 Page I-07243 
C-78/98 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Léger delivered on 14 September 1999. 
Shirley Preston and Othes v Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust and 
Others and Dorothy Fletcher and Others v Midland Bank plc. European 
Court reports 2000 Page I-03201 
C-207/98 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Saggio delivered on 7 October 1999. 
Silke-Karin Mahlburg v Land Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. European 
Court reports 2000 Page I-00549 
C-218/98 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Alber delivered on 3 June 1999. Oumar 
Dabo Abdoulaye and Others v Régie nationale des usines Renault SA. 
European Court reports 1999 Page I-05723 
C-226/98 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Saggio delivered on 13 January 2000. 
Birgitte Jørgensen v Foreningen af Speciallæger and Sygesikringens 
Forhandlingsudvalg. European Court reports 2000 Page I-02447 
C-236/98 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 16 December 1999. 
Jämställdhetsombudsmannen v Örebro läns landsting. European Court 
reports 2000 Page I-02189 
C-285/98 Opinion of Mr Advocate General La Pergola delivered on 26 October 
1999. Tanja Kreil v Bundesrepublik Deutschland. European Court 
reports 2000 Page I-00069 
C-407/98 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Saggio delivered on 16 November 
1999. Katarina Abrahamsson and Leif Anderson v Elisabet Fogelqvist. 
European Court reports 2000 Page I-05539 
C-79/99 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Jacobs delivered on 6 July 2000. Julia 
Schnorbus v Land Hessen. European Court reports 2000 Page I-10997 
C-366/99 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Alber delivered on 22 February 2001. 
Joseph Griesmar v Ministre de l'Economie, des Finances et de l'Industrie 
et Ministre de la Fonction publique, de la Réforme de l'Etat et de la 
Décentralisation. European Court reports 2001 Page I-09383 
C-381/99 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Geelhoed delivered on 15 March 2001. 
Susanna Brunnhofer v Bank der österreichischen Postsparkasse AG. 
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European Court reports 2001 Page I-04961 
C-438/99 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Tizzano delivered on 7 June 2001. 
Maria Luisa Jiménez Melgar v Ayuntamiento de Los Barrios. European 
Court reports 2001 Page I-06915 
C-476/99 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Alber delivered on 6 November 2001. 
H. Lommers v Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij. 
European Court reports 2002 Page I-02891 
C-109/00 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered on 10 
May 2001. Tele Danmark A/S v Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes 
Forbund i Danmark (HK). European Court reports 2001 Page I-06993 
C-320/00 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Geelhoed delivered on 14 March 2002. 
A. G. Lawrence and Others v Regent Office Care Ltd, Commercial 
Catering Group and Mitie Secure Services Ltd. European Court reports 
2002 Page I-07325 
C-160/01 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Mischo delivered on 2 July 2002. 
Karen Mau v Bundesanstalt für Arbeit. European Court reports 2003 
Page I-04791 
C-186/01 Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl delivered on 28November2002. 
Alexander Dory v Bundesrepublik Deutschland. European Court reports 
2003 Page I-02479 
C-256/01 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Geelhoed delivered on 2 April 2003. 
Debra Allonby v Accrington & Rossendale College, Education Lecturing 
Services, trading as Protocol Professional and Secretary of State for 
Education and Employment. European Court reports 2004 Page I-00873 
C-320/01 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer delivered on 21 
November 2002. Wiebke Busch v Klinikum Neustadt GmbH & Co. 
Betriebs-KG. European Court reports 2003 Page 00000 
C-342/01 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Mischo delivered on 3 April 2003. 
María Paz Merino Gómez v Continental Industrias del Caucho SA. 
European Court reports 2004 Page I-02605 
C-147/02 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Léger delivered on 30 September 2003. 
Michelle K. Alabaster v Woolwich plc and Secretary of State for Social 
Security. European Court reports 2004 Page I-03101 
C-196/02 OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL STIX-HACKL delivered on 29 
April 2004, case C-196/02 Vasiliki Nikoloudi v Organismos 
Tilepikinonion Ellados (OTE), http://curia.europa.eu/  
C-220/02 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott delivered on 12 February 2004. 
Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, Gewerkschaft der 
Privatangestellten v Wirtschaftskammer Österreich. European Court 
reports 2004 Page I-05907 
C-284/02 Opinion of Mr Advocate General Geelhoed delivered on 27 April 2004. 
Land Brandenburg v Ursula Sass. European Court reports 2004 Page I-
11143 
C-191/03 OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL LÉGER delivered on 2 
December 2004, case C-191/03, North-Western Health Board v Margaret 
McKenna,  http://curia.europa.eu/  
C-203/03 OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL JACOBS delivered on 8 July 
2004, Case C-203/03 Commission of the European Communities v 
Republic of Austria 
http://curia.europa.eu/  
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C-356/03 ĢENERĀLADVOKĀTA DAMASO RUISA-HARABO KOLOMERA 
[DÁMASO RUIZ-JARABO COLOMER] SECINĀJUMI, sniegti 
2004. gada 9. septembrī , lietā Elisabeth Mayer pret Versorgungsanstalt 
des Bundes und der Länder, http://curia.europa.eu/  
C-294/04 OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL STIX-HACKL delivered on 10 
November 2005, case C-294/04, Carmen Sarkatzis Herrero v Instituto 
Madrileño de la Salud (Imsalud), http://curia.europa.eu/  
 
 
EC policy documents 
*Communication from the Commission on the guidelines on the assessment of the 
chemical, physical and biological agents and industrial processes considered 
hazardous for the safety or health of pregnant workers and workers who have recently 
given birth or are breastfeeding (Council Directive 92/85/EEC) COM (2000), 0466 
final 
*92/191/EEC: Commission Recommendation of 27 November 1991 on the protection 
of the dignity of women and men at work, Official Journal L 049, 24/02/1992 P.0001-
0008 
*Council Recommendation 92/241/EEC on child care of 31 March 1992, OJ L123/16 
of 8.5.1992. 
*Council Recommendation on the promotion of Positive Action for Women, 
84/635/EEC (1984) OJ L331/34 
*Resolution of the Council and of the Ministers for employment and social policy, 
meeting within the Council of 29 June 2000 on the balanced participation of  women 
and men in family and working life (2000/C 218/02), OJ C 218/5, 31.07.2000. 
*Green Paper, Equality and non-discrimination in an enlarged European Union, COM 
(2004) 379 final 
*”Equal treatment for male and female workers (access to employment and to 
vocational training and promotion, and working conditions), Commission 
communication to the Council – COM (75) 36, 12 February 1975 
* ”A new Community action programme on the promotion of equal opportunities for 
women 1982-85, Commission communication to the Council, 14 December 1981, 
Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement 1/82 
* “Equal opportunities for women – Medium-term Community programme 1986-90, 
Commission communication to the Council, 20 December 1985, Bulletin of the 
European Communities Supplement 3/86 
* “Equal Opportunities for Women and Men, the third medium-term Community 
action programme”, 1991-1995, COM (90) 449, final – Brussels, 6 November 1990) 
*Council Decision 95/593/EC of 22 December 1995 on a medium-term Community 
action programme on equal opportunities for men and women (1996 to 2000), OJ L 
335, 30/12/1995, P.0037-0073 
*Commission’s Annual Reports on Equal Opportunities for Women and Men in the 
European Union to the Council, The European Parliament, the Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, COM (2002) 258 final   
*Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union, OJ C 364, 18/12/200 P.0001-
0022 
*Explanations relating to the text of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, CONV 
828/1/03 REV 1 
* Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
European Economic and Social committee and the Committee of the Regions - A 
 XXVI
Roadmap for equality between women and men 2006-2010 {SEC(2006) 275}, COM 
(2006) 0092 final  
 
Other Publications 
*A Roadmap for equality between women and men 2006-2010, European 
Commission, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publication of the European 
Communities, 2006 
*Report on equality between women and men, 2006, European Commission, 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publication of the European Communities, 2006 
*Equality between women and men in the European Union, European Commission, 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publication of the European Communities, 2005 
*How European spend their time. Everyday life of women and men, data 1998-2002, 
European Commission, Eurostat, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publication of the 
European Communities, 2004 
*Monitoring, implementation and application of Community Equality law, General 
report 1997&1998 of the legal Expert’s Group on Equal Treatment of Men and 
Women, European Commission, 1999, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/employment_social/publicat/equ-opp/experts.pdf  
*Equality quarterly news, Newsletter of the expert legal group on the application of 
European law on equal treatment between men and women No.1/99, European 
Commission, 1999, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/docs/newsletter/news9901_en
.pdf  
* Equality quarterly news, Newsletter of the expert legal group on the application of 
European law on equal treatment between men and women No.2/99, European 
Commission, 1999, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/docs/newsletter/news9902_en
.pdf  
*Bulletin Legal issues in equality, No.1/2000, Bulletin of the Commission’s network 
of legal experts on the application of community law on equal treatment between 
women and men, European Commission, 2000, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/docs/newsletter/bulletin00_1_
en.pdf  
* Bulletin Legal issues in equality, No.2/2000, Bulletin of the Commission’s network 
of legal experts on the application of community law on equal treatment between 
women and men, European Commission, 2000, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/docs/newsletter/bulletin00_2_
en.pdf  
*Bulletin Legal issues in equality, No.3/2000, Bulletin of the Commission’s network 
of legal experts on the application of community law on equal treatment between 
women and men, European Commission, 2000, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/docs/newsletter/bulletin00_3_
en.pdf  
* Bulletin Legal issues in equality, No.1/2001, Bulletin of the Commission’s network 
of legal experts on the application of community law on equal treatment between 
women and men, European Commission, 2001, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/docs/newsletter/bulletin01_1_
en.pdf  
* Bulletin Legal issues in equality, No.2/2001, Bulletin of the Commission’s network 
of legal experts on the application of community law on equal treatment between 
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women and men, European Commission, 2001, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/docs/newsletter/bulletin01_2_
en.pdf  
* Bulletin Legal issues in equality, No.3/2001, Bulletin of the Commission’s network 
of legal experts on the application of community law on equal treatment between 
women and men, European Commission, 2001, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/docs/newsletter/bulletin01_3_
en.pdf  
* Bulletin Legal issues in equality, No.1/2002, Bulletin of the Commission’s network 
of legal experts on the application of community law on equal treatment between 
women and men, European Commission, 2002, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/docs/newsletter/bulletin02_1_
en.pdf    
* Bulletin Legal issues in equality, No.2/2002, Bulletin of the Commission’s network 
of legal experts on the application of community law on equal treatment between 
women and men, European Commission, 2002, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/docs/newsletter/bulletin02_2_
en.pdf  
* Bulletin Legal issues in equality, No.3/2002, Bulletin of the Commission’s network 
of legal experts on the application of community law on equal treatment between 
women and men, European Commission, 2002, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/docs/newsletter/bulletin02_3_
en.pdf  
* Bulletin Legal issues in equality, No.1/2003, Bulletin of the Commission’s network 
of legal experts on the application of community law on equal treatment between 
women and men, European Commission, 2003, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/docs/newsletter/bulletin0103_
en.pdf  
* Bulletin Legal issues in equality, No.2/2003, Bulletin of the Commission’s network 
of legal experts on the application of community law on equal treatment between 
women and men, European Commission, 2003, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/docs/newsletter/bulletin2_200
3_en.pdf  
* Bulletin Legal issues in equality, No.3/2003, Bulletin of the Commission’s network 
of legal experts on the application of community law on equal treatment between 
women and men, European Commission, 2003, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/docs/newsletter/bulletin3_200
3_en.pdf  
* Bulletin Legal issues in equality, No.1/2004, Bulletin of the Commission’s network 
of legal experts on the application of community law on equal treatment between 
women and men, European Commission, 2004, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/docs/newsletter/bulletin04_1_
en.pdf  
*General Report on Developments in EU Gender Equality Law, June 2004 – May 
2005, European Commission, 2005, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/docs/2005/groupexpertleg_ge
neral_report_04_05_en.pdf  
* Bulletin Legal issues in equality, No.1/2005, Bulletin of the Commission’s network 
of legal experts on the application of community law on equal treatment between 
women and men, European Commission, 2005, available at 
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http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/docs/newsletter/bulletin05_1_
en.pdf  
* Bulletin Legal issues in equality, No.2/2005, Bulletin of the Commission’s network 
of legal experts on the application of community law on equal treatment between 
women and men, European Commission, 2005, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/docs/2005/bulletin05_2_en.p
df  
* Bulletin Legal issues in equality, No.3/2005, Bulletin of the Commission’s network 
of legal experts on the application of community law on equal treatment between 
women and men, European Commission, 2005, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/docs/2005/bulletin05_3_en.p
df  
* Bulletin Legal issues in equality, No.1/2006, Bulletin of the Commission’s network 
of legal experts on the application of community law on equal treatment between 
women and men, European Commission, 2006, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/docs/2006/bulletin06_1_en.p
df  
* Bulletin Legal issues in equality, No.2/2006, Bulletin of the Commission’s network 
of legal experts on the application of community law on equal treatment between 
women and men, European Commission, 2006, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/gender_equality/docs/2006/bulletin06_2_en.p
df  
*Remedies and Sanction in EC non-discrimination law, European Commission, 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publication of the European Communities, 2005 
 
International law documents 
*UN Convention on the Eliminations of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/   
*International Covenant on Economic, Social and cultural rights, Malcom D.Evans 
(ed.), International Law Documents, Blackstone’s, 4th edition, 1999 
*International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Malcom D.Evans (ed.), 
International Law Documents, Blackstone’s, 4th edition, 1999 
*Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-
5C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf  
*Council of Europe, European Social Charter (1961) CETS No.035,  
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/035.doc  
* Council of Europe, European Social Charter (revised) (1996) CETS No.163, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/163.doc  
* Council of Europe, European Code of Social Security (1964) CETS No.048, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/048.doc  
* Council of Europe, European Code of Social Security (revised) (1990) CETS 
No.139 , http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/139.doc  
*ILO, C3Maternity Protection Convention, 1919, 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm  
*ILO C103Maternity Protection Convention, 1952, 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm  
*ILO C183Maternity Protection Convention, 2000, 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm   
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*ILO C156 Workers with Family Responsibilities Convention, 1981, 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/convdisp1.htm   
 
Case of European Court of Human Rights 
Case of Petrovich v Austria (156/1996/775/976), 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&high
light=156/1996/775/976&sessionid=8572719&skin=hudoc-en  
 
Explanatory documents 
*General Recommendations No.1-25, to the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination against Women, UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women 
http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/index.html  
*The Limburg Principles on the implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights, http://www.abo.fi/instut/imr/ESC-
files/Kap1/The%20Limburg%20principles%20on%20the%20Implementation%20of
%20the%20ICESCR.doc  
*European Social Charter explanatory report, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/163.htm  
* ILO Maternity Protection Recommendation R95, 1952, 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/recdisp1.htm  
*ILO Maternity Protection Recommendation R191, 2000, 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/recdisp1.htm  
 
 
Latvian legislation 
Law 
* Latvijas Republikas Satversme: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1994. 12.februāris, 
nr.19 (Constitution of Latvia) 
*Civillikums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1994, 30.jūnijs, Nr.75 (Civil Law) 
*Darba likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2001. 6.jūlijs, Nr.105 (Labour Law) 
*Par sociālo drošību: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 21.septembris, nr.144 
(Law on social security) 
*Valsts sociālo pabalstu likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2002. 19.novembris, 
nr.168 (Law on state social allowances) 
*Sociālo pakalpojumu un sociālās palīdzības likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 
2002. 19.novembris, nr.168 )(Law no social services and assistance) 
*Par valsts sociālo apdrošināšanu: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1997. 21.oktobris, 
nr.274/276 (Law on statne social insurance) 
*Par apdrošināšanu bezdarba gadījumam: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1999. 
15.decembris, nr.416/419 (Law on unemployment social insurance)  
*Bezdarbnieku un darba meklētāju atbalsta likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 
2002. 29.maijs, nr.80 (Law on support of unemployed persons and job seekers) 
*Par maternitātes un slimības apdrošināšanu: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 
23.novembris, nr.182 (Law on maternity and sickness insurance) 
*Par obligāto sociālo apdrošināšanu pret nelaimes gadījumiem darbā un 
arodslimībām: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 17.novembris, nr.179 (Law on 
mandatory social insurance against accidents at work and occupational diseases) 
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*Par valsts pensijām: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1995. 23.novembris, nr.182 
(Law on state pensions) 
*Par izdienas pensijām Iekšlietu sistēmas darbiniekiem ar speciālajām dienesta 
pakāpēm: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1998. 16.aprīlis, nr.100/101 (Law on service 
pensions for employees of system of Ministry of Interior Affairs with special ranks) 
*Militārpersonu izdienas pensiju likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1998. 
1.aprīlis, nr.86 (Law on service pensions for militaries) 
*Prokuroru izdienas pensiju likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1999. 3.jūnijs, 
nr.181 (Law on pensions for prosecutors) 
*Valsts un pašvaldību profesionālo orķestru, koru, koncertorganizāciju, teātru un 
cirka mākslinieku izdienas pensiju likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2004. 
7.jūlijs, nr.106 (Law on service pensions for artists of state and municipal orchestras, 
choirs, concert organizations, theatres and circus) 
*Tiesnešu izdienas pensiju likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2006. 7.jūlijs, 
nr.107 
*Valsts fondēto pensiju likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2000. 3.augusts, 
nr.78/87 (Law on state funded pensionēs) 
*Par privātajiem pensiju fondiem: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1997. 20.jūnijs, 
nr.150 (Law on private pensionē funds) 
*Valsts civildienesta likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2000. 22.septembris, 
nr.331/333 (Law on state civil service) 
*Administratīvā procesa likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2001. 14.novembris 
(Law on administrative process) 
* Par individuālo (ģimenes) uzņēmumu, zemnieka vai zvejnieka saimniecību un 
individuālo darbu: LR likums. Augstākās Padomes MP, 1992. 31.janvāris, nr.4 
*Valsts pārvaldes iestāžu nodarīto zaudējumu atlīdzināšanas likums: LR likums. 
Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2005. 17.jūnijs, nr.96 (3254) (Law on compensation for loss and 
damage caused by institutions of state administration) 
* Darba aizsardzības likums: LR likums. Latvijas Vēstnesis 2001. 6.jūlijs, nr. 105 
(Law on labour health and safety protection). 
 
Regulations of Cabinet of Ministers 
*Noteikumi par valsts sociālā nodrošinājuma pabalsta un apbedīšanas pabalsta 
apmēru, tā pārskatīšanas kārtību un pabalstu piešķiršanas un izmaksas kārtību: MK 
noteikumi Nr.561, Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2005. 29.jūlijs, nr.119 (Regulations on amount 
of state social security allowance and death grant, and procedure for their award, 
reassessment and pay-out) 
*Grozījums Ministru kabineta 2003.gada 9.decembra noteikumos Nr.693 “Noteikumi 
par garantēto minimālo ienākumu līmeni un pabalsta apmēru garantētā minimālā 
ienākuma līmeņa nodrošināšanai”: MK noteikumi Nr.881. Latvijas Vēstnesis 2005. 
25.novembris, nr.189 (Amendments to regulations of Cabinet of Ministers adopted on 
9th of December 2003 „Regulations on guaranteed minimum income level and 
amount of allowance for provision of guaranteed minimum income level”).  
* Kārtība, kādā piešķir un izmaksā bērna kopšanas pabalstu un piemaksu pie bērna 
kopšanas pabalsta par dvīņiem vai vairākiem vienās dzemdībās dzimušiem bērniem: 
MK noteikumi Nr.1003. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2004. 12.decembris Nr.198 (zaudējuši 
spēku) (On procedure under which award and pay-out of child-care allowances and 
additional payment of child-care allowance on account of birth of two and more 
children in one birth) 
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*Noteikumi par bērna kopšanas pabalsta un piemaksas pie bērna kopšanas pabalsta 
par dvīņiem vai vairākiem vienās dzemdībās dzimušiem bērniem apmēru, tā 
pārskatīšanas kārtību un pabalsta un piemaksas piešķiršanas un izmaksas kārtību: MK 
noteikumi nr.644, Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2006. 11.augusts, Nr.128 (3496) (Regulations 
on amount of child care allowance, additional payment of child-care allowance on 
account of birth of two and more children in one birth, on revision of that allowance 
and on procedure of award and pay-out of allowance and additional payment) 
*Kārtība, kādā piešķir un izmaksā bērna piedzimšanas pabalstu: MK noteikumi 
Nr.166, Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2005. 15.marts (Procedure under which award and pay-
out child-birth allowance) 
*Sociālo pakalpojumu un sociālās palīdzības saņemšanas kārtība: MK noteikumi. 
Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2003. 30.maijs, nr.81 (Procedure on receipt of social services and 
assistance) 
*Kārtība, kādā piešķirams, aprēķināms un izmaksājams pabalsts garantētā minimālā 
ienākuma līmeņa nodrošināšanai: MK noteikumi Nr.96. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2003. 
5.marts, nr.35 (On procedure under which is calculated and pay-out guaranteed 
minimum income allowance) 
*Noteikumi par valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas obligātajām iemaksām no valsts 
pamatbudžeta un valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas speciālajiem budžetiem: MK 
noteikumi Nr.230. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2001. 13.jūnijs, nr.91 (Regulations on state 
social insurance payments from state budget and state social insurance special 
budgets). 
*Noteikumi par valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas iemaksu likmes sadalījumu pa valsts 
sociālās apdrošināšanas veidiem 2006.gadā: MK noteikumi Nr.968. Latvijas 
Vēstnesis, 2005. 23.decembris, nr.206 (Regulations on division of state social 
insurance rate among modes of state social insurance for year 2006) 
*Noteikumi par valsts sociālās apdrošināšanas obligāto iemaksu objekta minimālo un 
maksimālo apmēru: MK noteikumi Nr.193. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2000. 6.jūnijs, 
nr.213/218 (Regulations on maximum and minimum amount of state social insurance 
object) 
*Vidējās apdrošināšanas iemaksu algas aprēķināšanas kārtība bezdarbnieka pabalsta 
apmēra noteikšanai un bezdarbnieka pabalsta un apbedīšanas pabalsta piešķiršanas, 
aprēķināšanas un izmaksas kārtība: MK noteikumi Nr.32. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2000. 
28.janvāris, nr.26/28 ((Regulations on calculation of average insurance contribution 
salary for the purposes of calculation of unemployment allowance and on procedure 
of award, calculation and pay-out of death grant) 
*Bezdarbnieka statusa piešķiršanas kārtība: MK noteikumi Nr.24. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 
2003. 20.janvāris, nr.24 (On award of status of unemployed) 
*Vidējās apdrošināšanas iemaksu algas aprēķināšanas kārtība un valsts sociālās 
apdrošināšana pabalstu piešķiršanas, aprēķināšanas un izmaksas kārtība: MK 
noteikumi Nr.270. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1998. 31.jūlijs, nr.223/224 (Regulations on 
calculation of average insurance salary and calculation, assignation and pay-out of 
state social insurance allowances) 
*Obligātās sociālās apdrošināšanas pret nelaimes gadījumiem darbā un arodslimībām 
apdrošināšanas atlīdzības piešķiršanas un aprēķināšanas kārtība: MK noteikumi 
Nr.50. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 1999. 19.februāris, nr.48/49 (On calculation and award of 
mandatory social insurance remuneration due to accidents at work and occupational 
diseases) 
*Darba nodarītā kaitējuma atlīdzības aprēķināšanas, finansēšanas un izmaksu kārtība: 
MK noteikumi Nr.378. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2001. 29.augusts, nr.123 (Regulations on 
 XXXII
procedure of calculation, financing and pay-out of loss and damage caused by the 
accident at work)  
*Noteikumi par 2005.gadā vecuma pensijas aprēķināšanai piemērojamiem 
plānotajiem vecuma pensijas izmaksas laikaposmiem: MK noteikumi Nr.1013. 
Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2004. 14.decembris (Regulations on planned terms for pay-out of 
state old-age pensions applicable for calculation of old-age pensions on year 2005) 
*Noteikumi par profesiju klasifikatoru, profesijai atbilstošiem pamatuzdevumiem un 
kvalifikācijas pamatprasībām un profesiju klasifikatora lietošanas un aktualizēšanas 
kārtību: MK noteikumi Nr.306. Latvijas Vēstnesis 2006. 8.maijs, nr.70 (Regulations 
on classifier of professions according to their basic tasks and qualification 
requirements and on use and actualization of classifier of professions) 
*Militārpersonu izdienas pensijas izmaksas kārtība: MK noteikumi Nr.315. Latvijas 
Vēstnesis, 1998. 27.augusts, nr.246/247 (Regulations on procedure on pay-out of 
service pensions for militaries) 
*Kārtība, kādā izmaksājama prokuroru izdienas pensija: MK noteikumi Nr.21. 
Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2000. 14.janvāris, nr.11/12 (Regulations on procedure on pay-out 
of service pensions for prosecutors) 
*Kārtība, kādā izmaksājama valsts un pašvaldību profesionālo orķestru, koru, 
koncertorganizāciju, teātru un cirka mākslinieku izdienas pensija: MK noteikumi 
Nr.975. Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2004. 3.decembris, nr.192 (Regulations on procedure 
under which pay-out of service pensions for artists of state and municipal orchestra, 
choirs, theatres and circus must be carried out) 
*Noteikumi par uzņēmējdarbības riska valsts nodevas apmēru un darbinieku 
prasījumu garantijas fondā ieskaitāmās nodevas daļu 2006.gadam: MK noteikumi 
Nr.850, Latvijas Vēstnesis, 2005. 11.novembris, nr.181 (Regulations on amount of 
levy of risk of entrepreneurship and part of such levy which must be contributed to 
the fund for claims of employees) 
* Kārtība, kādā nosaka jūrnieku veselības atbalstītu darbam uz kuģa, un atbilstības 
noteikšanas kritēriji”: MK noteikumi Nr.374. Latvijas Vēstnesis 2003. 16.jūlijs, 
nr.105 (On procedure and assessment of state of health of sailors for work on board 
and criteria for defining of compatibility).   
*Darba vides iekšējās uzraudzības veikšanas kārtība: MK noteikumi Nr.379. Latvijas 
Vēstnesis 2001. 29.augusts, nr.123 (On procedure of internal assessment of working 
environment). 
 
Binding regulations of municipalities 
* Par paaugstināto garantēto minimālo ienākumu līmeni Rīgā: Rīgas domes saistošie 
noteikumi Nr.84. Latvijas Vēstnesis 2005. 24.februāris, nr.32 (On increased 
guaranteed minimal income level in Riga) 
 
Cases of Constitutional Court of Latvia 
No.2000-07-0409  
 ” On Compliance of Item 1.1 of the July 6, 1999 Cabinet of Ministers Regulations 
No. 249 ”Amendments to 6 October 1998 Regulations No. 388 on the Procedure of 
Trade in Markets, Fairs, Street Markets and Travelling Shops” with the Second Part 
of Article 4 and Item 1 of the First Part of Article 32 of the Law ”On Entrepreneur 
Activity” as well as with Article 91 of the Satversme of the Republic of Latvia, 
Paragraph 4 of ”General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade” (GATT, 1947), Article 14 
of the Law ”The Structure of the Cabinet of Ministers” and the Second Part of Article 
3 of the Law ”On the Free Trade Agreement among the Republic of Latvia, the 
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Republic of Estonia and the Republic of Lithuania on Trade with Agricultural 
Products”.  
No.2001-08-0109 
" On Compliance of Item 1 of the Transitional Provisions of the Law " On Social 
Insurance" with Articles 1 and 109 of the Satversme (Constitution) of the Republic of 
Latvia and Articles 9 and 11(the first Part) of the December 16, 1966 International 
Pact on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights". 
No.2003-19-0103 
”On the Compliance of the Transitional Provisions (Item 2, Sub-item 4) and Article 
31 (the fourth part) of the Law ”On Maternity and Sickness Insurance” as well as  the 
Cabinet of Ministers July 28, 1998 Regulations No. 270 ”The Procedure of 
Calculating the Average Insurance Payment Salary and the Procedure of Granting, 
Calculation and Payment of the State Social Insurance Benefits” with Articles 1, 91 
and 109 of the Republic of Latvia Satversme (Constitution)””. 
No.2005-09-01 
”On the Compliance of the Condition Incorporated in Section 7 (Item 1 of the First 
Paragraph) of the Law on State Social Allowances – ”if this person is not employed 
(is not considered to be an employee or self-employed person in accordance with the 
Law on State Social Insurance) or is employed and is on parental leave” with Articles 
91, 106 and 110 of the Republic of Latvia Satversme (Constitution).  
 
Judgements of Latvian national courts 
*Augstākās tiesas Senāta 2002.gada 8.maija spriedums Lietā Nr.SKC-297 (Par 
kompensācijas piedziņu, konstatējot dzimuma diskriminācijas faktu darba tiesībās), 
I.Muhina pret Tieslietu ministrijas Ieslodzījumu vietu pārvaldes Centrālcietumu 
Jurista Vārds, 2002. 4.jūnijs, nr.11 
*Augstākās tiesas Senāta 2005.gada 9.marta spriedums Lietā Nr.SKC-176 (Par 
individuālā darba veicēja tiesiskā statusu un tā norobežošanu no darba līguma), 
V.Pavlovs pret SIA „Jelgavas autobusu parks” 
*Augstākās tiesas Senāta 2006.gada 8.februāra spriedums Lietā Nr.SKC-60 (Par 
individuālā darba veicēja tiesiskā statusu un tā norobežošanu no darba līguma), 
V.Pavlovs pret SIA „Jelgavas autobusu parks” 
*Augstākās tiesas Senāta 2006.gada 8.februāra spriedums Lietā Nr.SKC-54, 
R.Kuzņerēvičs pret Valsts meža dienestu. Jurista Vārds, 2006. 4.aprīlis, nr.14 
*Augstākās tiesas Senāta 2004.gada 19.maija spriedums Lietā Nr.SKC-229. Jurista 
Vārds, 2005. 1.marts, nr.8 
 
*Latgales apgabaltiesas 2000.gada 19.maija spriedums Lietā Nr.2-145A, D.Abrāmova 
pret SIA „Latgales druka”, Jurista Vārds, 2000. 22.jūnijs, nr.25 
*Rīgas apgabaltiesas 2005.gada 21.septembra spriedums lietā Nr.C 27175804, CA-
2787/19; 2005.g., R.Kuzņerēvičs pret Valsts meža dienestu 
 
*Rēzeknes tiesas 2000.gada 26.janvāra spriedums Lietā Nr.2-133/3, D.Abrāmova pret 
SIA „Latgales druka”,  Jurista Vārds, 2000. 22.jūnijs, nr.25 
*Jelgavas tiesas 2006.gada 25.maija spriedums Lietā Nr. C 15066406, S.Kozlovska 
pret SIA „Palso” 
*Rīgas pilsētas Centra rajona tiesas 2005.gada 26.janvāra spriedums lietā 
Nr.C27176204, L.Ghadialija pret AS „Dambis” 
*Cēsu rajona tiesas 2005.gada 5.jūlija spriedums Lietā Nr.C11019405, A.Stūriņa pret 
Straupes pagasta padomi 
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*Rīgas pilsētas Ziemeļu rajona tiesas 2005.gada 29.aprīļa spriedums Lietā 
Nr.C32242904047505, C-475/3, M.Sants pret Rīgas Kultūru vidusskolu 
*Rīgas pilsētas Centra rajona tiesas 2005.gada 16.februāra spriedums Lietā Nr.C-
27175804, C-308/05/7, R.Kuzņerēvičs pret Valsts meža dienestu  
 
Policy documents of Latvia 
*Programma dzimumu līdztiesības īstenošanai 2005.-2006.gadam. Par programmu 
dzimumu līdztiesības īstenošanai 2005.-2006.gadam: MK rīkojums Nr.600, 2004.gada 
8.septembris 
 
Articles  
*Badoviskis M., Radzēvičs J., Par vienādām abu dzimumu tiesībām un pienākumiem.  
Latvijas Vēstnesis, Jurista Vārds, 2000. 22.jūnijs, nr.25 
*Ieva Brūvere, Vienlīdzīgas darba samaksas princips sievietēm un vīriešiem, Latvijas 
Universitātes Raksti, Juridiskā zinātne, 2003, 657.sējums, 30.-47.lpp. 
*Ieva Brūvere, Mazāk pārstāvētā dzimuma aizsardzība darbā atbilstoši Eiropas 
Savienības tiesībām, Latvijas Universitātes raksti, Juridiskā zinātne, 2004, 
667.sējums, 133.-147.lpp 
*Levits E., Par tiesiskās vienlīdzības principu. Latvijas Vēstnesis 2003. 8.maijs,  
Nr.68 
*Joksts O., Morālais kaitējums: zaudējumu atlīdzināšana. Latvijas Vēstnesis, Jurista 
Vārds, 2005. 26.aprīlis, nr.15 
*Kuzmane G., Vai kompensācija pienākas par jebkuru morālo kaitējumu, Latvijas 
Vēstnesis, Jurista Vārds, 2002. 12.februāris, nr.3 
*Bitāns A., Par morālā kaitējuma izpratni Latvija, Latvijas Vēstnesis, Jurista Vārds, 
2001. 18.septembris, nr.27 
*Bitāns A., Gaidāmā nemantiskā (morālā) kaitējuma lomas palielināšanās. Dienas 
Bizness, Saldo, 2006.gada aprīlis, nr.7  
*Torgāns K., Vainas vai attaisnojumu meklējumi civiltiesībās. Jurista Vārds, 2005. 
31.maijs, Nr.20   
* Kārkliņš J., Vainas nozīme, nosakot civiltiesisko atbildību. Jurista Vārds, 2005. 
26.aprīlis, Nr.15 
*Skultāne I., Darba devēja uzteikums pārbaudes laikā. Jurista Vārds, 2004. 
10.augusts, nr.30 
*Radzēvičs J., Darba likuma nianses. Mans Īpašums, 2002., Nr.11 
*Kalniņš E., Prasība par atjaunošanu darbā. Latvijas Vēstnesis, Jurista Vārds, 2004., 
30.marts, 6,aprīlis, nr.12; 13. 
*Akulova I., Termiņi darba tiesībās. Jurista Vārds, 2004. 7.septembris, nr.34 
 
 
Other publications 
*Latvijas Republikas Augstākās tiesas Plēnumu un tiesu prakses vispārināšanas daļa, 
Par likumu piemērošanu, izšķirot tiesās darba strīdus. Latvijas Vēstnesis, Jurista 
vārds, 2005. 22.februāris, Nr.7 (362), 21.lappuse. 
*Baltmane I., Darbinieks vai pašnodarbinātais. Saldo, Dienas Bizness, 2004. oktobris, 
nr.3 
*NVA, Vajag darbinieku? Meklē NVA. Komersanta Vēstnesis, 2006. 28.jūnijs, nr.25 
*Pilsētniece L., Cik izmaksā maksāt algu. Komersanta Vēstnesis, 2006. 1.februāris, 
nr.5 
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*Kristapsons A., Darbinieku veselības labad. Komersanta Vēstnesis, 2006. 4.janvāris, 
nr.1  
*Rūta Kesnere, Visiem jābūt vienādām iespējām, Latvijas Vēstnesis, 19.05.2004. 
*Indra Garā, “Tētis mājās ar bērnu”, Diena 15.04.2004 
*Dagnija Staķe, Vienādas iespējas un tiesības… Vai visiem?, Diena 30.03.2004. 
*Sannija Matule, Vecāki stereotipu gūstā”. Latvijas Vēstnesis Pluss, 2006. 10.augusts, 
nr.123 
*Sanita Jemberga, Brīvpusdienas – lūdzu, dzīvokli – nē. Diena, 2006. 12.augusts, 
Nr.186 
*LM Grib atcelt kopšanas pabalsta griestus, portāls www.delfi.lv, publicēts 2006. 
20.jūlijā, http://www.delfi.lv/archive/article.php?id=15004402 (aplūkots 2006. 
20.jūlijs) 
 
Statistics 
*Latvijas 2000.gada tautas skaitīšanas rezultāti. Results of the 2000 population and 
housing census in Latvia. Latvijas Republikas Centrālā statistikas pārvalde, Rīga, 
2002 
*Profesiju apsekojuma rezultāti Latvijā 2004.gada oktobrī. Latvijas Republikas 
Centrālā statistikas pārvalde, Rīga, 2005. jūlijs 
*Latvijas iedzīvotāju laika izlietojums, Latvijas Republikas Centrālā statistikas 
pārvalde, Rīga, 2005 
*Darbaspēka apsekojuma galvenie rādītāji 2004.gadā. Latvijas Republikas Centrālā 
statistikas pārvalde, Rīga, 2005. maijs. 
*Report on equality between women and men, 2006. European Commission, 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publication of the European Communities, 2006 
*Equality between women and men in the European Union. European Commission, 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publication of the European Communities, 2005 
*How Europeans spend their time. Everyday life of women and men, data 1998-2002. 
Eurostat, European Commission, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publication of the 
European Communities, 2004 
 
Researches 
*Men in Latvian Public Environment: Policy, Social and Economical Aspects,  
Ministery of Children and Family Affairs of Republic of Latvia, EC Grant 
No.VS/2005/0343 Men Equal Men Different, 2006 
http://www.bm.gov.lv/lat/tetis_majas/?doc=3620  
*Sieviešu un bērnu tiesību īstenošana laulības šķiršanas gadījumos Latvijas tiesu 
praksē, Krīzes centra „Skalbes” juristes Andra Tallija un Elīna Ālere, 2006, portal 
www.politika.lv, at http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=9912
*Pētījums par faktoriem, kas nosaka sieviešu iespējas iesaistīties darba tirgū, Baltijas 
Sociālo zinātņu institūts, Eiropas kopienas iniciatīvas EQUAL projekts “ Atvērtu 
darba tirgu sievietēm”, 2005. gada novembris, portal www.politika.lv, at 
http://www.biss.soc.lv/downloads/resources/EQUAL/Sievietes_darba_tirgu.pdf  
* Situācijas analīze par dzimumu līdztiesības pamatprincipu pielietošanu praksē par 
nodarbinātības un dzimumu līdztiesības politikas ieviešanu atbildīgajās institūcijās, 
sabiedrisko attiecību aģentūra Consensus PR, socioloģisko pētījumu firma  SKDS, 
Ariadna Ābeltiņa, Eiropas Sociālais fonds, Nacionālās programmas “Atbalsts 
kapacitātes stiprināšanai par darba tirgus un dzimumu līdztiesības politikas ieviešanu 
atbildīgajās institūcijās, informācijas izplatīšanai un izpratnes paaugstināšanai” projekts 
“Kapacitātes stiprināšana nodarbinātības un dzimumu līdztiesības politikas izstrādē un 
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ieviešanā iesaistītajām institūcijām”, 2005, portal www.politika.lv, at 
http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=4927
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